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Preface
The essays in Brave New World, seven of which are by non-British authors, 
reflect and contribute to the important changes in the writing of British 
history that have characterized the last twenty years or so. These have been 
changes both in emphasis and content. Not only have historians chosen 
to write about different things, they now write about the old things in 
different ways. The central themes of Brave New World – empire, gender, 
race, religion and ‘modernity’ – are themselves not new, but they would 
probably not have appeared in this form in a similar collection published 
twenty years ago. Absent, for example, in Brave New World is any treatment 
of social class as such. Social class is certainly here, and could scarcely not be, 
but it does not appear directly as a motor of social change or as a polarizing 
political agent. This represents the reluctance of contemporary historians 
to use class as an ‘objective’ political and social phenomenon, something 
which can be measured and which unites large numbers of people within 
a more-or-less clearly defined class interest, or to use it as a fundamental 
political category. If anything, gender is thought more fundamental than 
class. Discussions of class, as of politics more generally, have been drawn 
into a more widely defined political culture where linguistic and rhetorical 
conventions, ways of thinking and speaking, and fluid political allegiances 
become more important kinds of historical analysis. In Brave New World, 
for instance, politics is not party politics in the formal sense, but is the 
culture of the press, of the empire and the more amorphous culture of 
modernity. Furthermore, we can easily see why contemporary historians 
should give a sophisticated media – press, radio and cinema in the inter-
war years – a special place in the construction of a political culture. We only 
need look around us. 
The essays are, broadly speaking, organized around three subjects: the 
political role of the media, the significance of empire and the extent to 
which the inter-war years can be thought to be ‘modern’, to fit our idea of 
modernity. The media, especially the press, is central to the essays by Laura 
Beers, Ellen Boucher, Adrian Bingham and Geraint Thomas. In her essay, 
Beers argues strongly that the way the press treated the first generation 
of women MPs, its emphasis upon their clothes, their style of life, their 
private life (though their efforts here were, by modern standards, pretty 
unsuccessful) and the sex-appeal of MPs as a whole, even those who had 
none, anticipated what was to happen to political culture in its broadest 
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sense after the Second World War. In this development Beers gives the press 
a prime role. Bingham, in his study of the most successful paper of the 
period, the Daily Mirror of the late 1930s and 40s, suggests that despite 
the deliberate expulsion of formal political reporting from its pages, which 
clearly reflected the wishes of its increasingly huge readership, it was able 
to construct an influential sort of non-party political radicalism, especially 
during the Second World War. Boucher, in her essay on the establishment 
and growth of the Save the Children Fund, demonstrates the dangers as 
well as the benefits of any relationship with the modern press. The founders 
of the fund brilliantly exploited the press as a means of publicity and 
support but then found that they had to change the nature of its appeal 
and activities significantly in order to retain that support. Assistance could 
no longer be given to communities – who might, like the Bolsheviks, be 
politically suspect – but to individual children with whom people were 
urged to identify, often at the expense of the wider community. Thomas 
equally notes that whereas political activists in inter-war Britain were reliant 
on an increasingly national mass media, and knew it, they also resented the 
way the new media appeared to disrupt a more traditional (and cherished) 
politics of place and locality.
The empire is the second of Brave New World ’s organizing subjects. But 
the essays here are not an institutional history of the empire, nor are they 
about that familiar question – was the empire popular or not? Rather they 
are concerned with the relationship between the metropole (mostly London) 
and the empire, and the ways in which the empire was strengthened or 
weakened by such a relationship. Tamson Pietsch is concerned with the 
attempt to create an imperial (white) system of universities through the 
Universities’ Bureau of the British Empire, which would give the empire a 
new kind of political and intellectual coherence – a system based upon an 
expansive definition of the British nation. This was an attempt, she rightly 
notes, that has largely been expunged from the history of inter-war Britain. 
Marc Matera argues for the importance of London itself as a place where 
young blacks, especially west Africans (some of whom became leaders of 
African nationalist movements), could establish a kind of agreed critique of 
colonialism and suggests that the debate over the acceptability or not of the 
film Sanders of the River, one of whose stars was Paul Robeson, was important 
in establishing such a critique, even though the attitude of many to the film 
(including Robeson) was ambivalent to say the least. But the attempt to 
refound the empire on a sort of democratic basis could have perverse or 
unexpected consequences, as Priya Satia and Aaron Windel argue. Satia 
suggests that there was a kind of deliberately encouraged ignorance of 
empire (particularly of the Middle Eastern empire) and the handing over of 
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policy to the ‘experts’ (of whom Gertrude Bell was one) who could expect 
to make policy on the basis of ‘expert’ knowledge and without too much 
democratic interference. Windel also argues that under the influence of 
Fabianism, and of Sidney Webb as colonial secretary, important aspects 
of colonial policy, in this case the development of co-operatives in Africa, 
were in effect transferred to the technocrats, to those who were believed to 
be expert in the subject, at the expense of popular participation. Certainly, 
the admiration for the expert was an important element in inter-war 
intellectual and political behaviour and should be seen as a counter to the 
equally important view that Britain was now a democracy. 
The third organizing subject of Brave New World we might call the 
ambiguities of modernity. Although modernism as a cultural phenomenon 
and as a concept has its origins in the late Edwardian period, it only 
emerged fully armed in the inter-war years. It is in the inter-war years that 
the distinction between the highbrow and the middlebrow is invented: 
the highbrow understood modernism and the middlebrow did not. It is a 
distinction that would have had little meaning in the nineteenth century. 
Modernity was also a feature of daily life: in technology, communication, 
speed and artistic and commercial styles. Inter-war Britons very much 
thought of themselves as living in a modern world. Yet the reader of Brave 
New World is struck by how unmodern inter-war Britain remained; how far 
the preoccupations of Victorian and Edwardian Britain survived in the 1920s 
and 1930s; how far they even shaped modernity. Thus Beers notes the extent 
to which the popular press’s treatment of inter-war politics was driven by 
very traditional gender stereotypes which encouraged a conventional and, 
indeed, often contemptuous attitude to women in political and social life. 
Lucy Delap also notes how far the beliefs and practices of the nineteenth 
century continued to influence twentieth-century debates about the role of 
women in Anglicanism and of women in religion more generally. Bingham 
argues that the Daily Mirror, in media terms, of course, the model of 
democratic modernity, was successful because it actually exploited well-
established populist traditions by attaching them to new technology and 
marketing. Gary Love suggests that the career of Sir John Marriott, a man 
who in many ways made a successful transition to modern politics, shows 
how far the Victorian age continued to determine the thinking of literary 
Conservatives, while Pietsch argues that the attempts to recast the white 
empire via its universities were dependent on the Edwardian assumptions 
of those who founded the Universities’ Bureau. Thomas proposes, as we 
have seen, that the politically active still remained loyal to a nineteenth-
century politics of place. Many inter-war Britons were very conscious – as 
had been their Edwardian predecessors – of Britain’s seeming comparative 
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economic decline. They thought much about this and as a result much 
about the country’s industrial relations, its ‘man management’. Here the 
influence of American practice was strong and Taylorism or a variant of it 
– usually called ‘time and motion’ or the ‘Bedaux system’ in Britain – was 
widely adopted. Nonetheless, as Daniel Ussishkin points out, attempts to 
establish a uniform system of workplace management, or one dominated 
by a specialist psychology of labour relations, ‘morale-management’, were 
frustrated by the survival of Edwardian practices, some associated with the 
Cadbury family, which emphasized ‘character’. The picture of Britain that 
the contributors to Brave New World present is therefore one where much 
was indeed new or displaced – and given what happened after 1914, the 
extent to which the First World War reshaped so much of British life, that is 
hardly surprising. But it is also a picture which many of those who reached 
adulthood before 1914 would have found recognizable. Whether they would 
also have found it comforting is, however, a different question.
Ross McKibbin, April 2011
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1Introduction
Nation and ‘nations’ in inter-war Britain
Springtime of nation-building
The idea of nation-building is best known as a theory that frames the 
Eurocentric history of the nineteenth century – a period when nationalisms 
spawned nation states. In this sense, discussed most astutely by Eric 
Hobsbawm in his Nations and Nationalism since 1780, the concept of 
nation-building does not immediately lend itself as a means of analysing 
inter-war Britain.1 To be sure, developments in the field of communication, 
which theorists identify as the hallmark of nationalism’s modernity, were a 
definitive characteristic of the post-First World War years; likewise, to an 
extent, the awareness of that corpus of national myths and histories, not 
least those bequeathed by the Victorians, which represents what Hobsbawm 
describes as ‘the element of artefact, invention and social engineering 
which enter into the making of nations’.2 But nationalism, as such, was 
not a prominent feature of British life between the wars. Whereas the 1919 
Treaty of Versailles marked, in the words of Raphael Samuel, a ‘springtime 
of nations’ across much of continental Europe, in Britain debates about 
the nation were confined to the more advanced ideas of ‘national identity’ 
and ‘citizenship’.3 There was no new nation state to debate, to rally to, or to 
dissent from. Nonetheless, many Britons felt that they were bravely – some 
pessimistically, some idealistically – entering a new, uncertain world in 
1918. The response to this amounted to a springtime of nation-building, as 
both the state and its citizens set out to reshape the country they inhabited. 
Historians of the early modern era have given considerable attention to 
conceptualizing political, social and cultural change through the framework 
of nation-building, or ‘state-formation’, a term which captures ‘the more 
or less conscious efforts of particular individuals or groups to transform 
 1 E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge, 
1990).
 2 Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, p. 10. See also B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: 
Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (1983); E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism 
(Oxford, 1983); The Invention of Tradition, ed. E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (Cambridge, 1983).
 3 R. Samuel, Theatres of Memory, ii: Island Stories – Unravelling Britain, ed. A Light, S. 
Alexander and G. Stedman Jones (1998), p. 4.
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the state’.4 However, there has not, as yet, been a similar effort to consider 
the reshaping of national identities that took place in the wake of the First 
World War. Detached from nationalism per se, and with nation, state and 
citizens taken together, nation-building offers an opportunity to rethink 
many of the central themes in the history of inter-war Britain.
For decades the political, social, cultural and imperial histories of inter-war 
Britain have taken the ‘nation’ as an integral category of analysis. Although it 
is dangerous to generalize, most analysis has been concerned primarily with 
national identity – including national ‘character’ and the discourse of national 
‘values’ – rather than nation-building. This reflects not only the diffuse effects 
of the so-called ‘cultural turn’ among historians but also assumptions that, 
by the inter-war period, the British state had attained most of the apparatus 
and qualities characteristic of a mature and stable state. Yet it was not long 
before 1918 that theories of nation-building had been a staple of public debate 
in British society, as public intellectuals and politicians propounded their 
solutions to the challenges, both domestic and global, facing the Victorian 
state. And it was not long after the Second World War, amid the rise of Celtic 
nationalisms, decolonization abroad and welfarism at home, that figures on 
the left predicted the ‘break up’ of Britain, while their counterparts on the 
right lamented the precipitous ‘decline’ of a world power.5 The inter-war years 
were a dynamic part of this continuum: a period when processes of nation-
building were ongoing, continually devised and executed by competing 
groups with divergent aims and varied results. 
The nation-building of the 1920s and 1930s emerged in response to the 
domestic and international challenges posed by the armistice of 1918. The 
First World War had thrown society into the melting pot, with no guarantees 
of how pre-war roles, or indeed the identity and purpose of the roles 
themselves – class and gender, plus those related to an individual’s position as 
a public figure or one of ‘the masses’ – would emerge and settle in peacetime. 
Many people feared that a ‘brutalized’ society had been unleashed, while 
the physical and mental scars of one war fostered a fatalistic expectation 
of ‘the next’.6 Compounding this uncertainty were the implications of the 
 4 M. Braddick, ‘State formation and the historiography of early modern England’, 
History Compass, ii (2004), 1–17, at p. 1.
 5 D. Bell, The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860–1900 
(Princeton, NJ, 2007); T. Nairn, The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-nationalism (1977); 
C. Barnett, The Audit of War: the Illusion and Reality of Britain as a Great Nation (1986). 
 6 J. Lawrence, ‘Forging a peaceable kingdom: war, violence and fear of brutalization in 
post-First World War Britain’, Journal of Modern History, lxxv (2003), 557–89; S. Kingsley 
Kent, Aftershocks: the Politics of Trauma in Britain, 1918–31 (Basingstoke, 2009); R. Overy, 
The Morbid Age: Britain and the Crisis of Civilization, 1919–39 (2009).
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Representation of the People Act (1918), which enfranchised approximately 
14 million new voters, and thus in principle facilitated an unprecedented 
degree of public expression in national politics. This presented the political 
parties with a new opportunity to expand their appeals and to build upon 
their following. However, many politicians also felt confronted with a race 
against time to contain and shape the political character of the electorate 
amid the dislocation of the post-war world.7 Additionally, events tested 
Britain’s mettle as an imperial power, despite the empire itself emerging 
from the war larger than in 1914. Of particular concern was the geopolitical 
instability consequent upon the protracted peacemaking process (which 
lasted from the Versailles conference in 1919 to the final settlement of the 
northern Iraqi border in 1926), the threat posed by colonial nationalisms, 
and, at home, the cost and public censorship of military commitments. 
These all carried implications for Britain’s projection of itself abroad as well 
as for the metropole’s own sense of the purpose of its imperial project.8 
As a result, the years following 1918 witnessed a renewed impetus behind 
nation-building. This proved an eclectic and complex web of activity, since 
it involved various agents, old and new – including the state, politicians, 
religious groups and civil society in all its multiplicity – each with their 
own agendas, target audiences and preferred methods of engaging the 
British public. Indeed, this intense competition to set the mould of post-
war society characterized the inter-war period as a whole. D. L. LeMahieu, 
in his famous study of the relationship between ‘elite’ and ‘mass’ cultures, 
shows that many intellectuals, despite fearing the impact of the ‘materialistic 
and egalitarian values’ of commercial culture on a newly enfranchised 
people, themselves came to manipulate the new media, and by the 1930s 
the result was ‘an emerging common culture [that] provided a shared frame 
of reference among widely divergent groups’.9 As other historians’ work has 
similarly illustrated, the desire to define the post-war nation also occupied 
the attention of other institutions and movements. The Church of England 
and British feminists, for example, both had specific interpretations of the 
war and its consequences, which in turn spawned prescribed roles for religion 
 7 For a famous account of how Labour benefited in 1918, see H. C. G. Matthew, R. I. 
McKibbin and J. A. Kay, ‘The franchise factor and the rise of the Labour party’, English 
Historical Review, xci (1976), 723–52; and for the Conservative party leader’s world-view, 
P. Williamson, Stanley Baldwin: Conservative Leadership and National Values (Cambridge, 
1999). 
 8 J. Darwin, The Empire Project: the Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830–1970 
(Cambridge, 2009), esp. ch. 9.
 9 D. L. LeMahieu, A Culture for Democracy: Mass Communication and the Cultivated 
Mind in Britain between the Wars (Oxford, 1988), pp. 3–4.
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and gender in future social designs.10 It might therefore be useful to see Ross 
McKibbin’s work on inter-war society, which highlights the importance of 
class to people’s identity, as a study of how people on the ground sought 
to negotiate the boundaries of the post-war nation and their own position 
within it. It is surely this, above all, that justifies Stefan Collini’s description 
of McKibbin’s Classes and Cultures as ‘a national history’.11 
Not least as a result of McKibbin’s lead, the last ten years have witnessed 
something of a renaissance in studies of the 1920s and 1930s, in terms 
both of the range of historical disciplines the period now attracts and its 
popularity within degree courses, particularly in Britain.12 This bodes well 
for the further development of ‘inter-war studies’. But it also means, for 
the present, an opportunity to take stock, because the creativity of much of 
the recent work has frequently outstripped any overall analytical coherence 
for the period. This volume attempts to pave part of the way forward by 
bringing together political, social, cultural, imperial and transnational 
historians working on topics and approaches that, for inter-war Britain, too 
often fail to engage each other across the historiographical genres. 
This introduction discusses the historiographies most relevant to the 
theme of nation-building in inter-war Britain, and how the chapters in 
this volume both build upon and diverge from previous scholarship. Three 
general dichotomies appear repeatedly in the historiography: the first 
recognizes the public and private as distinct, but not always unrelated, 
spheres of social experience; the second relates to the different experiences 
as between male and female; and the third centres on the interpretation 
of developments as either ‘conservative’ or ‘modern’ in their impact. By 
engaging critically with the existing literature, the contributions in this 
volume highlight the extent to which a further theme – ‘nation-building’ – 
is already a common, albeit undeveloped, element in our understanding of 
inter-war Britain. As a contested process, the nation-building phenomenon 
offers an effective analytical framework through which to conceptualize the 
complexities and developments of a formative period in modern British 
 10 On the Anglican Church, see J. Kent, William Temple: Church, State and Society in Britain, 
1880–1950 (Cambridge, 1992) and M. Grimley, Citizenship, Community and the Church of 
England: Liberal Anglican Theories of the State between the Wars (Oxford, 2004); S. Kingsley 
Kent, Making Peace: the Reconstruction of Gender in Interwar Britain (Princeton, NJ, 1993).
 11 R. McKibbin, Classes and Cultures: England, 1918–51 (Oxford, 1998); S. Collini, English 
Pasts: Essays in History and Culture (Oxford, 1999), p. 34. 
 12 For many students, inter-war Britain provides a major focus for the study of particular 
cultural and social developments, such as the rise of cultural modernism and sex before the 
‘sexual revolution’. Increasingly ‘inter-war Britain’ is being offered as a ‘special subject’ – see, e.g., 
Matt Houlbrook’s ‘The sex age: gender, sexuality and culture in 1920s Britain’ in Oxford and, in 
Cambridge, Jon Lawrence’s ‘Class, party and the politics of social identity in England, 1918–40’. 
5Introduction
history. This way, the world inhabited by Britons between the wars emerges 
as one heavily oriented towards, but also complicated and sometimes 
confused by, the plurality and creativity of ideas of the nation.   
Histories of inter-war Britain
Polity and nation
In the 1960s and 1970s, the political history of inter-war Britain focused 
primarily on the evolution of the party political system – the rise of Labour, 
the decline of the Liberals and the dominance of the Conservatives.13 Social 
factors – class, in particular – were also of concern, but underlying these 
early works lay a conceptualization of the political world as a largely self-
contained, if not quite closed, phenomenon. Political change was generated 
from within. To be sure, the electorate could wield real influence, as in 
December 1923, when voters denied the Conservatives a clear majority 
and thereby precipitated the formation of the first minority Labour 
government. To this extent, the early ‘high political’ accounts recognized 
that voters could, and did, set the parameters within which the parties 
operated. Nevertheless, in contrast to some of the truly pioneering works 
on Victorian and Edwardian politics,14 inter-war historiography at that time 
did not show a systematic interest in how the voters themselves operated. 
We learnt about the consequences of voters’ actions – most notably, the 
emergence of the two-party system as the Liberal vote declined and split 
between the Conservatives and Labour – but without understanding the 
exact processes through which their allegiances were forged and displaced. 
Today, historians have continued to work on the political parties, 
producing revisionist accounts that question aspects of ‘Liberal decline’ or 
‘Conservative hegemony’, and even the very role of parties within a pluralist 
democratic culture.15 However, few show an active commitment to the 
notion of a ‘political system’. As a term, it is now rarely used with purpose. 
 13 The classic accounts are T. Wilson, The Downfall of the Liberal Party, 1914–35 (1966); M. 
Cowling, The Impact of Labour, 1920–4: the Beginning of Modern British Politics (Cambridge, 
1971); C. Cook, The Age of Alignment: Electoral Politics in Britain, 1922–9 (1975); and J. 
Ramsden, The Age of Balfour and Baldwin, 1902–40 (1978).
 14 E.g., J. Vincent, Pollbooks: How Victorians Voted (Cambridge, 1967); P. Clarke, 
Lancashire and the New Liberalism (Cambridge, 1971).
 15 E.g., B. M. Doyle, ‘Urban Liberalism and the “lost generation”: politics and middle-
class culture in Norwich, 1900–35’, Historical Journal, xxxviii (1995), 617–34; D. Dutton, 
‘1932: a neglected date in the history of the decline of the British Liberal party’, Twentieth 
Century British History, xiv (2003), 43–60; G. Thomas, ‘Conservatives and the culture of 
“national” government between the wars’ (unpublished University of Cambridge PhD 
thesis, 2010), ch. 1; H. McCarthy, ‘Parties, voluntary associations, and democratic politics 
in interwar Britain’, Historical Journal, l (2007), 891–912.
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The most notable exception is McKibbin, for whom – over thirty years on 
from his study of the early Labour party and as his Ford Lectures of 2008 
amply demonstrated16 – the story of Britain’s evolving party system continues 
to provide a strong narrative channel through which to conceptualize political 
developments. Despite this consistency, however, McKibbin has also been at 
the centre of the transformation of inter-war political history.
The 1980s and 1990s witnessed two developments. The first was a greater 
concern with society as a dynamic site of political change. McKibbin’s early 
work on Labour, despite ending with the party’s first government in 1924, 
pointed the way forward in this regard by rooting explanations of political 
change firmly in the analysis of social structures. In this case, he attributed 
the growth of Labour to trade union predominance in the constituencies: ‘the 
Labour party was not based upon broadly articulated principles, but rather 
upon a highly developed class-consciousness and intense class loyalties’ and it 
was the trade unions that ‘cultivated this consciousness and these loyalties’.17 
During this time there also emerged a powerful critique of social determinism 
in relation to political behaviour. While the fluidity of class identities and 
its constitutive role in political change is widely accepted among inter-war 
historians, it is worth noting that such a conceptual approach was pioneered 
most coherently in studies of Victorian popular politics, in particular by a 
Cambridge school (of research, if not of thought) inspired by Gareth Stedman 
Jones. In a famous essay on Chartism, Stedman Jones revealed the critical 
new insights that could be gained by analysing language (‘what Chartists 
actually said or wrote’). By taking the ‘linguistic turn’, historians since have 
avoided the pitfalls of ‘decontextualized’ interpretations of a particular group’s 
social and economic conditions and have instead turned their attention to the 
often revealing relationship between the social and the linguistic: ‘the [socio-
economic] matter determines the possibility of the [political] form, but the 
form conditions the development of the matter’.18 
 16 See the resulting book, R. McKibbin, Parties and People: England, 1914–51 (Oxford, 
2010). In this he traces British politics from the pre-1914 age of equipoise, marked as much 
by middle-class progressivism as working-class radicalism, through the volatility of the inter-
war years into the 1950s. By then, inter-war turmoil had produced a different equipoise, in 
which the middle and working classes were small-c conservative and both the Conservative 
and Labour parties stood for moderate social- (rather than liberal-) democracy.
 17 R. McKibbin, The Evolution of the Labour Party, 1910–24 (Oxford, 1974), p. 243.
 18 G. Stedman Jones, ‘Rethinking Chartism’, in his Languages of Class: Studies in English 
Working Class History, 1832–1982 (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 90–178. For a splendid discussion 
of how the shift away from social determinism has taken shape in the historiography, see 
J. Lawrence and M. Taylor, ‘Introduction: electoral sociology and the historians’, in Party, 
State and Society: Electoral Behaviour in Britain since 1820, ed. J. Lawrence and M. Taylor 
(Aldershot, 1997), pp. 1–26.
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The second, and related, development was the growing interest in cultural 
readings of history. From the late 1950s, many social historians turned to the 
blooming field of what became ‘cultural studies’ in search of a dimension 
beyond traditional structuralist and economistic explanations of class 
formation.19 This greatly expanded the subject matter and incorporated 
into future historical analysis factors including the attitudes and activities 
of groups marginalized by posterity, the role of the modern media market 
in displacing ‘authentic’ culture, the impact of ‘mass’ culture and the notion 
of cultural hegemony. All of this shed light on matters described by Carolyn 
Steedman as constituting ‘the bottom line, the real historical reality’ of past 
societies’ experiences.20 By the 1980s, the cultural genre was also deployed 
to explore both political and economic change.21 Much of the theoretical 
impetus behind this came from leftist historians, disquieted by the success 
of Thatcherism and seeking a cultural coherence for seemingly incongruous 
social and political phenomena, of which their own particular bugbear of 
working-class Conservatism – evident from at least 1867 and again under 
Thatcher – has been the most perennial.22 
Inter-war historians have embraced these developments – largely without 
the theoretical baggage – in order to explore the processes by which the 
British polity was constructed after 1918. The overwhelming focus here 
has been on the culture of electoral politics. With its emphasis on seats 
in parliament rather than votes in the country, the first-past-the-post 
electoral system forced the parties to engage voters from across the ‘interest’ 
divide and, insofar as these interests were often understood to be organized 
according to area (reflecting local industrial, religious, cultural and other 
characteristics), across various geographic cleavages. In order to form a 
majority government, the Conservative party would have to look beyond 
the suburban middle classes; likewise, the Labour party would be forced to 
look beyond the trade-unionized industrial centres. The parties therefore 
chose to appeal to certain ‘mass’ groups within the new electorate. As David 
Jarvis has shown, the Conservative party, arguably in possession of the 
 19 This produced some classic works: R. Hoggart, The Uses of Literacy (1957); R. Williams, 
Culture and Society (1961); and E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class 
(1963).
 20 C. Steedman, ‘Culture, cultural studies, and the historians’, in Cultural Studies, ed. L. 
Grossberg, C. Nelson and P. A. Treichler (New York, 1992), p. 617.
 21 The most notable works from this period are M. J. Wiener, English Culture and the 
Decline of the Industrial Spirit, 1850–1980 (Cambridge, 1981); J. H. Grainger, Patriotisms: 
Britain, 1900–39 (1986); R. Colls and P. Dodd, Englishness: Politics and Culture, 1880–1920 
(1987).
 22 For instance, see Crises in the British State, 1880–1930, ed. M. Langan and B. Schwarz 
(1985), including Schwarz’s chapter on ‘Conservatism and “caesarism”, 1903–22’, pp. 33–62.
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most professional strategists, targeted demographic groups – most notably, 
women of particular ages – in a way that enabled the party’s appeal to 
transcend individual and regional interests while simultaneously appearing 
alive to voters’ class identities.23 Labour’s ‘targeted electioneering’ emerged 
as a somewhat less discursive and more physical process. As a still infant 
party, the immediate goal in the 1920s had to be to secure inroads into the 
countryside and suburban constituencies; yet, particularly by the late 1930s, 
Labour too was seeking to appeal to a broad cross-class and cross-gender 
coalition.24
All these strategies were successful to some extent.25 But if the parties were 
alive to the plurality of the new electorate, its complexity also threatened to 
confound them. This is why the parties preferred to locate targeted appeals 
within more coherent and comprehensive discursive frameworks. Such 
constructs were the products of elaborate attempts to shape the political 
nation in a party’s own favour. According to the literature, for instance, 
the Conservative goal was to secure an anti-socialist paradigm within 
which the majority of voters could operate. In McKibbin’s classic account 
of Conservative success, anti-socialism is a deeply negative construct: the 
party was not going to abandon its commitment to the middle classes – 
which, according to McKibbin, ‘objectively’ benefited from Conservative 
 23 D. Jarvis, ‘Mrs Maggs and Betty: the Conservative appeal to women voters in the 
1920s’, Twentieth Century British History, v (1994), 129–52, and ‘British Conservatism and 
class politics in the 1920s’, English Historical Review, cxi (1996), 59–84. See also J. Lawrence, 
Electing our Masters: the Hustings in British Politics from Hogarth to Blair (Oxford, 2009), 
ch. 4.
 24 C. V. J. Griffiths, Labour and the Countryside: the Politics of Rural Britain, 1918–39 
(Oxford, 2007); T. Jeffery, ‘The suburban nation: politics and class in Lewisham’, in 
Metropolis London: Histories and Representations since 1800, ed. D. Feldman and G. Stedman 
Jones (1990), pp. 189–216; L. Beers, Your Britain: Media and the Making of the Labour Party 
(Cambridge, Mass., 2010). 
 25 In trying to appeal to a variety of disparate groups there was always the risk of 
alienating those closest to a party’s core value system, and at all times even the most 
advanced electioneering was susceptible to the effects of what McKibbin calls ‘contingency’ 
– ‘those unpredicted and unpredictable historical accidents that can still have profound 
consequences’ (McKibbin, Parties and People, p. vii). Nonetheless, for an overview of how, 
and with what success, Labour expanded its sphere of influence, see D. Tanner, ‘The Labour 
party and electoral politics in the coalfields’, in Miners, Unions and Politics, 1910–47, ed. A. 
Campbell and others (Aldershot, 1996), pp. 59–92, and his ‘Class voting and radical politics: 
the Liberal and Labour parties, 1910–31’, in Lawrence and Taylor, Party, State and Society, 
pp. 106–30. As for the Conservatives, historians have generally not questioned the story 
of electoral success so much as the factors behind it, but for a forceful declaration of the 
most common ground between them, namely a belief that the party secured its own success 
by constructing targeted appeals, see D. Jarvis, ‘The shaping of the Conservative electoral 
hegemony, 1918–39’, in Lawrence and Taylor, Party, State and Society, pp. 131–52.
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governments – so it set out to subjectivize the interests of the considerable 
non-unionized section of the working classes and thereby bring them 
seemingly into line with those of the middle classes, chiefly by propagating 
a stereotype of the unionized working classes as idle and radicalized 
blackguards continually threatening unreasonable strikes. In this way the 
Conservatives defined the category of the middle-ground ‘public’ in inter-
war politics, laying claim to represent its conventional wisdoms against the 
sectional interests of Labour.26 This process was complemented by the more 
positive anti-socialism of Stanley Baldwin, which, as Philip Williamson has 
argued, invoked commonalities as a means of assembling a sense of the 
public – an ecumenical rather than denominational Christianity; a shared 
rural heritage as antidote to the tensions of mass industrial and suburban 
psyches; an attachment to both locality and nation. The ‘non-political’ 
character and content of Baldwin’s speeches was crucial in positioning the 
party as the guarantor of the public interest.27
So, too, for Labour, was the moderate, progressivist strategy of Ramsay 
MacDonald’s leadership. As Jon Lawrence has recently argued, the Labour 
party fought for its ‘place within polity and nation’ by constructing a 
‘workerist politics’ that, by eliding the economistic division between manual 
and non-manual labour, claimed to speak on behalf of all workers – whether 
they be workers ‘by hand or brain’. Labour thus gave value to the romantic 
nobility of work and highlighted the substantive issues, such as job security, 
that united ‘the people’ (a term that Labour used interchangeably with ‘the 
workers’).28
This way, the history of politics between the wars emerges as a battle 
between competing versions of the nation, in which the two main parties set 
out to influence voters’ definitions of who belonged to a particular version 
of ‘the nation’, ‘the public’ or ‘the people’. This was so deeply ingrained 
in strategic thinking that Labour upheld its centrist, ‘workerist’ appeal 
throughout the 1930s, despite established hostility towards MacDonaldite 
moderation and the sense of betrayal engendered by its former leader’s 
decision in 1931 to lead a ‘National Government’ coalition with Conservative 
 26 R. McKibbin, ‘Class and conventional wisdom: the Conservative party and the “public” 
in interwar Britain’, in The Ideologies of Class: Social Relations in Britain, 1880–1950 (Oxford, 
1990), pp. 259–93.
 27 Williamson, Stanley Baldwin.
 28 J. Lawrence, ‘Labour and the politics of class, 1900–40’, in Structures and Transformations 
in Modern British History, ed. D. Feldman and J. Lawrence (Cambridge, 2011), pp. 237–60; 
L. Beers, ‘Counter-Toryism: Labour’s response to anti-socialist propaganda, 1918–39’, in The 
Foundations of the British Labour Party: Identities, Cultures and Perspectives, 1900–39, ed. M. 
Worley (Farnham, 2009), pp. 231–54.
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and Liberal support.29 However, Geraint Thomas argues for a more critical 
treatment of political nation-building. His chapter in this volume explores 
the attitudes and activities of political activists, who occupy a key position 
in the process by which appeals are mediated between the professional party 
strategist and the constituency voter. Paying particular attention to the local 
implications of political mass media, the chapter highlights, on the one 
hand, activists’ growing reliance on a sophisticated presentation of national 
politics and, on the other, their irritation at aspects of the new politics 
which cut across local nation-building strategies, and thus sheds light on the 
clash between ‘old’ Victorian and Edwardian ‘politics of place’ and political 
modernity. 
Meanwhile, it is difficult to identify an effective Liberal version of the 
political nation at this time. The equivocal fate of two mainstays of Liberal 
power before 1914, the nonconformist cleavage in the electorate and the 
nineteenth century’s popular belief in free trade, reveals something of 
the party’s survival, but also, crucially, its failure to construct an inclusive 
strategy. The Liberal vote remained buoyant in large parts of Wales, the West 
Country, East Anglia and Yorkshire throughout the 1920s, enough for it to 
seem reasonable to attribute the party’s survival to the nonconformist vote; 
and, somewhat less plausible in hindsight, sufficient to explain how Lloyd 
George thought he could make a comeback in British politics as late as 1935.30 
But, by the 1930s, it was becoming clear that it was not the political culture 
of nonconformity itself that had survived the Great War, so much as its 
Edwardian adherents – who continued to vote Liberal, but whose children 
turned in large numbers to Labour.31 Similarly, the free trade campaign at 
the 1923 general election brought the Asquithian and Lloyd George factions 
of the Liberal party together for the first time since the war, increasing its 
 29 Beers, ‘Counter-Toryism’, pp. 257–8. This contributes to the ongoing debate over the 
timing of, and factors behind, Labour’s recovery from its election defeat in 1931 (when 
the party won 52 seats on 30.8% of the national vote) to its victory in 1945 (with 393 seats 
and 49.7% of the national vote). For the most significant instalments in this debate, see 
B. Pimlott, Labour and the Left in the 1930s (Cambridge, 1977); S. Brooke, Labour’s War: 
the Labour Party and the Second World War (Oxford, 1992); M. Pugh, ‘The Daily Mirror 
and the revival of Labour, 1935–45’, Twentieth Century British History, ix (1998), 420–38; 
R. Toye, The Labour Party and the Planned Economy, 1931–51 (Woodbridge, 2003); Beers, 
Your Britain.
 30 See M. Kinnear, The British Voter: an Atlas and Survey since 1885 (2nd edn., 1981), on the 
patterns of Liberal (pp. 84–6) and nonconformist (pp. 125–9) voting. On Lloyd George in 
1935, see S. Koss, Nonconformity in Modern British Politics (1975), ch. 9.
 31 Doyle, ‘Urban Liberalism and the “lost generation”’; M. Childs, ‘Labour grows up: the 
electoral system, political generations and British politics, 1890–1929’, Twentieth Century 
British History, vi (1995), 123–44.
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share of the national vote and pushing the Conservative leadership onto 
the defensive with a watered-down tariffs policy (‘safeguarding’). In the 
finance and business worlds, however, as in civil society at a time of shifting 
consumerist concerns, free trade was in decline.32 
The problem for the Liberals was that their traditional appeals were 
not obviously in decline, and, if anything, remained important in keeping 
the party’s heartlands happy. This obscured, and ultimately impeded, the 
imperative for the party newly to think out its national appeal. At the 
popular level, the Liberals were in a mistakenly secure ‘centrist’ position 
within the party system; at the same time, Liberals in high political and 
intellectual circles believed that mass democracy would (eventually) 
come to recognize the need for a ‘rational’ and ‘moral’ direction to 
solving post-war problems, which only the Liberal party could provide.33 
Indeed, many politicians endorsed the continued applicability of Liberal 
(often Gladstonian) values of retrenchment and reform as signs of good 
government – including the Conservative and Labour leaderships, whose 
inclusive discourses consequently came to rely upon the appropriation of 
the Liberal inheritance.34
The intersection between popular politics and nation-building is not 
new, of course. For the Victorians, political community was integral to the 
processes of state-formation.35 In particular, it was closely aligned with the 
idea of the constitution as a set of parameters configured in a way that 
defined the legitimate political community. The Chartists, for instance, 
caused the language of ‘inclusion’ and ‘exclusion’ to become a key site of 
political debate, occupied by subsequent generations of politicians and 
suffragists as they fought out arguments about the class, gender and racial 
qualities of their ideal political nation.36 
 32 See A. Howe, ‘The Liberals and the City, 1900–31’, in The British Government and the 
City of London in the 20th Century, ed. R. Michie and P. Williamson (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 
135–52; and F. Trentmann, Free Trade Nation: Commerce, Consumption and Civil Society in 
Modern Britain (Oxford, 2008). 
 33 See M. Bentley, The Liberal Mind, 1914–29 (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 207–20.
 34 The different discussions of how ideas about Liberal norms and ideals of policy and 
government informed political debate beyond 1918, including the mid century Keynesian 
debates about the planned economy, are explored in The Strange Survival of Liberal England: 
Political Leaders, Moral Values and the Reception of Economic Debate, ed. E. H. H. Green and 
D. M. Tanner (Cambridge, 2007).
 35 Indeed, it was the 19th-century Liberal conception of the political nation that so 
appealed to Conservative and Labour after 1918. On this, see J. P. Parry, ‘Liberalism and 
liberty’, in Liberty and Authority in Victorian Britain, ed. P. Mandler (Oxford, 2006), p. 82.
 36 Re-reading the Constitution: New Narratives in the Political History of England’s Long 19th 
Century, ed. J. Vernon (Cambridge, 1996); C. Hall, K. McClelland and J. Rendall, Defining 
the Victorian Nation: Class, Race, Gender and the Reform Act of 1867 (Cambridge, 2000).
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The methods and implications of political nation-building were very 
different between the wars, however. For one thing, historians too commonly 
assume that the constitution ceased to be anything like a central political 
issue from 1918 (and certainly after 1928) because the state, through the 
franchise, now included all adults.37 Equally, if not more, important is the 
social context. Like other modern phenomena, nation-building has its own 
internal periodization; in other words, the aims, methods and efficacy of the 
nation-building process(es) all shift as society itself evolves. Consequently, 
inter-war efforts are best understood in the context of a wider appreciation 
of the different challenges and new opportunities presented by the post-
1918 world. 
Society and nation
While the parties touted their rival visions of the national polity, the political 
world as a whole was confronted by the fact that many Britons after the war 
were actively redefining the society in which they lived. In a variety of ways 
the British people embraced, witnessed or resisted changes to their ways of 
living. Across fields as diverse as employment, the mass media, literature, 
intellectual culture, leisure and consumption, developments shaped their 
sense of class, their belief systems and outlook, their experience of the family, 
the home and the community, and their contact with sex and sexuality. 
In conceptualizing the basic shape of inter-war society, three major 
developments provide us with the key narratives of social change for the 
period: the decline of the landed classes, the expansion and redefinition of the 
middle classes, and the redefinition of gender relations. The reorganization 
of rural society was well underway before the war. However, the challenges 
facing landed families grew to critical levels in the 1920s as death duties and 
government rent controls eroded estate incomes. Wartime casualties also 
disrupted patterns of inheritance, causing ruling families to question their 
economic and social capacity to survive. The gentry suffered an even steeper 
decline than the aristocracy: whereas the latter had sufficient resources to 
diversify or sell in lots, their juniors often had no choice but to sell their 
 37 Some aspects of the constitution remained topics of debate, such as House of Lords 
reform and voting reform (see D. H. Close, ‘The collapse of resistance to democracy: 
conservatism, adult suffrage and second chamber reform, 1911–28’, Historical Journal, xx 
(1977), 893–918; and J. D. Fair, ‘The second Labour government and the politics of electoral 
reform, 1929–31’, Albion, xiii (1981), 276–301), but increasingly ‘constitutionalism’ became a 
discursive construct within discussions of ‘citizenship’, as politicians (and political scientists) 
turned to the question of how to educate voters once within the franchise. However, for a 
discussion of House of Lords reform after the discursive turn, see G. Thomas, ‘Conservatives, 
the constitution and the quest for a “representative” House of Lords, 1911–35’, Parliamentary 
History (forthcoming).
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more modest estates in toto.38 As a result, the history of the gentry has rightly 
become a more general history of the countryside – but with an emphasis 
on how the shires became a site of consumption and leisure for the urban 
masses, rather than on village life itself. No modern social history of the 
village has yet appeared to complement the debates on the aristocracy and 
the cultural significance of the rural idyll.39 But this should not preclude 
recognition of the very great changes that flowed from the decline of the 
landed classes, in terms of authority structures, local economies, welfare 
provision, rural leisure and entertainment.
The second development was the expansion and diversification of the 
middle class. For much of the 1920s it was still possible to identify the 
‘traditional’ Edwardian middle class, whose members typically worked in 
recognizably pre-industrial occupations across the ‘professional-clerical-
commercial’ fields. The 1930s saw the middle class expand in size and alter 
in composition, as a result of the increased membership of the technical and 
scientific professions and the distributive service trades. These were salaried 
occupations, reflecting the displacement of the middle-class employer by 
the middle-class manager and administrator.40 Increasingly, middle-class 
lifestyles reflected the rising living standards associated with the spread of 
home ownership, the electrification of houses and services, and the wider 
use of domestic appliances for both housekeeping and entertainment.41 
The middle class came to assume a uniquely influential role within the 
inter-war nation, mediating patterns of social behaviour far beyond the 
confines of the suburban avenue. We can see this in the national decline in the 
fertility rate (a phenomenon normally associated with comfortable middle-
class existence). As Simon Szreter explains, fertility change ‘principally 
occurred not to whole social classes or to individual occupations but to 
social groups and communities’. This resulted from the fact that people 
inhabited ‘communication communities’, in which the influence of social 
networks, which could develop on a local residential level (for example 
through intermarriage) or if families in one town aspired to the lifestyle of 
families in another, created norms of behaviour – for example, in gender 
 38 F. M. L. Thompson, ‘English landed society in the 20th century’, Transactions of the 
Royal Historical Society, 5th ser., xl (1990), 12.
 39 The two classics are D. Cannadine, The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy (New 
Haven and London, 1990) and P. Mandler, The Fall and Rise of the Stately Home (New 
Haven and London, 1997).
 40 H. Perkin, The Rise of Professional Society: England since 1880 (1989), ch. 6; McKibbin, 
Classes and Cultures, pp. 44–9.
 41 For the diffusion of household appliances, see M. Daunton, Wealth and Welfare: an 
Economic and Social History of Britain, 1851–1951 (Oxford, 2007), p. 431.
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and work roles, and in family planning. Thus in the south, including the 
south-east and the west midlands, where most of the new light industries 
of the 1930s were located, many in the ‘working classes’ lived according to 
standards established by the growing middle class.42
If the middle class became more socially diverse, its relative unity was 
derived politically, owing to what might be called the imagined ideological 
community created by the class culture of the time. McKibbin has shown 
that traditional and non-traditional middle classness represented different 
mentalities and modes of behaviour – the former conservative and politically 
pessimistic, the latter relaxed and aware of its modernity. The shift from 
traditional to non-traditional, he argues, also represented the changing 
character of the middle class over the inter-war years. Yet one factor was able 
to unite the middle classes and remained more or less constant throughout 
this period, and this was their anti-working class attitude.43 McKibbin has 
stood out among recent scholars for his insistence on the continued primacy 
of class in shaping inter-war cultural identities. His work is an important 
reminder that, despite the emergence of a national media culture, more 
socially variegated forms of cultural association and identification persisted 
in inter-war Britain. 
 If inter-war scholarship has generally moved away from a focus on 
class as Britons’ primary social identity, the most prominent exception to 
this has been the recent work on the changing role of domestic service in 
post-World War I society. Here, the differing attitudes between servants 
and masters on the issue of the ‘servant problem’ are impossible to escape. 
Adrian Bingham has discussed the role of the press in mediating the 
debate over whether or not working-class women ought to be forced to 
take work in domestic service, even if they had no inclination or training 
in the field.44 Alison Light’s microhistory of the novelist Virginia Woolf ’s 
 42 S. Szreter, Fertility, Class and Gender in Britain, 1860–1940 (Cambridge, 1996; 2000 edn.), 
pp. 546–58. For the economic development of the south, see P. Scott, Triumph of the South: 
a Regional Economic History of Early 20th Century Britain (Aldershot, 2007). Historians offer 
differing views of the impact of new industries on the populations of the depressed industrial 
centres of the north and west: on the one hand, some of the job security enjoyed by workers 
in the south, such as in transport services and house-building, spread to towns in south Wales 
and Lancashire (Perkin, Rise of Professional Society, pp. 276–7); on the other hand, most new 
industries were too efficient to absorb a significant proportion of the unemployed (McKibbin, 
Classes and Cultures, pp. 126–7). For a detailed discussion of ‘labour transference’, including 
as a government policy, see W. R. Garside, British Unemployment, 1919–39: a Study in Public 
Policy (Cambridge, 1990), ch. 9; and a regional study of inter-war depression, S. Thompson, 
Unemployment, Poverty and Health in Interwar South Wales (Cardiff, 2006). 
 43 McKibbin, Classes and Cultures, chs. 2–3, esp. pp. 44–7, 67–9.
 44 Bingham, Gender, Modernity.
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tempestuous relationship with her servants explores the vacillating feelings 
of guilt, dependence, anger, superiority and love that Woolf felt towards 
the women employed by her own and her sister Vanessa Bell’s households.45 
Most recently, Lucy Delap has documented the evolution of ‘domestic 
service humour’ in inter-war popular culture. In their different ways, she 
argues, the time-worn mocking of servants in publications such as Punch, 
read by the ‘educated, servant-keeping classes’, and the mockery of both 
servant and master in bawdy music-hall performances and in the cheap 
comic press were ‘vehicle[s] for managing and negotiating emotional and 
social investments in the precarious institution of service’.46 Delap’s reading 
of the fragility of the institution of service offers a different perspective on 
Selina Todd’s recent suggestion that inter-war servants were less emotionally 
and socially invested in the institution of service than has previously been 
assumed. Rather than inhabiting a distinct social realm characterized by 
either deference or defiance, Todd presents service as just another job, and 
servants as defined principally by their detachment from their employment 
and their private aspirations to self-improvement. In this respect, inter-war 
servants had much in common with their increasingly lower-middle-class 
employers.47
Any exploration of domestic service invariably gives rise to the 
question of gender relations. The inter-war years were a crucial period in 
the renegotiation of gender boundaries in Britain, as older, principally 
propertied women received the franchise in 1918, and ultimately all women 
were granted the vote in 1928. Feminist advances were not limited to 
the suffrage; the inter-war period also witnessed the increased agency of 
women in the social processes of nation-building. As Susan Pedersen has 
argued, the British state responded to – or manipulated – women’s struggle 
to attain social citizenship after 1918 by creating a ‘gender-based model 
of welfare provision’ that entrenched a state-defined understanding of 
gender relations for a generation. The methods used to administer welfare 
to women were influenced by the wartime strategies of voluntary middle-
class social workers, who insisted on upholding the notion of the male 
as breadwinner and, in his absence or death, the wife’s moral rectitude; 
thus, the extension of such social benefits in the 1920s to civilian as well 
as servicemen’s widows enabled the authorities to create ‘a logic of social 
citizenship’ that continually renewed both the status of the male social 
 45 A. Light, Mrs. Woolf and the Servants (2007).
 46 L. Delap, ‘Kitchen sink laughter: domestic service humor in 20th-century Britain’, 
Journal of British Studies, xlix (2010), 623–54, at p. 627.
 47 S. Todd, ‘Domestic service and class relations in Britain 1900–50’, Past & Present, cciii 
(2009), 182–204.
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citizen and the role of the state in moral surveillance. By operating within 
the ostensibly progressive debate about women’s citizenship, and perhaps 
safe in the knowledge that claimant scrutiny of the authorities’ controlling 
motives was muffled by the real material benefits gained, the state was able 
to use the heightened topicality of women’s concerns after 1918 to mediate 
social norms more widely.48
Feminists tried to make a positive case for recognizing women’s unique 
contribution to the nation. While the ‘equal rights’ feminists centred around 
the Six Point Group continued to emphasize gender equality, the New 
Feminists, led by Eleanor Rathbone, argued that housewifery – wifehood 
and motherhood – was a function that merited full citizenship.49 In doing 
so, some historians have argued, the New Feminist case inadvertently 
bolstered the conservative nature of gender discourses, according to which 
the male citizen remained a public figure distinct from women rooted in 
their private worlds of domesticity.50 However, women also participated 
in bottom-up processes of nation-building, as the more recent histories 
of the changing quotidian lives and life-cycles of women show. After the 
war, it became common for working-class women, many of them leaving 
domestic service, to enter the industrial workplace and stay in employment 
until marriage (at the average age of twenty-four). As Todd argues, ‘young 
women’s understanding of their value as wage-earners, breadwinners and 
workers fuelled their claims to economic independence as well as political 
citizenship’. Many joined trade unions and became active in workplace 
politics.51 Socially and culturally, through her habits in fashion and leisure, 
the young female worker contributed to Britain’s first ‘youth culture’ and to 
a working class that was, like the middle class, aware of its own modernity.
The decline of live-in domestic service in the 1920s also forced more women, 
including in the middle classes, to take up the role of active housewife. But, 
in a trend that both constituted and reflected the rise of the new middle 
class, phenomena like the ‘companionate marriage’, ‘creative housekeeping’ 
and household consumerism were embraced by many housewives in the 
 48 S. Pedersen, ‘Gender, welfare, and citizenship in Britain during the Great War’, American 
Historical Review, xcv (1990), 983–1006; also her Family, Dependence and the Origins of the 
Welfare State: Britain and France, 1914–45 (Cambridge, 1993) and, on the significance of 
gender more generally in histories of nation-building and state formation, A. Kessler-Harris, 
‘What is gender history now?’, in What is History Now?, ed. D. Cannadine (Basingstoke, 
2002), pp. 104–8. 
 49 C. Law, Suffrage and Power: the Women’s Movement, 1918–28 (2000). On Rathbone, see 
S. Pedersen, Eleanor Rathbone and the Politics of Conscience (New Haven, Conn., 2004).
 50 Kent, Making Peace; H. L. Smith, ‘British feminism in the 1920s’, in British Feminism 
in the 20th Century, ed. H. L. Smith (Aldershot, 1990), pp. 47–65.
 51 S. Todd, Young Women, Work, and Family in England, 1918–50 (Oxford, 2005), p. 13.
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1930s, presaging the notion – common by the 1950s – of ‘a happy home and 
family life [as] the bulwark of a nation’.52 
These social changes are important in understanding the processes and 
language of political nation-building. The construction of discourses cannot 
be separated from the subjectivity either of politicians’ aims or the way they 
perceived shifting demographics. For Labour, unlike many Conservatives, 
the figure of the female ‘worker-citizen’ was a promising development; for 
the Conservatives, meanwhile, rising levels of homeownership proved to be 
one of the most beneficial legacies of the inter-war years.53 But the concept of 
social identity has arguably been more important than the narrative of social 
change in understanding the inter-war generation. Witness, for example, 
the fact that many homeowners, by their practices and in defiance of the 
embourgeoisement theory, continued to think of themselves as ‘working 
class’ – a reminder of the assumption, at the heart of the methodologies of 
recent research, that ‘class’ is not a given analytic category but a discursive 
construct.54 Consequently, the people whom politicians addressed also 
need to be investigated in terms of their own subjectivities. This is why 
historians, including those discussed so far in this section, have turned to 
cultural categories to assess the formation of social identities. These ‘social 
and cultural’ histories provide insights into the influences at work on the 
British population, and how the people responded.55 
Constructing a ‘national culture’
The most unmistakably new stimulus was that of the mass media and its 
role in shaping public opinion in the newly democratic polity. Indeed, the 
national media was arguably the principal vehicle driving the creation of 
 52 The last quotation comes from a Mass-Observation witness in C. Langhamer, ‘The 
meanings of home in postwar Britain’, Journal of Contemporary History, xl (2005), 341–62, 
at p. 344; J. Giles, The Parlour and the Suburb: Domestic Identities, Class, Femininity and 
Modernity (Oxford, 2004).
 53 A. Bingham, ‘“Stop the flapper vote folly”: Lord Rothermere, the Daily Mail, and 
the equalization of the franchise, 1927–8’, Twentieth Century British History, xiii (2002), 
17–37; J. Ramsden, ‘“A party for owners or a party for earners?” How far did the British 
Conservative party really change after 1945?’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th 
ser., xxxvii (1987), 49–63.
 54 See the discussion of self-defined class identity in J. Lawrence, ‘The British sense of 
class’, Journal of Contemporary History, xxxv (2000), 307–18; and J. Hinton, ‘The “class” 
complex: Mass Observation and cultural distinction in pre-war Britain’, Past & Present, cxlix 
(2008), 207–36. 
 55 On the cultural turn in social history, see P. Mandler, ‘The problem with cultural 
history’, Cultural and Social History, i (2004), 94–117; and for a trenchant response to this 
and the cultural turn more generally, see P. Joyce, ‘What is the social in social history?’, Past 
& Present, ccvi (2010), 213–48, at p. 218. 
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a more truly national culture in the 1920s and 1930s. As LeMahieu has 
argued,
Class, region, generation, and personal idiosyncrasy each contributed to a 
complex national culture. It was during the interwar era and especially in the 
1930s, however, that a relatively new element [the mass media] became part of 
this configuration. The common culture of the 1930s did not displace traditional 
patterns of taste as much as provide unifying points of reference among them.56 
By the late 1930s, three out of four households possessed a licensed radio 
set, and not only the working classes, but two-thirds of the middle classes, 
read at least one of the four most popular broadsheet newspapers (the Daily 
Express, Daily Herald, Daily Mail and News Chronicle).57 For the first time, 
women were reading newspapers in nearly the same proportions as men, 
with the publishers, as Bingham’s work has shown, naturally seeking to 
appeal to this newly feminized market.58 In addition to women, young 
people became an increasingly important market in the inter-war period. In 
his contribution to this volume, Bingham explores the success of the Daily 
Mirror after its makeover as a youthful populist paper in the late 1930s, and 
its emergence as a particularly important source of news and information 
for Britain’s youth. 
The radio and cinema also played central roles in popularizing a potential 
source of national culture. By 1939, an average of 23 million Britons, out 
of a population of just under 50 million, went to the cinema each week. 
Women, young people and members of the working class saw more films 
than the older, wealthier and better educated; nonetheless, the middle 
classes were frequent cinemagoers throughout this period as well.59 Film 
stars became national celebrities, and the middle and working classes both 
sought to emulate the styles of dress and language portrayed on the silver 
screen.60 These fashions – many imported from America – were further 
diffused in the pages of the daily and weekly journals, cementing a symbiotic 
relationship between the press and the world of film. The commercial 
impetus behind much inter-war cultural production was also evident 
beyond the film and journalism industries. Chris Hilliard, for instance, 
has shown how the commercialization of publishing in this period fostered 
 56 LeMahieu, Culture for Democracy, p. 332.
 57 Beers, Your Britain, pp. 14–20.
 58 A. Bingham, Gender, Modernity and the Popular Press in Interwar Britain (Oxford, 2004).
 59 J. Richards, The Age of the Dream Palace: Cinema and Society in Britain, 1930–9 (1984), 
pp. 11–17.
 60 S. Alexander, ‘Becoming a woman in London in the 1920s and 1930s’, in Metropolis 
London: Histories and Representations since 1800, ed. D. Feldman and G. Stedman Jones; F. 
Inglis, A Short History of Celebrity (Princeton, NJ, 2010), pp. 108ff.
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a democratization of poetic, fictional and autobiographical writing, as 
working-class and provincial men and women, previously circumscribed 
from literary society, were now drawn in through writers’ clubs, magazines, 
guidebooks and correspondence schools. Hilliard identifies a working-class 
literary world at once more crassly commercial and less ‘intellectual’ than 
that described by Jonathan Rose, but which nonetheless offered inspiration 
and uplift to a wide group of men and women.61 
The British dance hall industry did not escape the broader commercialization 
of culture in the inter-war period, as large dance hall chains popped up 
across Britain. The emergence of dance halls in Britain has been associated 
with Americanization. However, as James Nott has argued, the British 
responded to the American musical incursion by reasserting a ‘distinctively 
British popular music’.62 Allison Abra’s recent work further considers the 
British commercial dance industry that emerged in the inter-war period. 
Although these dances, including most famously the Lambeth Walk, were 
commercially successful, Abra contends that inter-war Britons could see 
through the synthetic nature of Mecca’s cultural productions. Her study 
of the reception of Mecca’s novelty dances suggests that ‘the public equally 
had agency in determining what vision of the nation they would accept, 
transform or simply reject’.63 
Nott’s and Abra’s work brings commercial dance into the ongoing debate 
over the extent of ‘producer’ versus ‘consumer’ sovereignty within the so-
called culture industry. While most would accept that the producers and 
disseminators of commercial cultural had near unprecedented influence 
in inter-war Britain, scholars have tended to emphasize the importance of 
consumer choice in shaping media and other cultural content in this period. 
Thus, while LeMahieu and McKibbin disagree in many respects about the 
evolution of inter-war culture, both argue that the BBC evolved in the 1920s 
in response to consumer demands. Despite the BBC’s broadcast monopoly, 
inter-war Britons could, and did, listen to pirate radio stations broadcasting 
from the Normandy coast. As Nott has shown, the BBC did play dance 
and jazz music in the 1920s, and began experimenting with the production 
of musical comedy and variety programming, but entertainment remained 
 61 C. Hilliard, ‘Modernism and the common writer’, Historical Journal, xlviii (2005), 769–
87; C. Hilliard, To Exercise our Talents: the Democratization of Writing in Britain (Cambridge, 
Mass., 2006); J. Rose, The Intellectual Life of the British Working Classes (New Haven, Conn., 
2001).
 62 J. J. Nott, Music for the People: Popular Music and Dance in Interwar Britain (Oxford, 
2002), p. 232.
 63 A. Abra, ‘Doing the Lambeth Walk: novelty dances and the British nation’, Twentieth 
Century British History, xx (2009), 346–9, at p. 369.
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only one element in a mix of programming that also including extensive 
didactic (and often frankly esoteric) talk. While the BBC director-general 
John Reith saw this balance of programming as a crucial component of 
his plans to use the BBC as a vehicle of cultural uplift and education, 
listeners made clear that ‘national culture’ could not be dictated from 
Broadcasting House. The decline in popularity of pirate radio in the 1930s 
reflects the responsiveness of the BBC to listener demands for more light 
entertainment in the broadcast schedule. (‘Between 1930 and 1933 there 
were only 3 musical comedies adapted for radio; in 1934 alone the BBC 
broadcast 24 musical comedies.’64) 
American cultural influences were everywhere apparent in inter-war 
Britain, as was the case increasingly throughout Europe.65 Perhaps the only 
cultural arena that remained immune from Americanization was sport, where 
Britain’s closest links remained with the empire, not the United States.66 
The success of domestically produced variety programming on the 1930s 
BBC, and the substantial market for British cinema, suggests an appetite 
on the part of the British public for a cultural product that, while ‘modern’ 
and cosmopolitan, was not merely an American import.67 Peter Bailey has 
emphasized the hybridity of inter-war tastes, arguing that British music hall 
audiences were capable of appreciating the slick American performances of 
men like Fats Waller while still cherishing the traditionally British humour 
of Harry Champion.68 Although British culture borrowed heavily from the 
United States, the result was less a straightforward ‘Americanization’ than 
the creation of a uniquely British mass culture, typified, Bingham argues in 
this volume, in the Daily Mirror. 
While the new mass culture was undeniably ‘modern’ and national in 
its reach, it was not perforce progressive. There were still those who saw 
the potential of new media in distinctly didactic terms. Under Reith, 
the BBC took upon itself the role of educating society in the traditions 
of ‘rational recreation’, in order to foster a view of ‘culture as a form of 
 64 LeMahieu, Culture for Democracy, p. 289 and ch. 6; McKibbin, Classes and Cultures, pp. 
462–7. 
 65 V. de Grazia, Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance through 20th-Century Europe 
(Cambridge, Mass., 2005).
 66 R. Holt, Sport and the British: a Modern History (Oxford, 1989); D. Birley, Playing the 
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 67 On film, see LeMahieu, Culture for Democracy, ch. 6; McKibbin, Classes and Cultures, 
ch. 11; Richards, Age of the Dream Palace. 
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self-improvement, a means of personal and social discipline’.69 Nor was 
intellectual well-being the only concern pursued by public educators 
through the new media: physical fitness mattered, too. As Ina Zweiniger-
Bargielowska shows in her Managing the Body, debates about health outlived 
Edwardian anxieties about ‘national efficiency’ and became part of the effort 
to promote responsible citizenship after the war. An ‘A1 citizen’ – unlike a 
‘C3 anti-citizen’ – promised an ‘A1 nation’.70 The exercise and life reform 
enthusiasts discussed by Zweiniger-Bargielowska were the popular faces of 
a broader initiative to redefine British society in the inter-war years. Daniel 
Ussishkin’s chapter in this volume shows how sociologists and industrial 
theorists also made use of evolving notions of ‘national efficiency’ to posit a 
central role for ‘morale’ in both industrial and social policy.
While the new media may have provided a forum for intellectuals and 
enthusiasts, the views of these men and women were not always embraced 
by their target audiences. Stefan Collini has identified a generalized hostility 
to the idea of the public intellectual in Britain during the 1920s and 1930s, 
and particularly to the Bloomsbury ‘highbrows’, whose ecstatic avant-
garde culture (not to mention their carnal predilections) was at odds with 
Reith’s insistence on culture with a ‘moral character’.71 It is these ‘highbrow’ 
intellectuals who form the subject of Richard Overy’s The Morbid Age. Overy 
paints a picture of inter-war Britain as a nation teetering under the weight 
of intellectual doom and gloom. ‘Morbid’ intellectuals such as Maurice 
Dobb, Aldous Huxley, Arnold Toynbee and the Webbs brooded anxiously 
over the inevitable collapse of capitalism and democratic society, drawn to 
the utopianism of Soviet Russia and fascist Italy.72 Yet while it is these men 
and women whose names are most easily recalled and whose writing has 
survived into the twenty-first century, many middle-brow writers were as, 
if not more, influential at the time. One of these, as Gary Love’s chapter 
identifies, was the Conservative historian and essayist J. A.  R. Marriott. 
The continued market for his Whiggish histories illustrates a persistent 
optimism that the British system of representative government could evolve 
to meet the challenges of mass democracy. 
 69 D. L. LeMahieu, ‘John Reith (1889–1971): entrepreneur of collectivism’, in After the 
Victorians: Private Conscience and Public Duty in Modern Britain, ed. S. Pedersen and P. 
Mandler (1994), p. 195.
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This optimism is perhaps most evident in studies of men and women 
who devoted their lives to working within the existing political framework 
to change public perceptions and to direct national priorities towards those 
causes in which they believed. Helen McCarthy’s work on the League of 
Nations Union has shown how an extra-governmental body used modern 
organizational and publicity techniques to mobilize British citizens behind 
an agenda of international co-operation.73 Yet an increased awareness of 
international affairs could be a double-edged sword. During the First World 
War, the popular press had fuelled jingoism and racial animosity. After the 
war, the media reported on events in Russia in a manner slated to make 
readers hostile to and suspicious of the Soviet Union. The implications of 
this media coverage for the evolution of the broad-based Fight the Famine 
Council, initially formed to combat malnourishment and famine in eastern 
Europe and Russia, into a narrower organization focused on combating 
child poverty are discussed in Ellen Boucher’s chapter. Here, public opinion 
conscribed the limits of the possible for the council, and later for the Save 
the Children Fund (SCF), as British citizens proved reluctant to support 
aid to Russia or to parts of the former Austro-Hungarian empire. The 
democratization of Britain and of the British press opened up the scope for 
greater participation in organized, popular internationalism as more people 
became informed about international affairs. However, the nature of their 
sources of information meant that many individuals had deeply prejudiced 
understandings of the international situation and arguably grew less inclined 
to be sympathetic to their fellow man than if they had remained ‘ignorant’ 
of international politics altogether. Ultimately, the Save the Children Fund’s 
focus on child poverty allowed it to eschew international politics and to 
focus on the universal humanity of children. 
The difficulties faced by the SCF underscore another reality of inter-war 
culture: while the mass culture provided opportunities for some, it was not 
always either tolerant or inclusive. Whereas, up to the equalization of the 
franchise in 1928, the constitution was arbiter of who ‘belonged’ within 
the nation, it was clear that editors, producers, publicists and promoters, 
through the selection of media content, could now seek to dictate what, and 
hence who, was included in the corpus of national culture. Black Britons 
were largely excluded and therefore, as Marc Matera explores in his chapter, 
sought alternative media through which the black diaspora community 
could negotiate a place for itself in ideas of the British nation. Similarly, as 
Matt Houlbrook’s work shows, not only were homosexual Britons generally 
 73 H. McCarthy, ‘Democratising British foreign policy: rethinking the peace ballot, 1934–
5’, Journal of British Studies, xlix (2010), 358–87.
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excluded from mainstream media, but, insofar as they appeared in the 
press, they were reported in the context of courtroom proceedings. This, 
he writes, ensured that ‘public knowledge of “homosexuality” was framed 
by an overarching narrative of sexual danger’. Queer urban culture thus 
became the ‘abject outside of Britishness’.74 In the political sphere, Laura 
Beers has shown how the media fostered fears about left-wing politics, and 
prejudices against organized labour.75 In this volume, she examines the 
ways in which the press retarded women’s political progress in the inter-war 
period by playing to and perpetuating stereotypes about ‘frivolous’ women, 
uninterested in politics. Arguably the press were only seeking to cater to the 
market as they understood it – if women preferred human-interest stories to 
political news, it did not make economic sense to print serious political news 
in publications targeted towards women readers. Further, as Billie Melman’s 
work has shown and as both Beers and Lucy Delap further develop in this 
volume, prejudicial attitudes about gender difference were by no means 
limited to the press.76 Nonetheless, Beers’s chapter raises questions about 
the way in which gendered assumptions about men’s and women’s capacity 
for political citizenship were inculcated and reified in the modern era.
Delap’s chapter similarly explores continuities and change in attitudes 
towards gender in inter-war Britain. Drawing on publications such as the 
Church Times and the English Churchman, as well as public statements and 
writings by Anglican men and women, she explores the persistent gender 
conservatism within the Anglican Church. While she notes the progressive 
shift in many Anglicans’ attitudes towards overtly misogynous practices, 
such as the vows of obedience made by wives in the Anglican marriage 
ceremony, she concludes that inter-war women as well as men continued 
to adhere to a ‘conviction in divergent sexual qualities and suspicion of 
female authority figures, though this was now presented as a customary 
and commonsensical rather than scientifically backed belief ’. Writing 
more than twenty years ago, Alison Light picked up on the paradoxes of a 
‘conservative modernity’ in literature that expanded roles for women while 
also narrowly circumscribing what it meant to be ‘feminine’.77 Beers and 
Delap find similar contradictions in the attitudes towards women in the 
popular and religious press.
 74 M. Houlbrook, Queer London: Perils and Pleasures in the Sexual Metropolis, 1918–57 
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 75 Beers, ‘Counter-Toryism’; Beers, Your Britain.
 76 B. Melman, Women and the Popular Imagination in the Twenties: Flappers and Nymphs 
(Basingstoke, 1988).
 77 A. Light, Forever England: Femininity, Literature and Conservatism between the Wars 
(1991).
Brave New World
24
Perhaps the biggest challenge to the idea that public media forged collective 
identities comes from recent explorations that stress the multiplicity of social 
experiences. The memory of war, for instance, has long been conceptualized 
as a combination of collective grief and disillusionment leading to pacifism, 
constructed through the ‘canonical’ literature of Wilfred Owen, Robert 
Graves and Siegfried Sassoon. But studies of commemoration activities have 
revealed a disaggregated and frequently conflictual process. National and 
local methods of memorializing, often dictated by elites who sidelined the 
families of the bereaved, brought into play class, religious, political and other 
divides. As Adrian Gregory has argued, ‘although literary works played a part 
in developing [popular] interpretations’ of the war, ‘Depictions of Britain 
in the 1920s as a traumatized society, with a shattered sense of itself, should 
be understood for what they are: constructions to cover up a much more 
complex social reality of winners and losers, continuities and changes.’78 
Inter-war Britain was a pluralist mass society, but a mass society all the 
same. Historians trying to make sense of this apparent contradiction have 
turned to the concept of ‘selfhood’, the site of much innovative research 
in recent years. According to this, people would use available cultural 
resources to construct narratives of and for themselves, a process of self-
fashioning rendered infinitely richer by the proliferation of mass media in 
the 1920s and 1930s. The practice of so-called ‘cultivated’ reading has long 
been regarded as a mark of the self-construction (and social mobility) of the 
autodidact or working-class radical; but so too, Houlbrook argues, should 
historians recognize that the consumption of, and ‘creative engagement’ 
with, allegedly lesser genres – romantic fiction, Hollywood films – enabled 
individuals to forge a sense of self. Thus, fiction was not just a form of 
‘escapism’: it offered a critical perspective through which to negotiate one’s 
place in the world.79
An older form of self-fashioning, certainly critical to the Victorians’ sense 
of self, now suffered at the hand of media-driven selfhood. In the most 
recent major work on British (and more especially English) secularization, 
S. J. D. Green highlights the decline in church attendance among women, 
especially the young and married. The real significance of this finding is 
located in the ‘common Victorian understanding of married women as the 
 78 A. Gregory, The Last Great War: British Society and the First World War (Oxford, 
2008), pp. 257, 272, and see ch. 8. For the key contributions on the ‘literary’ and ‘social’ 
interpretations of war memory, see, respectively, P. Fussell, The Great War and Modern 
Memory (1975) and A. King, Memorials of the Great War in Britain: the Symbolism and Politics 
of Remembrance (Oxford, 1998).
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religious representation of their families in public acts of worship’, for fewer 
female observants gestures towards a more ‘pervasive de-institutionalisation’ 
of religion in society (though not wholesale secularization). As Delap shows 
in this volume, many women did remain invested in religious communities 
in the inter-war period, but increasingly they sought to challenge the 
traditional Victorian understandings of women’s role, both within the 
church and in society more broadly. Green recognizes the increasing number 
of alternative forms of worship, both institutional and non-institutional, 
available by the mid twentieth century. The real change, however, was 
the decline of ‘puritanism’ in the national character, a result of increased 
material concerns fostered through engagement with the mass media. By 
the 1940s, ‘the British generally, and the English especially, rejected the ideal 
of abstinence … they increasingly defined “self-denial” solely in terms of 
the denial of the self ’.80 
This self-indulgent hedonism takes centre-stage in Martin Pugh’s recent 
study We Danced All Night: a Social History of Britain between the Wars. 
Pugh does not whitewash the serious uncertainty and doubt engendered by 
the experience of total war – he opens his book with the caveat that ‘behind 
the gaiety, exuberance and irresponsibility of post-war social life lurked a 
pervasive undercurrent of pessimism, the inevitable consequence of the 
devastating human impact of four years of mass war’.81 Yet, for him, the 
signal characteristic of the age is not this undercurrent but the possibilities 
and positive reforms that coursed above it, particularly for women.82
While Pugh’s characters are more concerned with family planning and 
the availability of mortgages than with national or international politics, 
they share with Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin a conservative optimism 
and belief in British exceptionalism that, as Peter Mandler has noted, 
was perceived as particularly ‘English’. Mandler suggests that the late 
1920s and 1930s saw the ‘triumph’ of Baldwin’s ‘specific depiction’ of the 
 80 S. J. D. Green, The Passing of Protestant England: Secularisation and Social Change, c.1920–
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English national character as defined by ‘common sense, good temper, 
ordered freedom, [and] progress’.83 As discussed above, many scholars have 
attributed Baldwin’s phenomenal political success to his ability to articulate 
and embody a vision of the nation that resonated with a substantial 
constituency of British voters. Yet Baldwin’s imagined nation was perforce 
a partial and distorted representation, a reality underscored by his frequent 
recourse to the term ‘English’ to embody a country of four nations that 
governed over an empire spanning a quarter of the globe. The following 
section explores the interrelationship between Britain and her empire in the 
inter-war period, and the impact of the empire on domestic and imperial 
concepts of nationality and the nation state. 
British imperialists and imperial Britons
The experience of the First World War and the subsequent enthusiasm 
for pacifism and internationalism meant that ‘muscular imperialism’ did 
not play the same role in national identity in inter-war Britain as it had 
in the late Victorian and Edwardian eras.84 Rather than defining Britain 
as an imperial power, inter-war statesmen presented the nation state as 
a defender of democracy against the threat of both Bolshevik and fascist 
authoritarianism. Yet, while British national identity may no longer have 
fashioned itself through antagonism with the French and German empires, 
inter-war Britain remained an imperial power. A central aim of this volume 
is to reconcile the domestic and imperial influences on British identity. 
Britain’s imperial status had profound implications in terms of both how 
Britons understood themselves and how Britain’s imperial subjects and 
Commonwealth allies understood their relationship with the metropole. 
The importance of the empire to British and imperial identity was recently 
emphasized by Thomas Hajkowski in his study of The BBC and National 
Identity in Britain, 1922–53, which focuses on the use of broadcast technology 
to reinforce imperial ties.85 Yet the relationship between Britain and the 
empire was not limited to the realm of culture. Nationalist movements 
in the colonies drew on metropolitan models of governance even while 
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rejecting British rule; increased immigration from the colonies to the 
metropole created new racial and cultural challenges in inter-war Britain; 
and the continued importance placed on Commonwealth co-operation 
created new challenges as officials across the Commonwealth sought to 
forge institutions that would preserve traditional allegiances while allowing 
room for autonomous development and decision-making.
The British empire reached its widest extent between the wars. The secret 
negotiations between Britain, France and Russia to divide up the Middle 
East into spheres of influence that culminated in the Sykes-Picot agreement 
of 1916 were formally repudiated after the Bolsheviks released copies of the 
agreement in November 1917. In practice, however, the British and French 
plans were largely carried out through the implementation of the League of 
Nations mandates system. Most famously, the formerly Ottoman territories 
of Mesopotamia, Palestine and Transjordan became British mandates, as 
did several former German provinces in Africa. Article 22 of the League 
of Nations charter stipulated that the mandatory powers undertake the 
‘tutelage’ of the territories placed under their trusteeship, ensuring the 
‘well-being and development’ of their inhabitants. How (or whether) the 
obligations of trusteeship were fulfilled varied across time and space. The 
only constant was the considerable energy and expenditure required to 
administer the mandates, at a time when the British government was already 
committing reserves of both to combating the burgeoning nationalist 
sentiment in India, as well as the growth of the anti-colonial movement in 
Africa. Within the Commonwealth, as the confederation of self-governing 
states under the British crown gradually came to be known in the early 
twentieth century, the former colonies were also seeking to redefine their 
relationship with the metropole.86 Although the ties between Britain and 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand in particular remained close, changing 
patterns of international trade and economic obligations incurred by 
Britain during the First World War left London more dependent on empire 
than the other way around.87 At the same time, the growing number of 
non-white immigrants to Britain from the empire raised new questions 
about the meaning of Britishness, and the role of race in national identity. 
 86 While the British Commonwealth of Nations was formally established with the Treaty 
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 87 On the changed economic relationship between metropole and empire post-1914, see N. 
Ferguson, The Pity of War (1998). On the continued close relationship between Britain and 
the settler colonies in the inter-war period, see A. G. Hopkins, ‘Rethinking decolonization’, 
Past & Present, cc (2008), 211–47; P. Buckner and R. D. Francis, Rediscovering the British 
World (Calgary, 2005).
Brave New World
28
It is impossible to understand the development of the British nation in the 
inter-war period without taking into account the changing role of empire 
within British national consciousness and experience. 
Over the past several decades, the so-called imperial turn in British 
studies has focused historians’ attention on the mutually constitutive 
relationship, or the ‘connexity’, between Britain and her empire to an 
unprecedented degree. In its initial phase, in the 1980s and 1990s, the 
imperial turn was strongly influenced by post-colonial theory and by 
modes of analysis borrowed from literary studies. Building upon the 
work of Edward Said, as well as the earlier analyses of scholars such as 
Frantz Fanon and Albert Memmi, such scholarship sought to ‘subject 
the language of the colonizers to critical scrutiny, deconstructing 
representative texts and exposing the discursive designs that underlie 
their surface narratives’.88 Too often, scholars did not have to look hard to 
find racist, exoticizing or patriarchal imperial subtexts in literature, art, 
advertising, leisure activities and other manifestations of British culture. 
In that such studies had a temporal focus, it tended to be the eighteenth 
and particularly the nineteenth centuries – although a critique of this 
brand of ‘new imperial history’ has been its ‘failure to contextualize over 
space and time’.89 For the early twentieth century, the principal locus of 
post-colonial analysis has been the Boer War and the racism that both 
fed it and was fed by it; until recently ‘the interwar years [had been] a 
period in British imperial history that remain[ed] curiously neglected’.90 
While such studies present a picture of a metropolitan culture permeated 
by empire, Bernard Porter has argued that they overstate the prevalence 
of the empire in the life of the average Briton.91 New imperial historians, 
he contended, overestimate what Peter Mandler has called the ‘relative 
“throw” – the weight or significance’ of the texts on which they have based 
 88 D. Kennedy, ‘Imperial history and post-colonial theory’, Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, xxiv (1996), 345–63, at p. 349. E. Said, Orientalism (New York, 
1978); F. Fanon, Peau noire, masques blancs (Paris, 1952); F. Fanon, Les damnes de la terre 
(Paris, 1961); F. Fanon, Pour la revolution africaine (Paris, 1964); A. Memmi, Portrait du 
colonisé, précédé par portrait du colonisateur (Paris, 1957).
 89 R. Price, ‘One big thing: Britain, its empire and their imperial culture’, Journal of British 
Studies, xlv (2006), 602–27, at p. 619.
 90 B. Bush, Imperialism, Race and Resistance: Africa and Britain, 1919–45 (1999), p. 3. On the 
Boer War, see S. Attridge, Nationalism, Imperialism, and Identity in Late Victorian Culture: 
Civil and Military Worlds (Basingstoke, 2003); P. Krebs, Gender, Race, and the Writing of 
Empire: Public Discourse and the Boer War (Cambridge, 2004); J. Schneer, London 1900: the 
Imperial Metropolis (New Haven, Conn., 1999).
 91 B. Porter, Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society and Culture in Britain (Oxford, 
2004).
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their conclusions, and as a consequence miss the Little England forest for 
the imperial trees.92 
Porter’s reading of Britain’s Absent-Minded Imperialists caused considerable 
controversy within the field, and Catherine Hall in particular has been vocal 
in defending the centrality of the empire to Britons’ cultural, emotional and 
intellectual lives.93 Yet, in part in response to criticisms of decontextualized 
analyses, over the past ten or fifteen years the field has moved away from a 
strict focus on discourse to encompass, to name only a few examples:
monographs on the presence of colonial and ex-colonial peoples in metropolitan 
spaces; books on the impact of state-sponsored racial policies ‘at home’; critiques 
of the imbrication of imperial politics on the making of domestic legislation; 
articles and essays on the role of spectacle in producing imperial citizens in the 
metropole; work on the influence of empire on romanticism, the novel, and 
‘English’ literature more generally; and arguments that attempt to reorient the 
home/empire model by positing new concepts of political and social formation.94
In recent years, scholars have also increasingly sought to view the British 
empire through the lens of ‘transnational networks’, decentring Britain 
from its privileged place as the prime mover of imperial history, and instead 
examining the myriad ways in which the constituent parts of the empire equally 
influenced and were influenced by developments in what had previously 
been viewed as the metropole and the peripheries.95 This scholarship has also 
drawn attention to the reality that the empire was only one of the networks 
in which Britain was enmeshed, and reasserted the centrality of European and 
international, particularly Anglo-American, connections to Britain’s history.96 
 92 Mandler, ‘The problem with cultural history’, at pp. 96–7.
 93 Catherine Hall’s Civilizing Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination 1830–
67 (2002) was published before Porter’s work. Since, she has published several texts specifically 
refuting Porter’s analysis, including principally her edited volume with S. O. Rose, At Home 
with the Empire: Metropolitan Culture and the Imperial Word (Cambridge, 2006). 
 94 A. Burton, ‘Introduction: on the inadequacy and indispensability of the nation’, in A. 
Burton, After the Imperial Turn: Thinking with and through the Nation (Durham, NC, 2003), 
p. 8.
 95 For a good conceptual discussion of the applicability of network theory to imperial 
studies, see A. Games, The Web of Empire: English Cosmopolitans in an Age of Expansion, 1560–
1660 (Oxford, 2008). For similar analyses focusing on the modern period, see T. Ballantyne, 
Orientalism and Race: Aryanism in the British Empire (Basingstoke, 2001); K. Grant, P. 
Levine and F. Trentmann, Beyond Sovereignty: Britain, Empire and Transnationalism, 1860–
1950 (Basingstoke, 2007); T. Metcalf, Imperial Connections: India in the Indian Ocean Arena, 
1860–1920 (Berkeley, Calif., 2008).
 96 Nonetheless, most scholars have continued to view the empire as the central sphere in 
Britain’s international relations. Jon Parry has controversially posited that European relations 
retained their paramountcy over imperial concerns even in the heyday of empire (The Politics 
of Patriotism: English Liberalism, National Identity and Europe 1830–86 (Cambridge, 2006)).
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Finally, scholars of both the British and other empires have redirected 
attention to the central role of the state in building and sustaining imperial 
projects, and the importance of understanding how that state power was 
constructed, understood and maintained.97 Certain of these studies have in 
particular broadened our understanding of the role of the empire and the 
Commonwealth, and of the citizens of these countries, in defining the new 
British nation as it emerged in the aftermath of the First World War; and, 
conversely, the impact of metropolitan developments on nationalist and 
anti-colonial movements in the empire. The following discussion surveys 
the literature on inter-war empire, with a particular focus on questions of 
national identity.
Issues of race and ethnicity are central to the question of how to define 
the British nation.98 In central and southern Europe, the period between 
1914 and 1945 saw formerly heterogeneous states transformed into much 
more ethnically homogeneous ‘nation states’. As Tony Judt has emphasized, 
between 1945 and 1991, ‘Thanks to war, occupation, boundary adjustments, 
expulsions and genocide, almost everybody [in continental Europe] now 
lived in their own country, among their own people’.99 Yet, while much 
of continental Europe became less racially diverse over the course of the 
twentieth century (at least until the fall of the Iron Curtain opened the gates 
to a new wave of immigration in many European countries), the upsurge 
in immigration to Britain from the far-flung outposts of empire meant that 
the imperial metropolis became less and less a collective of men and women 
of a common descent, language, culture and history. 
Of course, Great Britain was never truly a nation state in the sense of 
France or Prussia. Britain encompassed the traditional homelands of three 
distinct national groups – Englishmen, Scots and Welsh – and the 1801 Act 
of Union between Britain and Ireland brought several million Irishmen 
and women under crown rule. Even after the partition of Ireland in 1922, 
over a million Northern Irish remained British citizens, not to mention the 
millions of Irishmen and women who had emigrated to Britain over the past 
several centuries, and whose descendants continue to make up substantial 
 97 Since Richard Price lamented the lack of such scholarship in 2006 (‘One big thing’, 
pp. 607ff.), several rich works have emerged on this theme, including M. Ogborn, Indian 
Ink: Script and Print in the Making of the English East India Company (Chicago, Ill., 2007); 
M. Wiener, An Empire on Trial: Race, Murder, and Justice under British Rule, 1870–1935 
(Cambridge, 2008); and Price’s own Making Empire: Colonial Encounters and the Creation of 
Imperial Rule in 19th-Century Africa (Cambridge, 2008).
 98 A. D. Smith, The Nation in History: Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and 
Nationalism (Boston, Mass., 2000).
 99 T. Judt, Postwar: a History of Europe since 1945 (New York, 2006), p. 9.
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minorities in cities such as Liverpool and Manchester. Each Celtic minority 
had its difficulties establishing a modus vivendi within a country whose 
culture and government were dominated by the English.100 Yet, with the 
possible exception of the Irish, Celtic Britons had an easier time finding a 
place within the national community than did the many non-white citizens 
of the British empire who made their homes in Britain between the wars. 
Since the publication of Paul Rich’s Race and Empire in British Politics 
in 1986 and Paul Gilroy’s Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack the following 
year, several studies have explored the political, social and cultural position 
of non-white immigrants in post-Second World War Britain.101 In ‘We Ask 
for British Justice’: Workers and Racial Difference in Late Imperial Britain, 
Laura Tabili looks in depth at the changes in racial attitudes in inter-
war Britain discussed by Rich and argues that the distinctions enshrined 
between white and non-white citizens of the empire in the twentieth 
century were not foreordained. In her reading, black men were not always 
‘archetypal strangers’ within British society, nor was ‘racial difference … 
an ineluctable impediment to social harmony’.102 Instead, the exclusion of 
‘black’ British seamen (a category that encompassed not only Africans and 
Afro-Caribbeans, but also Asians and Arabs) from full British citizenship 
was contingent on a series of economic and political decisions taken in 
the inter-war period. The desire of British shipowners to lower their wage 
bill led them to embrace a racialized language of difference that identified 
blacks as particularly suited to unskilled labour. Ironically, the government’s 
desire to curb this exploitation in turn led to the passage of legislation – 
the Coloured and Alien Seamen Order of 1925 and the Special Certificate 
of Nationality and Identity of 1932 – that formalized and institutionalized 
racial difference. 
If the racism that emerged and solidified in the inter-war period was 
dictated by the logic of economic structures, so too, by that argument, 
were both the racial solidarity that emerged among non-white seamen in 
 100 J. G. A. Pocock issued the clarion call for a ‘four nations’ approach to British history 
in ‘British history: a plea for a new subject’, Journal of Modern History, lxxiv (1975), 601–28. 
For a history of the British Isles that emphasizes the interaction between the four nations, 
see N. Davies, The Isles: a History (Oxford, 2000). 
 101 P. Rich, Race and Empire in British Politics (Cambridge, 1986); P. Gilroy, ‘Ain’t no Black 
in the Union Jack’: the Cultural Politics of Race and Nation (1987); K. Paul, Whitewashing 
Britain: Race and Citizenship in the Postwar Era (Ithaca, NY, 1997); R. Hansen, Citizenship 
and Immigration in Post-war Britain: the Institutional Origins of a Multicultural Nation 
(Oxford, 2000). Despite its title, Panikos Panayi’s An Immigration History of Britain: 
Multicultural Racism since 1800 (New York, 2009) focuses on the post-war period. 
 102 L. Tabili, ‘We Ask for British Justice’: Workers and Racial Difference in Late Imperial 
Britain (Ithaca, NY, 1994), p. 2.
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the 1920s and the evident racism of the Liverpool riots of June 1919, when 
white men and women attacked mixed-race dock communities, looting and 
terrorizing the homes of black Britons. When black men did band together 
to ‘ask for British justice’ it was because they had been pushed onto the 
defensive.103
Other scholars have questioned both the argument that racism was not 
present a priori in white British culture, and the representation of black 
solidarity as primarily a defensive movement. Barbara Bush begins her 
study of Imperialism, Race and Resistance in British Africa in the inter-war 
period by reiterating Albert Memmi’s conviction that ‘racism is not an 
incidental part of colonialism (the practical workings of imperialism), but 
a “consubstantial part” – the “highest expression of the colonial system” 
and the basis of the “fundamental discrimination” between coloniser and 
colonised’.104 She goes on to provide a detailed analysis of the ways in which 
institutionalized racism translated into colonial policy in South Africa, and 
in Nigeria and the former Gold Coast (now Ghana). 
Susan Kingsley Kent has recently emphasized the persistence of racist 
attitudes in the metropole as well as in the colonies. In her reading, the 
various riots in port cities in 1919 – in Cardiff, South Shields and the East 
End, as well as in Liverpool – were clearly racially motivated, and driven 
by fears of not only economic but also sexual displacement, particularly on 
the part of white soldiers who returned to Britain after the war to find a 
conspicuous and threatening surge in interracial relationships. There were 
only around 10,000 black seamen living and working in Britain, most 
of whom were based in Liverpool and Cardiff, and scholars such as Jon 
Lawrence have argued that the extent of riotous behaviour in 1918–19 has 
been overstated. Nonetheless, for Kent, the riots are indicative of a broad-
based racism and brutalization that emerged as a key outgrowth of the 
experience of war.105
Seamen, of course, made up only one-third to a half of non-white men 
and women in inter-war Britain. In addition to domestic servants and other 
low-wage labourers, imperial subjects were increasingly coming to Britain 
to study, and staying to work in the arts and the professions in the inter-war 
period. Once arrived in London (and the majority were based in London), 
black students and professionals frequently congregated, many staying in 
boarding houses such as the West African Students Union hostel in Camden 
 103 Tabili, ‘We Ask for British Justice’, pp. 149–50.
 104 Bush, Imperialism, Race and Resistance, p. 7.
 105 Kent, Aftershocks; J. Lawrence, ‘Forging a peaceable kingdom: war, violence, and fear 
of brutalization in post-First World War Britain’, Journal of Modern History, lxxv (2003), 
587–9.
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Town, and often gaining political consciousness through their involvement 
with such groups. Susan Pennybacker’s recent work on race and political 
culture in the imperial metropolis offers an insight into the process by 
which politically active blacks such as the Trinidad-born communist George 
Padmore, and the future Kenyan president Jomo Kenyatta, constructed a 
narrative of international racial solidarity in the inter-war period.106 
The transnational and international exchanges that Pennybacker 
highlights underscore the extent to which black activists in Britain were 
enmeshed in a project that went beyond reforming British racial attitudes. 
Further, in emphasizing the links between the anti-racist movement in the 
United States, campaigns against African slavery, resistance to Nazi racial 
policies and the international communist movement, Pennybacker greatly 
widens our understanding of the importance of Marxist thinking to much 
inter-war anti-colonial agitation. She expands our appreciation of the role 
of London as a hub for socialists and anti-imperialists from around the 
globe that Nicholas Owen had previously highlighted in his work on the 
British left and India,107 and Barbara Bush had explored in her discussion 
of the African diaspora. Yet, as Marc Matera’s contribution to this volume 
suggests, an emphasis on international co-operation can also obscure what 
was unique to the experience of black British subjects in the inter-war 
period. Matera highlights the differences in outlook and understanding 
that emerged between London’s black intellectuals, who saw themselves as 
engaged in a specifically anti-imperialist project, and African-Americans 
such as the actor and singer Paul Robeson. The Trinidad-born writer and 
anti-colonial activist C. L. R. James summed up this sense of difference in 
his critique of Robeson as
not a colonial and [hence someone who] never really understood British 
imperialism. In fact, it took him a long time to grasp the damage done by a 
movie like Sanders of the River … Paul was an American and a Westerner, not 
an African. As an American I don’t think he understood what the British had 
done in the colonies and how wrong it all was, even though it was so like his 
own situation in America.108
While James and Robeson shared many of the same goals, the national and 
racial consciousness of black British activists was necessarily informed by 
their experiences as citizen-subjects of the British empire.
 106 S. Pennybacker, From Scottsboro to Munich: Race and Political Culture in 1930s Britain 
(Princeton, NJ, 2009). 
 107 N. Owen, The British Left and India: Metropolitan Anti-Imperialism, 1885–1947 (Oxford, 
2007).
 108 Quoted in M. Matera, ‘Black intellectuals in the imperial metropolis and the debate 
over race and empire in Sanders of the River’, pp. 246–7.
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Of course, imperial bonds did not only have an impact on the development 
of national identities and notions of citizenship among black Britons. Of 
all of Britain’s former colonies, India has received the greatest attention in 
imperial scholarship. While most of this work has focused on the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, several recent studies have shed new light on the 
relationship between Britain and India between the wars. Mrinalini Sinha’s 
study of the international reaction to the 1927 publication of Katherine Mayo’s 
scathing indictment of Hindu society’s treatment of women, Mother India, 
highlights the unexpected interplay between Western and Indian politics. 
Sinha shows how middle-class Indian women, hitherto marginalized within 
a social system (supported by the British government) that privileged a male-
dominated communal identity over an individualistic notion of citizenship, 
used Mayo’s evidence of widespread sexual depravity to lobby for a national 
law protecting girls from child marriage that, for the first time, brought social 
legislation outside the bounds of the community and identified a universal set 
of rights and responsibilities for all Indian citizens. The use of the Mother India 
controversy to further the cause of women’s emancipation within the sub-
continent illuminates the importance of the ‘“translational process” through 
which the supposedly generic concepts and practices of European modernity 
were both adopted and adapted in the colonial context’.109 Martin Wiener’s 
recent study, An Empire on Trial: Race, Murder, and Justice under British Rule, 
1870–1935, similarly foregrounds this process of translation. Through a series 
of case studies, not only in India, but in Africa, the Caribbean and Australasia, 
Wiener shows how the empire’s subject peoples were able to use the seemingly 
colour-blind letter of English law to expose and challenge the racism and 
hypocrisy of colonial rule. In each of these studies, the impact of the ideas 
and political language of the metropole are evident in the development of the 
anti-imperial movements of the inter-war period.
The links between the metropole and the white settler empire remained 
just as vital in the inter-war period. Scholars of the Atlantic world have 
emphasized the continued transatlantic connections between Britain 
and America.110 But the continued linkages between Britain and the 
 109 M. Sinha, Specters of Mother India: the Global Restructuring of an Empire (Durham, NC, 
2006), p. 15.
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Commonwealth have only recently come under similar scrutiny. To 
name only a very few examples, from the political, social and cultural 
spheres, respectively: Duncan Bell has drawn attention to the persistence 
of ambitions for a robust imperial union even after the collapse of the 
political campaign for a ‘Greater Britain’ in the late nineteenth century;111 
Andrew Thompson has highlighted the links in terms of personnel and 
finances between metropolitan and colonial branches of unions such as the 
Amalgamated Society of Engineers through the inter-war period;112 and 
Chris Hilliard’s work on the publishing industry illustrates the extent to 
which imperial networks remained crucial to periodical publishers seeking 
outlets for syndication.113 Ellen Boucher is currently completing a study 
of the treatment of inter-war ‘child migrants’ by the British state and by 
private welfare organizations such as Barnardo’s, which illustrates the extent 
to which those groups still saw the white empire as a British space to which 
they could transplant these children. Recent apologies issued by Gordon 
Brown and the Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd to children who had 
been sent from Britain to Australia between 1930 and 1970, in many cases 
without their parents’ consent, and suffered abuse or abandonment at the 
hands of Australian caretakers, show the extent to which the impacts of 
such policies continue to resonate.114 
Fortunately, imperial exchanges were not always so controversial. 
Organizations such as the League of Empire fostered educational linkages 
within the settler empire through teacher and curriculum exchanges.115 And 
Tamson Pietsch’s contribution to this volume, on the Universities’ Bureau 
of the British Empire, founded in 1912, illuminates the different ways in 
which such exchange operated at the level of higher education. While the 
League of Empire helped to bring a new brand of popular imperialism to 
millions of schoolchildren in Australia, New Zealand, Canada and beyond, 
the Universities’ Bureau harked back to a nineteenth-century vision of an 
imperial elite – a small cadre of crown subjects educated, if not at Oxford 
 111 D. Bell, The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860–1900 
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or Cambridge, then along Oxonian and Cantabrigian lines – who could 
all be trusted to share the same values and priorities. Richard Toye’s study 
of Winston Churchill’s often fraught relationship with the British empire 
highlights the extent to which a uniquely ‘imperial mentality’, inculcated 
from childhood, influenced his approach to both imperial and domestic 
policy throughout his long political career.116 Like many men of his age 
and class, Churchill viewed imperial subjects as the, often ungrateful, 
beneficiaries of Britain’s investment of manpower, resources and expertise, 
and thus had little natural sympathy with the growing anti-colonial 
movements in Africa, the Middle East and south Asia – particularly when, 
as was increasingly the case in the inter-war period, these movements 
turned to violence to destabilize the colonial regime and draw international 
attention to their cause. Toye cites a 1920 letter to Hugh Trenchard, chief of 
the air staff, in which Churchill lobbied for the use of gas bombs in Iraq on 
the grounds that such non-lethal ‘punishment’ was an appropriate response 
to the uprisings of ‘recalcitrant natives’ in the region.117 
The consequences of what Priya Satia has called this ‘official mindset’ for 
the Iraqi mandate formed the subject of her recent monograph.118 In this, 
she argued that the myopia and prejudices of the imperial establishment in 
Mesopotamia, an establishment reliant on an actively ‘anti-empirical way of 
knowing’, enabled the creation of an imperial administration premised on 
violence – one that came to believe ‘official conspiracy theories’ that painted 
the native population as untrustworthy, if not actively insurgent, and that 
led to an unprecedented reliance on aerial surveillance and bombardment. 
In this volume, she further explores the implications of the government’s 
conspiratorial mindset in Iraq for its relationship with the public at home. 
Secrecy breeds secrecy, she argues. Just as the government relied on a web 
of hushed whispers in Arabia, it sought to secure public acquiescence in 
its policy by obscuring from the British press – and hence from the public 
– the details of government operations in the region. This ‘agnotology’, 
or officially fostered ignorance, was a sinister example of imperial policy 
corrupting domestic democracy. 
In Satia’s reading, British administrators in Arabia were largely indifferent 
to the ‘trusteeship’ aspect of their mandatory position in the region. Here, 
Satia’s picture of imperial policy in Iraq contrasts with Aaron Windel’s 
description of the debates over the role of co-operation in rural African 
societies in the inter-war period. In his chapter in this volume, Windel shows 
 116 R. Toye, Churchill’s Empire: the World that Made him and the World he Made (2010).
 117 Toye, Churchill’s Empire, p. 145.
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that certain interested parties, in particular Sidney Webb (Lord Passfield), 
who served as colonial secretary from 1929 to 1931, and the retired Indian civil 
servant C. F. Strickland, who aided in drafting the Tanganyika Co-operative 
Societies Ordinance, believed that participation in local co-operatives had 
the potential to foster ideas of ‘self-reliance, responsibility and citizenship’ 
and increase a country’s ‘capacity for democratic self government’. The 
efforts of the second Labour government to foster co-operation in Africa 
were not solely spurred by altruism, and both the interests of the domestic 
British economy and the desire to subvert nationalist and pan-African 
movements in the continent informed support for it. However, Windel 
shows how the introduction of the mandate system served to shift the terms 
of debate about the goals and obligations of colonial governance. 
Windel further highlights an often obscured reality of British colonial 
policy: the importance of party politics. His chapter explores the link between 
broader Labour policy and co-operative policy in Africa, and the contingent 
future of co-operative experiments after the collapse of the second Labour 
government. Too frequently imperial histories posit ‘the colonial state’ as an 
agent above or independent from domestic politics, although several recent 
studies have brought to the fore the interrelationship between the two. In 
addition to E. H. H. Green’s work on Conservatism and the settler empire, 
and Owen’s work on the Labour party and India, Philip Williamson’s study 
of the formation of the National Government pays particular attention to 
the role of imperial policy as both a stumbling block to and a facilitator of 
co-operation between MacDonald, the Conservative party and individual 
Liberals.119 
In emphasizing the importance of Article 22 of the League of Nations 
charter to the development of inter-war imperial policy, Windel endorses 
Susan Pedersen’s argument that the League of Nations mandate system 
represented a significant move away from the imperial mindset of the 
nineteenth century.120 Although the requirements that the mandatory 
powers oversee their new territories with an eye towards encouraging self-
government and establishing democratic institutions were largely observed 
 119 E. H. H. Green, The Crisis of Conservatism: the Politics, Economics and Ideology of the 
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in the breach, the existence of a commission to which the powers would 
annually have to justify their administration of the mandates, and where 
grievances could be aired and debated, created a discursive space in which 
the muscular imperialism of the previous century could no longer be 
openly defended. While Satia emphasizes the continued limitations on the 
information about imperial activity made available to the public, Pedersen 
focuses on the increased transparency compared to the previous period. 
Both, however, acknowledge the increasing importance of public opinion 
to imperial policy.
One of the central themes of this volume is the growing role of public 
opinion in shaping policy both at home and abroad. The advent of mass 
democracy after 1918 meant that inter-war Britons had an unprecedented 
opportunity to shape the development of the British nation. While ‘public 
opinion’ had always played a role in policy-making, the franchise reforms 
of 1918 and 1928 greatly expanded the scope of the political public. The 
emergence of a new mass media similarly expanded the number of voices 
claiming to speak for that public, and to articulate an agenda for both 
domestic and imperial reform. However, nation-building is not only 
about politics and policies. The chapters in this volume illuminate how 
Britons sought to redefine what it meant to be British, politically, socially 
and culturally, in both a domestic and broader imperial and international 
context. In so doing, they reassert the centrality and complexity of national 
identity in defining the history of inter-war Britain.
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1. Political modernity and ‘government’ in the 
construction of inter-war democracy: 
local and national encounters
Geraint Thomas
The evolution of public politics over the course of the long nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries shows no sign of abating as an area of interest 
among political and, increasingly, cultural historians. Covering the period 
of enfranchisement that lasted from 1832 until 1918 (or 1928, the date of 
equal franchise for men and women) and the growth of mass media in 
the twentieth century, these historians’ fascination has essentially been 
with the relationship between ‘local’ and ‘centre’, ‘people’ and ‘politicians’. 
Frequently, their analysis has been conducted under the influence of, or 
while debating, the linguistic turn, postmodernism and a host of other 
-isms.1 The inter-war period is a pivotal episode in the transformation they 
describe, as a time when the plebeian traditions of Victorian and Edwardian 
popular politics met the modernity of mass-scale political communication. 
The story that follows demonstrates the formative part played by this 
confrontation, and by the activists who negotiated it, in forging Britain’s 
modern democratic culture. From this arise the themes required for us 
to develop a more subtle awareness of the dynamics between locality and 
centre in the inter-war polity.
The inter-war Conservative party is considered a pioneering force in the 
development of new methods of mass political communication. Its wealth 
enabled it to move quickly towards a professional system of publicity 
departments, whose innovations set the pace and style of electioneering 
practice for a generation and more. Cinema newsreels, radio broadcasts 
 1 For a synoptic discussion of the general subject matter, see J. Lawrence, Electing our 
Masters: the Hustings in British Politics from Hogarth to Blair (Oxford, 2009). For the key 
staging posts in this debate, see G. Stedman Jones, ‘Rethinking Chartism’, in his Languages 
of Class: Studies in English Working Class History, 1832–1982 (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 90–
178; P. Joyce, Visions of the People: Industrial England and the Question of Class, 1848–1914 
(Cambridge, 1991); J. Vernon, Politics and the People: Study in English Political Culture, 
c.1815–67 (Cambridge, 1993); and J. Lawrence, Speaking for the People: Party, Language and 
Popular Politics in England, 1867–1914 (Cambridge, 1998). 
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and publications printed in the latest ‘popular’ style were all deployed, 
with the content of public appeals tailored according to readings of 
social, cultural and demographic trends. Embodying this strategy was 
Stanley Baldwin, Conservative leader between 1923 and 1937, who became 
probably the most familiar political figure of the inter-war years and who 
is now credited with adapting the party’s public appeal to suit the brave 
new world of mass democracy.2 The Labour party, we have tended to 
think, had an altogether more difficult task harnessing the advent of 
mass communication. Many in the early Labour party entertained a 
deep suspicion of the capitalist media, typically reflected in a fraught 
relationship with the press and its proprietors. But as Laura Beers’s work 
has shown, this is not to say that the party either lacked the initiative 
to exploit new media or failed to do so. True, the media’s ‘anti-socialist 
turn’ of the mid 1920s was the nadir of Labour’s public relations strategy, 
the combined result of an internal party victory for those suspicious of 
using the capitalist media to convert voters to socialism and the press’s 
own acquiescence in the Conservatives’ concerted ‘Red Scare’ campaigns. 
Yet, this difficult period simply brings into sharper focus the otherwise 
sophisticated nature of Labour’s media strategy for most of the inter-war 
years, reciprocated in the early 1920s by some sympathetic press coverage 
and crucial in the 1930s for laying the groundwork for Clement Attlee’s 
great victory of 1945.3
Following the debates on ‘class’ that raged through the 1980s and 1990s, 
it is now the idea of ‘modernity’ that assumes centre stage among historians 
of political culture. Modernity can be used as an analytical category to 
study the various processes of modernization – capitalism, imperialism, 
globalization, urbanization, democratization, the rise of civil society. Of 
late, it has gathered the significance of a subject matter in its own right, 
with increasing attention paid to examining its discursive forms (that 
is, its varied constructions and contested meanings) and the notion of 
‘consciousness’ (the ways in which society experienced and understood the 
 2 J. Ramsden, ‘Baldwin and film’, in Propaganda, Politics and Film, 1918–45, ed. N. 
Pronay and D. W. Spring (1982), pp. 126–43; S. Nicholas, ‘The construction of a national 
identity: Stanley Baldwin, “Englishness” and the mass media in inter-war Britain’, in The 
Conservatives and British Society, 1880–1990, ed. M. Francis and I. Zweiniger-Bargielowska 
(Cardiff, 1996), pp. 127–46; D. Jarvis, ‘The shaping of Conservative electoral hegemony, 
1918–39’, in Party, State and Society: Electoral Behaviour in Britain since 1820, ed. J. Lawrence 
and M. Taylor (Aldershot, 1997), pp. 131–52; P. Williamson, Stanley Baldwin: Conservative 
Leadership and National Values (Cambridge, 1999), ch. 5.
 3 L. Beers, Your Britain: Media and the Making of the Labour Party (Harvard, Conn., 
2010).
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condition of the modern).4 Despite this, many of the questions raised by 
the study of modernity, and especially our understandings of consciousness, 
have yet to be integrated in any comprehensive sense into the analysis of 
party politics. The Conservative party may justifiably be thought of as the 
most ‘modern’, or advanced, party between the wars, partly for the reasons 
outlined above.5 Conversely, British modernity was itself ‘conservative’ in 
many ways. Indeed, it has been suggested that the Conservatives stood to 
benefit most from this ‘conservatism’ inherent within British modernity, 
such as that in the popular middlebrow literature famously discussed by 
Alison Light and in the longue durée of democratization which, as Jon 
Lawrence argues, established (or prolonged) the ‘paternalistic’ influence of 
institutions such as the BBC and the established church.6 
Yet, political modernity, even when perceived as largely ‘conservative’ 
in nature, was still mutable and contested in practice. As the Labour party 
ultimately proved, the traditional idioms and institutions of British political 
life were available for non-conservative forces to coalesce around and thereby 
demonstrate their moderation to voters.7 However, the development of 
democratic culture between the wars also reveals the controversial impact 
of political modernity within parties; in other words, not only between 
rival ideological and electoral camps, as might be expected, but between 
those bound by party loyalties. This raises the question of what the political 
modernity of the inter-war years meant to political actors in different 
political spaces. The difficulty facing a party seeking a coherent response 
to the mass franchise was the essential fact that local and national actors 
occupied different worlds and so often operated according to conflicting 
world-views. This was not new, as histories of Victorian political culture 
 4 See S. Gunn and J. Vernon, ‘Introduction’, in The Peculiarities of Liberal Modernity in 
Imperial Britain, ed. S. Gunn and J. Vernon (Berkeley, Calif., 2011), esp. pp. 3–7. Other 
notable works on representations and discourses of British modernity are Modern Times: a 
Century of English Modernity, ed. M. Nava and A. O’Shea (1996); Moments of Modernity: 
Reconstructing Britain, 1945–64, ed. B. Conekin, F. Mort and C. Waters (1998); Singular 
Continuities: Tradition, Nostalgia and National Identity in Modern British Culture, ed. G. K. 
Behlmer and F. M. Leventhal (Stanford, Calif., 2000); Meanings of Modernity: Britain from 
the Late-Victorian Era to World War II, ed. M. Daunton and B. Rieger (Oxford, 2001).
 5 In addition to n. 2, see R. Cockett, ‘The party, publicity and the media’, in Conservative 
Century: the Conservative Party since 1900, ed. A. Seldon and S. Ball (Oxford, 1994), pp. 
547–77, esp. pp. 549–64; Lawrence, Electing our Masters, pp. 98–9, 110–11.
 6 A. Light, Forever England: Femininity, Literature and Conservatism between the Wars 
(1991), esp. pp. 14–16; J. Lawrence, ‘Paternalism, class, and the British path to modernity’, 
in Gunn and Vernon, Peculiarities of Liberal Modernity, pp. 147–64.
 7 See M. Pugh, ‘The rise of Labour and the political culture of Conservatism, 1890–1945’, 
History, lxxxvii (2002), 514–37. For a statement of Labour’s constitutional conservatism, see 
Ramsay MacDonald’s Parliament and Revolution (1919), ch. 8.
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tell us.8 This chapter takes the story forward by exploring some of the 
specific circumstances surrounding political nation-building after 1918. This 
involved not only the growing use of mass media by the party hierarchy 
but, crucially, the responses of local political actors to this manipulation 
– sometimes promising, sometimes intrusive – of the national political 
culture. Taken together, it sees the period as one in which the dynamics 
between local and national, grassroots and leadership, were fundamentally 
recalibrated as each sought to negotiate the opportunities and challenges of 
a new democratic age.
Throughout the inter-war years, the activities of local political actors were 
shaped by two main considerations. One was the assumption, sometimes 
more deliberately articulated as a key objective, that voters should continue 
to participate in the political system with a distinctly – though not 
exclusively – local mindset. This would preserve the key place of locality 
while also ensuring certain continuities of practice in the new democracy. 
The other consideration was a systematic interest in the development of 
mass communication techniques and, consequently, how the new media 
could carry national discourses that reinforced particular local appeals. 
Following the great focus in the 1980s and 1990s on the role of language 
in the construction of political identity, this chapter picks up on recent 
work on material history in order to recapture the centrality of the material 
interest in local political life. This does not negate the importance of 
language – quite the opposite, in fact, since it sheds light on why and how 
activists were so discerning in their reception of the nationally constructed 
discourse of their leaders. Section one introduces this world-view of party 
activists, with particular reference to Birmingham and Ilford.
As the second section argues, for most of the 1920s political leaders and 
party strategists were pursuing a rather different objective: shaping, rather 
than representing, public opinion. Ideas about the ‘public’, and indeed the 
‘people’, were familiar to politicians long before the First World War,9 but 
there was a renewed effort after 1918 to understand the phenomenon. This 
derived not only from the new imperatives of the adult franchise, but rather 
arose in combination with advances in the social sciences and especially in 
social psychology. Here, the new emphasis on applicable theories – what 
become known as ‘practical psychology’, for use in the real political system 
– found an audience among party strategists eager to grasp new methods 
 8 No better confirmation of this can be had than by reading in succession Lawrence, 
Speaking for the People and M. Bentley, Lord Salisbury’s World: Conservative Environments in 
Late-Victorian Britain (Cambridge, 2001). 
 9 See J. Thompson, ‘The idea of “public opinion” in Britain, 1870–1914’ (unpublished 
University of Cambridge PhD thesis, 2000); Joyce, Visions of the People.
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of managing the democratic process. As will become clear, contrasting 
local and national conceptions of the body politic led to very different and 
sometimes conflicting political practices. One of the striking implications 
of this, explored in the third section, is the emergence of a dichotomy 
in which material politics, favoured by local actors seeking to ‘represent’ 
voters, and the politics of ‘values’, favoured by national actors seeking to 
‘manage’ the mass of voters, formed a constantly shifting balance of local and 
national agencies. The factor best placed to negotiate these cross currents, 
and too often neglected in histories of popular politics, was government. As 
a construct, ‘government’ was capable both of narrowing the gulf between 
local and national ideas of controlling mass democracy and of mediating 
the typically ‘national’ language perpetuated by the modern mass media. 
Even though this was true of the 1920s, it only became strikingly clear in the 
1930s when, for the Conservatives at least, the circumstances of the National 
Government enabled the party to reconcile local and national projects. 
Political nation-building in the locality
During the last year of war, Conservatives up and down the country 
busily took stock of their party’s preparedness for the brave new world 
of British politics following the implementation of the Representation 
of the People Act, which had reached the statute book in February that 
year. Local party organization was a major concern, not least because of 
the redistribution clauses contained within the legislation, which, in the 
name of ‘equalization’, had both created new constituencies and altered the 
constellation of seats in large urban centres such as Birmingham.10 More 
than that, this focus on local organization reflected the determination of the 
grassroots to reconstruct a political nation that unmistakably locked party 
and politics into the local community.
We can pick out this trend by looking to two areas as examples. In 
Birmingham, Conservatives in all bar one of the dozen constituencies came 
together to form the Birmingham Conservative and Unionist Association, 
a central organization charged with co-ordinating Unionist activity in the 
city. Modelled on the old caucus politics that had shaped Birmingham’s 
reputation as the cockpit of Victorian radicalism, and with Neville 
Chamberlain as its ambitious architect, the organization clearly anticipated 
the continuation of a resonant communitarian culture. Its aims were to 
reaffirm the party’s ubiquity in all facets of municipal life and to achieve a 
high level of self-sufficiency in matters of propaganda and activist training. 
 10 M. Kinnear, The British Voter: an Atlas and Survey since 1885 (1968), p. 70; Conservative 
Agents’ Journal (hereafter CAJ), Jan. 1918, p. 18.
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Local activists proudly referred to their plans as ‘the Birmingham scheme’ 
of party organization.11 
What this meant in practice can be seen in the way Birmingham 
Conservatives responded to Labour’s early post-war advance. The Labour 
party made its mark in the municipal elections of 1919, taking control of 
Bradford and a dozen London boroughs, together with the county councils 
of Durham, Glamorganshire and Monmouthshire. Taken together, the party 
gained sufficient new ground across the country, including in Birmingham 
where it won the same number of municipal contests as the Conservatives, 
for its success to resemble something approaching a national breakthrough.12 
The Birmingham Conservatives’ response was to augment the local as the site 
of political competition. It did so, to begin with, by establishing a limited 
company charged with publishing a Unionist monthly, The Straightforward, 
to rival Labour’s Town Crier. The magazine had originally been a short-
lived project of the party in the West Birmingham division in 1914. Its 
brief now was to be ‘as local as possible’, with the odd ‘trenchant’ article 
on national affairs.13 In addition, a body called the Unionist Propaganda 
Society was formed. This would become the eyes and ears of the party in 
the city, reporting to the main association on the state of public opinion, 
while also recruiting and educating working-class speakers with the aim of 
encouraging ‘open-air meetings in the streets’.14
Such efforts to revitalize the local political scene could not always entail 
rehabilitating aspects of pre-1914 strategy. Whereas the reassertion of the 
 11 Birmingham Central Library, Birmingham Conservative and Unionist Association 
(hereafter BCL, Birmingham CUA), AQ329.94249, minutes of special meeting, 1 July 
1918; The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, i: the Making of a Politician, 1915–20, ed. R. 
Self (Aldershot, 2000), pp. 281–2 (to Hilda, 3 Aug. 1918). After standing aloof in 1918, the 
party association in the Erdington division entered the central organization in 1920 (BCL, 
Birmingham CUA, management committee, 20 Jan. 1920).
 12 The Conservative and Labour parties won 9 contests each in Birmingham in 1919, 
although the Conservatives continued to have an overall majority on the council (66 
councillors to Labour’s 24) (S. Davies and B. Morley, County Borough Elections in England 
and Wales, 1918–38. A Comparative Analysis, i: Barnsley-Bournemouth (Aldershot, 1999), pp. 
237, 240, 645). The Labour victories of 1919 occurred despite the fact that most of the new 
and unpropertied male voters traditionally associated with the party could still not vote 
at municipal level (see D. Tanner, ‘Elections, statistics, and the rise of the Labour party, 
1906–31’, Historical Journal, xxxiv (1991), 893–908, at p. 906).
 13 BCL, Birmingham CUA, management committee, 15 March 1920, sub-committee, 31 
March, 12 Apr. 1920.
 14 BCL, Birmingham CUA, management committee, 9 July 1920. The need for effective 
party workers is made clear in The Austen Chamberlain Diary Letters: the Correspondence 
of Sir Austen Chamberlain with his Sisters Hilda and Ida, 1916–37, ed. R. Self (Cambridge, 
1995), pp. 99–100 (to Ida, 8 Dec. 1918).
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‘civic gospel’ in Birmingham appeared feasible, given the party’s established 
connections, Conservatives in the new parliamentary seat of Ilford lacked 
historic civic institutions and had few other sources of continuity on which 
to draw. Ilford was not only a new seat, carved out of the old county seat of 
Romford, but also a new town, having expanded from a rural Essex village 
of just 11,000 inhabitants in 1891 to a desirable outer-London suburb, home 
to over 85,000 by 1921. The population would expand further still, both in 
size and social diversity, with the building of the London County Council’s 
Becontree estate, part of which lay in the division. Ilford Conservatives made 
it their task to shape a civic culture that would impose a strong local imprint 
on residents’ political identity, not only through the routine contestation 
of municipal politics but also through the politicization of voters’ urban 
experience. Thus, throughout the early 1920s the Conservatives’ appeal 
centred on a campaign to grant Ilford borough status, through which the 
party hoped to prove itself the champion of the community’s urban future, 
shaping rather than observing Ilford’s advancement ‘from village pump to 
Town Hall’.15 
Given the period under discussion here, during which the political 
and social vicissitudes of war and franchise reform were felt (and their 
consequences predicted) most acutely, what should strike us is the 
unexceptional nature of post-war political organization in Birmingham 
and Ilford. At a time when anxieties about the future of politics gripped 
members of the three main parties – the Conservatives feared a ‘socialist’ 
working class, Labour a ‘capitalist’ working class, and each party in its own 
way feared an ‘irrational’ electorate16 – constituency parties reverted to 
localism, which had been a key feature of the construction and expression 
of political identity before 1914. Of course, the lines dividing national and 
local politics had been blurred some time earlier, through, for instance, the 
growth of the popular national press in the late nineteenth century. Even so, 
political culture continued to be shaped by what Jon Lawrence has called 
the ‘politics of place’ – a concept that has helped historians fundamentally 
to revise the narrative of nationalization by asking ‘how national politics 
were refracted through local political cultures and traditions, and how 
this process of mediation helped to shape patterns of allegiance within a 
constituency’.17 That constituency parties re-established the politics of 
 15 Ilford Monthly, July, Dec. 1925
 16 D. Jarvis, ‘British Conservatism and class politics in the 1920s’, English Historical 
Review, cxi (1996), 59–84; S. Macintyre, ‘British Labour, Marxism and working class apathy 
in the 1920s’, Historical Journal, xx (1977), 479–96; M. Bentley, The Liberal Mind, 1914–29 
(Cambridge, 1977). 
 17 Lawrence, Speaking for the People, p. 6. 
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place after the war not by default but by design is a signal reminder of the 
continued centrality of the local to activists’ assumptions about political 
participation in the new democracy. 
Political nation-building from the centre
Political nation-building after the war, then, involved local as well as national 
processes. Local activists were not unthinkingly parochial, nor were they 
immutably hostile to political discourse emanating from the centre; so long 
as the national rhetoric spoke to their needs, it could often be embraced as 
an integral component of the politics of place. However, the question of 
what political issues provided the basis of the nation-building process, and 
how different political actors intended it to relate to voters, reveals a real 
gulf between the national and the local that lasted throughout the 1920s.
In particular, local and national politicians differed in their conception 
of the place and nature of corporate identity within the political system. 
Lawrence has recently argued that Britain’s path to political modernity was 
as much a ‘conservative’ as a ‘liberal’ one. The process of democratization 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, he argues, came to be shaped by 
a ‘Tory liberal’ creed defined by a ‘widespread acceptance of patrician ideas 
about the merits of elite government and the need to preserve (or as often 
reinvent) “natural” social hierarchies’. Collective identification, facilitated 
by different social groups – parish, town or nation, church or chapel, club 
or union – reflected corporate communities within which paternalism and 
mutuality, but not equality, were legitimate social dynamics. These social 
structures, continuously in flux and susceptible to periodic reinvention, 
ensured that the corporate rather than the individual continued as the focal 
point of political strategies to manage identity.18 
For national political leaders, this notion of the corporate became 
more important still after 1918. It constituted an important facet in the 
‘traditional’ Victorian values that underpinned the practices of public 
and political leadership between the wars; so much so, in fact, that 
developments including the trajectory of the BBC under John Reith and 
political broadcasting as practised by Baldwin, both pioneering within 
the history of communication techniques, might in the broader context 
be considered little more than new bottles for old wine. But like any 
vintage, it too changed over time, with ambitions about the scope of the 
corporate now fashioned by the unprecedented influence wielded by the 
human sciences in the realm of political practice. In particular, the years 
following the Great War witnessed a growing recognition of the potential 
 18 Lawrence, ‘Paternalism, class, and the British path to modernity’, esp. pp. 149–53.
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of psychology as a solution to a range of social problems. This both built 
on the Edwardians’ popular interest in the psychological dimension of 
human development and preluded the process of anthropologizing Western 
(specifically Anglo-American) society that informed the governing practices 
of the state during the Second World War.19 This reflected a widespread 
belief, shared by industrialists, health practitioners and educationalists, that 
the effective control of social and political change lay not in institutions and 
structures but in the management of ideas and attitudes. The discipline was 
now applied by industrialists to employment and labour relations (as well 
as by philanthropists to the condition of unemployment), by businessmen 
to the design of advertisements, by health practitioners to the treatment 
of shellshock among war veterans, and by educationalists across many 
fields seeking to direct the public’s understanding of the international and 
domestic fallout of total war.20 Crucially, in Britain, where the deconstructive 
impulse of psychoanalysis and the spectre of the individual subjected to 
scientific experimentation met cultural resistance, applied psychology 
developed a unifying, even ameliorating, ethos. In this way it developed 
with the political grain, having much to offer party strategists by way of 
shaping corporate identities. 
In his evaluation of the impact of psychology in Britain by the mid 
twentieth century, Matthew Thomson argues that its potential was realized 
more in theory than practice because it was forced by the presence of certain 
key subjectivities, or ‘ideological moods’, to be accommodated within 
existing frameworks. Thus, he claims, the psychology that advanced the 
 19 See A. Wooldridge, Measuring the Mind: Education and Psychology in England, c.1860–
1990 (Cambridge, 1994), esp. ch. 9; P. Mandler, ‘Margaret Mead amongst the natives of 
Great Britain’, Past & Present, cciv (2009), 195–233.
 20 In addition to Daniel Ussishkin’s chapter in this volume, see D. L. LeMahieu, A Culture 
for Democracy: Mass Communication and the Cultivated Mind in Britain between the Wars 
(Oxford, 1988), p. 162; R. Overy, The Morbid Age: Britain between the Wars (2009), ch. 4. For 
general accounts charting the rise of psychology in this period, see N. Rose, The Psychological 
Complex: Psychology, Politics and Society in England, 1869–1939 (1985); G. D. Richards, ‘Britain 
on the couch: the popularization of psychoanalysis in Britain, 1918–40’, Science in Context, 
xiii (2000), 183–230; and M. Thomson, Psychological Subjects: Identity, Culture, and Health 
in 20th-Century Britain (Oxford, 2006). Both Rose and Thomson emphasize the applied 
(non-Freudian) aspects of the discipline, but Thomson goes farthest beyond disciplinary 
boundaries, highlighting the popular ‘excitement’ surrounding psychology’s potential and 
paying particular attention to scrutinizing its practical influence within a shifting historical 
context that involved, as he says, ‘messy politics, competing interests, and economic realities’ 
(p. 7). For fascinating examples of the impact of psychology at the level of the individual, and 
shedding some light on the processes by which Victorian values were slowly broken down or 
transmogrified across the 1930s–50s, see J. Hinton, Nine Wartime Lives: Mass-Observation and 
the Making of the Modern Self (Oxford, 2010), esp. pp. 18, 120, 135. 
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most was that seen to be ‘validating the essential mental health of British 
political culture and national character’.21 Psychology did not transform 
the political system in Britain as it had done on the continent under the 
dictators.22 But to downplay its impact upon the political system is to 
underestimate the extent to which national politicians were able to apply its 
teachings creatively and proactively within the status quo, creating different 
conditions in which others, including grassroots activists, could work. 
Of those shaping national politics – perhaps the ‘fifty or sixty’ individuals 
who mattered to Cowling23 – we know that some were influenced by the 
vocabulary and insights of psychology, directly or indirectly. This can be 
seen in three ways, each of which highlights an intersection between politics 
and the social sciences that deserves further dedicated research. The first is 
the politicians’ connections with the literary canon of applied psychology. 
It is difficult to gauge the full readership of such works as Wilfred Trotter’s 
The Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War (1916) or the many reprints of 
William McDougall’s Introduction to Social Psychology (1908) and Graham 
Wallas’s Human Nature in Politics (1908), but it is possible to deduce 
the character of those inspired and targeted by them. These works were 
influential during the war, Trotter’s in particular having been encouraged 
by the government ‘as a contribution to national morale in wartime’.24 In 
his post-war manifesto to the Labour movement, Ramsay MacDonald drew 
heavily on ideas of the ‘herd instinct’ to craft his thoughts about how the 
party should engage voters in the new franchise.25 Public figures including 
Thomas Jones, the senior civil servant, philanthropist and educationalist, 
and John Reith, the director-general of the BBC, both of whom were close 
advisers to Baldwin, were also keen students of psychological readings of 
post-war problems, especially in industry, and used such insights as they 
gained in their own fields.26 Added to this is the fact that the most prolific 
author of social psychology at the time, Graham Wallas, had himself been 
active in the Lib-Lab debates of the Edwardian years, like J. A. Hobson, first 
as a leading Fabian and then as a force in London politics.27
 21 Thomson, Psychological Subjects, p. 209.
 22 See, e.g., U. Geuter, The Professionalization of Psychology in Nazi Germany (Cambridge, 
1992).
 23 According to his definition of ‘high politics’ (M. Cowling, The Impact of Labour, 1920–
4: the Beginning of Modern British Politics (Cambridge, 1971), p. 3).
 24 D. Holdstock, ‘Trotter, Wilfred Batten Lewis (1872–1939)’, Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography (Oxford, 2004; online edn., Oct. 2006) <http://www.oxforddnb.com/
view/article/36562> [accessed 24 Oct. 2011].
 25 R. MacDonald, A Policy for the Labour Party (1920), p. 67.
 26 LeMahieu, A Culture for Democracy, pp. 141–54; J. C. W. Reith, Broadcast over Britain (1924). 
 27 M. J. Wiener, Between Two Worlds: the Political Thought of Graham Wallas (Oxford, 1971).
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The second factor to consider is the development of political science 
in Britain and its influence on contemporary political practice. Both the 
Victorians and Edwardians had shown a keen interest in the ‘noble science 
of politics’, especially in times of franchise reform and constitutional crisis. 
This genre of political science dealt overwhelmingly with the structures 
of political systems and shaped debates on electoral reform through 
comparative studies of the two-party systems in Britain and America. 
These played a part in the franchise debates of 1917–18, which rejected 
proportional representation as antithetical to the two-party system, 
and continued to exert influence into the 1920s. One example of this is 
Baldwin’s statecraft, which aimed at displacing the Liberals with Labour 
so as to preserve (or restore) a two-party system that ‘institutionalized’ a 
particular issue – in this case anti-socialism – in the Conservatives’ favour.28 
With the input of social psychology, political science became considerably 
more diverse in its applicability, perhaps more so than contemporaries at 
the time fully realized. In his Human Nature in Politics, Wallas stated that 
individuals comprehended the complexities of their political environment 
through ‘symbolism’, and added that the political party, with its colours, 
tunes, myths and rituals – more than its ideology – was the ultimate symbol 
in British political life.29 After 1918, it was commonly held that the social 
sciences were slow to make their mark in Britain, in contrast with America, 
where, McDougall felt, ‘the public interest in psychology and sociology 
is much more widespread than in these islands’.30 Yet, American political 
science was remarkably responsive to British social psychology and the 
American experience of democracy continued to interest politicians and 
party strategists across the Atlantic.31 For one American commentator 
keen to develop the practicable results that could be derived from the 
social sciences, Wallas’s works ‘represent[ed] … the best that sociology has 
to offer in the way of suggestions to political science’. ‘It can no longer 
afford to concern itself with metaphysical questions about society or with 
unreal conceptions of human nature, but must deal with actual conditions 
 28 A. J. Taylor, ‘Stanley Baldwin, heresthetics and the realignment of British politics’, 
British Journal of Political Science, xxxv (2005), 429–63.
 29 G. Wallas, Human Nature in Politics (1908; 1921 edn., repr. 1981), pp. 103–17.
 30 W. McDougall, The Group Mind (1920), preface to the American edition, p. vii.
 31 For American democracy in Victorian political debate, see J. Roper, Democracy and its 
Critics: Anglo-American Democratic Thought in the 19th Century (1989); and R. Saunders, 
Democracy and the Vote in British Politics, 1848–67: the Making of the Second Reform Act 
(Farnham, 2011), ch. 5. One of the broader cultural themes underpinning such exchanges, 
namely the debate over the relationship of democracy to national identity, is discussed in A. 
Smith, ‘The “cult” of Abraham Lincoln and the strange survival of liberal England in the era 
of the world wars’, Twentieth Century British History, xxi (2010), 486–509. 
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of the present’.32 Likewise in Britain, where the exchange between social 
psychology and political science (generally along British and American lines 
respectively) created a quasi-academic community that dispensed solutions 
to the challenges of post-war democracy.33
The third area is the content of this dialogue, especially the nation-
building concerns of both social science and national politicians. Common 
to all political leaders was a fear of the ‘mass mind’, something that was 
hardly new to those seasoned by Edwardian election campaigns but which 
became more acutely felt with the onset of adult enfranchisement and the 
proliferation of commercial entertainment after 1918.34 While it is right to 
view the concerns of politicians like Baldwin as emanating from the same 
Victorian cultural ‘distrust of the frivolous, the spontaneous, the sensual’ 
displayed by men like Reith, for whom culture was the ‘moral governor’ of 
society,35 their desire to understand the mass mind might also be seen as an 
attempt to gain greater ability to gauge public opinion in the days before 
opinion polls. Social psychology’s claim to be a science, capable of the 
‘statistical measurement of human conduct’, was thus a propitious starting 
point.36 More important than this were the substantive ways in which 
the discipline addressed itself to how the mass mind could be organized 
in advanced industrial democracies. Both Wallas, in Our Social Heritage 
(1921), and McDougall, in The Group Mind (1920), dismissed as outdated 
the main organizing forces of the nineteenth century, the territorial state and 
capitalism. Wallas did so for progressive ideological reasons and McDougall 
in favour of updated methods. Yet, the category of the ‘nation’ remained 
central to their conception of human co-operation and, ultimately, to 
the way they viewed the electoral objectives of political leaders. As Wallas 
explained: ‘since that scale [of the modern industrial nation] far surpasses 
the range of our senses, we should consciously aim at creating in our own 
 32 H. E. Barnes, ‘Some typical contributions of English sociology to political theory’, 
American Journal of Sociology, xxviii (1922), 179–204, at p. 202.
 33 See J. G. Gunnell, ‘Making democracy safe for the world: political science between the 
wars’, in Modern Political Science: Anglo-American Exchanges since 1880, ed. R. Adcock, M. 
Bevir and S. C. Stimson (Princeton, NJ, 2007), pp. 137–57.
 34 Commenting on Randolph Churchill’s intervention as an unofficial Conservative 
candidate at the 1935 by-election in Wavertree, Austen Chamberlain lamented ‘the love of 
a stunt[,] which is one of the chief elements in the life of the mass of electors today’. He 
continued: ‘A film star could win almost any seat in the country, and Randolph would make 
an excellent film star’ (Austen Chamberlain Diary Letters, p. 475 (to Ida, 9 Dec. 1935)). See also 
Williamson, Stanley Baldwin, pp. 143–8; Ramsay MacDonald’s Political Writings, ed. B. Barker 
(1972), p. 226 (from Parliament and Revolution); Bentley, The Liberal Mind, esp. ch. 4.
 35 LeMahieu, A Culture for Democracy, p. 145.
 36 Barnes, ‘Some typical contributions of English sociology’, p. 202.
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minds and in those minds whose training we influence, such an idea of our 
nation as will form the most reliable stimulus to large-scale co-operative 
emotion and co-operative action’.37 
McDougall addressed much of his advice directly to political leaders. In 
his book of 1908 he argued that the statesman can ‘set the tone of political 
life’ through ‘eloquence and parliamentary skill’, putting in place a process 
of ‘social imitation’ whereby people in the constituencies associate with the 
‘prestige’ of a leader and his values.38 In The Group Mind, which has a chapter 
dedicated to ‘The part of leaders in national life’, his advice turns to the 
importance of modern communication facilities in shaping public opinion 
and transcending the distances involved in modern ‘political organisms’, 
whether within nations or across nations within the empire. Recalling the 
general election of January 1910, he argued that the use of the motor car (‘at 
that time the latest great addition to our means of communication’) had 
boosted voter turnout and thereby produced a ‘more complete expression 
of the will of the people than any preceding’ election.39 By the early 1920s, 
the wireless set and the ‘amplifier’ were the latest inventions. As Lionel 
Curtis, the influential Round Table thinker on imperial and international 
affairs, enthused to Thomas Jones: ‘You must realise that by means of this 
instrument [the amplifier] the P.M. could sit in Downing Street and address 
audiences of unlimited number simultaneously in Birmingham, Manchester, 
Liverpool, Cardiff, Edinburgh, and Glasgow. It means incredible addition 
to the power of the political leader’.40 
For the purposes of this chapter, it is worth highlighting three ideas 
expounded in the nation-building plans of social psychologists that emerge 
uncannily centre-stage in the electoral strategy of Conservative and Labour 
leaders. The first and most general is Wallas’s rule that ‘national co-operation 
is more dependent on our social heritage than group co-operation’; that is 
to say, national identity is constructed and relies on the imagination while 
group identity is local and derived from experience.41 This can be viewed as 
a partial precursor of Benedict Anderson’s famous ‘imagined community’ 
thesis, which highlights the growing vernacular literacy of the masses and 
the role of ‘print capitalism’ in shaping modern national identities in the 
 37 G. Wallas, Our Social Heritage (1921), p. 101.
 38 W. McDougall, An Introduction to Social Psychology (1908; 2nd edn., 1909), p. 338.
 39 McDougall, Group Mind, pp. 182, 184. Note the book’s subtitle: A Sketch of the Principles 
of Collective Psychology with some Attempt to Apply them to the Interpretation of National Life 
and Character. 
 40 Whitehall Diary, i, ed. K. Middlemas (Oxford, 1969), p. 206 (Curtis to Jones, 20 Aug. 
1922).
 41 Wallas, Our Social Heritage, pp. 10, 77–100.
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nineteenth century. During the 1920s, as we know, the Conservative and 
Labour parties forged elaborate national strategies aimed at organizing 
voters into imagined ideological communities.42 The second idea relates to 
McDougall’s explanation of the precise relationship between national and 
local identities under modern conditions:
Easy means of communication promote development in the direction of the 
organic unity of a nation in another way – namely, they promote specialisation 
of the functions of different regions; they thus render local groups incapable of 
living as relatively independent closes communities … hence they develop the 
common interest of each part in the good of the whole.43
This anticipated Baldwin’s attempts to associate Conservatism in the 
public’s mind with ‘national values’ while still wanting to seem alive to the 
parochialism of constituents.44 The third is Wallas’s idea of vocationalism 
as an organizing force, a suggestion he chooses to explore rather than 
prescribe, owing to the chequered history of guild organization as a method 
of government over the centuries. As a means of identity, however, he 
does not doubt the ‘vocational tendency among manual and intellectual 
workers’, and this anticipated the unifying workerist ethos which made up 
Labour’s claim to be a ‘national’ party in the 1920s.45 
The advent of social psychology had some far-reaching effects on British 
politics. Most notably it proved seminal in the political thought of the 
architects of post-war Labour revisionism.46 More immediately, the value 
of social psychology for politicians was that it helped them to understand 
the irrational and instinctive processes of the mind without pandering to 
them, thus enabling them to use this understanding to manage the modern 
construction of democracy. The Conservative strategist Philip Cambray 
had come to appreciate the importance of putting in place a continuous 
process of campaigning, or fashioning the electorate. Before 1918 it had 
been necessary for a successful political campaign to influence public 
 42 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism 
(1983). See Jarvis, ‘British Conservatism and class politics’ and L. Beers, ‘Education or 
manipulation? Labour, democracy and the popular press in interwar Britain’, Journal of 
British Studies, xlviii (2009), 129–52.
 43 McDougall, Group Mind, p. 184.
 44 Williamson, Stanley Baldwin, p. 251.
 45 Wallas, Our Social Heritage, p. 104; on the ‘workerist’ label, see J. Lawrence, ‘Labour 
and the politics of class, 1900–40’, in Structures and Transformations in Modern British 
History, ed. D. Feldman and J. Lawrence (Cambridge, 2011), pp. 237–60.
 46 The key text here is E. Durbin, The Politics of Democratic Socialism (1940). See also J. 
Nuttall, Psychological Socialism: the Labour Party and Qualities of Mind and Character, 1931 
to the Present (Manchester, 2006), ch. 2. 
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(not just voter) opinion, on the grounds that voters were swayed by, and 
would not vote contrary to, ‘public opinion’. Adult franchise disrupted 
this equilibrium: ‘The change that has taken place in recent [post-war] 
years is that public opinion and electoral opinion have been made almost 
coincident … the two are practically one. The mass now exercises direct 
electoral influence’.47 In other words, underpinning a general anxiety about 
mass democracy was a specific concern about the loss of public opinion; 
once considered, rather paternalistically, as the express will of the masses, 
public opinion now became more than ever before something that political 
leaders had to construct with care. The result was that electoral politics in 
the 1920s came to centre on the construction of multiple publics, as leaders 
and strategists at the centre saw in the new methods of communication 
the means not just to appeal to voters but to cast the mass of voters as a 
legitimate repository of their party’s core values. Hence, the (Conservatives’) 
anti-socialist ‘public’ and the (Labour party’s) workerist ‘public’.48 
A particular feature of political modernity as shaped by the social sciences 
was the tendency to think in terms of reforming the individual, not just the 
masses. Although more immediately applicable to totalitarian regimes on 
the continent,49 this also relates to a specific problem facing British political 
parties at the time. This was the emergence of a ‘silent majority’, so called 
because politicians felt that most voters had turned away from the usual 
rituals of participatory politics, thanks to either apathy or the distractions 
of commercial entertainment, and had thus become anonymous figures in 
the political system.50 Many articulate figures like Reith, whose enthusiasm 
for the mass media was important in relaying the possibilities of the 
social sciences to political leaders, felt that the radio enabled effective 
communication with these individual voters. Such professional opinion, 
together with his own experience of broadcasting, convinced Baldwin 
that the radio, insofar as it reached the individual at home, was the most 
 47 P. Cambray, The Game of Politics (1932), p. 17 (emphases added).
 48 See R. McKibbin, ‘Class and conventional wisdom: the Conservative party and the 
“public” in interwar Britain’, in R. McKibbin, The Ideologies of Class: Social Relations in 
Britain, 1880–1950 (Oxford, 1990), pp. 259–93; and Lawrence, ‘Labour and the politics of 
class’.
 49 For a thoughtful synthesis of the literature, see G. Eghigian, A. Killen and C. 
Leuenberger, ‘The self as project: politics and the human sciences in the 20th century’, 
Osiris, xxii (2007), 1–25.
 50 On voter apathy, see Macintyre, ‘British Labour, Marxism, and working class apathy’, 
pp. 479–96. On how political practices were adapted in response to the silent majority, see 
J. Lawrence, ‘The transformation of British public politics after the First World War’, Past & 
Present, cxc (2006), 185–216, esp. pp. 203–12; and Williamson, Stanley Baldwin, pp. 224–35.
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important tool in managing mass opinion.51 Moreover, many commentators 
ventured that radio would reconnect the voter with the best traditions of 
the political meeting – oratory and rational thought – while simultaneously 
having ‘a disintegrating effect upon the power of crowd psychology’.52 
Material interest and the challenge of representation in the 1920s
Just as Wallas criticized many on the left for ignoring the psychological 
dimension of political life, so they in return despaired at his insensitive 
idealism in the face of the economic and social pressures of the post-war 
years. His latest thinking was concerned with no less than the fate of 
civilization after war, with the search for a new ‘world-view’, and prompted 
Beatrice Webb to comment that ‘His sympathies lie more with the young 
men of the Round Table [a movement devoted to promoting imperial co-
operation] than with any of the Socialist and radical groups who are in 
revolt against the existing governing class’.53 In her repudiation of Wallas’s 
idealism, the Fabian thinker was the unwitting spokesperson for many 
political activists in the constituencies, and not just within the Labour 
party. For Conservative as well as Labour figures toiling at the coalface of 
the new democracy, the economic and social experiences and ambitions 
of voters were crucial to defining their political world-view. In this way, 
the ‘material’ formed an integral and constitutive part of how activists saw 
the ‘interests’ of voters. Whether it be the cost of food or utilities, the rate 
of tax, or the impact of infrastructure developments or welfare legislation 
on household life and finances, the material experience – and activists’ 
perception of it – helped to define the subject matter of political interests 
and their discourses. Crucially, the material also impacted on the topicality 
of different interests.
In turn, these interests formed the core of local activists’ conceptions 
of how corporate identities were formed and could be appealed to. 
There were two kinds of material politics. Based on the notion of appeal 
by association, many politicians sought to appropriate objects that they 
deemed symbolic to voters. Thus, from the late nineteenth century the pint 
of beer, together with the paraphernalia of gambling and football, became 
a staple of Conservative propaganda in urban England. (The same was 
true of the Liberals’ free-trade loaf after 1906.) It carried the message that 
Conservative candidates respected the working man’s right to a pint and 
 51 Williamson, Stanley Baldwin, pp. 83–6.
 52 Viscountess Erleigh, daughter of Sir Alfred Mond, MP and daughter-in-law of the 
marquess of Reading, writing in the Radio Times, 1927 (quoted in LeMahieu, A Culture for 
Democracy, p. 182).
 53 Wiener, Between Two Worlds, ch. 8, esp. pp. 175–9.
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would protect this liberty from the faddist moral agenda of killjoy Liberal 
governments.54 Contemporaries on the ground knew full well that the 
‘working class’ did not constitute a homogeneous group in the community, 
for there were often stark differences in patterns of accommodation and 
home-ownership, levels of skills, club and trade-union affiliations, religious 
denomination, and so on. Yet, we see that the Tory claim to champion the 
social liberalism of ‘the workers’, expressed through sympathetic references 
to the consumption of material items, nonetheless became an important 
shorthand in electioneering, a sort of basic appeal, based on Conservative 
assumptions about working-class life and leisure. Despite the shift to a 
discourse of economic liberalism in response to the socialist threat after 
1918, and new restrictions on treating voters, objects like the pint of beer, 
together with those that reflected developing tastes (for instance, cigarette 
smoking), remained centre-stage in Conservative approaches towards the 
public.55 Notwithstanding the often grave anxieties that the permissive 
tastes of the 1950s and 1960s provoked within the party, these material 
appeals point to an important strand running through the Tory democratic 
paternalism of the twentieth century.56
Yet, the symbolic does not reflect the full scope, nor then the complexity, 
of the material politics cultivated by activists in the 1920s. Whereas the 
symbolic rested on a reductive and more-or-less static understanding of 
voters’ tastes, local activists were also alive to what we might call changeable 
or contingent material interests. As Frank Trentmann notes in his discussion 
of ‘Dingpolitik’ (the history of ‘things’), objects carry consequences, 
good and bad. They break down and disappoint as much as they fulfil. 
The ‘fluid’ and ‘troublesome’ nature of objects creates experiences that 
overflow into politics. They are, therefore, not always reliable as tools of 
discipline and control in a democracy.57 The Conservative party in Ilford 
found this out during the course of the inter-war years. Up to 1926, 
when the town received borough status, the campaign for incorporation 
 54 J. Lawrence, ‘Class and gender in the making of urban Toryism, 1880–1914’, English 
Historical Review, cviii (1993), 629–52.
 55 Many Conservative associations had entertainment sub-committees dedicated to the 
task, and treats – often presented as ‘prizes’ at sports or carnival days – typically included 
chocolate for the women, cigarettes for the men and penknives for boys (see G. Thomas, 
‘Conservatives and the culture of “national” government between the wars’ (unpublished 
University of Cambridge PhD thesis, 2010), pp. 42, 108–17).
 56 M. Jarvis, Conservative Governments, Morality and Social Change in Affluent Britain, 
1957–64 (Manchester, 2005). See also L. Black, ‘The lost world of Young Conservatism’, 
Historical Journal, li (2008), 991–1024.
 57 F. Trentmann, ‘Materiality in the future of history: things, practices, and politics’, 
Journal of British Studies, xlviii (2009), 283–307, esp. pp. 299–301.
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anticipated an urban renaissance symbolizing the material improvement 
with which Conservatives expected the area’s aspiring ‘middle class’ readily 
to associate themselves. The exposition rested in large part on symbolic 
material interests – facilities, including civic parks, and municipal services, 
of which education was the most important. After 1926, the troublesome 
nature of material politics became ever more apparent, with infrastructural 
developments having a knock-on effect on issues ranging from the rateable 
value of properties to the rights of commuters and the increasing demands 
on central government funding. This is reflected in the fact that, by 1934, 
the Ilford ratepayers’ association had split in two. The faction in ‘new’ Ilford, 
which mostly represented the residents of newly built houses, campaigned 
for additional civic facilities – and was opposed by the faction representing 
the residents of ‘old’ Ilford, for whom the newcomers were to blame for 
increases in the local rates.58 
What did this materialist conception of voters’ corporate identities mean 
in practice? How did it fit with, or serve, the localist agenda of activists in 
the constituencies? As activists saw it, their objective was less to manage 
voters than to represent their interests. This perhaps best exemplifies the 
different subjective worlds occupied by national and local, or professional 
and grassroots, politicians after 1918. Local activists acted in the belief that 
voters responded to self- or group-interest. With this activist sovereignty 
in mind, we see that the notion of voter rationality was not banished from 
political practice as much as either the contemporary focus on the irrational 
and ‘unconscious’ or present-day scholarly focus on the constitutive power 
of discourse would have us believe. 
In fact, an interest-based rational politics is one of the most under-
appreciated results of ‘the rise of Labour’ and its impact on the culture of 
British politics. Labour was often effective at tailoring its campaigns to local 
needs, rooting its discourse in voters’ material interests. In the coalmining 
seats of south Wales, for example, the party’s claim to be the advocate 
of the ‘community’ was demonstrated through attention to the evolving 
welfare needs of families, especially (following female enfranchisement) 
maternity services.59 In suburbs like Ilford, the party made a decent fist of 
posing as the disinterested defender of consumers in an economy rife with 
profiteering. Concerns about profiteering – in the food market, the rental 
property market, and in respect of commuter travel – were especially topical 
and common to middle- and working-class voters alike. This way, Labour 
 58 Ilford Recorder, 12, 19 Apr. 1934.
 59 See D. Tanner, ‘Gender, civic culture and politics in south Wales: explaining Labour 
municipal policy, 1918–39’, in Labour’s Grass Roots: Essays on the Activities and Experiences of 
Local Labour Parties and Members, 1918–45, ed. M. Worley (Aldershot, 2005), pp. 170–93.
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came close to constructing a discourse that defied allegations of sectional 
interests, drew on continuities in liberal politics more than redistributive 
theory, and instituted a co-operative culture whose objectives were not 
necessarily in contention with the civic mindedness of associational bodies 
like the Middle Class Union. Through its support for ‘local option’, which 
many householders backed in order to protect property values as well as 
on grounds of temperance, Labour mobilized consumers’ interests and so 
aligned itself with middle-class respectability.60 Within the discursive war of 
electoral politics, then, lay key battles over voters’ material interests.
Of course, Conservatives required little evidence to reinforce their 
view of Labour as a movement inextricably, even menacingly, tied to 
material concerns – or, rather, to the exploitation of material concerns. 
Not only were the Conservatives ideologically hostile to Labour’s policies 
of redistribution and nationalization, they were deeply nervous about two 
particular aspects of the political world after 1918: the extravagant public 
promises, as they saw them, which Labour candidates would make in order 
to secure a working majority in parliament, and the voters’ (in)ability to 
resist them.61 All the same, Labour’s arrival did consolidate the place of the 
material in British politics, ensuring that it became the object of a more 
acutely competitive inter-party dialogue. Labour politics proved less easily 
dismissible than Liberal fads, as Conservative party workers in the north 
discovered. Even after Labour’s crushing defeat at the 1931 general election, 
local Conservatives found themselves once more having to contest their 
opponents’ claims to represent voters’ material, and especially welfare, 
interests. Conservatives in the northern counties noted that health and 
welfare conferences, organized by professionals and lobby groups such as 
the Maternal Mortality Committee, were being attended by representatives 
from the Women’s Co-operative Guild and other Labour organizations. 
It was of ‘extreme importance’, they thought, that the Conservative party 
showed its commitment to ‘social services’.62 At the national level, too, 
 60 For instances of these debates played out in the local press, see Ilford Recorder, 10 Sept. 
1920, 2 Oct., 27 Nov. 1925. See also K. Manton, ‘Playing both sides against the middle: the 
Labour party and the wholesaling industry, 1919–51’, Twentieth Century British History, xviii 
(2007), 306–33, esp. pp. 308–9; and the analysis of the role of ‘non-political’ associational 
life in inter-war political culture in H. McCarthy, ‘Parties, voluntary associations, and 
democratic politics in inter-war Britain’, Historical Journal, l (2007), 891–912.
 61 For Conservative readings of the new franchise’s susceptibility to Labour, see Jarvis, 
‘British Conservatism and class politics’, pp. 69–79; and G. Thomas, ‘Conservatives, the 
constitution, and the quest for a “representative” House of Lords, 1911–35’, Parliamentary 
History (forthcoming).
 62 Ashington, Northumberland Archives, Northern Counties Area, NRO 4137/8, women’s 
advisory council, 13 June 1933.
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Conservatives were forced to respond. It was not only after the Attlee 
reforms of the late 1940s that the Conservative leadership desisted from 
repealing Labour’s legislation. Shaped by Neville Chamberlain, the party’s 
official policy following the first Labour government in 1924 was to preserve 
certain legacies (for instance, the Agricultural Wages Board, which saw the 
National Farmers’ Union denounce its former links with the Conservative 
party) and to construct a Conservative ‘social policy’.63 Thus, while anti-
socialists doggedly fought to disprove or trump Labour’s claim to represent 
people’s interests, few could deny the fact that Labour wielded real influence 
in determining the ground on which competition was fought.
As a result, the object of ‘government’ acquired a new immediacy and 
subtlety in local politics. Locality and government have had a closely 
interwoven history in modern times: the social ties and political sub-
structures operating at the local level made the parish, county and borough 
key units in the development and management of modern state bureaucracy. 
As the work of John Prest, David Eastwood, K. D. M. Snell and others 
has shown, there was much about the growth (and limitations) of British 
central government that was distinctly ‘bottom up’.64 In the twentieth 
century, the question of government became infused with ideological 
meanings, typically along a left-right axis, and with it a commonplace 
view emerged of Conservatism, especially at the grassroots after 1945, as 
hostile to large government.65 And yet the party had a discernible statist 
lineage: many Conservative activists between the wars had served their 
apprenticeship in the Edwardian campaign for tariff reform. What this 
tells us about the precise nature of the range of Conservative ideological 
stances towards the state, and how this changed over time, is hard to pin 
 63 The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, ii: the Reform Years, 1921–7, ed. R. Self (Aldershot, 
2000), pp. 18–20, 26; A. F. Cooper, British Agricultural Policy, 1912–36: a Study in Conservative 
Politics (Manchester, 1989), pp. 67–8.
 64 J. Prest, Liberty and Locality: Parliament, Permissive Legislation and Ratepayers’ 
Democracies in the Mid-19th Century (Oxford, 1990); D. Eastwood, Government and 
Community in the English Provinces, 1700–1870 (Basingstoke, 1997); Lawrence, ‘Paternalism, 
class, and the British path to modernity’; K. D. M. Snell, Parish and Belonging: Community, 
Identity and Welfare in England and Wales, 1700–1950 (Cambridge, 2006).
 65 Many party members opposed the so-called consensus created by the Churchill, Eden 
and Macmillan governments’ accommodation of Attlee’s welfare legislation and managed 
economy after 1951. This anti-statism later gained expression at the party’s national level 
with Thatcher, who was fond of recalling the self-reliance of pre-war society as inspiration 
for a smaller British state (see E. H. H. Green, ‘The Conservative party, the state and the 
electorate, 1945–64’, in Lawrence and Taylor, Party, State and Society, pp. 176–200, and his 
‘Thatcherism: an historical perspective’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 6th ser., 
ix (1999), 17–42).
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down.66 But, crucially, the question of government is about more than just 
whether or not Conservatives were statist. Rather, it hinges on the fact that 
it was during the inter-war period, in response to the new franchise, that 
activists placed ‘government’ centre stage in constructions of their party’s 
public culture. Central government and locality were once again expected 
to go hand in hand. Whereas for the party headquarters the new media 
increasingly held the key to transcending the gulf between objectives set at 
the national level and the inchoate agenda of a mass of voters, for activists 
it was government itself that became the key to their conception of how to 
mediate national and local politics. 
Of course, these national and local approaches were not mutually exclusive. 
Broadcast and wireless technology held a fascination and even became an 
amateur pastime for many in the 1920s, with radio clubs (like cinemas) 
springing up in urban – and particularly suburban – communities. For the 
politically active members of such fraternities, like David Richards, a leading 
Conservative in Ilford, there was little difficulty in admiring, as many party 
agents did, the reach of the radio broadcast into households whose occupants 
could not or would not attend traditional political meetings.67 Moreover, 
national campaigns were often successful where they built on local methods. 
Behind Herbert Morrison’s celebrated success as chief Labour strategist in the 
1940s was his equally vaunted control of London Labour in the 1930s, which, 
as Tom Jeffery has demonstrated, borrowed much from the approaches taken 
by divisional Labour parties in areas such as Lewisham, where the seemingly 
conflicting political demands of a mixed-class electorate told of the challenge 
facing Labour nationally. And these approaches had government at their 
centre: demonstrable competence in local and national government was 
instrumental for underwriting the party’s claims to represent effectively, and 
success in the former was thought to help beat a pathway to the latter.68
If this mutual appreciation of national and local means of communication 
created the potential for effective propaganda advertising government 
achievements, the factor that most prevented its routine realization was the 
vexed question of how best to pitch a party’s appeal. In some instances 
 66 For discussions, see E. H. H. Green, The Crisis of Conservatism: the Politics, Economics 
and Ideology of the British Conservative Party, 1880–1914 (1996); M. Fforde, Conservatism and 
Collectivism, 1886–1914 (Edinburgh, 1990); and, more broadly, M. Bentley, ‘Liberal Toryism 
in the 20th century’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 6th ser., iv (1994), 177–201.
 67 Ilford Monthly, July 1926; Ilford Recorder, 26 Oct. 1926; CAJ, Aug. 1931, pp. 191 (on 
apathy), 199 (on the use of cinema vans in attracting voters outdoors to street meetings), 
Dec. 1931, p. 266 (recognizing the convenience of radio broadcasts for voters in their homes).
 68 T. Jeffery, ‘The suburban nation: politics and class in Lewisham’, in Metropolis London: 
Histories and Representations since 1800, ed. D. Feldman and G. Stedman Jones (1989), pp. 
189–216.
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activists favoured local methods of reaching the silent voter because of the 
unsuitable content of national, or central-party, methods. In Birmingham, 
Conservatives decided that the ‘ordinary literature obtainable from 
the Central office was not sufficiently effective to be worth the trouble 
of distribution’, and so The Straightforward was revived as the form of 
political literature most likely ‘to find its way into the houses of the people’. 
Although run at a financial loss, it remained the cornerstone of Conservative 
propaganda in Birmingham for four years, always in preference to the 
party’s central literature, until evidence amassed of the ‘cordial support’ of 
the daily press in the city.69
More common than outright hostility to nationally directed content was 
the feeling that it cut across, and so failed to support, more relevant political 
dialogues taking place locally. As one Conservative agent complained 
in 1927, when urging his party managers to increase publicity of the 
government’s work in order to target male industrial workers, ‘it is futile 
to preach platitudes about the duties of citizenship to a busy man whose 
efforts to earn his daily bread leave him little leisure’.70 This critique takes 
us to the nub of the challenge facing activists by the late 1920s, namely the 
tension between the politics of material interest and the politics of values. 
Baldwin liked to model himself as the new Disraeli. As an invocation, 
this could reasonably be expected to resonate with party members, since 
it chimed with the desire to be seen as the party of reform and legislative 
achievements. In the post-1918 world, however, Baldwin spoke not just of 
Disraeli’s famous public health and sanitation programmes of the 1870s but 
of citizens’ democratic duty – what he called the ‘spiritual sanitation of our 
people’.71 Even when leaders descended on constituencies, on such occasions 
as would normally boost activist morale and facilitate some (relatively) 
unmediated communication with voters, national ‘management’ could cut 
across idioms of local interest and thus offend the materialist sensibilities 
of voters and activists alike. This could produce some unexpected verdicts 
– as when Baldwin was accused by party members in Birmingham of being 
excessively partisan. Remarking on the prime minister’s visit during the 
1929 general election to a depressed housing area in West Birmingham, 
where improvement work had been carried out by the ‘non-sectarian & 
non-political’ COPEC Society, Councillor Canning noted of the leader: 
‘to use his visit during the election, & by inference to claim credit to the 
Unionist Party for what had been done, was looked upon as trying to make 
 69 BCL, Birmingham CUA, management committee, 14 July 1922, 9 Feb. 1923, 19 Sept. 
1924.
 70 CAJ, Dec. 1927, p. 338.
 71 Williamson, Stanley Baldwin, p. 155.
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unfair capital for our side’. Canning had to conclude, from the ‘resentment 
in the Division about Mr. Baldwin’s visit’, that ‘the value of the visit was 
doubtful’.72 Activists were still negotiating the new political spaces – in this 
case, the distance between leader and voter – created by the mass media. 
Such was the existence of party leaders as modifiers of mass opinion at 
the national level that activists could struggle to deploy them locally, even 
in what might be regarded as promising instances like West Birmingham, 
where Baldwin’s broader non-sectarian persona should have complemented 
the material benefits coming from COPEC. 
We might ask how aware activists were of the ‘management’ objective 
(and psychological methods) guiding the activities of the party leadership. 
On the one hand, election agents ought to have been relatively well 
informed, if only from familiarity with party efforts to professionalize 
the art of electioneering. On the other, the answer is most probably ‘not 
fully’: when party members had misgivings about their leaders – and they 
certainly did – these were most commonly expressed in terms of either the 
leader’s ideological moderation compared with the purity of grassroots 
doctrine or the leader’s social distance from the rank and file member. 
This was the case in Labour, as studies of MacDonald’s gradualism and his 
‘aristocratic embrace’ reveal.73 A new vocabulary articulating grassroots’ 
views of the national leader, which, if it existed, would betray some 
understanding of the ‘management’ idiom, was slow to emerge after 
1918. Yet, by the time Labour entered government for the second time 
in 1929, the political world had been shaped by the forces of two nation-
building projects. Local activists tolerated and sometimes encouraged 
the use of the new mass media, so long as the language complemented 
their claims to represent local interests. Reactions to the rise of Labour 
renewed the relevance of government action in the discourse of both main 
parties; activists hoped that the story of government would substantiate 
the national language they needed locally. Where national language was 
unsuitable, there was little that they could do to stop its dissemination 
through the mass media. The local politics of interest was thus liable 
on occasions to be contaminated by the national language. Such was 
the highly subjectivized nature of the activist encounter with political 
modernity that the national project of management could obstruct the 
local project of representation, and vice versa. 
 72 BCL, AF 329.94249, E. R. Canning to Austen Chamberlain, 21 June 1929.
 73 Some of the main themes are discussed in N. Owen, ‘MacDonald’s parties: the Labour 
party and the “aristocratic embrace”, 1922–31’, Twentieth Century British History, xviii 
(2007), 1–53.
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Conclusion
There has of late been a welcome renewal of interest in the politics of the 
1930s, and especially how it differed from – and in some ways resolved – 
the more feverish politics of the 1920s. The most important episode in this 
narrative is the financial crisis of August 1931, which saw MacDonald take 
the helm of a cross-party National Government after losing the confidence 
of the majority of his Labour MPs. Ross McKibbin makes the case for 
viewing 1931 as a key staging post in the ‘party-political transformation’ 
of British politics in the early twentieth century, on account of how it ‘re-
founded a stable political system based upon a moderate constitutional 
Conservatism whose electoral hegemony seemed permanent’.74 Crucially, 
that same year also put in motion developments in domestic politics that 
did much to reconcile the competing national and local experiences of 
democracy described above.
That the troublesome nature of ‘things’ (as Trentmann calls them), or the 
objects of voters’ material concerns, overflowed into political considerations is 
a rule writ large across the British political landscape in the aftermath of 1931. 
The effects were far-reaching. We know, for instance, that in some sections 
of the Labour movement the event occasioned something of an intellectual 
watershed. This led eventually to the revisionism of the post-1945 party, which 
diminished the material in favour of the ‘mind’ or ‘character’ as the target of 
political action.75 More visible at the time, and arguably just as far-reaching in 
the long term, was the significant shift at the level of national party strategy 
in the opposite direction, away from the mind and towards the material. 
This saw the two main parties embrace the politics of representation more 
systematically than ever before. Dire economic circumstances (financial and 
trade deficits, unemployment at over three million) and the resulting policy 
agenda meant that material matters preoccupied the public utterances of 
party leaders more than at any time since the 1923 tariff election, and possibly 
since 1918. For the Conservative party, which constituted the majority of 
the National Government, this centred on policies promoting economic 
recovery (tariffs, imperial co-operation and sector reforms, in particular) 
and addressing the conditions of the unemployed (including the means test, 
housing and ‘distressed area’ schemes).
This, in turn, occasioned some notable changes in the character of 
party propaganda. For instance, Neville Chamberlain, as chancellor of the 
exchequer, assumed a more prominent role in Conservative material. As a 
result, prior to appeasement his reputation grew as he established himself as 
 74 R. McKibbin, Parties and People: England, 1914–51 (Oxford, 2010), p. vii, ch. 3.
 75 See above, n. 46.
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the architect and foreman of national recovery.76 Moreover, the aftermath of 
1931 demanded that strategists paid particular attention to publicizing results, 
or what today is referred to as government ‘delivery’. While the desire to 
promulgate government activity was far from novel, strategists in the 1930s – 
mainly Conservative – had to respond to the pressing imperative to construct 
a compelling narrative of progress. Thus, common to almost all the publicity 
campaigns between 1932 and the general election of 1935, when the National 
Government went to the country defending its majority, was the prevalence 
of a linear narrative highlighting improvements in different regions and 
industries since 1931 – and then linking them directly to government policy. 
Orchestrating this by 1935 was the National Publicity Bureau (NPB), which, 
although ostensibly non-political, proved effective in producing both film 
and print informing voters of the government’s legislative programme, its 
implementation and its positive results on the ground.77 The NPB was founded 
around the same time as John Grierson’s pioneering work at the General Post 
Office Film Unit, whose task included publicizing the work of the GPO in 
constructing new communication networks. Many of these, along with the 
concomitant process of electrification, were among the government’s most 
celebrated job-creating and modernizing initiatives. The GPO and the NPB 
in the 1930s together shaped a new culture of government, anticipating the 
public relations revolution of subsequent decades.78
Yet, however notable this new culture of government, it was not a paradigm 
shift towards a predominantly representative conception of what constituted 
the political objective in a mass democracy. Among national politicians, the 
urge to manage far outlived the travails of the 1920s. The story of recovery 
from 1931 was as much a grand narrative, malleable in the hands of party 
strategists, as it was a breath of fresh air to activists on the ground. It tells us 
of the ingenuity of the professional politician by the 1930s, especially that he 
by then saw in the politics of the material a means by which to continue and 
diversify the essential task of shaping democracy. Indeed, Baldwin and many 
leading Conservatives entered a new – perhaps heightened – phase of national 
 76 For a fuller discussion of Chamberlain’s role, see Thomas, ‘Conservatives and the 
culture of “national” government between the wars’, pp. 77–8, 81–2. See also the striking 
portraits that appeared in the Illustrated London News on the occasion of his reforms: 13 Feb. 
1932 (Import Duties Bill statement to the house of commons), 24 Dec. 1932 (negotiations 
with the American government on war debts), 21 Apr. 1934 (his ‘restoration’ budget, which 
restored the cuts to unemployment benefit and public sector salaries implemented in 1931).
 77 See the NPB’s broadsheet, The Popular Illustrated (1935–6).
 78 S. Tallents, The Projection of England (1932); R. Casey, ‘The National Publicity Bureau 
and British party propaganda’, Public Opinion Quarterly, iii (1939), 623–34; J. L’Etang, ‘State 
propaganda and bureaucratic intelligence: the creation of public relations in 20th century 
Britain’, Public Relations Review, xxiv (1998), 413–41. 
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rhetoric in the 1930s, primarily in response to the rise of the continental 
dictatorships.79 Observing the propaganda machines in Germany and Italy 
arguably reinforced the faith of British political leaders in the efficacy of 
mass communication. It was possible to denounce the enslaving universality 
of the ‘mass mind’ under the totalitarians and at the same time to appreciate 
how some of their techniques could be used towards different ends within 
the context of British democracy. Baldwin was surely too canny a political 
strategist to be only thinking in a simple anti-totalitarian register when, 
in speeches warning of the threat of extremism, he noted how the new 
press and the radio ‘“annihilated” distance, time, and frontiers’.80 During 
the 1935 election, Baldwin’s broadcasts and cinema newsreel appearances 
reached an unprecedented number of voters.81 It is little coincidence then 
that Williamson has viewed the campaign as the pinnacle of Baldwin’s 
grand strategy to shape and mobilize ‘moral opinion’.82
And yet the 1930s were undeniably a significant moment in the history 
of political representation, when material interests mattered. And it was at 
the local level that the real significance of this was felt. Although it did not 
displace the managerial aims of the chief strategists, the new emphasis on 
‘good governance’ seemed to speak more directly to the corporate identities 
of voters in their communities. Of course, there is no guaranteeing the 
popularity or effectiveness of government policy: the means test proved 
intensely unpopular among the unemployed and government schemes to 
regenerate the ‘distressed areas’ had little immediate impact. It is also likely 
that, by 1945, many voters had come to identify with a popular memory 
of the 1930s, constructed by Labour party polemics in the aftermath of 
Munich and Dunkirk, which associated the decade with a distinctly vain 
culture of unrepresentative and irresponsible government.83 But for most 
 79 See P. Williamson, ‘Christian Conservatives and the totalitarian challenge, 1933–40’, 
English Historical Review, cxv (2000), 607–42.
 80 Williamson, Stanley Baldwin, p. 315.
 81 It is estimated that by the mid 1930s around 20 million Britons watched the cinema 
newsreels each week and that up to half of the electorate tuned in to political broadcasts 
on the radio during the 1935 campaign (Lawrence, Electing our Masters, p. 99; T. Stannage, 
Baldwin Thwarts the Opposition: the British General Election of 1935 (1980), p. 178).
 82 Williamson, Stanley Baldwin, pp. 354–5.
 83 The main instalment in Labour’s history was ‘Cato’ [M. Foot, P. Howard and F. Owen], 
Guilty Men (1940). It could be argued that this account of the 1930s set the scene for Labour’s 
nation-building project from 1945. Not only did this provide a vision of the recent past that 
seemed in contradistinction to the party’s radical hopes for the future, it also shaped the 
conventional wisdoms governing the relationship between political leaders and voters by 
placing ‘government’ – and with it politicians’ representativeness and effectiveness – as more 
central still to the process of shaping modern democracy. 
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Conservative activists at the time, the years between 1931 and 1938 delivered 
perhaps the most effective culture of national government yet experienced 
at the grassroots. This was the result of two particular developments 
triggered by the accident of the economic crisis: the emergence of a more 
‘relevant’ message from the national leadership, scaling down idealism in 
favour of materialism, plus the dissemination of this new message through 
updated forms of communication in a way that betrayed greater awareness 
among strategists of voters’ multiple identities. By 1935, party workers 
in Ilford made enthusiastic use of the government’s literature because it 
showcased infrastructure projects in and around London. These included 
tube extensions, which spoke directly to suburban commuters’ concerns. 
Meanwhile, commuters travelling on existing tube services were targeted by 
NPB posters advertising other government achievements.84 It was possible, 
after all, to mitigate some of the tensions contained within the activist 
encounter with modern national politics after 1918. 
This helps to explain why, after so famously rejecting the post-war 
coalition in 1922, local Conservative parties supported the cross-party 
National Government for so long after 1931. More generally, it shows that 
local and national conceptions of mass democracy could be reconciled. That 
this occurred most clearly in the mid 1930s, when the production of party 
propaganda was most mechanized and centralized, is significant. By focusing 
on the place of government in local constructions of mass democracy, the 
political historian comes to see that the hallmarks of political modernity, 
among them the nationalization of political strategy and language, hint not 
at the decline of localism in political culture but rather at a new dynamic 
between the local and national. 
 
 84 Casey, ‘National Publicity Bureau’, pp. 633–4.
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2. Whig lessons, Conservative answers: the literary 
adventures of Sir J. A. R. Marriott*
Gary Love
 
The question of how public intellectuals and political elites responded to 
the onset of mass democracy after the franchise reforms of 1918 and 1928 
continues to occupy the minds of historians and literary critics. D. L. 
LeMahieu, Peter Mandler and Susan Pedersen have shown that educated 
elites responded to the challenges of democracy in different ways. Mandler 
and Pedersen argue that some liberal elites accepted that they would not 
be able to remake democracy in their own image. Others ‘fought back’, 
choosing to defend Britain’s ‘“civilizing” institutions’, which the Victorians 
had always admired.1 LeMahieu’s innovative study of the inter-war years did 
much to flesh out these different intellectual responses to Britain’s evolving 
democratic culture. If new media were increasingly concerned with profit 
and the marketplace then educated elites like John Reith, Compton 
Mackenzie and Stephen Tallents worked hard to deliver highbrow messages 
to democratic audiences through different media.2 While LeMahieu’s work 
dealt with the broader issues raised by the changing nature of inter-war 
British culture, Miles Taylor’s discussion of the views of the historian G. M. 
Young demonstrated how a prominent Tory intellectual responded to these 
challenges. Young lamented the loss of highbrow influence on middlebrow 
opinion during the inter-war period because he argued that it was 
instrumental to the formation of ‘culture’. In Young’s view, the sensationalist 
popular press was a poor substitute for the moral leadership provided by 
 * The 1st Baron Balfour of Inchrye papers are reproduced with permission of the master and 
fellows of Churchill College, Cambridge. Printing statistics are republished by permission 
of the secretary to the delegates of Oxford University Press. Stanley Baldwin’s papers are 
reproduced by permission of the syndics of Cambridge University Library.
 1 After the Victorians: Private Conscience and Public Duty in Modern Britain. Essays in 
Memory of John Clive, ed. S. Pedersen and P. Mandler (1994), p. 23.
 2 D. L. LeMahieu, A Culture for Democracy: Mass Communication and the Cultivated 
Mind in Britain between the Wars (Oxford, 1988), pp. 1–5; Pedersen and Mandler, After the 
Victorians, p. 20. On Reith, see D. L. LeMahieu, ‘Entrepreneur of collectivism: Reith of the 
BBC’, in Pedersen and Mandler, After the Victorians, pp. 188–206.
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Victorian elites and intellectuals.3 More recently, Richard Overy has tried 
to bridge the gap between elite and mass culture in inter-war Britain. He 
argues that the pessimistic views of a select group of left-wing intellectuals 
informed mass culture to such an extent that the period should be referred 
to as The Morbid Age.4 As Overy’s work reveals, we know far more about 
left-wing intellectuals during the inter-war period than we do about those 
on the right, especially those who were associated with the Conservative 
party.5 This chapter discusses the literary career of the Oxford historian and 
former Conservative MP, Sir J. A. R. Marriott. In so doing, it highlights 
the impact of democratization on a particular kind of inter-war intellectual. 
Marriott was a Victorian who made his reputation in the Edwardian period, 
but as a liberal-Conservative he adapted his politics to embrace Britain’s 
new democratic age. A re-exploration of Marriott’s literary output allows 
historians to measure the potential impact of Conservative intellectuals on 
educated elites and the general public.
J. A. R. Marriott was one of the most prolific Conservative writers of the 
1930s, but if we exclude Lawrence Goldman’s work on his role as an Oxford 
University extension lecturer, he has generally been dismissed as nothing 
more than a ‘literary’ historian who failed to engage with anything other than 
‘surface events’.6 Such a portrayal does not account for Marriott’s broader 
role as a public intellectual during this period. As an ‘eminent Victorian’ he 
still identified books and the periodical press as the most important media 
for influencing politics in the 1930s, and he devoted much of his time to 
writing for prominent monthly reviews. Indeed, Marriott’s decision to write 
for elite publics was not a bad one. Although Conservatives modernized 
their approach to publicizing their ideas – the party was the first truly to 
exploit radio and film in the inter-war period – like other political and 
intellectual elites they did not immediately abandon more elevated forums 
for political communication. The literary historian Stefan Collini argues 
that after the introduction of new media and the specialized academic 
journal, the broader cultural role of the periodical press, like that of The 
 3 M. Taylor, ‘G. M. Young and the early Victorian revival’, in The Victorians since 1901: 
Histories, Representations and Revisions, ed. M. Taylor and M. Wolff (Manchester, 2004), pp. 
84–5. 
 4 R. Overy, The Morbid Age: Britain between the Wars (2009).
 5 There are some exceptions. On Arthur Bryant, see J. Stapleton, Sir Arthur Bryant and 
National History in 20th-Century Britain (Lanham, 2005). On Bryant, K. Feiling and F. J. C. 
Hearnshaw, see R. N. Soffer, History, Historians, and Conservatism in Britain and America: 
from the Great War to Thatcher and Reagan (Oxford, 2009).
 6 See J. W. Osborne, ‘The endurance of “literary” history in Great Britain: Charles Oman, 
G. M. Trevelyan, and the genteel tradition’, Clio, ii (Oct. 1972), 12–13; L. Goldman, Dons 
and Workers: Oxford and Adult Education since 1850 (Oxford, 1995), pp. 76–7.
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Times, became more limited as competition for readers increased.7 Collini is 
right to warn historians that periodicals no longer influenced British society 
in the way that they did during the nineteenth century, but it is argued here 
that their status was robust in political circles during the 1930s. Circulation 
figures for periodicals did not decline between the Victorian and inter-war 
periods, and if some well-known Victorian reviews had ceased publication 
they had been replaced by newly established literary ventures.8 This is why 
a substantial number of Conservative intellectuals, MPs, peers and party 
workers, many of whom had a role in educating young Conservatives at 
Ashridge College, contributed to this public discourse, which was distinct 
from party election broadcasts, newsreels and the popular press.9 The 
regularity of politicians’ contributions, and the acknowledgement of each 
other’s work both in private and in print, suggest that the reviews remained 
influential forums for political debate at least until the Second World War. 
Historians of inter-war politics have neglected Marriott’s contributions to 
the periodical press, just as they have failed to utilize his important collection 
of private papers.10 Both sources confirm that Marriott was consulted by 
leading figures of the day. At the same time, his influence extended beyond 
Westminster: his articles, monographs and letters to The Times reached a 
larger, educated reading public, which was interested in history and politics. 
Marriott was an independent Conservative who used his skills as a historian to 
bolster the forces of constitutionalism and parliamentary vigilance in Britain. 
As Philip Williamson and others have shown, the Conservative party leader 
Stanley Baldwin worked hard to sustain a ‘language of constitutionalism’ in 
Britain, which, in Baldwin’s words, was meant to ‘educate’ British democracy 
‘before the crash comes’.11 However, Marriott was no Baldwinite apologist 
 7 S. Collini, Common Reading: Critics, Historians, Publics (Oxford, 2008), p. 227.
 8 Collini, Common Reading, p. 225. For a thorough analysis of circulation figures for 
periodicals during the inter-war period, see G. Love, ‘Conservatives, national politics, and 
the challenge to democracy in Britain, 1931–7’ (unpublished University of Cambridge Ph.D. 
thesis, 2010), pp. 24–36.
 9 These issues are also explored at length in my unpublished doctoral thesis, which 
analyses the literary contributions of a range of Conservative intellectuals and MPs (see 
Love, ‘Conservatives, national politics’, pp. 1–49).
 10 For an exception, see S. Ball, Baldwin and the Conservative Party: the Crisis of 1929–31 
(1988), p. 246. Ball’s principal interests lie elsewhere, which is why he did not make much 
use of Marriott’s papers.
 11 P. Williamson, Stanley Baldwin: Conservative Leadership and National Values 
(Cambridge, 1999), p. 148. See also B. Schwarz, ‘The language of constitutionalism: 
Baldwinite Conservatism’, in Formations of Nation and People (1984), pp. 1–18. S. Nicholas, 
‘The construction of a national identity: Stanley Baldwin, “Englishness” and the mass media 
in inter-war Britain’, in The Conservatives and British Society, 1880–1990, ed. M. Francis and 
I. Zweiniger-Bargielowska (Cardiff, 1996), pp. 127–46.
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and he often highlighted Baldwin’s apparent indifference to constitutional 
dangers. Unlike most government ministers, Marriott did not limit himself 
to criticizing dictatorial politics abroad or raising the potential threat from 
extremist movements at home. He was critical of the National Government 
because he believed it was using its powers to usurp English traditions of 
parliamentary government. As an expert on the British constitution, he 
saw himself as an important influence on the National Government, 
warning its backbench MPs of the potential pitfalls of a large majority in 
the House of Commons. Marriott’s ideas were also carefully structured to 
refute inter-war extremist arguments in favour of revolutionizing the British 
system of government. However, these views conflicted with his favourable 
impression of Mussolini. Marriott admired the fascist regime’s imperialism 
and nationalism, but distrusted its syndicalist roots. His sympathy for fascist 
Italy influenced his approach to foreign policy and his arguments added 
weight to the National Government’s policy of appeasement. As a Victorian 
Conservative, Marriott also rejected claims for self-government in India 
because he believed the English imperial mission to be incomplete.
These issues, and Marriott’s role as a public intellectual, will now be 
explored in four sections. First, there is a discussion of Marriott’s views on 
the writing of history. A series of examples show how he tried to influence 
British politics through his histories and political commentaries. This is 
followed by an account of Marriott’s view of fascist Italy and his response to 
continental dictatorships. Then Marriott’s ‘Whig interpretation of history’ 
is compared with the ideas of the Conservative historian Arthur Bryant, and 
the Liberal political theorist Ernest Barker.12 At the same time, Marriott’s 
work is placed within wider debates about the professionalization of history 
in this period. Finally, discussion turns to Marriott’s influence on educated 
and political elites.
 
In the early 1930s J. A. R. Marriott was already in his seventies. He was 
an honorary fellow of Worcester College, Oxford, an Oxford University 
extension lecturer, a well-known historian, a former MP, a prolific letter 
writer to The Times, a regular book reviewer for the Sunday Times, an 
occasional contributor of political articles to the national press, and a regular 
contributor to the periodical press. At the same time, he was very much in 
demand as a public speaker.13 However, parliamentary politics had been 
 12 Stapleton, Bryant, pp. 91–4.
 13 Goldman, Dons and Workers, pp. 76–7. J. Marriott, Memories of Four Score Years: the 
Autobiography of the Late Sir John Marriott (1946), pp. 91–101.
71
Whig lessons, Conservative answers
his main interest since the First World War, following his election to the 
House of Commons in 1917. As a former Oxford don, Marriott should have 
been well suited to his constituency of Oxford City, but he was defeated at 
the 1922 general election by the maverick Liberal candidate, Frank Gray.14 
Marriott won York in 1923, but lost the seat in 1929, the end of his troubled 
parliamentary career. 
Though little has been written about Marriott’s contribution to 
Conservative politics during these years, the same cannot be said of his 
work as a historian. John Osborne locates Marriott’s historical work within 
a linear tradition that was largely unaffected by the controversy surrounding 
the publication of J. A. Froude’s History of England from 1529 to the Death of 
Elizabeth in the 1870s, seen by some as the death knell of ‘literary’ history. 
Osborne compares Marriott’s style to that of two of his contemporaries, 
Charles Oman and G. M. Trevelyan. He reminds us that their narrative 
approach remained popular with the educated public until the 1950s.15 
But there was much more to Marriott’s literary work. True, books such 
as Modern England, 1885–1932 (1934) offered virtually no serious analysis, 
which explains Osborne’s categorization of his work, but such volumes 
made up only part of his output. Others had direct political messages. This 
is reflected in the way Marriott viewed himself both in the 1930s and in his 
autobiography (published posthumously in 1946). He often termed himself 
a ‘publicist’ rather than a historian because many of his books and nearly 
all of his articles for the periodical press were written with regard to current 
affairs. As Goldman observes, Marriott’s ‘approach was not bound by the 
lives of great men’; he paid ‘attention to the interconnection of events and 
movements’; and he presented ‘complex historical questions for an educated 
but non-specialist audience’.16 
Marriott’s politics and his ‘Whig interpretation of history’ were heavily 
grounded in the nineteenth century.17 The story of the gradual accumulation 
of liberty remained, but it now acted as a warning to those who were 
contemplating breaking with tradition and adopting continental systems of 
government. In 1936 Marriott revealed those historians he most admired; 
he identified Lord Clarendon, Edward Gibbon, Lord Macaulay and 
George Grote as ‘the four most eminent, if not the four greatest, English 
 14 F. Gray, The Confessions of a Candidate (1925), pp. 73–4. 
 15 Osborne, ‘Endurance of “literary” history’, pp. 12–13.
 16 L. Goldman, ‘Marriott, Sir John Arthur Ransome (1859–1945)’, Oxford Dictionary 
of National Biography (Oxford, 2004) <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/34887> 
[accessed 15 Jan. 2009].
 17 See V. Feske, From Belloc to Churchill: Private Scholars, Public Culture, and the Crisis of 
British Liberalism, 1900–39 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1996), pp. 1–14.
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historians’.18 This judgement was based on the fact that all four men had 
at some stage sat in parliament (three held office) and that all employed a 
partisan approach to writing history.19 Marriot was aware of the dangers 
of partisanship, but he believed all history to be ultimately political: ‘It 
is as much “politics” as the events recorded in “The Times” of yesterday. 
History and politics are in truth one; consequently, only a politician can 
write history’.20 He argued that politicians like Austen Chamberlain and 
Winston Churchill were capable of making worthy contributions to the 
discipline. Of Churchill, Marriott wrote, ‘With a vocabulary as copious as 
Macaulay’s he is his equal in vivacity, and in rhythm of his sentences he is 
both to Macaulay and Gibbon manifestly superior’.21
Marriott had publicized his constitutionalist views since 1900, but the 
challenges of 1929–31 and the rise of political extremism abroad meant 
that he was keen to deploy constitutional arguments to sustain a ‘faltering’ 
political class.22 To understand Marriott’s ‘Whig interpretation of history’, 
his thinking and his consistent political message in the 1930s, we must begin 
with his The Crisis of English Liberty: a History of the Stuart Monarchy and the 
Puritan Revolution (1930). Although written before the 1931 crisis, Marriott’s 
view of the Stuart monarchy represented an attempt to quarry the past for 
lessons that could be applied to Britain’s current political difficulties. These 
lessons acted as warnings to those who were voicing dissatisfaction with 
parliamentary democracy. They were to dominate his literary work for the 
remainder of the decade. As Marriott explained in the preface, the book’s 
only claim to originality was that it was written with ‘special reference to 
problems now insistently confronting us’. These were thought to have been 
solved in the seventeenth century by struggles for parliamentary sovereignty, 
but they had now reappeared to ‘stir the blood of those who mingle in public 
affairs’.23 One reviewer characterized the book as a polemic, not history.24 
Marriott made no secret of the fact that the book was written for the 
‘general reader’. He thought that British citizens could ‘do their duty to 
their own generation’ only if they were ‘familiar with the problems which 
 18 J. A. R. Marriott, ‘History and politics’, Quarterly Review, lxxvii (Jan. 1936), 34.
 19 Marriott, ‘History’, p. 36.
 20 Marriott, ‘History’, p. 40.
 21 Marriott, Memories, p. 84. 
 22 J. A. R. Marriott, ‘Cabinet government or departmentalism?’, Nineteenth Century, xlviii 
(Oct. 1900), 685–94.
 23 J. A. R. Marriott, The Crisis of English Liberty: a History of the Stuart Monarchy and the 
Puritan Revolution (Oxford, 1930), preface. 
 24 R. G. Usher, ‘Review of The Crisis of English Liberty. A History of the Stuart Monarchy 
and the Puritan Revolution by J. A.R. Marriot’, Journal of Modern History, iii (1931), 289–90.
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confronted their forefathers’.25 However, comparing G. M. Trevelyan’s 
Blenheim (1930) with Marriott’s latest work, R. W. Macan wrote:
I am sure of one small point—that I shall not be distressed in yours, as in his, 
by any such literary concessions to the proletariat … I must say that a glance 
at your ‘Table of Contents’ makes me think that you take the intelligence and 
zeal of ‘the General Reader’ at a figure which is a very high compliment to his 
General-Readership!26
For all Marriott’s efforts, print-run statistics from Oxford University Press 
confirm that he was no more successful than the typical Conservative 
writer, averaging just 2,000 copies per book. Moreover, Marriott’s history 
books, written mainly for university undergraduates, sold better than those 
that harboured distinct political messages.27 The fifth edition of Marriott’s 
English Political Institutions: an Introductory Study ran to 5,000 copies in 
1938. However, Marriott’s books were continuously reissued, unlike those 
of most literary Conservatives in this period.28 
But what sparked Marriott’s attempt to fuse history with politics? It 
appears that reading Lord Hewart’s The New Despotism (1929) led him ‘to 
rewrite the constitutional history of the seventeenth century’.29 Hewart was 
a Liberal MP between 1913 and 1922, and the lord chief justice of England 
from 1922 (the year he was elevated to the peerage) until 1940. In his book, 
Hewart argued that the executive arm of the constitution (government) 
was trying to cajole, coerce and use the legislative (parliament) for its own 
ends. In his view, government wished to bypass parliament and the courts 
in order to rule supreme.30 Marriott praised Hewart, declaring that he had 
 25 Marriott, Crisis, preface.
 26 York City Archives, J. A. R. Marriott papers (hereafter YCA, Marriott papers), Acc 
140, envelope marked ‘Letters of Appreciation and Criticism, mostly dated 1939–40’, R. W. 
Macan to J. A. R. Marriott, 10 Oct. 1930. R. W. Macan was master of University College, 
Oxford (1906–23) and an expert on historical theology.
 27 J. A. R. Marriott, Modern England 1885–1932: a History of my own Times (1934), pp. vi, 
529. Marriott explains how his bibliography is intended to be of practical use for students.
 28 Printing statistics for individual books can be found in Oxford University Press 
Archives, ref. OP275/1584, English Political Institutions: an Introductory Study (Oxford, 1938), 
5,000 copies printed in Dec. 1938; Long Book Editorial Files from OUP’s London Office, 
LB6500, The Crisis of English Liberty, 2,000 copies printed 9 Oct. 1930; LB7622, The Makers 
of Modern Italy: Napoleon–Mussolini (Oxford, 1931), no figures survive for the 1931 edition 
but a second run of 1,000 copies was printed 3 Feb. 1937; LB6784, The English in India: a 
Problem of Politics (Oxford, 1932), 2,000 copies printed 14 Apr. 1932; LB6895, Oxford: its 
Place in National History (Oxford, 1932), 2,500 copies printed 12 Jan. 1933.
 29 R. Lodge, ‘Review of The Crisis of English Liberty. A History of the Stuart Monarchy and 
the Puritan Revolution by J. A. R. Marriot’, English Historical Review, xlvii (1932), 311.
 30 Lord Hewart of Bury, The New Despotism (1929), p. 17, quoted in Marriott, Crisis, p. 4.
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‘descended from the forum into the market-place and issued urbi if not orbi 
his reflections upon the contemporary situation’. He even compared him 
to Edward Coke, the great defender of the English common law against 
the Stuart monarchy in the seventeenth century.31 Marriott’s aim was to 
present historical struggles for parliamentary sovereignty in the seventeenth 
century as an amplification of Hewart’s thesis on the dangers threatening 
the constitution in the present. Marriott attributed these modern 
constitutional problems to three sources: ‘the exaltation of the “expert” in 
all spheres of activity; the multiplication of the functions of Government 
and the consequent expansion of the Public Departments; and, not least, 
the growing volume of legislation and the increasing preoccupation or 
heedlessness of the Legislature’.32 This was paving the way for the transfer of 
legislation from Westminster to Whitehall, laying the foundations for what 
he characterized as an autocracy. Worryingly, he argued, unlike ‘amateur’ 
politicians, professional civil servants were not accountable to the public 
because they could remain anonymous.33 Furthermore, Marriott thought 
that a number of underlying factors were responsible for this shift of power. 
Britain was now subject to complex ‘industrial and social conditions’, while 
its constitution was suffering from both the ‘influence of a Civil Service, 
consciously or unconsciously permeated by the ideas of Fabian Socialism’ 
and the rejection of laissez-faire in favour of government interference in ‘all 
the affairs of life’.34 
Marriott singled out Baldwin as an apologist for what he termed the 
‘new order’, which was supposedly eroding the constitution. He argued 
that Baldwin was defending unaccountable forms of executive power, and 
he rejected his defence of two remaining constitutional safeguards against 
the potential abuse of powers to make statutory rules and orders: the courts’ 
powers to reject an act of legislation and an MP’s right to introduce a private 
member’s bill to call for an annulment.35 While Marriott considered the 
second of these to be ‘almost wholly illusory’ he was even more disturbed 
by relying on the judiciary rather than on parliament to protect the 
liberties of the individual. Marriott’s main point was the conflict of interest 
arising from government departments’ newfound willingness to make 
law in addition to administering it. The courts could intervene to reject 
the application of legislation only if an individual member of the public 
appealed against it. This, he argued, was insufficient protection because 
 31 Marriott, Crisis, pp. 3–4, 461.
 32 Marriott, Crisis, p. 4.
 33 Marriott, Crisis, p. 5.
 34 Marriott, Crisis, p. 11.
 35 Marriott, Crisis, p. 12.
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most members of the public were not aware of their rights of appeal and 
could ill afford the costs of litigation.36 Marriott’s message was a reminder to 
MPs to remain vigilant in the defence of both the constitution and personal 
liberty. The story of the battles fought between the Stuart monarchy and 
lawyers such as Coke was told to remind MPs of parallel cases in their own 
time; little wonder that critics and reviewers were unenthusiastic about its 
contribution to Stuart history. Furthermore, Marriott offered no solution 
to the constitutional problems he identified other than a committee to 
consider their implications. This fitted his purpose. It seems Marriott was 
more concerned about keeping the issue alive within political circles. 
As Priya Satia also reveals in this volume, concerns about ‘the exaltation 
of the “expert”’ were not restricted to domestic affairs during the inter-
war period. The delegation of ministerial powers to civil servants and the 
influential role of state bureaucracy were essentials tools in the governing 
of what Satia terms Britain’s ‘covert empire’ in the Middle East.37 Calls 
for more government accountability to parliament on domestic affairs 
paralleled those on foreign and imperial matters. However, one could argue 
that Marriott’s opposition (and the evidence cited by Satia) to a reliance 
on the ‘expert’ went against the grain of British politics in this period. 
The prevailing mood among Britain’s parliamentary elite during the inter-
war years was that parliamentary procedure and accountability were too 
cumbersome. This is why the British cabinet appointed a select committee 
on Commons procedure in early 1931, which heard evidence from a number 
of admirers of the Italian ‘corporate state’, including Churchill, Oswald 
Mosley and Lord Eustace Percy.38 Most MPs were in favour of reviewing 
parliamentary procedure because radicals like Mosley were calling for an 
even more autocratic system, but mainly because it was a means of limiting 
the potential effect of universal suffrage on policy-making.  
One of the few occasions when Marriott wrote about Conservative 
politics was in an article on the reformist politician Francis Burdett for 
Cornhill Magazine in August 1931. Marriott identified Burdett, like Coke, 
as a model for his time, arguing that he was Conservative, despite his radical 
connections and sympathy for the French Revolution, because he was a 
defender of personal and political liberty, a champion of the oppressed and 
 36 Marriott, Crisis, pp. 12–13.
 37 P. Satia, ‘Inter-war agnotology: empire, democracy and the production of ignorance’, in 
Brave New World: Imperial and Democratic Nation-Building in Britain between the Wars, ed. 
L. Beers and G. Thomas (2011), p. 211.
 38 P. Williamson, National Crisis and National Government: British Politics, the Economy 
and Empire, 1926–32 (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 136–7.
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the suffering.39 Marriott identified Burdett as the ‘lineal ancestor of Disraeli 
and the Fourth Party’.40 He argued that ‘both ardently believed in the 
compatibility of true Toryism and genuine Democracy’.41 But he qualified 
his praise of Burdett, insisting that ‘A few Burdetts are a valuable ingredient 
in any representative assembly,—but only in minute proportions; many 
Burdetts would constitute a real political danger’.42 The message was clear: 
the Conservative party was a natural home for politicians seeking radical 
reform, but the bulk of traditional Conservatives would always act as a 
restraining influence on the reforming zeal of the ‘Tory Democrats’.43 
In the aftermath of 1931, Marriott wrote a number of articles glorifying 
England’s response to national crisis. In his article ‘The crown and the crisis’ 
Marriott argued that the king’s actions vindicated the role of the crown in 
the British constitution. It was the constitution rather than the political 
parties that saved Britain from doom, although Ramsay MacDonald was 
to be congratulated for upholding his constitutional duty, unlike Asquith 
in 1910.44 After the 1931 general election, Marriott wrote another important 
article praising ‘The answer of demos’ to the recent crisis. He argued that the 
election was more than just a vindication of democracy: ‘It is a vindication 
of that peculiar type of Democracy—Parliamentary, as opposed to Direct 
Democracy—which we English folk were the first to evolve’.45 Even more 
important, Marriott concluded, was the response given by poorer members 
of the electorate who showed their ‘patriotism and good sense’. This, he 
said, was particularly surprising under the circumstances:
there was at least a hope that the return of the Socialists would have brought 
some immediate mitigation of the sacrifices now accepted by all. Quite clearly 
and definitely, then, the mass of the electors refused a bribe. They showed 
themselves to be (in a fine phrase of Sir Robert Horne’s) ‘not mercenaries, but 
citizens’.46
Marriott believed that the general population was won over by reasoned 
argument, not just patriotism; the people recognized the potential long-
term economic danger of inflation (as witnessed in Germany) and they 
rejected attempts by the Trades Union Congress to pressurize the Labour 
 39 J. A. R. Marriott, ‘The father of Tory democracy’, Cornhill Magazine, lxxi (1931), p. 152, 
reviewing M. W. Patterson, Sir Francis Burdett and his Times (2 vols., 1931). 
 40 Marriott, ‘Tory democracy’, p. 152.
 41 Marriott, ‘Tory democracy’, pp. 150–1.
 42 Marriott, ‘Tory democracy’, p. 152.
 43 Marriott, ‘Tory democracy’, p. 152.
 44 J. A. R. Marriott, ‘The crown and the crisis’, Fortnightly Review, cxxx (1931), 586–9.
 45 J. A. R. Marriott, ‘The answer of demos’, Fortnightly Review, cxxx (1931), 681.
 46 Marriott, ‘Answer of demos’, p. 682.
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government into accepting its demands.47 But Marriott was unsure of whether 
the election result would strengthen the British system of government. He 
warned the National Government that it must act responsibly because no 
alternative government existed in parliament as the official opposition was 
in such a minority.48 Despite Marriott’s suspicions of Baldwin, we know 
that the Conservative leader shared his anxieties. Baldwin was careful to 
establish the government’s ‘national’ credentials by allowing the prime 
minister, Ramsay MacDonald, to reconstruct the government on his own 
terms.49
Marriott did not, indeed, idealize the National Government. Although 
he was generally supportive of both it and the Conservative party leadership, 
he regarded his role as that of critical friend rather than loyal apologist. He 
constantly warned political elites of potential constitutional, financial and 
political abuses, and he urged responsible conduct by all MPs. In March 
1932 he was critical of the cabinet’s decision to adopt an ‘agreement to differ’ 
on the Import Duties Bill.50 For Marriott, this struck at the heart of one 
of the most sacred aspects of the Victorian constitution, the principle of 
collective cabinet responsibility, and he could barely hide his distress:
Mr. Baldwin’s answer to my questions would, I doubt not, be ‘solvitur 
ambulando’: pedants propounded logical dilemmas; it is the business of 
statesman to carry on, as best they can, the business of the State. So be it. 
Englishmen, impatient of theory and disdainful of logic, will wait and see how 
the thing works. I sincerely hope it will work well.51
Marriott was equally critical of L. S. Amery’s plans for limiting the cabinet 
to five members without departmental responsibilities – a ‘super-cabinet’ 
like that adopted by the government during the First World War, which was 
also being advocated by fascists.52 Marriott argued that Amery was doing 
the country a great service by raising the issue, but he concluded that it 
would not improve the British system of government. The introduction of 
a cabinet secretary, an agenda and official minutes meant that the cabinet 
 47 Marriott, ‘Answer of demos’, pp. 683–7.
 48 Marriott, ‘Answer of demos’, pp. 690–1.
 49 Williamson, National Crisis, pp. 485–6.
 50 D. J. Wrench, ‘The needs of the time: the National Government and the “agreement to 
differ”, 1932’, Parliamentary History, xxiii (2004), 249–64.
 51 J. A. R. Marriott, ‘Cabinet government – its future?’, Fortnightly Review, cxxxi (1932), 
318–22.
 52 L. S. Amery, The Forward View (1935), pp. 441–58. G. Love, ‘“What’s the big idea?”: 
Oswald Mosley, the British Union of Fascists and generic fascism’, Journal of Contemporary 
History, xlii (July 2007), 450–1.
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system had already been made more efficient.53 Furthermore, there was 
evidence to show that a lack of departmental experts within the war cabinet 
had led to increased friction among its members, resulting in inefficient 
decision-making.54
Financial issues also concerned Marriott. Although he generally admired 
the National Government’s handling of the War Loan conversion scheme he 
was highly critical of the government’s decision to offer bankers commission 
rates of 5%. Marriott argued that this measure was an act of extravagance 
during times of financial hardship. He calculated that if the whole conversion 
was carried out in July 1932 the taxpayer would be liable for £5 million.55 An 
article on the House of Commons’ control of finance followed in February 
1933, urging the government to address a most unfashionable subject, the 
proper regulation of government spending, which he thought would lead to 
an overall reduction in expenditure.56 Marriott even warned the chancellor 
of the Exchequer, Neville Chamberlain, not to take credit for ‘cheap money’ 
in December 1934: ‘Cheap money is … an indication not of prosperity but 
of industrial depression’.57 He followed this with another letter to The Times 
in response to the Conservative MP Waldron Smithers, who had repeated 
Chamberlain’s claims. Marriott labelled his words as ‘partisanship’ and 
warned him, as well as other Conservative candidates at the next election, 
not to exaggerate the National Government’s economic record.58 Marriott’s 
natural sympathies were for individual initiative, private enterprise, low 
taxation and low levels of public spending, but it seems he adapted his 
views on free trade in line with the development of Conservative politics.59 
He supported the introduction of an emergency tariff on manufactured 
goods, but insisted that no artificial mechanisms be introduced to stabilize 
the pound because only ‘the natural operation of economic forces’ could 
‘guarantee its permanent stability’.60 
Marriott’s writings on domestic politics reveal that his sympathies were 
directed towards the crown, the constitution and, curiously, the people. The 
British public had passed a crucial test in 1931 and because they were now 
wedded to Whig constitutionalism Marriott had little to fear. Party politics 
 53 J. A. R. Marriott, ‘The machinery of government’, Nineteenth Century and After, cxxi 
(Feb. 1937), 188–9.
 54 Marriott, ‘Machinery of government’, p. 190.
 55 The Times, 11 July 1932.
 56 J. A. R. Marriott, ‘Commons control of finance’, Fortnightly Review, cxxxiii (1933), 203.
 57 The Times, 24 Dec. 1934.
 58 The Times, 1 Jan. 1935.
 59 Marriott, Memories, pp. 134–5. J. A. R. Marriott, ‘Adam Smith and some problems of 
to-day’, Fortnightly Review, lxxxii (1904), 969–81.
 60 Marriott, ‘Answer of demos’, p. 691.
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were never a key feature of Marriott’s writings in the 1930s. This was partly 
because he was no longer a Conservative MP or subject to the party whip, 
but it also owed much to his intellectual interests, the nature of the literary 
spaces in which he published, and the fact that his arguments happened 
to suit the aims of a Conservative party subsumed within a National 
Government. When Marriott chose to intervene more directly in party 
politics he did so usually through letters to The Times, but his comments 
never amounted to more than warnings against the likely excesses of a large 
Conservative majority in the Commons. Marriott was a self-consciously 
independent Conservative intellectual who sought to keep Conservative 
backbenchers and their coalition partners on their mettle to defend 
principles of parliamentary sovereignty and constitutional government. In 
this respect, he offered critical support for Baldwin and his ministers and 
stressed how Conservatives could retain a distinct identity within National 
politics. Marriott’s influential voice acted as an early warning system for the 
maintenance of Baldwin’s centrist coalition of Conservative-Liberal support 
in elite political circles.
Marriott’s anti-socialist, imperialist beliefs resulted in sympathy for 
Mussolini. In a second edition of The Makers of Modern Italy (1931), he 
gave an account of the rise of fascism and praised Mussolini’s successful 
record on domestic policy. However, although Marriott argued that it was 
too early to judge the Italian fascist ‘experiment’, he wondered if too high a 
price had been paid for rapid improvements to Italian society:
have not all these advantages been attained at the price of that which is more 
precious than rubies, the enjoyment of liberty, personal and political? The answer 
to that question depends on the definition of ‘liberty’. ‘Liberty’, said Mussolini, 
echoing Mazzini, ‘is not a right but a duty.’ Parliamentary democracy—and 
all that the phrase implies to an Englishman—has unquestionably been 
superseded by a dictatorship: the press is muzzled; Parliament has been reduced 
to the position of a debating society, without the power to legislate, and has no 
control whatever over the Executive; the new electoral methods seem (at any 
rate to an Englishman, so far as we can comprehend them) a mere travesty of 
representative government. Despite many elaborative devices, all real power is 
concentrated in the Fascist Grand Council and its President.61
Marriott warmed to the imperialist-nationalist sentiment of the fascist 
regime, but he was extremely suspicious of its syndicalist roots. As a result, 
 61 J. A. R. Marriott, The Makers of Modern Italy: Napoleon–Mussolini (Oxford, 1931), p. 
204.
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he seized upon Winston Churchill’s comments in his famous Romanes 
Lecture at Oxford in 1930. Marriott wrote that Churchill’s mind ‘is moving 
in the same direction as Signor Mussolini’s. They are both, consciously 
or unconsciously, inspired by Syndicalist doctrine’.62 Marriott’s fear of 
syndicalism and labour unrest had deepened after the 1926 General Strike. 
In his words, it ‘revealed clearly enough that my temper and outlook were 
essentially Conservative’.63 However, despite these fears Marriott refused 
to engage critically with the philosophy of fascism. Instead, he encouraged 
his readers to examine Britain’s own historical record, notably the years of 
Tudor dictatorship, which he argued represented ‘an indispensable prelude 
to a period of constitutional advance’.64 Marriott would not accept that 
there was any conflict between his endorsement of constitutional values at 
home and his condoning of Italian fascism. He chose to interpret this within 
the context of his own reading of Tudor and Stuart England. Although he 
refused to draw direct parallels between the two nations, Marriott hoped 
for a similar transition from Italy’s ‘modernizing’ dictatorship to some form 
of parliamentary democracy. In his Dictatorship and Democracy, Marriott 
asked, ‘Will repression, having served its disciplinary purpose, prepare the 
way for the enjoyment of a larger liberty? Will the Italian Dictatorship, like 
that of the English Tudors, prove itself politically educative?’65 
Like Churchill, Marriott lamented the loss of national self-confidence 
in British institutions at the end of the ‘long nineteenth century’. He 
remembered how ‘the balanced Constitution of England appeared to 
mankind to be the quintessence of political wisdom’.66 But the rise of 
dictatorships in Europe served only to confirm his belief in a Whig view 
of the national past. As Marriott explained, ‘admiration … is one thing: 
imitation is another’ and ‘there is no reason why the failure of the copyists 
should arouse among ourselves dissatisfaction with the original’.67 It was this 
attitude and his Christian values that led to his support for appeasement. 
Marriott always stressed that the British should not look down upon 
their neighbours simply because they could not sustain parliamentary 
government and democracy. As he argued, ‘Forms of government are to 
be judged not absolutely, according to some preconceived standard of 
 62 Marriott, Makers of Modern Italy, p. 205. For the Romanes Lecture of 19 June 1930, see 
W. S. Churchill, Thoughts and Adventures (1932), pp. 229–44.
 63 Marriott, Memories, p. 139. On Marriott’s attitude towards organized labour, see 
Goldman, Dons and Workers, p. 78.
 64 Marriott, Makers of Modern Italy, p. 206.
 65 J. A. R. Marriott, Dictatorship and Democracy (Oxford, 1935), p. 192.
 66 Marriott, Dictatorship, p. 219.
 67 Marriott, Dictatorship, pp. 218–19.
81
Whig lessons, Conservative answers
excellence, but relatively to circumstances’.68 These arguments were the by-
products of a ‘Whig interpretation of history’, which had done much to 
propagate constitutional and democratic values at home. Marriott blamed 
the Treaty of Versailles for the rise of ultra-nationalism in inter-war Europe, 
and his memories of the First World War haunted him afresh, but he was 
aware of the ugliness of dictatorship and of the Nazi regime.69 
Marriott’s views on foreign policy were expressed in a steady flow of 
articles defending negotiations with Mussolini during the Abyssinian crisis. 
In his diary, he also acknowledged how he hoped his article England and 
Italy would ‘do something to appease bitterness on both sides’.70 This was 
certainly wishful thinking, but perhaps he was influenced by a personal 
letter from Mussolini thanking him for The Makers of Modern Italy in 1931.71 
Marriott even wrote a letter of support to the recently displaced foreign 
secretary, Samuel Hoare, in 1935 declaring that his ‘policy will justify itself ’.72 
However, it must be said that although Marriott’s articles and books added 
weight to pro-appeasement arguments, they did not cloud his views on 
domestic politics. R. W. Macan, reading the proofs of Marriott’s The Makers 
of Modern Italy, wrote:
I am thinking of the doctrinaire Liberals and Socialists, of both peoples—and 
it has come upon me, with fresh force, that the essence, or part of the essence of 
‘Conservative politics’ is just, not to be ‘doctrinaire’, but to be ‘evolutionary’—I 
need not develop the point—for it must be the ABC of your own historical 
conscience.73
Marriott’s literary work resonated in academic and political circles, and 
his message that the Conservative party was the natural defender of the 
constitution, evolved over centuries, remained clear in the minds of his 
contemporaries.74 
 68 Marriott, Dictatorship, p. 218.
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In her recent work on the Conservative historian Arthur Bryant, Julia 
Stapleton compares Bryant’s responses to the ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 
1688 with the views of the Liberal intellectual Ernest Barker. She reveals 
how Bryant’s and Barker’s interpretations of 1688 represented a key area 
of disagreement, which ultimately located both scholars in inter-war 
Conservative or Liberal politics respectively.75 Barker rejected Bryant’s 
claim that the negative social consequences of the industrial revolution and 
the ‘unleashing of the aristocracy’ after 1688 had undermined the Bill of 
Rights Act of 1689. Barker argued that the price for political liberty was 
worth paying, and he suggested Bryant’s arguments could in fact be used to 
defend the extremist politics of Nazi Germany and fascist Italy.76 Stapleton 
rightly draws our attention to the importance of these differences: ‘Barker’s 
wariness of the state was firmly rooted in the securities against the misuse 
of power which he believed was [sic] enshrined in the 1689 constitutional 
settlement. By contrast, Bryant placed great faith in the capacity of a 
benevolent ruling class’.77
Marriott’s Whig view of 1688 and its consequences edged him closer to the 
thinking of Liberal conservatives like Barker. It was perhaps no coincidence 
that both Marriott and Barker wrote regularly for the Fortnightly Review, 
which targeted a broad liberal readership. It has also been claimed that 
religion was a key stumbling block to potential ‘Liberal-Conservative 
agreement against the rising tide of “progressivism”’ in the 1930s.78 While 
nonconformity may have been a problem for some Conservatives, it was 
not for Marriott because he never made religion a key feature of his work, 
despite his commitment to private worship and the Anglican Church.79 
Marriott said that he had never had much contact with nonconformists, 
‘from no lack of sympathy or appreciation of their many sterling qualities 
but simply through circumstances’. He was tolerant of the religious beliefs 
of his academic friends, especially R. F. Horton:
To Horton’s own views, ecclesiastical and still more strongly political, I was 
definitely opposed. His Nonconformity and his Radicalism greatly mellowed, 
indeed, in old age, and towards the end, while deeply lamenting the virtual 
disappearance of the Liberal Party, he found, I think, in Mr. Stanley (Earl) 
Baldwin the nearest approach among modern statesmen to the idol he had 
worshipped in his political adolescence—Mr. Gladstone.80
 75 Stapleton, Bryant, pp. 92–3.
 76 Stapleton, Bryant, p. 92. 
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Marriott was representative of a form of Conservatism that wanted to 
meet constitutional and economic Liberals halfway to ensure the survival 
of Britain’s established economic and political order at a time when it was 
being challenged by statist and unconstitutional ideas from both left and 
right. Like Barker, Marriott put his faith in the constitutional settlement, 
but like Bryant and other Conservatives he relied on MPs and the crown 
to safeguard the unwritten principles of the constitution on behalf of the 
general public. However, Marriott accepted democracy and he did not fear 
modern political and social change. He rejected the idea that the nineteenth 
century had undermined the strength of the English national character.81 
‘As in 1914, as in 1926, so again in 1931–2’, he wrote, ‘Britons proved that the 
national fibre is still sound, that in real stamina, moral or physical, there has 
in fact been no decay’.82
Marriott’s orthodox economic liberalism reflected an important bridge 
between the Conservative party and National Liberals in the 1930s, but 
we should also not forget that his Whig view of 1688 was published in 
the context of serious debates about the ‘professionalization’ of history in 
this period. In The Whig Interpretation of History (1931), Herbert Butterfield 
warned famously against studying the past for contemporary purposes and 
it is likely that Marriott was one of his targets.83 After all, Marriott’s The 
Crisis of English Liberty was as close to a perfect example of a Conservative 
‘Whig interpretation of history’ as one could get; and, more important, 
it was published just one year before Butterfield’s work. Most academics 
anticipated or echoed Butterfield’s concerns in their reviews of Marriott’s 
work. Denis Brogan, a lecturer in politics at the London School of Economics, 
was critical of Marriott’s Whig interpretation, but he was also disturbed 
by Marriott’s claims that Britain was dangerously close to returning to a 
pre-1688 system of government.84 He was particularly critical of Marriott’s 
inability to look beyond the idea that the legal and parliamentary response 
to the crisis of 1688 was a purely moral one, disregarding the idea that other 
personal and professional motives might have played a part in Britain’s 
constitutional ‘march of progress’. Brogan was for a more dialectical account 
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of history, which Butterfield would have no doubt appreciated.85 However, 
one senses that Marriott would not have been overly concerned by the 
responses of professional historians. For all of his admiration for academic 
history, politics took centre stage in the twilight of his career. Instead of 
altering his methodology to suit an emerging historiographical orthodoxy, 
Marriott justified his ‘Whig interpretation of history’ on the grounds that it 
could provide the answers to contemporary constitutional dangers.
Marriott’s potential influence can be measured only by documenting the 
reception of his ideas in political circles. The task has been made more difficult 
because he crossed out much of his surviving political correspondence in 
order to provide paper for writing manuscripts. Nevertheless, a number of 
important letters and diary entries survive, while others can be rescued from 
their more recent literary homes. The material gives us a strong indication 
of Marriott’s academic and political connections in the 1930s. The fact 
that he was an MP in the 1920s gave him greater credibility than other 
Conservative intellectuals. His writings were undoubtedly popular with 
educated elites, as a systematic analysis of the periodical press reveals. No 
author would have been given so much intellectual space if he was of no 
interest to readers. The editor of the Fortnightly Review certainly believed 
that Marriott’s work appealed to old parliamentarians.86 The fact that The 
Times published so many of his letters demonstrates that he was a man of 
stature. Furthermore, the political stance of the periodicals where Marriott 
chose to publish, mainly the Cornhill Magazine, Fortnightly Review and 
Quarterly Review, suggests that editors considered his work to be less 
partisan than that of other Conservative historians, even though he always 
claimed to be a ‘stern and unbending Tory’ in the national press.87 
Certainly, the popularization of Hewart’s arguments in Marriott’s history 
of the seventeenth century and the views that Marriott later put forward 
in articles for the periodical press registered in Conservative, Liberal and 
legal circles. His work, for example, greatly influenced the Conservative 
 85 Collini, ‘Believing in history’, p. 141.
 86 YCA, Marriott papers, sorted letters 1870–1943, editor of the Fortnightly Review to J. A. 
R. Marriott, 11 Oct. 1932. The article in question was probably Marriott, ‘Commons control 
of finance’, pp. 194–203.
 87 The Times, 20 Nov. 1935. Presumably Marriott was trying to compare himself to the 
historian T. B. Macaulay who used the same words in a hostile review of W. E. Gladstone’s 
book The State in its Relations with the Church (1838). See R. Shannon, Gladstone, i: 1809–65 
(1982), pp. 43–4; and B. Hilton, A Mad, Bad, and Dangerous People? England 1783–1846 
(Oxford, 2006), p. 485.
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backbench MP Harold Balfour, who wrote an important series of broadcasts 
on the British constitution for the BBC in October 1935.88 Although Balfour 
did not fully endorse Marriott’s suspicions of the political establishment, 
his talks touched upon nearly all of Marriott’s concerns, and during his first 
two broadcasts he openly acknowledged the latter’s work as important and 
influential. Marriott’s seventeenth-century comparison fuelled Balfour’s 
script with examples of British freedoms won through hard-fought legal 
and constitutional developments. Balfour advised his audience: ‘I only wish 
that I could assure you that the fears expressed by men like Lord Hewart 
and Sir John Marriott are groundless’.89 Balfour’s talks were written with 
Hitler’s ‘Night of the Long Knives’ fresh in the popular mind. Despite 
trying to nuance his views of the Nazi regime in hope of improved 
diplomatic relations with Germany, it was obvious from his broadcasts that 
such qualification struck at the heart of his view of British justice and his 
high regard for personal liberty.90
Marriott’s impact on Balfour indicates how academic works could 
influence 1930s Conservative culture. Both Marriott and Balfour attempted 
to underpin their constitutional arguments with historical examples in 
order to convince the public that the parliamentary system was preferable 
to foreign-style dictatorship. They both recognized that in a new democratic 
age the public had to be ‘educated’, but the level of detail that they deployed 
suggests that their messages were more likely to convince the highly educated 
elite. Certainly they did have influence with such people. The Conservative 
MP Duff Cooper expressed interest in Marriott’s book Castlereagh (1936).91 
Lord Selborne praised his Oxford and its Place in National History (1933). 
The legal world, which played an important role in parliamentary politics, 
also approved of Marriott’s work, especially The Crisis of English Liberty. As 
late as 1944 Humphrey Leggett informed Marriott of a recent encounter 
with two leading legal experts, the former Liberal MPs Norman Birkett and 
William Jowitt, who were then working on the ‘war criminals question’. 
Leggett suggested to the two men that Marriott was well placed to write 
 88 The broadcast series was ‘The citizen and his government’.  
 89 Cambridge, Churchill Archives Centre (hereafter CAC), papers of Harold Harington 
Balfour, 1st Baron Balfour of Inchrye, GBR/0014/BLFR, H. Balfour, ‘The citizen and his 
government. 2. Political liberty. Parliament: the making of laws’, broadcast script, 8 Oct. 
1935.
 90 CAC, papers of Harold Harington Balfour, 1st Baron Balfour of Inchrye, GBR/0014/
BLFR, Harold Balfour, ‘The citizen and his government. 1. The free-born Briton’, broadcast 
script, 1 Oct. 1935.
 91 YCA, Marriott papers, unsorted letters, envelope marked ‘Letters Misc. 1910–45, chiefly 
political’, Duff Cooper to J. A. R. Marriott, 24 Jan. 1936. See J. A. R. Marriott, Castlereagh: 
the Political Life of Robert, Second Marquess of Londonderry (1936).
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a letter to The Times on the subject of ‘Act of State’. According to Leggett: 
‘Jowitt and Birkett jumped at this in the most amazing way, and both said 
that they hoped I would write you at once, urging you to do it. Jowitt added 
“It would be rendering a very high public service if Marriott would do this, 
and you may tell him so from me”’. Furthermore, Birkett asked Leggett if 
he had ever read The Crisis of English Liberty. Birkett judged the work to 
be ‘one of the finest books ever written’ and argued that ‘a man who could 
write that book is the right man to instruct the British public’.92
Marriott’s private papers confirm that he was solidly in touch with 
Conservative politics despite his advancing years. He was valued by 
Conservative Central Office (CCO) as a platform speaker, campaigning 
for the National Government during the 1931 general election. The vice-
chairman of the Conservative party wrote to Marriott explaining that his 
former parliamentary status would be an asset during the campaign.93 
Marriott’s friend the marquess of Salisbury recommended to Baldwin’s 
private secretary, Geoffrey Fry, that he be nominated for a peerage because 
of his commitment to Conservative literary ‘propaganda’.94 But Fry 
rejected Marriott’s claims because he was blamed by CCO for losing two 
safe Conservative seats at previous elections.95 In the final chapter of his 
autobiography, Marriott also draws our attention to his more intimate 
political contacts, particularly those Conservatives and publicists who often 
joined him at his home for luncheon in the 1930s. Marriott claimed to be in 
contact with the venerable Viscount Bridgeman and Austen Chamberlain, 
but a group of former and serving Conservative MPs furnished him 
with contemporary parliamentary gossip, namely Nathan Raw, Vivian 
Henderson, Annesley Somerville, William Collins and Servington Savery. 
Financiers, soldiers and publicists such as Arnold Wilson (also a Conservative 
MP), Wickham Steed, Harold Nicolson, John Coatman and Owen Rutter 
(editor of the Hungarian Quarterly, where Marriott sometimes published) 
were also regular visitors.96
Marriott was also consulted by Liberal cabinet ministers, including 
John Simon, the home secretary, who had been recruited by Marriott as an 
 92 YCA, Marriott papers, unsorted letters, envelope marked ‘Letters Misc. 1910–45, chiefly 
political’, Sir Humphrey Leggett to J. A. R. Marriott, two letters dated 6 and 7 Jan. 1944. 
 93 YCA, Marriott papers, letter from vice-chairman of the Conservative party to J. A. 
R. Marriott, 7 Oct. 1931 (correspondence survives, crossed out, on the reverse of his draft 
manuscript for ‘Oxford: its place in national history’).
 94 See Cambridge University Library (hereafter CUL), Stanley Baldwin papers, 167/236, 
marquess of Salisbury to Geoffrey Fry, 14 Dec. 1931; and CUL, Baldwin papers, 167/241, 
marquess of Salisbury to Geoffrey Fry, 16 March 1932. 
 95 CUL, Baldwin papers, 167/245, Geoffrey Fry to marquess of Salisbury, 22 March 1932.
 96 Marriott, Memories, pp. 234–9.
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Oxford extension lecturer earlier in his career. That Simon shared Marriott’s 
interest in upholding constitutional values in public life can be seen in a 
letter that he wrote to Marriott in June 1936. Simon raised the issue of the 
Budget Disclosure inquiry involving the recent malpractices of J. H. Thomas 
(National Labour MP for Derby and secretary of state for the colonies):
you will have been much interested in the proceedings and conclusion of the 
Budget Disclosure Inquiry—a sad business and indeed a very distressing one 
as regards the individuals, but at bottom a tremendous proof of the integrity 
of British public life and a lesson to the world on how to set things right if 
something goes wrong. The contrast with Stavisky and Teapot Dome makes 
one feel proud of being an Englishman.97
Simon’s confidence in the superiority of the British constitution and the 
good conduct of its MPs was in fact backed up by punitive action taken 
by the House of Commons. Simon saw the result of the Budget Disclosure 
inquiry as evidence that honourable members were heeding Marriott’s 
warnings about the safeguarding of the constitution. 
However, Marriott’s relationship with Arthur Bryant was more complicated 
because he did not lecture at the unofficial Conservative training college, 
Ashridge, which was under Bryant’s control in the 1930s. The Conservative 
historians F. J. C. Hearnshaw and Hugh Sellon lectured regularly at Ashridge 
and they often corresponded with Bryant, but there is no record of Marriott 
ever doing so in either his or Bryant’s private papers. However, Marriott 
met Hearnshaw and Sellon for luncheon on a number of occasions and 
corresponded with Hearnshaw during the 1930s.98 Marriott may have decided 
against being involved because, given Bryant’s more partisan influence at 
Ashridge, he wanted to maintain the appearance of non-partisanship in his 
own work. Whatever the reasons behind his absence from Ashridge, he was 
able to reach a reading public different to that of Bryant, Hearnshaw and 
Sellon;99 it was much more liberal and it consisted of members and voters of 
 97 YCA, Marriott papers, unsorted letters, envelope marked ‘Letters Misc. 1910–45, chiefly 
political’, John Simon to J. A. R. Marriott, 12 June 1936. For the Stavisky affair, see B. 
Jenkins, France in the Era of Fascism: Essays on the French Authoritarian Right (New York, 
2005), p. 15. On Teapot Dome, see B. Davis, The Teapot Dome Scandal (2007), p. 15. The 
Budget Disclosure inquiry confirmed revelations that J. H. Thomas had disclosed budget 
secrets before an official government announcement was made (see also Marriott, Memories, 
p. 45).
 98 YCA, Marriott papers, box marked ‘Marriott Notebooks’, diary (loose leaf ), mainly 
1933–7, Marriott diary, 12 Aug. 1935 and 16 Dec. 1936. See also YCA, Marriott papers, 
envelope marked ‘Letters of Appreciation and Criticism, mostly dated 1939–40’, F. J. C. 
Hearnshaw to J. A. R. Marriott, 21 Nov. 1940. 
 99 F. J. C. Hearnshaw and Hugh Sellon are discussed in detail in my PhD thesis (see Love, 
‘Conservatives, national politics’, pp. 74–128).
88
Brave New World
all political parties. This was a significant middle- and upper-class readership, 
which was needed to support the National Government and Baldwin’s centrist 
Conservative politics in the 1930s.100 
For all of Marriott’s output and influence in the 1930s, we must remember 
that he derived much from others. His private papers reveal that most 
of his books and articles drew heavily on newspaper cuttings and other 
printed documents such as pamphlets; he collected quotations on liberty 
and fascism by Baldwin, Simon, Birkett, Hearnshaw, Churchill and Robert 
Bernays to name a few.101 But he was also a voracious reader of the work 
of contemporaries. For example, in 1937 alone he read books by Kenneth 
Pickthorn, Viscount Snowdon, Lord Snell, Walter Citrine, Arthur Bryant 
and Thomas Dugdale. However, it was always Churchill’s books that stood 
out in his mind. He described Churchill’s Great Contemporaries as ‘wholly 
delightful’ and praised his ‘wonderful portraits’ of all the great men he 
covered in his book.102 
In some ways, Marriott had more in common with Churchill than he did 
with Baldwin. As we know, he was critical of Baldwin’s complacency in the 
early 1930s.103 But it is also clear from entries in Marriott’s private diary that 
Baldwin’s handling of the abdication crisis impressed him deeply. The episode 
convinced Marriott to end his scepticism of the Conservative leader: 
SB’s retirement at the zenith of his popularity + prestige is surely unique in the 
history of English statesmanship … Had he resigned anytime before Dec. 1936 
he would have gone down to history to a very mixed reputation, + wd never 
have been put in the 1st class of P.M’s. Now he is ranked to the Walpoles, Peels 
+ Younger Pitt. The Edw. Viii crisis gave him his opportunity + he rose to it 
superbly. I doubt if there has ever been a P.M. … [with] … fewer enemies, tho’ 
there have been many with more … friends + admirers. He stands in sharp 
contrast to Dizzy + Gladstone.104
Furthermore, Marriott drew on Baldwin’s anti-fascist speeches as a valuable 
rhetorical source for his own literary work.105 As Philip Williamson explains, 
 100 It is noticeable, for example, that those who published in the Fortnightly Review 
alongside Marriott included Edward Grigg, Austin Hopkinson, Robert Bernays, Hugh 
Dalton and George Orwell. It was a very diverse political and literary space.
 101 YCA, Marriott papers, box marked ‘ZWD(Y)’, assorted press cuttings. The envelopes 
of cuttings relate to chapters of certain books and articles over the years and seem to have 
been continuously updated and reworked using the material.
 102 YCA, Marriott papers, box marked ‘Marriott Notebooks’, diary (loose leaf ), mainly 
1933–7, Marriott diary, 20–31 Dec. 1937. 
 103 Marriott, ‘Cabinet’, p. 322.
 104 YCA, Marriott papers, box marked ‘Marriott Notebooks’, diary (loose leaf ), mainly 
1933–7, Marriott diary, 28 May 1937. 
 105 YCA, Marriott papers, box marked ‘ZWD(Y)’, assorted press cuttings.
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Baldwin was largely ambivalent towards democracy, but he accepted it 
as irreversible and he often invoked Whig interpretations of Britain’s sui 
generis past to add weight to his constitutional arguments.106 Baldwin’s 
inclusive public message allowed a Conservative ‘Whig interpretation of 
history’ to thrive in the 1930s and Marriott’s publications added weight 
to this constitutional Conservative message. It did not matter if Baldwin’s 
personal views differed from Marriott’s because in the end they worked 
towards the same national goal.
This chapter demonstrates how strongly the Victorian age continued to 
grip the minds of literary Conservatives, and how their work could still 
command an important elite readership throughout the 1930s. Marriott’s 
‘Whig interpretation of history’ refused to reject the political and social 
reforms of the nineteenth century and this provided one way of reaching out 
to National Liberals and other liberal-Conservative readers. Marriott was an 
independent Conservative and he warned the National Government against 
the potential abuse of its powers. He was also a consistent voice against the 
adoption of fascist ideas at home because he rejected political extremism 
out of hand. Marriott reinforced continuity in British elite reading circles 
at a time when radical political change was being implemented abroad 
and discussed at home. He contributed towards the success of both the 
Conservative party and the National Government in the 1930s. However, 
his work also encouraged the party to be politically cautious, arguably 
helping to cement its position on the ‘long road to 1945’. 
 106 Williamson, Stanley Baldwin, pp. 204, 254–5.
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3. The ‘Will to Work’: industrial management and the 
question of conduct in inter-war Britain
Daniel Ussishkin
The First World War marked an important turning point in the emergence 
and implementation of new managerial theories and attitudes, a story that 
forms an important chapter in the history of social governance in Britain.1 
The first industrial nation was notoriously late to develop a modern 
expertise in industrial management. Early attempts to devise schemes for 
rational factory organization, such as those suggested by Matthew Boulton 
and James Watt or by Charles Babbage, were limited to particular issues 
such as accounting or the administration of things.2 It was only in the 
earlier part of the twentieth century that the human aspect of labour was 
problematized as the object of expert knowledge and intervention, marked 
by the appearance of ‘man-management’ as a new English phrase. In a sense, 
Britain merely followed broader transnational trends, best exemplified by 
the work of Frederic W. Taylor in America before the First World War. 
The new attitude to management, which Taylor had notoriously termed 
a ‘mental revolution’, suggested that it was the domain of ‘experts’ who 
professed political neutrality. Management, as the new practitioners argued, 
was ‘no longer the “middle man” between Capital and Labour; no longer 
the wedge which takes all the strain. It stands rather in co-ordinating 
position between the two, owing allegiance to neither, but acknowledging 
as master the public will of the community alone’.3 Lyndall Urwick, one 
of the leading managerial theorists and later the chair of the International 
Management Institute in Geneva, viewed the new management thought in 
terms of the much-discussed rationalization of industries: ‘Rationalization’, 
 1 The title of this chapter is taken from G. H. Miles, The ‘Will to Work’ (1929). I would 
like to thank Jon Lawrence and Grahame Foreman for commenting on an earlier draft. 
Research for this chapter has been assisted by the Newhouse Center for the Humanities, 
Wellesley College, and the Yad Hanadiv Postdoctoral Fellowship in History. 
 2 On early practices of industrial management, see, for instance, J. A. Merkle, Management 
and Ideology: the Legacy of the International Scientific Management Movement (Berkeley, Calif., 
1980); S. Pollard, The Genesis of Modern Management: a Study of the Industrial Revolution in 
Great Britain (Cambridge, Mass., 1965).
 3 O. Sheldon, The Philosophy of Management (1924), p. 44. 
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he explained, ‘is not a method or a system: it is a state of mind’.4 These 
calls for the professionalization of management gathered into what the 
historian and critic of management, John Child, has seen as the emergence 
of the British management movement, driven by the promise of better 
organization of industry to deliver social progress: ‘From now to Utopia’, 
in the often-quoted words of Sidney Webb, ‘Management is indispensable 
and all enduring’.5
Yet in another sense, British management writers exhibited a particular 
trajectory, for, while accepting Taylor’s call for a ‘mental revolution’ in 
attitudes towards the question of management, they differed sharply as 
to the shape or content of the new managerial practices. For the most 
part, the early promoters of expert management in Britain constructed 
a professional ethos that was presented as being in opposition to the 
basic premises of Taylorism and other forms of scientific management. 
They rejected wholesale what they conceived as Taylor’s atomizing 
and alienating methods: the subjection of the worker to the experts’ 
stopwatch, the standardization of work that curbed skill and initiative, 
and the reduction of workers to mere automata.6 They articulated their 
opposition in both practical and ethical terms. First, they argued against 
policies that seemed bound to arouse opposition and would therefore be 
difficult, if not impossible, to implement: a policy that ‘fixes its attention 
on the efficiency of the workman as a living tool’, explained Edward 
Cadbury in 1912, ‘and disregards every part of his individuality … [is] 
bound to awaken resentment’. Such a policy, it was maintained, was 
inconsistent with ‘the democratic temper of the age’, and was therefore 
bound to fail.7 Second, it was argued that the goals of management must 
comprise more than merely augmenting the profits of owners. Expert 
management must work to produce social good, and it would do so by 
acknowledging that the management of humans would be, so to speak, 
human.8 Hence, British management thought developed, or at least styled 
itself, in opposition to what were seen as American individuating and 
 4 L. Urwick, Management of Tomorrow (1933), p. 119. 
 5 J. Child, British Management Thought: a Critical Analysis, ed. A. Robertson (Studies in 
Management, 1969), chs. 3–4; S. Webb, The Works Manager Today: an Address Prepared for a 
Series of Private Gatherings of Works Managers (1917).
 6 There were, of course, other methods that drew similar fire. For a classic articulation, 
see J. A. Hobson, ‘Scientific Management’, Sociological Review, vi (1913), 197–212.
 7 E. Cadbury, Experiments in Industrial Organization (1912). 
 8 The ‘fundamental principle’, Seebohm Rowntree explained, was ‘that Industry should 
everywhere and always serve the needs of citizenship’ (B. S. Rowntree, ‘Social obligations of 
industry to labour’, in Industrial Administration: a Series of Lectures (Manchester, 1920), p. 
3).
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alienating techniques, and acquired a distinct welfarist inflection that 
emphasized management’s obligation to care for the workers’ well-being.9
This particular British trajectory in the history of management thought 
has been correctly viewed as generating ‘social’ visions of industrial 
management. Writers on management and later historians have for 
the most part emphasized continuities between inter-war calls for 
welfare management and the post-war obsession with human-relations 
management. Sharp differences, such as the institutional apparatus for 
generating and disseminating professional industrial management, were 
recognized (after the Second World War the calls to reform management 
practices received the support of an enthusiastic Labour government and 
had a wider appeal more generally), but these have largely been understood 
as differences in scale rather than in kind.10 Writing from the perspective of 
the seeming triumph of ‘human-relations’ management during the post-war 
years, British management theorists and historians could posit the ‘human 
relations’ school as the natural outgrowth of the British welfarist model of 
management of the inter-war years. The first to write those histories were 
central figures in the newly forged profession, such as Lyndall Urwick and 
Edward Brech, whose famous trilogy on British management established 
human-relations management as the endpoint of a particularly British 
trajectory.11 This view has been mirrored in the critical analysis offered by 
John Child, whose 1969 British Management Thought is still considered the 
most thorough analysis of management ideas in Britain. In Child’s account 
welfarist managerial practices served one purpose only, that of securing the 
foundations of industrial societies and economic inequalities. As Child has 
suggested, late Victorian and Edwardian welfarist management, largely 
introduced by Quaker employers, sought to reconcile its abhorrence of 
 9 Recent research has emphasized the extent to which certain aspects of scientific 
management have permeated British industry, even among those who professed to offer an 
alternative (C. R. Littler, The Development of the Labour Process in Capitalist Societies (1982), 
pp. 80–116; M. C. Rowlinson, ‘The early application of scientific management by Cadbury’, 
Business History, xxx (1988), 377–95; K. Whitston, ‘Scientific management and production 
management practice in Britain between the wars’, Historical Studies in Industrial Relations, 
i (1996), 47–75; K. Whitston, ‘The reception of scientific management by British engineers, 
1890–1914’, Business History Review, lxxi (1997), 207–29). For a discussion of the politics 
of remembering the early days of scientific management in Britain, see M. Roper, ‘Killing 
off the father: social science and the memory of Frederick Taylor in management studies, 
1950–75’, Contemporary British History, xiii (1999), 39–58. 
 10 C. S. Maier, ‘Factory as society: ideologies of industrial management in the 20th 
century’, in Ideas into Politics: Aspects of European History, 1880–1950, ed. R. J. Bullen, H. 
Pogge von Strandmann and A. B. Polonsky (1988), pp. 147–63.
 11 L. Urwick and E. F. L. Brech, The Making of Scientific Management, i (1949).
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profit made through exploitation, a traditional puritan ethic of hard labour, 
an egalitarian world-view, and the rejection of conflict.12 Child has drawn 
a direct line from the welfarist programmes of the Quaker managers to 
what he saw as the ‘human relations’ school in management thought. 
According to this view, then, the post-war obsession with ‘human relations’ 
is understood as a professional re-articulation of inter-war welfarist 
management programmes.
This chapter argues that such a view conceals essential differences 
between these two programmes of management, specifically that both 
were premised on different modalities of human conduct. The first 
model targeted the worker as an individual, and was related to what the 
Victorians called ‘character’, which can be best understood as individual 
ethical conduct. This model generated management programmes that 
were largely known as industrial welfare.13 The second model targeted the 
workers as groups, and was related to collective attitude, or ‘morale’, and 
generated programmes of management known as ‘human relations’. The 
transition from one to the other was a fractured process that could not be 
explained as a linear development internal to the professionalization of 
industrial management. 
In order to understand the differences between these two programmes 
of management, and the aspects of conduct each targeted, I will discuss 
two of the clearest articulations of the aims and methods of each. 
The programme of industrial welfare is examined mostly by looking 
at how the new profession of welfare emerged during the First World 
War and its aftermath, and the ways in which it exhibited important 
continuities with similar Edwardian trends. The meanings of morale 
in relation to industrial management and the crystallization of new 
programmes that targeted it are studied by looking at the work of inter-
war British psychologists, who offered some of the clearest articulations 
of the significance of the management of morale to social stability or 
reconstruction. In order to do this, I will examine closely the particular 
trajectories that were specific to each sphere. Other spheres or types 
of inquiry that are closely related are therefore left out, such as the 
social-psychological literature, international in its nature, on the moral 
 12 J. Child, ‘Quaker employers and industrial relations’, Sociological Review, xii (1965); 
Child, British Management Thought, p. 264. 
 13 The concept of character, central to Victorian political idioms, has been explored in a 
seminal article by Stefan Collini (S. Collini, ‘The idea of “character” in Victorian political 
thought’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th ser., xxv (1985), 29–50). As Collini 
explains, the notion of character, closely linked to notions such as self-help and duty, was 
both descriptive and prescriptive, and it referred to both habit and will.  
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conditions of the unemployed.14 It is important to emphasize, moreover, 
that the lines separating those two managerial programmes and dividing the 
groups who promoted them were fuzzy. There were important differences 
within the welfare ‘movement’ itself. Angela Woollacott, for instance, 
has demonstrated that significant variations existed between the types of 
professional ethos and practice promoted by the new inter-war organizations 
that consisted largely of women, and the older, largely male-dominated 
associations.15 The new organizations discussed by Woollacott arguably 
promoted versions of welfare that placed greater emphasis on its ‘social’ 
aspects, which, like the psychological trajectory described below, developed 
in response to some social and cultural legacies of the First World War and 
as a coming to terms with the advent of mass democracy.16 
My point, then, is not to argue that welfare was about individuals and that 
psychology was about groups or societies. Far from it: welfare, in general, 
developed strong notions of collective life at the levels of the community 
and society. For inter-war American or French observers, a British ‘social’ 
psychology would have appeared as virtually non-existent. Rather, I aim to 
analyse modes of theoretical articulations of workers’ conduct within the 
sphere of industrial management, and to suggest that these are important 
to our understanding of the ways in which inter-war Britons confronted 
perceived social transformations, and the continuities that such responses 
exhibited with both earlier and later responses to the political problem of 
managing the body politic. 
The character of individuals
Before the First World War only a handful of northern industrialists 
introduced limited schemes of factory welfare, which had usually amounted 
to the implementation of various profit-sharing schemes or the establishment 
 14 This literature is explored and carefully dissected in R. McKibbin, ‘The “social 
psychology” of unemployment in interwar Britain’, in R. McKibbin, The Ideologies of Class: 
Social Relations in Britain, 1880–1950 (Oxford, 1990), pp. 228–58. On the relation between 
the conduct of the unemployed and the problem of work discipline, see A. Olechnowicz, 
‘Unemployed workers, “enforced leisure” and education for the “right use of leisure” in 
Britain in the 1930s’, Labour History Review, lxx (2005), 27–52.
 15 A. Woollacott, ‘Maternalism, professionalism, and industrial welfare supervisors in 
World War I Britain’, Women’s History Review, iii (1994), 19–56.
 16 The managerial aspect of these trajectories was key. Programmes of welfare and the care 
of morale were both understood in terms of increasing the productivity of British workers 
while securing social stability through the development of loyalty to the workplace or the 
working group (rather than, say, to a class or a union). Management, then, is understood 
both in ‘negative’ terms (of containment, out-manoeuvring class politics, and so forth), as 
well as in ‘positive’ terms (maximizing productive capacity). 
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of mutual-aid funds. The managerial or disciplinary origins of such schemes 
have not escaped either contemporaries or later historians, who have regarded 
such initiatives with suspicion. The problem with welfare management was 
perceived to be its individuation and atomization. As Dorothea Proud, a 
leading spokeswoman for the early twentieth-century welfare ‘movement’, 
lamented, workers were too often suspicious that such schemes aimed at 
rendering them ‘callous to the lot of their fellows’ and were designed to weaken 
the ‘social instinct which is humanity’s natural safeguard’.17 Attempting 
to surpass the power of existing working-class organizations and loyalties, 
historians have argued, enabled industrialists to ‘articulate a philosophical as 
well as an economic case for freedom of contract or liberty at the workplace’, 
while muting class conflict and rift.18
Those who promoted practices of industrial welfare articulated their 
programmes in both technical and political terms. On the one hand, welfare 
was offered as a disciplinary solution – how to make workers work: ‘The 
supreme principle’, explained Edward Cadbury in his book on the Bourneville 
Works, ‘has been the belief that business efficiency and welfare of employees 
are but different sides of the same problem’.19 Welfare, he explained, paid, 
because the efficiency of workers depended on their ‘general attitude and 
feelings towards the employer’ rather than merely on physical conditions.20 In 
short, he envisioned a system that took stock of his recognition that ‘human 
beings will insist on being treated as human beings, and not as imperfect 
machines’.21
On the other hand, these early twentieth-century efforts to secure welfare 
programmes in the workplace were a direct manifestation of the turn to the 
social in the search for solutions for the apparent failings of the unregulated 
free market. The five decades preceding the Great War saw the gradual erosion 
of liberal forms of government and the intrusion of the state into nearly 
every aspect of private and public life: education, work, family and morals.22 
‘Organization’ became a catch-all slogan that reflected the Edwardian attempt 
to reconcile the principles of individuality and laissez-faire with the evident 
 17 E. D. Proud, Welfare Work: Employers’ Experiments for Improving Working Conditions in 
Factories (1916), p. 52. 
 18 J. Melling, ‘Employers, industrial welfare, and the struggle for work-place control in 
British industry, 1880–1920’, in Managerial Strategies and Industrial Relations: an Historical 
and Comparative Study, ed. H. F. Gospel and C. R. Littler (1983), p. 62.
 19 Cadbury, Experiments, p. vii. 
 20 Cadbury, Experiments, p. xiii.
 21 Cadbury, Experiments, p. xi. 
 22 For general overviews, see J. Harris, Private Lives, Public Spirit: a Social History of 
Britain, 1870–1914 (Oxford, 1993); G. R. Searle, A New England? Peace and War, 1886–1918 
(Oxford, 2004). 
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failure of these nineteenth-century models to serve as the sole principle of 
government. What propelled this transformation was not only the realization 
that the classical principle of laissez-faire generated mounting problems. 
These problems were increasingly understood as ‘social’. A host of issues 
such as poverty, delinquency, criminality, health, education and personal life 
now belonged to a domain that emerged in relation to two existing forms 
of thinking about collective life, namely population and society.23 However, 
solutions to problems that were now designated as ‘social’ were still cast 
in a distinctly moral terrain and committed to a liberal outlook. As Reba 
Soffer has demonstrated in her seminal study, this process reverberated across 
the academic social sciences.24 Education in character would alleviate the 
misfortunes presented by the miscalculated work of Adam Smith’s invisible 
hand or would serve as an antidote to the pressures presented by the human 
aspects of the changes which Graham Wallas, the liberal political scientist, 
articulated as the advent of Great Society.25 For Wallas, the term captured the 
rapid transformations of the ‘social scale’ in modern societies. Such concerns 
provided the context for the articulation of social forms of government, such 
as the calls for ‘Socialism in Liberalism’, a term that denoted a commitment 
to ‘social problems’ within the frameworks of (new) liberal forms of rule.26
Industrial welfare was premised on the idea that the workplace could 
serve as the prime locus for moulding and producing a good society. ‘Next 
to his religion’, Cadbury told his readers, ‘and home atmosphere, a man’s 
work and its environment are probably the most potent forces in his life’.27 
The stakes were high and the programmes were expansive. Under the title 
‘Industrial Conditions’, for instance, Cadbury discussed every aspect that 
relates to dignity and moral habits. High standards of work were essential to 
an individual’s pride, hygiene perfected habits of order and promoted self-
respect, and the separation of men and women (including separate entrances) 
 23 On the social aspect, see N. Rose, Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought 
(Cambridge, 1999), pp. 98–136. I use the concept of ‘domain’ in the sense that Mary Poovey 
has made it available to historians (M. Poovey, Making a Social Body: British Cultural 
Formation, 1830–64 (Chicago, Ill., 1995), pp. 5–6).
 24 R. N. Soffer, Ethics and Society: the Revolution in the Social Sciences, 1870–1914 (Berkeley, 
Calif., 1978). 
 25 G. Wallas, Human Nature in Politics (1908); G. Wallas, The Great Society (1914). 
 26 A. Venn Dicey, Lectures on the Relation between Law and Public Opinion in England 
during the 19th Century (2nd edn., 1920); J. A. Hobson, The Social Problem: Life and 
Work (1901). On New Liberalism, see S. Collini, Liberalism and Sociology: L. T. Hobhouse 
and Political Argument in England, 1880–1914 (Cambridge, 1979); M. Freeden, The New 
Liberalism: an Ideology of Social Reform (Oxford, 1978). ‘Socialism in Liberalism’ was the title 
of an essay by Hobson, published in his The Crisis of Liberalism (1909).
 27 Cadbury, Experiments, p. 247. 
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prevented the demoralizing effects of mixing the sexes. A policy that barred the 
employment of married women would prevent the destruction of homes; the 
establishment of saving funds and recreation facilities (allotments, libraries, 
music, games) would inculcate habits of self-improvement; and a disciplinary 
system which was based on record-book keeping rather than on fines ensured 
that ‘the system was designed to be reformative, and not merely punitive’.28 
These typically Edwardian concerns were carried over and gave form 
to the wartime and inter-war efforts to secure welfare at work. Take, for 
example, industrial canteens: as James Vernon has demonstrated, canteens, 
initially devised to feed the body and provide security against malnutrition, 
gradually emerged as tools of vital importance to produce sociable citizens, 
who were now able to learn how, what and with whom they were to eat.29 
The 1916 report by the Canteen Committee of the Central Control Board 
(Liquor Traffic) boasted that apart from boosting the health of workers and 
reducing sickness absences, the 500 canteens that had been established by that 
time, catering for more than 600,000 workers, were also responsible for a 
decline in drinking, greater contentment, and increase in recreation.30 As the 
body was fed, the soul was moulded. This was true for a range of industrial 
practices. Welfare, explained John Lee, one of the chief promoters of the new 
welfarist managerial thought, ‘will care for physical health, too, and leisure 
and enjoyment, but they are means to an end and the end is the development in 
character’.31 On the one hand, the desire of workers for ‘moral self-realization’, 
as Oliver Sheldon had it (he thought that the struggle of labour was not 
material!), was linked to the elimination of industrial unrest.32 On the other 
hand, the production of social good was understood in terms of economic 
utility: ‘Character’, Cadbury notoriously wrote, ‘is an economic asset’.33
Few employers had paid attention to such matters before 1914. The 
prolongation of the war, and the new roles that the state had acquired in 
 28 Cadbury, Experiments, pp. 7–8, 71–2. 
 29 J. Vernon, Hunger: a Modern History (Cambridge, Mass., 2007), pp. 160–80.
 30 The Canteen Committee of the Central Control Board (Liquor Traffic), Feeding the 
Munition Worker (1916), p. 27. 
 31 J. Lee, The Principles of Industrial Welfare (1924), p. 36 (my italics). 
 32 Sheldon was the director of Rowntree’s works at York. He lamented that the ‘reversion 
after the war to conditions where personal gain once more becomes the dominant motive of 
work, has revealed a great lack in the general scheme of industry which the wartime motive 
has temporarily supplied’ (Sheldon, Philosophy of Management, pp. 8, 14). On industrial 
unrest, see, e.g., B. S. Rowntree, Industrial Unrest: a Way Out (1922).
 33 Cadbury, Experiments, p. xvii. The emphasis on character also provided a standpoint 
from which to critique American scientific management. J. A. Hobson, for instance, linked 
‘industrial servitude’ associated with scientific management to a threat to political liberty 
(Hobson, ‘Scientific management’, p. 12). 
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regulating production, meant that welfare, as a profession, had ‘taken off’, 
in the words of Angela Woollacott.34 In September 1915 Lloyd George, 
then the minister of munitions, appointed a Committee on the Health 
of Munition Workers; in December that year, a new Welfare Department 
was created (with Seebohm Rowntree as chair). In the aftermath of the 
war, welfare emerged as a visible profession, with its own experts, journals, 
conferences and associations (such as the Industrial Welfare Society and 
the Central Association of Welfare Workers).35 Great optimism marked 
the activities of those early welfare workers, engendering a belief in the 
new possibilities of a profession of ‘social engineers’, a term which tells us 
something about how the members of this emerging profession regarded 
their job.36 Welfare was now a discipline.
If the need for welfare was easy to articulate, it was less straightforward to 
define precisely what welfare comprised. Proud suggested that the only thing 
that united welfare workers was the ‘recognition of the individuality of each 
worker’.37 As she further explained, ‘building a palatial dining hall, providing 
tooth-brushes, supervising daily fluctuations in wages, or teaching dancing 
– all are included in this vague and vaguely named attempt at making the 
workers better in some way’. Some idea of what welfare was can be formed by 
looking at Rowntree’s memorandum to the Ministry of Munitions: it dealt 
with issues such as rooms, food, hours, wages, amenities, health and education, 
supervision, and recreation.38 Or take the report of E. C. Wagstaff, a welfare 
supervisor at the Newport National Shell Factory: she observed hiring and 
dismissal practices, the First Aid Room, the canteen and dining hall, the cloak 
room and lavatories, overalls and caps, cleaning, platforms to protect from 
the damp floors, drinking fountains, additional clocks for easy clocking in, 
management’s flexibility, attentiveness to grievances, the health of workers, 
recreation, and moral tone.39 Rather than a coherent set of institutional 
practices, then, welfare was a ‘method of factory administration’.40 
 34 A. Woollacott, On her their Lives Depend: Munitions Workers in the Great War (Berkeley, 
Calif., 1994), p. 72. Woollacott here refers to the years 1917–18. 
 35 Revd. Hyde, a close aide of Rowntree at the Welfare Department, expressed a common 
sentiment when he noted that the influence of the ‘welfare movement’ had far exceeded 
its numerical strength (700 welfare workers in the immediate years after the war) (The 
National Archives of the UK: Public Record Office, MUN 9/30, Revd. Hyde, undated 
memorandum on the Industrial Welfare Society). 
 36 W. B. Owen, ‘Welfare work among men’, Welfare Work, i (1920), 166. 
 37 Proud, Welfare Work, p. 67
 38 TNA: PRO, MUN 9/30.
 39 Wagstaff was appointed as a welfare supervisor in September 1916, and issued the report 
on her own achievements in May 1919 (TNA: PRO, MUN 5/92/346/27). 
 40 TNA: PRO, MUN 9/30, ‘A record of the history of the Welfare Department’.
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Welfare practices within the factory were premised upon liberal notions 
of individualism, with the typical emphasis on education, recreation and 
civility. By the Second World War, however, the notion of character, 
while still an important factor, was no longer the foundational element 
or organizing principle in thinking about social and political organization; 
in some cases it disappeared altogether.41 Morale signalled this process by 
suggesting a new way of articulating the problem of workers’ conduct. 
Contemporaries themselves viewed the problems of human relations and 
the welfare of workers as essentially different.42 Those who spoke of morale 
and human relations differed from those who spoke of welfare in their 
reliance upon aspects of conduct that are best described as attitude (often 
in a psychologized form), in their emphasis on social interaction (and on 
the subjective aspect of sociality), and in their construction of the group (as 
an abstract referent that connected both).
The morale of groups
In a series of lectures on social psychology, probably written in the late 
1920s, the eminent Cambridge experimental psychologist Frederic Charles 
Bartlett lamented the backward state of British social psychology. It 
had ‘a brilliant beginning’, he thought, with the publication of William 
McDougall’s Introduction to Social Psychology in 1908.43 But he also blamed 
McDougall for the backward state of the science in Britain, notably the 
latter’s emphasis on instinctive reactions, and the controversy that his work 
had generated: ‘in the hurly burly an enormous amount has been said about 
instincts and comparatively little about social conduct in any special and 
genuinely observed sense’.44 Bartlett, of course, had a point.45 McDougall’s 
 41 Stefan Collini has already noted that the new sciences of society were ‘inhospitable’ 
to the Victorian ideal of character (Collini, ‘The idea of “character”’, p. 49). This process 
was uneven and fractured, and for the most part difficult to gauge. It certainly did not 
disappear from political discourses, and was echoed in, although not synonymous with, 
the psychological notion of personality. On the latter, see M. Thomson, Psychological 
Subjects: Identity, Culture, and Health in 20th-Century Britain (Oxford, 2006), pp. 42–5, 
71–2.
 42 See, e.g., E. F. L. Brech, ‘The management lessons of the war – industrial relationship’, 
British Management Review, v (1945), 35. This was clearly the message of the work of Elton 
Mayo (E. Mayo, The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization (New York, 1960)). 
 43 W. McDougall, An Introduction to Social Psychology (1908).
 44 Cambridge University Library Archives, ADD. 8076/B.1, F. C. Bartlett, ‘Social 
psychology’, Lecture no. 1, pp. 1–2 (original emphasis). The lectures themselves are not 
dated, but their content suggests that they were written sometime in the late 1920s.
 45 For a different contemporary view by McDougall’s student, who situated discussions 
of instincts firmly within British philosophical tradition, see J. Drever, Instinct in Man: a 
Contribution to the Physiology of Education (Cambridge, 1917). 
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was a deductive science, firmly rooted within a typically British biosocial 
tradition. As McDougall himself explained, his science owed its existence 
to Darwin. But if we accept Bartlett’s premise that social psychology is the 
study of conduct ‘determined by grouping’, we will find that inter-war 
Britain saw a number of scientists who aspired to do just that. As Mathew 
Thomson has recently suggested, British psychology after McDougall was 
always to a certain extent ‘social’, and the idea that all psychology was social 
psychology has become somewhat of a cliché.46 
The work of early British ‘social psychologists’ (if the term is used fluidly, 
for there was no such discipline during that time) William McDougall and 
Wilfred Trotter was premised on two assumptions.47 The first of these was 
the belief that humans were not, after all, rational beings, and that this 
assumption must be taken into account in any discussion of political affairs. 
This was especially terrifying with the advent of the masses, as the conduct 
of humans, amassed together as a crowd, was altogether qualitatively 
different, and more dangerous.48 Second, by insisting on the application of 
psychology to social life, these writers joined the turn-of-the-century effort 
to construct a New Psychology that was relevant to everyday life as a new 
science of conduct.49 If crowds stood for all that was bad or dangerous in 
the Great Society, the group, a new concept in social sciences after the war, 
was offered as an important sort of collective amenable to management, 
which would emerge as both the foundation for, and an abstract unit of 
analysis of, the government of social life. 
The care of the affective life and attitudes of groups was understood as a 
technology of management that was appropriate for an increasingly democratic 
 46 Thomson, Psychological Subjects, p. 65. 
 47 Both works originally appeared in 1908. Trotter’s article, ‘Herd instinct and its bearing 
on the psychology of civilized man’, originally published in the first volume of the Sociological 
Review, was later republished in W. Trotter, Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War (2nd edn., 
1919), pp. 11–60. The very same year another book appeared, similar in its psychological 
approach to social problems, albeit radically different in its conclusions. This was Wallas, 
Human Nature. 
 48 Soffer, Ethics and Society, pp. 222–8. For an argument about the 19th-century roots of 
crowd psychology, which can apply equally to Britain, see S. Barrows, Distorting Mirrors: 
Visions of the Crowd in Late 19th-Century France (New Haven, Conn., 1981).
 49 On the new 20th-century psychology, see Thomson, Psychological Subjects. For a 
detailed analysis of the centrality of McDougall (often not recognized by later historians), 
see  Thomson, Psychological Subjects, pp. 55–63; D. Ussishkin, ‘Morale: social citizenship and 
democracy in modern Britain’ (unpublished University of California PhD thesis, 2007), pp. 
219–20. Trotter, too, was an important figure. Thomas MacCurdy, an American psychologist 
who worked at Cambridge, accorded Trotter nearly equal status with Freud in the annals of 
science (J. T. MacCurdy, The Psychology of War (New York, 1918)). 
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society, if this is understood as a social rather than constitutional process.50 The 
group, serving as what Nikolas Rose has pithily termed ‘an intermediary 
between the individual and the population’, would emerge as an important 
site to combat the social problems associated with modern civil society, 
namely, atomization, anomie and social disintegration (in this sense, the 
workplace was one sphere among several through which such problems 
could be targeted; others included the family or the local community). Rose 
has further argued that the group was ‘first discovered in the factory’.51 It 
was less an object of discovery, however, than an ideal to be constructed 
and created.52 McDougall discussed the idea of the group in his 1908 
Introduction but his fullest articulation of the problem was in his Group 
Mind, published in 1920.53 Groups, he explained, were distinguished 
from the amorphous, libidinal, unstable and dangerous crowds by a 
collective mind, which develops through the establishment of continuity, 
tradition and identification within the group. The quintessential group 
was the military group, and group spirit was the highest form of military 
discipline.54 The role of science was to organize and manage group affect. 
The best organization would secure that ‘while the common end of collective 
action is willed by all, the choice of means is left to the best qualified 
and in the best position for deliberation and choice’.55 Wilfred Trotter, 
who was more interested in articulating the nature of gregariousness, 
expressed similar sentiments. The war, he thought, was one of ‘Nature’s 
august experiments’, which demonstrated that ‘the domination of egoistic 
impulses by social impulses which we call satisfactory morale is capable 
of direct cultivation as such’, and indeed requires such cultivation.56 
 50 Dicey, Lectures on the Relation between Law and Public Opinion, p. 50. For different 
explorations of the advent of democracy, and the processes by which society responded and 
adapted to it, see R. McKibbin, Classes and Cultures: England 1918–51 (Oxford, 1998); D. 
LeMahieu, A Culture for Democracy: Mass Communication and the Cultivated Mind between 
the Wars (Oxford, 1988); L. Beers, Your Britain: Media and the Making of the Labour Party 
(Cambridge, Mass., 2010).
 51 N. Rose, ‘Social psychology as a science for democracy’, in Inventing Our Selves: 
Psychology, Power, and Personhood (Cambridge, Studies in the History of Psychology, 1996), 
p. 136. This argument was central to Mayo, Human Problems.
 52 I develop this point more fully in my forthcoming Morale: a History. 
 53 W. McDougall, The Group Mind: a Sketch of the Principles of Collective Psychology with 
some Attempt to Apply them to the Interpretation of National Life and Character (New York, 
1920; 1973). 
 54 In these views regarding the military model of subjective group feelings, McDougall 
was not far off from Freud and Durkheim, who differed from him in nearly everything else 
(McDougall, Group Mind, ch. 4). 
 55 McDougall, Group Mind, p. 73. 
 56 Trotter, Instincts of the Herd, p. 209. 
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The experience of war and the theoretical foundations explored above 
were translated into the spheres of industry in the war’s aftermath: 
‘Psychology’, explained Frank Watts from the University of Manchester, 
‘will deal with the group-life of men and the conditions of its existence
and unity. The various schemes for the organization of industry as a group-
adventure must, therefore, call for psychological study’.57 
Scientific studies of work in the era after the First World War experienced 
several important transformations that would help to reorient the basic 
premises of work management towards the management of the collective 
mental life of the working group. Chief among these was the dissolution 
of the notion of fatigue as an organizing principle in the approach to the 
problem of workers’ capacity. In his magisterial work on the nineteenth-
century science of work, Anson Rabinbach has described its emergence and 
its intimate links to utopian programmes of social reform.58 Initially these 
studies were mainly undertaken on the continent. In Britain, investigations 
of fatigue largely awaited the establishment of the Industrial Fatigue 
Research Board in 1917 as a joint effort of the Medical Research Council 
and the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research. Later renamed 
the Industrial Health Research Board, its activities quickly positioned 
Britain at the forefront of scientific studies of work. 
Fatigue studies abounded, but the result was that the very category of 
muscular fatigue increasingly seemed to lack theoretical coherence. There 
was no agreement as to how fatigue was to be measured other than some 
indicators that seemed suggestive of the individual worker’s capacity to 
labour: output, sickness rates, accidents, absenteeism and labour turnover.59 
However, these measured not fatigue but its assumed effects. Fatigue 
was understood as a physiological phenomenon, but attempts to devise 
physiological measurements (such as levels of lactic acid) had produced 
results that were far from conclusive. Very quickly, then, the study of 
industrial fatigue turned into a broader examination of ‘the conditions of 
work’. By 1928, E. P. Cathcart, a chemical physiologist from Glasgow, could 
write without any hesitation that fatigue ‘cannot be defined as a single 
limited entity’.60 Other psychologists sought to identify it in the mind 
 57 F. Watts, An Introduction to the Psychological Problems of Industry (New York, 1921), p. 
18. The military group too received attention from psychologists (see, for instance, F. C. 
Bartlett, Psychology and the Soldier (Cambridge, 1927)). 
 58 A. Rabinbach, The Human Motor: Energy, Fatigue, and the Origins of Modernity (New 
York, 1990). 
 59 See, for instance, H. M. Vernon, Industrial Fatigue and Efficiency (1921); F. S. Lee, The 
Human Machine and Industrial Efficiency (1918). 
 60 Cathcart, quoted in Mayo, Human Problems, p. 10. 
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rather than (only) in the body, understood as ‘subjective’ or ‘mental’ fatigue.61 
It proved no less of a troubled route. While it was agreed that mental fatigue 
was in some ways related to the nature of the work itself, it was primarily 
understood as a subjective problem, therefore largely a matter of perception 
and suggestion: ‘If the worker is induced to believe that his task is very 
difficult he reacts to it as a difficult task, and the amount of work performed 
may in consequence be greatly reduced’.62 Put differently, the worker was an 
untrustworthy informant regarding his own capacity to work.63 In the final 
analysis, mental fatigue appeared to be dependent upon factors that were 
often outside the scope of the short-term conditions of work: ‘to maintain the 
will to work at the optimum level depends upon long-term sources of human 
motivation’.64 In 1929 Charles Myers, perhaps the most eminent of British 
industrial psychologists, concluded that fatigue normally resulted ‘not directly 
from over-action, but from worry, resentment, suspicion, etc. Remove these, 
increase interest, improve the general mental “atmosphere” and complaints of 
over-strain will mostly vanish’.65 Collective attitude was what really mattered.
The implication of these discussions was an entirely new conception 
of the worker.66 At the shop-floor level, workers were no longer ‘standard 
economic individuals, differing in productive capacity and the like, but 
quite uniform as regards to driving motives’.67 Psychologists could therefore 
offer a scientific explanation for the failures of the various schemes of 
profit-sharing or piece-rate, which by the inter-war years were nearly 
universally recognized as counter-productive, although nobody seemed to 
comprehend why this was the case.68 It was not profit-sharing that was 
needed, but team spirit.69 Work, like war, was a group activity: ‘When an 
individual is a member of a social group’, the industrial psychologist James 
 61 B. Muscio, ‘Fluctuations in mental efficiency’, British Journal of Psychology, x (1920), 
327–44; T. H. Pear, ‘The applications of psychology to industry’, in Industrial Administration: 
a Series of Lectures (Manchester, 1920), p. 40. H. J. Welch and G. H. Miles, Industrial 
Psychology in Practice (1935), p. 22.
 62 J. Drever, The Psychology of Industry (1921), p. 101.
 63 Pear, ‘Applications of psychology’, pp. 40–2. 
 64 C. A. Mace, ‘Satisfaction in work’, Occupational Psychology, xxii (1948), 8. 
 65 C. S. Myers, ‘Introduction’, in Industrial Psychology, ed. C. S. Myers (1929), p. 14. 
 66 On the manager as psychologist, see C. S. Maier, ‘Factory as society: ideologies of 
industrial management in the 20th century’, in Bullen, von Strandmann and Polonsky, Ideas 
into Politics, pp. 152–5.
 67 J. Drever, ‘The human factor in industrial relations’, in Myers, Industrial Psychology, p. 16.
 68 Profit-sharing schemes were usually seen as too complex for workers to understand 
(and therefore to serve as a real encouragement for hard work); piece-rate incentives 
were considered as individualizing techniques, aimed at alienating the worker from his 
fellows.  
 69 Drever, ‘Human factor’, pp. 37–8.
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Drever explained, ‘his impulses, feelings, and behaviour may be modified 
in various ways and degrees, dependent on the nature of the group in 
question’. Drever suggested that industry must be constructed in ways that 
would allow it to acquire ‘community-type’ groups. This entailed securing 
continuity in its composition, cultivating ‘definite group self-consciousness’, 
and maintaining proper organization.70 Collective attitudes were related to 
other factors but could not be reduced to them. ‘The roots of bad factory 
morale’, explained another, ‘are not always economic’.71 The task of the 
psychologist would be to engineer the correct social environment that 
would generate cohesive groups.72 
The war and the ways in which it was remembered were instrumental 
to this new interest in the psychological management of group conduct. 
Shellshock, largely understood in terms of discipline and morale, created an 
unprecedented opportunity for psychologists to reorient their profession from 
treatment to management.73 In the aftermath of the war, psychologists who 
worked with ‘neurotic’ soldiers now shifted their gaze to the management 
of workers. Myers, who had worked with soldiers in France (and who had 
coined the misnomer shellshock), went on to establish the National Institute 
of Industrial Psychology (NIIP). Elton Mayo, guided by his work in Australia 
with soldiers during the war, later emerged as the single most important 
figure associated with ‘human relations’. Moreover, images of collective effort, 
evoked in relation to Britain’s first mass citizen army that had just emerged 
out of war, nourished this new interest in the psychological management of 
group conduct. Whether or not the images of camaraderie in the trenches 
or at home offered a true representation of British collective war experience 
was less important than the cultural work that these images performed in the 
conflict’s aftermath: ‘During the war’, Drever remembered, ‘the spirit in many 
 70 Drever, ‘Human factor’, pp. 36–7. With the term ‘community-type’ Drever referred 
to a group guided by rational ends and ideals. It was contrasted to the crowd, guided by 
impulse, and the club, guided by sentiment. The problem, of course, was that virtually all 
social relations were guided by ‘deeper forces ... human impulses, emotions, and passions, 
arising out of fundamental human needs’ (Drever, ‘Human factor’, pp. 18–19).
 71 H. Davies, ‘Work and environment’, in Myers, Industrial Psychology, p. 42.
 72 ‘Co-operation between engineer and psychologist begins properly at the drawing-
board, since good conditions are easy to secure before ideas have clothed themselves in 
brick and mortar’ (see Hudson Davies, ‘Work and environment’, pp. 40–1). On the modern 
problem of social environment see P. Rabinow, French Modern: Norms and Forms of the 
Social Environment (Cambridge, Mass., 1989). On aligning work-groups with other ‘organic’ 
groups such as locality or family, see O. Tead, Instincts in Industry: a Study of Working-Class 
Psychology (Boston, Mass., 1918), p. 175. 
 73 For the most recent, and a justly cautious, assessment of the place of shellshock in the 
history of psychology, see Thomson, Psychological Subjects, pp. 182–6. 
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factories was the spirit of the football field’.74 Another industrial psychologist 
told his readers that the problem of ‘fatigue of the human will’ was known 
to any ‘of those practical organizers whose work it has been to galvanize large 
masses of men into activity and enthusiasm and maintain it in this condition’. 
Every military general, he continued, insisted that ‘a B2 army of men with 
an excellent morale will suit him better than an A1 army with a morale that 
is low and staled’.75 Psychologists now showed initial interest in training and 
selection of the supervisory grades (explicitly influenced by selection procedures 
established by the American army during the war).76 In both the military and 
the factory, capacity was recognized as a function of morale. The effects of its 
absence were clear enough. When the manufacturing process is not efficient, 
explained one psychologist, the worker is kept waiting for raw material; he 
becomes a grumbler, ‘and as he in turn affects others the “morale” of the whole 
shop is ultimately lowered … The general effect ... is not a sudden revolt, but 
rather a gradual lowering of the “tone” of the workshop’.77 Watts was one of 
the first who actually attempted to define morale: morale, he thought, was ‘the 
establishment of mental attitudes favourable to continued efforts along lines 
of activity which are not immediately connected with crude self-interests’. He 
also predicted that modern civilization would ‘be confronted in the future with 
morale problems of growing complexity in all avenues of social progress’.78 
Conclusions
It took another total war to see such programmes of management 
implemented in any serious manner. During the inter-war years, the 
nascent ‘management movement’ was widely identified by its welfarist 
inflection, a legacy of its Edwardian origins, and industrial welfare itself 
emerged as a profession, with its own institutions, training courses, ethos 
and an expertise that focused on the technicalities of well-being.79 The 
 74 Drever, Psychology of Industry, p. 52.
 75 Watts, Psychological Problems of Industry, p. 41. ‘That we are at present unable to study closely 
what we may call the fatigue of the will should be no bar to our admission of its existence’.
 76 See, for instance, A. G. Ikin, ‘The qualities desirable in a foreman’, Journal of the 
National Institute of Industrial Psychology (1924). 
 77 A. Angles, ‘Unproductive working time’, in Myers, Industrial Psychology, pp. 112–13.
 78 Watts, Psychological Problems of Industry, pp. 42–3. Watts likened the work of the 
psychologist to that of the electrician, who learns to deal practically with a phenomenon he 
fails to understand. 
 79 The chief organs of the profession were the Institute of Industrial Administration 
and the Institute of Industrial Welfare Workers (later rechristened the Institute of Labour 
Management). Membership of each was still limited, amounting to 517 and 760, respectively, 
in 1939 (T. Rose, A History of the Institute of Industrial Administration (1954), p. 166; Child, 
British Management Thought, p. 113). 
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actual application of industrial welfare across British industry was uneven 
and still in many ways a minority practice.80 It was only during the Second 
World War that industrial welfare was put on a more permanent footing. 
By that time, however, it was hardly considered as an exercise in moulding 
character in the way it had been conceived by employers such as Cadbury 
or Rowntree. 
In both theory and implementation, morale management in Britain 
remained in its infant stages. This was partly for the same reasons that 
limited the application of industrial welfarist practices, namely the lack 
of interest on the part of British employers in such matters, especially in 
the face of rising levels of unemployment and industrial and social unrest. 
This was true of industrial psychology more generally. As the history of the 
National Institute of Industrial Psychology demonstrates, there was a wide 
gap between intentions and actual work. This body relied heavily on services 
rendered to private industries to secure its income, and these were mostly 
interested in selection and vocational guidance (the only departments of the 
institute that were profitable throughout the inter-war years).81 Moreover, it 
seems that the psychologists themselves were at a loss as to how to translate 
their interest in morale and group feelings into a concrete research agenda. 
Investigations carried out by the NIIP for private employers are indicative: 
they tell us about layout, movement, physical conditions of work, rest pauses, 
movements, and so forth.82 These were individual-psychological versions of 
fatigue studies and scientific management (perhaps with a ‘human face’). 
The report summaries of the investigations conducted by the NIIP during 
the years 1929–35 mention ‘morale’ only once, under ‘Miscellaneous’.83 
This gap between what psychologists did and what they wanted to do 
was not lost on contemporaries. Winifred Raphael, the superintendent of 
the Personnel Department at the NIIP, who had conducted research on 
collective grievances, complained that industrial psychologists were still 
only paying lip-service to the problem of workers’ morale, and the lack of 
 80 For a conflicting view, one that argues that industrial welfare in the inter-war years 
was more prevalent than often assumed, see R. Fitzgerald, British Labour Management and 
Industrial Welfare, 1846–1939 (1988).
 81 London School of Economics, British Library of Political and Economic Science 
(hereafter BLPES), NIIP 8/1, ‘Notes for Lord Percy’s Speech at the 25th Annual General 
Meeting of the NIIP’, Monday, 11 Feb. 1946. Similar conclusions may be reached by any 
cursory glance at the NIIP’s financial books for those years.
 82 BLPES, NIIP 7/10, Abstracts of Reports, 1929–35. 
 83 Balchin, who carried out an investigation at McColl, a chocolate manufacturer, found 
a slackness of organization that led to low morale and indifference (BLPES, NIIP 7/10, 
Abstracts of Reports, 1929–35, sect. 16, report 377 (1932)). 
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professional attention to it amounted to a professional embarrassment.84 
In 1939 Eric Farmer, a Cambridge industrial psychologist and a member 
of the Industrial Health Board, noted that social-psychological studies 
of industrial life were ‘largely neglected’, perhaps because they ‘would be 
politically suspect by both employers and employees’ organizations’.85 Elton 
Mayo’s work in the Western Electric Company in Chicago was introduced 
to a British audience by his ardent pupil, T. North Whitehead, in 1935.86 Yet, 
the impact of this work in Britain was so limited that in the aftermath of 
the Second World War, Urwick and Brech could write in the introduction 
to the third volume of their Making of Scientific Management that there was 
still a need to introduce Mayo’s work to the British reader.87
In the aftermath of the war, a wave of interest in the management of 
morale was manifested by private and public research organizations, 
and the British state, now with Labour in government, heavily invested 
in such matters.88 These programmes, which were understood in terms 
of both industrial productivity and the production of social cohesion 
and national unity, were premised on ideas regarding the sources of the 
collective conduct of workers, and on attempts to mobilize these towards 
the production of a harmonious mass-democratic polity. Both of these, as 
we have seen, emerged gradually during the inter-war years. By the time 
human-relations management saw its zenith, welfare practices were much 
more widely applied, although these were understood more as technicalities 
of physical and moral well-being. The obsession with character, which had 
given rise to such practices, by now seemed to belong to a past epoch. 
These transformations could not be explained in the terms adopted by 
the protagonists themselves, that is, as linear developments internal to the 
story of management thought. Rather, they could only be understood as 
part of a larger and more complex story – of the myriad responses to the 
general problem of the management of the Great Society and the perceived 
pressures exerted by the advent of mass democracy. 
 84 W. Raphael, ‘Grievances – their ascertainment and alleviation’, Human Factor, xxi 
(1937), 91. 
 85 E. Farmer, ‘The study of social groups in industry’, in The Study of Society: Methods and 
Problems, ed. F. C. Bartlett, M. Ginsberg and E. J. Lindgren (1939), p. 418. 
 86 T. North Whitehead, ‘Social relationships in the factory: a study of an industrial group’, 
The Human Factor, ix (1935), 381–94; T. North Whitehead, The Industrial Worker: a Statistical 
Study of Human Relations in a Group of Manual Workers (2 vols., Cambridge, Mass., 1938). 
 87 L. Urwick and E. F. L. Brech, The Making of Scientific Management, iii (1949), x.
 88 N. Tiratsoo and J. Tomlinson, Industrial Efficiency and State Intervention: Labour 1939–
51 (1993).
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4. Representing the people? The Daily Mirror, class 
and political culture in inter-war Britain
Adrian Bingham
In the inter-war period British politics was transformed by the arrival of 
democracy and the rise of the mass media. The franchise extensions of 1918 
and 1928 quadrupled the Edwardian electorate and, after nearly a century 
of incremental reform, finally enabled all men and women over twenty-
one to participate fully in national politics.1 Political parties and voluntary 
associations suddenly faced considerable new challenges in mobilizing 
support.2 At the same time the possibilities for national political debate 
were significantly expanded by the increasing penetration of the media into 
the everyday life of all social classes. The circulation of daily newspapers 
doubled in the twenty years after 1918, and by 1939 some two-thirds of the 
population regularly read one.3 In 1922, radio broadcasting began under 
the monopoly of the BBC, and by the outbreak of the Second World 
War over 70% of households possessed a licence.4 Cinema-going became 
another hugely popular pastime in these decades, with an average of 18–19 
million attendances a week; although the vast majority of films avoided 
overtly political content, newsreels offered the novelty of news presented in 
 1 The Representation of the People Act of 1918 enfranchised all men over 21 and most 
women over 30, increasing the electorate from 7.7 million in 1910 to 21.4 million in 1918. 
The Equal Franchise Act of 1928 gave women the vote on the same terms as men, further 
increasing the electorate to 28.9 million (D. Butler and G. Butler, Twentieth Century British 
Political Facts (Basingstoke, 2000), pp. 234–5). 
 2 See, e.g., D. Jarvis, ‘British Conservatism and class politics in the 1920s’, English Historical 
Review, cxi (1996), 59–84; L. Beers, ‘Education or manipulation? Labour, democracy, and 
the popular press in interwar Britain’, Journal of British Studies, xlviii (2009), 129–52; H. 
McCarthy, ‘Parties, voluntary associations, and democratic politics in interwar Britain’, 
Historical Journal, l (2007), 891–912.
 3 Maj. G. Harrison, with F. C. Mitchell and M. A. Abrams, The Home Market (1939), 
ch. 21; A. P. Wadsworth, ‘Newspaper circulations 1800–1954’, Manchester Statistical 
Society Transactions, iv, session 1954–5; C. Seymour-Ure, ‘The press and the party system 
between the wars’, in The Politics of Reappraisal, ed. G. Peele and C. Cook (1975), pp. 
233–9.
 4 A. Crisell, An Introductory History of Broadcasting (2nd edn., 2002), pp. 22–5.
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moving images.5 A relatively slow-moving, localized and socially fragmented 
political culture was challenged profoundly by the emergence of a mediated 
mass democracy.
In this changed environment much thought was given to the task of 
communicating effectively with working-class voters and integrating them 
into the political system. With the rise of the Labour party and the growing 
power of the trade unions, class had a new centrality in British politics, 
and political turbulence across Europe – particularly the October 1917 
revolution in Russia – offered a stark warning about the consequences of 
failing to contain social tensions. Political parties developed new techniques 
of electoral persuasion, media producers searched for fresh ways of packaging 
politics for a mass audience and market researchers promised insights into 
the minds of ordinary members of the public.6 Yet British society and culture 
remained highly stratified, and the middle-class domination of most British 
political organizations and media institutions ensured that many struggled 
to find the appropriate language to appeal to working-class citizens. The 
Conservative and Liberal parties inevitably found it difficult to shake off 
their image as defenders of the interests of the propertied classes, but even 
the Labour party often failed to find a message that resonated beyond its 
core trade union support: official literature frequently bemoaned the party’s 
inability to reach the ‘apathetic’ masses.7 The dominant media forms of the 
period, moreover, continued to be heavily shaped by middle-class values 
and expectations. The expansion of the popular daily press after the launch 
of the Daily Mail in 1896 had been based on targeting the expanding lower 
middle classes, and most inter-war dailies tended to give priority to middle-
class perspectives and priorities. The main exception, the trade union-owned 
Daily Herald, shared many of the Labour party’s difficulties in appealing 
beyond the organized labour movement. The BBC under Lord Reith was 
famously metropolitan and elitist in tone: as Ross McKibbin has observed, 
before 1939 it found it ‘immensely difficult to approach working men and 
women without condescension’ or to give them an ‘authentic voice’.8 The 
strict censorship regime imposed by the British Board of Film Censors 
 5 R. McKibbin, Classes and Cultures: England 1918–51 (Oxford, 1998), p. 419; on newsreels, 
see A. Aldgate, Cinema and History: British Newsreels and the Spanish Civil War (1979).
 6 D. LeMahieu, A Culture for Democracy: Mass Communication and the Cultivated Mind 
in Britain between the Wars (Oxford, 1988); L. Beers, ‘Whose opinion? Changing attitudes 
towards opinion polling in British politics 1937–64’, Twentieth Century British History, xvii 
(2006), 177–205.
 7 Beers, ‘Education or manipulation?’; S. MacIntyre, ‘British Labour, Marxism and 
working-class apathy in the 1920s’, Historical Journal, xx (1977), 479–96.
 8 McKibbin, Classes and Cultures, p. 460.
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(BBFC) ensured that cinema enshrined middle-class notions of propriety 
and avoided political ‘controversy’.9 A ‘culture for democracy’ may have 
been gradually emerging in this period, but much of its form and content 
continued to be centred around, or mediated by, middle-class viewpoints.
It is in this context that the dramatic reinvention of the Daily Mirror in 
the mid 1930s is of interest. The Mirror’s new editorial team transformed 
a right-wing picture paper read largely by middle-class women into what 
can be seen as the first modern tabloid, aimed at a mixed sex, working-class 
audience and adopting a distinctively left-of-centre political position. This 
was the most fundamental, and most successful, newspaper reinvention in 
modern Britain.10 The paper’s circulation rose by almost two-thirds between 
1935 and 1939, at a time when all of its main rivals, other than the Express, 
were losing readers; it reached working-class men and women who had 
not previously acquired the daily newspaper reading habit.11 This growth 
continued during the war, and the Mirror became the most popular paper 
among the forces.12 In 1949 it overtook the Daily Express to become Britain’s 
most popular daily with a circulation of well over four million; in 1967 it 
reached the unprecedented circulation peak of 5.25 million copies, when it 
was the best-selling paper in the world.13 The Mirror, in short, became the 
most successful and influential expression of popular print culture in mid 
twentieth-century Britain.
A number of scholars have recognized the political and social importance 
of the paper during and after the Second World War. A. J. P. Taylor, with 
characteristic overstatement, claimed that during the 1940s the Mirror ‘gave 
an indication as never before of what ordinary people in the most ordinary 
sense were thinking’.14 A. C. H. Smith’s detailed study of the Mirror offered 
qualified support for this assertion, suggesting that the paper was able 
to ‘crystallize’ a ‘new mood of radical populism’ among the electorate in 
1945, while Colin Seymour-Ure agreed that ‘In the war and in the later 
1940s it was to capture the mood of the working class better than any other 
 9 J. Richards, The Age of the Dream Palace: Cinema and Society in Britain 1930–9 (1984); 
J. Robertson, The British Board of Film Censors: Film Censorship in Britain 1896–1950 
(Beckenham, 1985).
 10 The only comparable example is The Sun after 1969, but its editorial transformation 
was not as far-reaching: the Daily Herald / Sun had long been a working-class paper, and the 
paper’s shift to a right-wing line was relatively gradual.
 11 Seymour-Ure, ‘Press and party system’, p. 237.
 12 P. Kimble, Newspaper Reading in the Third Year of the War (1942).
 13 J. Tunstall, Newspaper Power: the New National Press in Britain (Oxford, 1996), pp. 
43–5.
 14 A. J. P. Taylor, English History 1914–45 (1965; Harmondsworth, 1982), p. 666.
112
Brave New World
paper’.15 More recently, Martin Pugh has argued that the paper played a 
‘crucial role’ in shifting popular opinion in favour of the Labour party 
before the 1945 election, because it ‘reflected the political culture of many 
working class English people in a way that most of the leading Labour 
politicians were ill-equipped to do’.16 James Thomas has developed a more 
nuanced interpretation, contending that while the Mirror continued to 
prioritize entertainment over politics, it ‘articulated a popular yearning 
for a less party-dominated and adversarial politics that could appeal to the 
disengaged and disempowered younger generation’.17 Although reaching 
different conclusions about the Mirror’s political impact, all agree that the 
paper enjoyed an unusually close relationship with its readers, and that it 
provided an outlet for working-class opinions insufficiently represented 
elsewhere in mainstream culture. 
Despite these suggestive analyses, there have been no detailed historical 
studies of the way the Mirror developed its new editorial appeal in the second 
half of the 1930s. Many scholars have assumed that it was the wartime crisis, 
coupled with the easing of commercial pressures due to newsprint rationing 
and the pegging of circulations, which encouraged the paper to develop a 
more radical voice. Pugh’s thoughtful analysis is unusual in examining what 
he describes as the ‘neglected pre-1939 period’, but he focuses largely on 
foreign affairs and appeasement, and his contention that ‘the paper showed 
few symptoms of change on domestic social and economic questions before 
1939’ obscures some significant shifts in the style and tone of its reporting.18 
This chapter seeks to address some of these gaps in the existing literature 
and, by providing a fresh perspective on the reinvention of the Mirror in the 
1930s, it aims to shed light on aspects of the political culture of the period. 
In particular, it examines the process by which the paper’s journalists tried 
to find a language and content that would appeal to the non-unionized 
working class, who provided the largest remaining gap in the newspaper 
market. Given the unprecedented success of these efforts, moreover, it 
is reasonable to assume that they resonated with their audience. This is 
certainly not to claim, with Taylor, that the Mirror somehow gave a ‘voice’ 
to ‘ordinary people’; the relationship between a commercially driven 
mass circulation newspaper and its diverse and often sceptical readership 
 15 A. C. H. Smith, with E. Immirizi and T. Blackwell, Paper Voices: the Popular Press and 
Social Change 1935–65 (1975); Seymour-Ure, ‘Press and party system’, p. 250.
 16 M. Pugh, ‘The Daily Mirror and the revival of Labour 1935–45’, Twentieth Century 
British History, ix (1998), 431.
 17 J. Thomas, ‘“A cloak of apathy”: political disengagement, popular politics and the Daily 
Mirror 1940–5’, Journalism Studies, v (2004), 480.
 18 Pugh, ‘The Daily Mirror’, pp. 421, 427.
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is more complicated than that. Nevertheless, the repositioning of the 
Mirror does provide significant evidence about the political currents of 
the period; the evident plausibility of the paper’s articulation of a class-
based disillusionment with party politics, and more specifically with the 
policies of the National Government, lends credence to accounts detecting 
a leftward shift in opinion in the late 1930s and, as Pugh suggests, should 
inform accounts of the 1945 election victory.
After a brief outline of the Mirror’s history, this chapter will examine 
how the paper packaged politics for its readers in the second half of the 
1930s. It will demonstrate the editorial team’s commercial pragmatism in 
prioritizing human interest and entertainment over political content, but 
will argue that this pragmatism coexisted with an underlying seriousness 
which manifested itself in powerful campaigning rhetoric and idealistic 
attempts to educate readers on certain issues. The chapter will show, in 
particular, how the Mirror expressed discontent with the political status 
quo and demanded a greater voice for its working-class constituency; 
at the same time it developed a distinctive critique of appeasement and 
offered a persuasive reworking of patriotism as the international situation 
deteriorated. The paper was able to update established populist traditions 
for a modern, mediated mass democracy.
 
The early history of the Daily Mirror
The Daily Mirror was launched in 1903 by Alfred Harmsworth (later Lord 
Northcliffe) in the wake of his success seven years earlier with the Daily 
Mail.19 Taking inspiration from the French publication La Fronde, it offered 
something new for the British market: a daily newspaper for women 
produced entirely by women.20 Within a few months, though, it was clear 
that the paper was a spectacular failure in this format, and it was rescued 
only by Northcliffe’s decision in January 1904 to turn the Mirror into an 
illustrated paper, taking advantage of recent technological developments 
which allowed cheap and efficient rotary printing of photographs.21 This 
move was well judged: as an illustrated paper it became the first daily to rival 
the readership levels of the market leader, the Daily Mail, and it remained 
successful until the First World War, with a circulation of close to a million. 
Although the Mirror no longer advertised itself as paper for ‘ladies’ it had 
 19 Alfred Harmsworth was ennobled as Lord Northcliffe in 1905: henceforth he will be 
called Northcliffe.
 20 K. Jones, Fleet Street and Downing Street (1920), p. 227.
 21 A. Bingham, Gender, Modernity and the Popular Press in Inter-War Britain (Oxford, 
2004), ch. 1; B. Hagerty, Read all about it! 100 Sensational Years of the Daily Mirror (Lydney, 
2003), p. 14.
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a significantly higher percentage of female readers than its rivals. It had a 
similar world-view to the Mail – conservative and imperialistic – but much 
of its content was devoted to human interest stories and features about 
fashion and domesticity.
After 1918, however, the Mirror gradually fell behind its rivals in the 
popular market. As all dailies started integrating photographs into their 
pages, much of the Mirror’s original appeal was lost, and it lacked a 
distinctive editorial personality to set it apart from the other popular papers 
on the right. By 1934, its circulation had slumped to 720,000, barely a 
third of the market leader, the Daily Express. Its core audience was now 
middle-class women in the south of England, and it lagged far behind all 
its main rivals in working-class households.22 It was at this low point that 
personnel changes brought an infusion of new ideas and, eventually, a new 
direction for the Mirror. At the centre of the reinvention was Harry Guy 
Bartholomew, who became editorial director in 1934, having joined the 
paper as a cartoonist thirty years earlier. The son of a clerk, and with no 
more than an elementary education, Bartholomew relied on his visual flair 
and technical expertise to rise in journalism; self-conscious about his lack of 
articulacy, he harboured a deep-seated suspicion of social elites and detested 
pretension and snobbery.23 He immediately sought to make significant 
shifts in the style and content of the Mirror, and in this process he was 
supported by Cecil King, Northcliffe’s nephew and a key member of the 
paper’s board of directors.24 Bartholomew took the advice of the American 
advertising agency J. Walter Thompson, and drew up a new editorial 
template heavily influenced by successful American tabloids such as the 
New York Daily News.25 The new format included the liberal use of heavy 
black type and bold block headlines; the writing became more colloquial, 
the pursuit of sensation more pronounced, and the sexual content more 
explicit.26 Further momentum was given to these editorial changes by a 
raft of new appointments in 1935, including Basil Nicholson, who moved 
from a career in advertising, the young Welsh journalist Hugh Cudlipp, 
 22 Of the popular dailies, the Mirror was second only to the Mail as the most widely read 
paper in the upper two social categories (W. Coglan, The Readership of Newspapers and 
Periodicals in Great Britain, 1936 (1936), 1A).
 23 H. Cudlipp, Publish and be Damned! The Astonishing Story of the Daily Mirror (1953), pp. 
48–62; M. Edelman, The Mirror: a Political History (1966), pp. 38–41.
 24 On King, see R. Edwards, Newspapermen: Hugh Cudlipp, Cecil Harmsworth and the 
Glory Days of Fleet Street (2003).
 25 On this reinvention, see Cudlipp, Publish and be Damned!; H. Cudlipp, Walking on 
Water (1976).
 26 On sexual content, see A. Bingham, Family Newspapers? Sex, Private Life, and the British 
Popular Press 1918–78 (Oxford, 2009).
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who joined as Nicholson’s assistant in the features department, and William 
Connor, a former copywriter for J. Walter Thompson, who became the star 
columnist ‘Cassandra’.27 The result was a new style of paper in the British 
daily market: a brash populist tabloid aimed squarely at a working-class 
audience, updating and refreshing Northcliffe’s popular newspaper model 
with the insights of American commerce and the democratic instincts of a 
reform-minded editorial team. If papers like the Mail and the Express had 
aimed to be ‘popular not vulgar’, the Mirror now portrayed itself as ‘vulgar 
but honest’.28 
The limits of political coverage
How did these editorial transformations affect the Mirror’s political 
coverage? As a picture paper largely aimed at women, politics had never 
been a priority and, in general, the routine business of the public sphere 
had received relatively little attention. Content analysis for the Royal 
Commission on the Press (1947–9) found that 16% of the Mirror’s total 
news space in 1927 was devoted to ‘political, social and economic news’ 
(both domestic and foreign), compared to 20% of the Daily Mail ’s and 
27% of The Times’s.29 On the main news page, 37% of the stories were public 
affairs news of this sort, the lowest proportion of the national market; the 
Daily Graphic, the other leading picture paper, had a similar figure at 39%, 
while the Express, Herald, Mail and News Chronicle varied between 46% 
and 52%.30 After the editorial reinvention of the mid 1930s, however, these 
figures fell markedly as public affairs content was further marginalized, and 
the disparities with the Mirror’s main rivals opened up significantly. In 1937, 
only 8% of the Mirror’s total news space was devoted to ‘political, social and 
economic news’, half the amount of a decade earlier; over the same period, 
the Mail ’s coverage had declined by less than a sixth to 17% in total, and 
The Times’s had fallen by just under a fifth to 22%. On the main news page, 
even greater reductions were evident: only 15% of the Mirror’s stories were 
about public affairs. Across the rest of the popular press, by contrast, these 
proportions were relatively stable, ranging from 40% (the Daily Mail) to 
56% (the News Chronicle).31 The Mirror had conspicuously set itself apart 
 27 On Nicholson, see Cudlipp, Publish and be Damned!, pp. 78–81; on Cudlipp, see Edwards, 
Newspapermen; on Connor, see R. Connor, Cassandra: Reflections in a Mirror (1969).
 28 Cardiff University, Bute Library, Hugh Cudlipp papers (hereafter Cudlipp papers), 
HC/2/2, Hugh Cudlipp to Cecil King, 27 May 1960.
 29 Report of the Royal Commission on the Press 1947–9 (Parl. Papers 1949 [Cmd. 7700])
(hereafter RCP, Report), app. VII, table 4, p. 250.
 30 RCP, Report, app. VII, table 14, pp. 257–8. 
 31 RCP, Report, app. VII, table 4, p. 250; table 14, pp. 257–8.
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from its competitors, developing a tabloid template in which ‘serious’ news 
of the public sphere played only a small part in the editorial formula.32
This rebalancing of the paper’s content reflected the editorial team’s belief 
that its working-class target audience was largely disengaged from party 
politics. By the mid 1930s, Fleet Street had plenty of evidence to support this 
belief. The publications that had proved most popular with working-class 
readers were Sunday papers such as the News of the World and The People – 
papers whose appeal lay firmly in court reports, sports coverage and exclusives 
from the world of entertainment, rather than in any political coverage.33 
Among the dailies, the Daily Herald had built up an impressive working-
class readership after its relaunch of 1930, but much of this was based on 
the huge amounts spent by Odhams Press on insurance offers, free gifts and 
intensive canvassing; its growth had clearly stagnated by the mid 1930s as 
its unwavering support for the labour movement and its relatively extensive 
political content put off many among the non-unionized working classes.34 
Market research surveys, first commissioned to investigate audience responses 
to newspaper content in the early 1930s, confirmed that human interest was 
the most popular category of news, and offered the best prospect of reaching 
the young, mixed-sex, working-class readership sought by the Mirror; interest 
in political content tended to be skewed to older, and more educated, 
men.35 Key figures in the Mirror’s reinvention were adamant that the paper 
should pay close attention to this evidence and accept that political events 
were remote from the lives of most ordinary people. One of the strongest 
proponents of this policy was Basil Nicholson, who was features editor only 
for a few months in 1935, but whose legacy lived on through Hugh Cudlipp 
and others impressed by his ideas. Cudlipp remembered being challenged by 
Nicholson about the basic purposes of newspapers:
What was the use of worrying readers about obscure revolutions in Bolivia if 
they could not sleep at night through indigestion? Was a pregnant woman, 
whose husband could not possibly afford her fourth child, interested in a 
Parliamentary debate on foreign affairs which would obviously result in nothing 
at all? What was the point of publishing pompous articles by avaricious big-
wigs when figures proved that nobody would read them?36
 32 This pattern is confirmed by the follow-up research conducted by J. Curran, A. Douglas and 
G. Whannel, ‘The political economy of the human interest story’, in Newspapers and Democracy: 
International Essays on a Changing Medium, ed. A. Smith (Cambridge, Mass., 1980), pp. 288–316.
 33 C. Bainbridge and R. Stockdill, The ‘News of the World’ Story: 150 Years of the World’s 
Bestselling Newspaper (1993).
 34 H. Richards, The Bloody Circus: the ‘Daily Herald’ and the Left (1997), ch. 7.
 35 Curran and others, ‘Political economy’. 
 36 Cudlipp, Publish and be Damned!, p. 81.
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Popular journalism, from this perspective, should concern itself primarily 
with the everyday issues that preoccupied readers – their personal lives, 
health, domestic circumstances – or with sensational stories that would 
allow them to escape their worries; political content was worthy of inclusion 
only where it could be shown to intrude directly into their world. This 
pragmatism is the dominant thread running through the public statements 
and recollections of the leading editorial figures. Bartholomew argued to the 
Royal Commission on the Press in 1948, for example, that ‘heavy material’ 
had to be restricted if a ‘mass public’ was to be held, while for Cecil King 
the key criterion used to judge content was whether ‘it was of interest to, 
or intelligible by, a bus driver’s wife in Sheffield’.37 Cudlipp, looking back 
over his newspaper career, was similarly clear that ‘Political opinion is a 
small proportion of a newspaper’s activities and is never the major factor 
in the success of the product’.38 In private, the language was often more 
incautious. In 1943, King wrote to Cudlipp that while the population was 
gradually becoming more ‘seriously minded’, ‘formidable numbers’ of their 
target audience were ‘feather-brained’; ‘I am not arguing that instruction 
should not be given’, he continued, ‘but that our main function is, and is 
likely to remain, entertainment’.39 The Mirror team were acutely aware of 
the commercial dangers of overestimating its audience. 
For many observers, both at the time and subsequently, such policies 
cynically disregarded the public responsibilities of journalism in order to 
profit by pandering to the ‘lowest common denominator’. Political and 
Economic Planning’s Report on the British Press observed in 1938, for example, 
that a ‘rather dangerous tendency has recently been manifesting itself, by 
which entertainment ceases to be ancillary to news and either supersedes 
it or absorbs it’. This tendency was most evident in ‘the pictorial daily 
newspapers’ – the authors clearly had the Mirror in mind here – in which 
‘features take up almost as much space as news, and much of what appears 
in the news columns is only thinly veiled entertainment material’. Such 
papers enabled readers ‘to escape from the grimness of actual events and the 
effort of thought by opening the backdoor of triviality and sex appeal. They 
thus keep up the illusion of following what is going on in the world without 
in fact being in a position to know what is significant’.40 These criticisms 
– and many similar laments could be reproduced, from across the political 
 37 RCP, Minutes of Evidence (1948), Cmd. 7398, day 22, p. 3; C. King, Strictly Personal: 
some Memoirs of Cecil H. King (1969), pp. 101–2.
 38 Cudlipp, Walking on Water, p. 401.
 39 Cudlipp papers, HC2/1, Cecil King to Cudlipp, 16 Dec. 1943.
 40 Political and Economic Planning (hereafter PEP), Report on the British Press (1938), pp. 
33–4.
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spectrum – had much force. The Mirror did not usually provide enough 
information about public events to enable readers to make independent 
judgements about the issues of the day; the privileging of the everyday, the 
personal and the concrete often had the effect of obscuring the underlying 
structural issues that shaped political, social and economic developments. 
Yet in many respects the Mirror was simply adapting its content to make 
it suitable for a poorly educated audience, many of whom understandably 
viewed politics as an elite activity conducted by ‘them’ rather than ‘us’. As 
McKibbin has observed, most working-class families had a taboo on talking 
politics at home, and most forms of sociability excluded overtly political 
debate; party political allegiances tended to be lukewarm, and in some areas 
even belonging to a political party was deemed unrespectable.41 Many of the 
households the Mirror was targeting had never taken a national daily paper, 
and were poorly integrated into national political culture; and as Political 
and Economic Planning admitted:
even the more trivial newspapers compare favourably in many respects with 
much of the reading matter which they have in fact replaced. So far from 
the public taste having fallen from a once high level, there is good reason to 
suppose that it was even lower in the past, although the rise of mass-circulation 
newspapers has made its shortcomings much more generally conspicuous.42
Even if the Mirror only brought a limited amount of political content to 
the working-class home, it may still have been more than many readers had 
previously consumed. This content was not, moreover, designed to allow 
these readers to ‘escape from the grimness of actual events’, but was treated 
seriously. Pragmatically restricting political coverage was not incompatible 
with strong political views or even idealism: Cudlipp and King, in particular, 
combined their commercial realism with a desire to contribute to the political 
education of readers and to further the cause of political and social reform. 
Cudlipp, after all, left school at fourteen, and was well aware of the potential 
for individual self-improvement. He believed that readers attracted initially by 
entertainment and titillation could be tempted to try other types of material:
The general idea was to leave the reader gasping for breath, and then, leading 
him gently by the hand, to whisper in his ear: ‘Just a moment, friend. Before 
you take another look at that luscious Swedish blonde in the swimming pool on 
page 16, there’s a piece on page 27 by the Foreign Editor of the New York Times 
analyzing the sources of Hitler’s power’.43
 41 McKibbin, Classes and Cultures, pp. 202–5; K. Jefferys, Politics and People: a History of 
British Democracy since 1918 (2007), ch. 2.
 42 PEP, Report, p. 31. 
 43 H. Cudlipp, At your Peril (1962), p. 51.
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As we will see, the Mirror developed rhetoric critical of the National 
Government’s failings and demanded action to solve pressing domestic and 
international problems. Left-of-centre political positions were conveyed 
in a simple, but powerful, populist rhetoric that played on working-class 
frustrations with the rigidities of party politics and the harshness of social 
inequality. As A. J. P. Taylor noted, the Mirror was a ‘serious organ of 
political opinion’.44 
Domestic politics
In domestic politics, the challenge facing the new editorial team was 
to move away from the right-wing conservatism that had characterized 
the Mirror under the proprietorship of Lord Rothermere between 1914 
and 1931, while at the same time providing something distinctive from 
the Labour-supporting Daily Herald. As late as January 1934, indeed, 
the Mirror was still giving space to Rothermere to advocate the cause 
of Mosley’s British Union of Fascists: ‘Give the Blackshirts a Helping 
Hand’ was the headline of one infamous article.45 The dalliance 
with Mosley soon ended, but in the 1935 general election the paper 
remained broadly behind the National Government. ‘They Have Done 
Much – They Can Do More – They Will’ declared the paper.46 It used 
conventional conservative arguments to claim that the government 
had encouraged the return of economic confidence; the election of the 
‘Socialists’ with a ‘revolutionary policy’ would only lead to the ‘flight 
of money’ and the ‘collapse of currency’.47 Over the course of 1936, 
however, a different approach to politics became evident. At the heart 
of this were two individuals, the leader-writer Richard Jennings and 
the columnist William Connor. Jennings, an Oxford-educated son of 
a Times journalist, had actually been at the Mirror since 1904, but he 
now took the opportunity to follow his own left-of-centre leanings, and 
developed increasingly strident attacks on the National Government’s 
domestic and foreign policy.48 Connor, one of the new recruits, quickly 
developed a hard-hitting style that was a fresh departure for the paper: 
here was a journalist writing directly to his working-class audience as if 
he was talking to them in the local pub.49
 44 Taylor, English History, p. 666.
 45 Daily Mirror, 22 Jan. 1934, p. 12.
 46 Daily Mirror, 1 Nov. 1935, p. 13.
 47 Daily Mirror, 12 Nov. 1935, p. 11.
 48 Cudlipp, Publish and be Damned!, pp. 126–8; Edelman, The Mirror, pp. 27–8. He wrote 
editorials under the initials ‘WM’, apparently in honour of William Morris. 
 49 Connor, Cassandra.
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As a result of the Mirror’s new approach the National Government was 
increasingly portrayed as a dithering, ‘wiggle-woggle’ administration.50 In 
an editorial in May 1936, for example, Jennings bluntly accused the cabinet 
of ‘lacking brains’ and demanded the inclusion of maverick Conservative 
MP Winston Churchill as minister of defence: he might provide ‘new 
ideas, drive, modernisation’.51 This attack on official incompetence and 
bureaucratic stagnation would become a persistent refrain in years to come. 
In developing political solutions that would appeal to its audience, the 
paper repeatedly focused on personalities: changing the bosses would reap 
rewards. Such calls became louder later in the year: when Baldwin suggested 
in November 1936 that it would have been politically imprudent to have 
fought the 1935 election on the promise of rearmament, the Mirror described 
it as ‘the most ghastly admission in the history of British politics’.52 A bold 
black headline, ‘Baldwin Betrays His Convictions For Votes’, introduced 
a sharp attack on ‘muddled ministers’ who had shown an ‘unsavoury 
eagerness to keep their jobs at all costs’. The solution, characteristically, 
was better leaders: Churchill was highlighted as the man for the moment. 
There was, though, a touch of humour in the presentation, something that 
the new Mirror team believed was vital in packaging politics for working-
class readers. Baldwin was ‘The Face that Did NOT Launch a Thousand 
Planes’.53
The Mirror’s populist rhetoric was sharpened during the abdication crisis 
in December 1936, when the paper suggested that the political class was 
conspiring against the wishes of the public to remove a popular king. The 
Mirror used its front page to try to represent the sentiments of the people, 
demanding that they be allowed to participate in the decision-making 
process: ‘Tell Us The Facts, Mr Baldwin! … The Country Will Give You 
the Verdict’.54 The paper made a point of emphasizing its attentiveness to 
the opinions expressed by its own readers: ‘Sympathy for the King facing 
the greatest crisis of his life is voiced in the hundreds of letters that have 
poured into the Daily Mirror office from all parts of the country ... Not 
one per cent of the letters received criticize the King in his choice of Mrs 
Simpson’.55 (Recent research by Susan Williams lends credence to this 
statement and suggests that the Mirror – unlike other papers on the left 
 50 Daily Mirror, 26 May 1936, p. 13.
 51 Daily Mirror, 26 May 1936, p. 13.
 52 Daily Mirror, 14 Nov. 1936, p. 1.
 53 Daily Mirror, 14 Nov. 1936, p. 1.
 54 Daily Mirror, 5 Dec. 1936, p. 1.
 55 Daily Mirror, 5 Dec. 1936, pp. 6–7.
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– was in tune with public sentiment.56) This strategy of posing as both a 
platform for, and champion of, public opinion would become central to 
the paper’s political and social commentary: the Mirror devoted more space 
to letters and reader contributions than its rivals, and frequently asked its 
audience to respond to questionnaires on key issues of the day.57 Writing in 
1953, for example, Cudlipp described the Mirror as an ‘immense, permanent 
Gallup Poll Survey of changing mass opinion. Whatever nonsense might be 
purveyed by politicians in Westminster, the staff … were guided by the 
mood of the public and by their own faith’.58 Such claims were obviously 
designed to burnish the paper’s populist credentials, but in these early years, 
as the Mirror worked hard to win over a new audience, much importance 
was indeed placed on the effort to understand public opinion; and as its 
circulation rose – it increased more than any of its competitors during the 
abdication crisis – the paper’s claims about representing the public became 
more confident and plausible.59 The editorial team may have been aware 
of the educational inadequacies of readers on an individual level, but they 
showed a striking respect for, and faith in, the combined political wisdom 
of ‘the people’.
This populism was reinforced by a judicious use – initially in Cassandra’s 
columns – of a language of class that focused insistently on the remoteness, 
selfishness and insensitivity of the political and social elites. Cassandra’s 
analysis of the abdication crisis, dramatically headlined ‘I Accuse!’, was based 
on the view that those opposing the king’s marriage were ‘The Church, the 
West End of London and the aristocracy’. The attempt to remove Edward 
VIII was the ‘biggest mistake of all time’, with the church leading the way 
by ‘putting our King in a position from which it was almost impossible 
to retreat’. The divorce laws supported by the church, he continued, were 
‘medieval and unjust’: ‘the attitude of the country is in fierce opposition 
to them and has been actively so for the last ten years’. He was even more 
scathing about the metropolitan and rural elites: ‘There is more corruption, 
there is more spiritual rottenness in the West End of London than in any 
other place in the country. And the aristocracy? ... The sorry pageant of 
adultery and divorce is an unceasing spectacle from this elevated class’.60 
He insisted that ‘The future of the Empire cannot be decided by the result 
 56 S. Williams, The People’s King: the True Story of the Abdication (2003). 
 57 Smith, Immirizi and Blackwell, Paper Voices, pp. 63, 85. 
 58 Cudlipp, Publish and be Damned!, p. 236.
 59 Cudlipp, Publish and be Damned!, p. 101. Cudlipp thought this circulation rise during 
the abdication ‘curious’ because he assumed that the paper had actually misread public 
opinion; in fact, Williams’s evidence suggests that the paper’s line was shared by the majority.
 60 Daily Mirror, 5 Dec. 1936, p. 13.
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of a few hasty telephone conversations among politicians … the people 
themselves have to be consulted’.61 As the crisis played itself out, the Mirror 
gradually moderated its criticism of Baldwin and fell in behind the preferred 
solution of the political class, namely abdication; its coverage, nevertheless, 
provided clear signs of the populist approach to come.
These critiques of the National Government did not mean that the 
Mirror automatically switched its support to the Labour opposition. Indeed, 
well into the 1940s the paper continued to view Labour with suspicion 
and sometimes hostility. The ‘Parliamentary Labour Party continues to 
behave with a mild imbecility that reminds us of a gathering of elderly 
spinsters’ observed Jennings in an editorial in October 1938.62 Instead the 
Mirror developed its own line, attacking both parties for their inability 
to understand the needs of the ‘people’ and bring about real change. In 
March 1939, for example, Cassandra criticized the four ministers of labour, 
of both parties, who had served over the last decade for failing to make 
any impression on the problem of unemployment: ‘Like glorified clerks, 
they have sat at their desks watching the figures rise and fall … At no 
time have these ineffective public servants attempted to provide work on a 
measurable scale’.63 He argued that the lack of investment in programmes 
of public works was nothing less than scandalous, especially because ‘idle 
capital is available in quantities that make Croesus look as if he was on 
poor relief ’. ‘This country stinks of several things’, he lamented; ‘one of 
them is administrative incompetence – and another is money’: ‘we have 
the financial equipment to harness the minds and muscles of two million 
idle men. Whether we have the energy and conviction to smash our way 
through the appalling muddle, confusion, conceit, indifference and even 
official contempt is another matter’.64
The substance of its political commentary was not particularly original, 
but by framing it in this informal, conversational tone, laced with bitterness 
at social inequality and official inactivity, the Mirror offered something 
different from the other left-of-centre popular papers. By refusing to support 
any of the main parties, the Mirror was able, as James Thomas has observed, 
to tap into a widespread working-class disillusionment with party politics. 
Rather than offering specific solutions to the nation’s problems, the paper 
suggested that it was only by paying closer attention to the views of ordinary 
working people that wide-ranging reform would be achieved. The Mirror 
was especially keen to offer a platform for the opinions of young people. 
 61 Daily Mirror, 5 Dec. 1936, p. 13.
 62 Daily Mirror, 25 Nov. 1938, p. 15. 
 63 Daily Mirror, 1 March 1939, p. 14.
 64 Daily Mirror, 1 March 1939, p. 14.
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In February 1939 it raised the issue of extending the vote to eighteen-year-
olds, and the following month it established a ‘Parliament of Youth’ through 
which younger readers could express their views by returning coupons with 
their vote on a weekly motion.65 Perhaps unsurprisingly, 93% voted in favour 
of the first motion ‘That this House urges a stronger hearing for the Voice of 
Youth and recognizes that it can have an important effect on the lives of our 
people’.66 By the summer of 1939, Jennings was using the leader column to 
rally support for a Popular Front in order to bypass existing party structures 
and enable the voices of freedom-loving people to be heard: 
[the next] Election can only be won if democratic opinion is united against 
the Fifth Columnists who would compromise with Fascism. The object of the 
Popular or Democratic Front would be to rally all those who are often called 
‘silent voters’ … [to] a programme designed to save democracy at a time when, 
all over Europe, democracy is being stabbed to death.67 
But this was not, Jennings noted wearily, a policy accepted by what he 
called the ‘official leaders and wire-pullers of the Labour Front’. By the 
outbreak of the war, therefore, the Mirror had positioned itself as a voice 
of democratic reform and a champion of the excluded, while remaining 
distant from the Labour movement. It was also starting to ruffle the feathers 
of the social elites: the Marlborough Club in London so disliked the paper’s 
combination of outspoken politics and brash entertainment that it banned 
the paper as a ‘red and pornographic rag’.68 
International affairs
Similar shifts towards a more strident, class-based, left-of-centre politics 
were also evident in the coverage of foreign affairs, although this process was 
more gradual and uncertain than is sometimes suggested.69 When Hitler’s 
Germany remilitarized the Rhineland in March 1936, for example, the paper 
did little more than utter a cry of despair: ‘The futile pacts and obsolete 
treaties may lie in pieces wherever Hitler or anybody else has thrown them. 
Better flimsy fragments of imbecile documents on the ground than millions 
of rotting bodies of young men’.70 In the early stages of the Spanish Civil 
 65 Daily Mirror, 25 Feb. 1939, p. 9; 1 Apr. 1939, p. 9.
 66 Daily Mirror, 1 Apr. 1939, p. 9. 
 67 Daily Mirror, 2 June 1939, p. 15.
 68 Fleet Street, Press Barons and Politics: the Journals of Collin Brooks 1932–40, ed. N. J. 
Crowson (Cambridge, 1998), p. 250.
 69 Pugh, ‘The Daily Mirror’, for example, suggests that the Mirror was consistent in its 
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 70 Daily Mirror, 9 March 1936, p. 13. For Edelman this was the ‘nadir’ of the paper’s 
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War, the Mirror’s coverage was intermittent, superficial and focused almost 
exclusively on human interest stories – either tales of atrocities on either side, 
or British subjects who had become tangled up in the violence.71 The paper 
presented the conflict as involving morally equivalent forces motivated by 
an irrational extremism that was supposedly alien to the English character: 
‘the war is between two mysticisms, two creeds each backed by its frenzied 
supporters all across Europe’.72 Such hatred and violence, the paper observed 
complacently, ‘are the negation and ruin of all that we value in England’.73 
The Mirror was therefore content to support the National Government’s 
policy of non-intervention. 
But over the course of 1938 and 1939, the Mirror became increasingly 
critical of the government’s policy of appeasement and repeatedly warned its 
readers of the dangers posed by the fascist dictators. The paper consistently 
called for faster rearmament: ‘A greater national effort is essential if Britain 
is to keep pace with any possible aggressor or group of enemies’.74 The 
coverage of the Spanish Civil War shifted considerably: no longer was it 
portrayed as an unfortunate local conflict, but rather as an international 
struggle with vital consequences for European stability. Franco was little 
more than a puppet of Hitler and Mussolini, and a victory for the rebels 
would seriously damage British interests. ‘It is incredible that the British 
Government will let this bloodstained country become a third totalitarian 
empire’, lamented Cassandra. ‘If they do, they have removed one cornerstone 
of our race.’75 Although hoping for peace during the Sudetenland crisis 
of autumn 1938, the paper was opposed to offering too many concessions 
to Hitler; the Munich agreement was portrayed as a ‘tragedy’ stemming 
from British weakness.76 As the paper’s hostility to appeasement intensified 
during 1939, the Mirror provided a platform for Churchill to outline his 
views on the international situation.77 At a time when many of its rivals 
downplayed the extent of the crisis – the Express famously claimed in 1939 
‘There Will Be No War’, while even left-of-centre papers like The Herald 
and the News Chronicle were placed under pressure to maintain a certain 
level of optimism – the paper offered hard-hitting coverage designed to 
 71 For more details on the coverage of the Spanish Civil War, see A. Bingham and M. 
Conboy, ‘The Daily Mirror and the creation of a commercial popular language: a people’s 
war, a people’s paper?’, Journalism Studies, x (2009), 639–54.
 72 Daily Mirror, 6 Jan. 1937, p. 11.
 73 Daily Mirror, 6 Aug. 1936, p. 11.
 74 Daily Mirror, 4 Apr. 1938, p. 13.
 75 Daily Mirror, 14 Jan. 1939, p. 13. 
 76 Daily Mirror, 26 Sept. 1938, p. 11; 12 Oct. 1938, p. 14.
 77 Daily Mirror, 11 Aug. 1939, p. 15.
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shake any sense of complacency among its readers.78 The Mirror’s disdain 
for the usual practices of political journalism actually gave it an advantage 
in this case: as Richard Cockett has observed, ‘only those papers which had 
absolutely no contact with the government, such as the Daily Mirror, were 
able to oppose appeasement’.79 
During this period class came to inform both the Mirror’s analysis of 
international affairs and its discussion of British policy. Cassandra explicitly 
presented events in Spain as a class conflict: ‘It is largely a class struggle – 
there’s no doubt about it. The peasant in Spain has for centuries lived in 
a state of unparalleled misery and poverty. This war has been an attempt 
to throw off the yoke … And it has failed’.80 The policy of appeasement, 
meanwhile, was repeatedly associated with decadent and out-of-touch 
social elites. It was, Cassandra proclaimed in September 1938, ‘a rich clique, 
born and bred in the selfish cradle of the ruling classes’ who were happy to 
sacrifice the Sudeten territories; similarly, in April 1939, it was the leisured 
classes, represented by The Times, the Cliveden Set and those who ‘fish and 
play golf ’, who were celebrating Franco’s victory in April 1939.81 By contrast, 
the paper was confident that ordinary people were prepared to stand up 
to Hitler: in a poll of its readers shortly before the Munich Agreement, 
more than 70% declared themselves ‘ready to fight if Germany insists on a 
warlike solution to the Sudeten crisis’.82
But perhaps the Mirror’s most distinctive contribution was the way in 
which it updated and reworked the language of patriotism for its working-
class audience. Cassandra was at the heart of this effort: during 1938 and 
1939, he travelled to Italy, Germany and Spain, and sent back dispatches 
that were often turned into full-page features. Cassandra was a realist and 
pragmatist: foreign affairs were essentially matters of military and economic 
power. He was critical of the idealism of the organized left, ridiculing the 
‘long-haired, dirty-necked, semi-Bohemian gawd-help-Spain meetings’.83 
His was the voice of ‘common-sense’, sceptical of grand rhetoric but 
determined that Britain should act decisively to protect its own interests; 
in the Mirror’s words he provided ‘realistic writing unadulterated with 
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sentiment or jingoism’.84 During the Sudetenland crisis, for example, he 
was certain that war was not sought by working people themselves, but 
warned that it might become necessary to restrain the expansionism of 
Hitler’s Germany:
the ordinary German has not the slightest desire to get behind a gun and put 
the sights on an Englishman. And I, for my part, know of nobody in this 
country who wants to blast hell out of Fritz. Yet here we are whooping along 
for a war that’ll make the last scrap seem like a nursemaid’s tiff … I think we 
are on top of a volcano.85
Weakness, he insisted, was as undesirable in international relations as it 
was in everyday life; the National Government’s craven policies meant that 
Britain was losing face: ‘My God! The stuff we put up with! ... If you find a 
couple of thugs slugging each other in your front garden, the best thing to 
do is to grab a yard of lead piping and beat the stuffing out of them. It may 
not save the rose bushes, but they’ll not be back in a hurry’.86 
At the same time he had no desire to disguise the realities of war. As war 
approached in August 1939, he was determined that no one would be seduced 
by the elevated rhetoric of national glory, imperial manliness and Christian 
piety that had been so widely used in 1914. He drew instead on the language 
of the soldier poets and authors – from Owen and Sassoon to Graves and 
Remarque – who had exposed the brutality and inhumanity of modern 
conflict. War, he declared, ‘may be lawful but it is also obscene, murderous, 
bestial, profoundly evil, and in general a thoroughly Satanic procedure. So 
if we are going to war let us remember that God is on neither side and 
to invoke his name is, in my view, blasphemy unbounded’.87 Cassandra’s 
justifications for supporting the war effort were unapologetically pragmatic. 
‘When the triggers start going off I’ll do some shooting myself to save my 
skin’, he noted with grim humour. More broadly, though, he was adamant 
that ‘the rulers of Germany’ – once again, he was careful not to demonize 
the ordinary German citizens – ‘are the biggest bunch of gangsters that 
ever clubbed a man to death’. ‘I’ll not be in it for love, for money, for 
glory or for honour’, he concluded, ‘but because the most detestable regime 
since the days of Attila the Hun wants to carve up our way of life to fit its 
own evil purpose’.88 Through columns like these, Cassandra was able to 
articulate for his working-class audience a persuasive form of the ‘temperate 
 84 Daily Mirror, 15 Sept. 1938, p. 14.
 85 Daily Mirror, 8 Sept. 1938, p. 12.
 86 Daily Mirror, 4 Nov. 1938, p. 17.
 87 Daily Mirror, 30 Aug. 1939, p. 16.
 88 Daily Mirror, 30 Aug. 1939, p. 16.
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masculinity’ – which combined elements of inter-war anti-heroism with 
traditional soldierly qualities – that Sonya Rose has argued was hegemonic 
during the Second World War.89
The reputation that the paper had built up by 1939 for its cynical humour, 
its plain-speaking and its patriotic criticism of appeasement enabled it to act 
during the war as an outlet for the frustrations of the forces and a platform 
for criticism of bureaucratic inefficiency.90 In so doing it provoked severe 
displeasure from Churchill’s government and, in 1942, a threat of closure 
from home secretary Herbert Morrison.91 Mass-Observation found that 
this warning from above served only to ‘increase the proportion of people 
who feel favourably towards the Daily Mirror’; it suggested, moreover, that 
the paper was ‘probably the biggest source of opinion forming’ for men in 
the forces.92 
Conclusion
The reinvention of the Daily Mirror was a significant moment in British 
political culture. By targeting a broad working-class readership the paper 
helped to spread the habit of daily newspaper reading: the rapid increase 
in the Mirror’s circulation was one of the main reasons behind the steady 
growth of newspaper sales to its peak in the early 1950s.93 The Mirror’s 
shift to the left did much to rectify the striking imbalance in Fleet Street’s 
political sympathies, an imbalance which had caused great anxiety in 
the Labour movement for much of the inter-war period: from the 1940s 
until the late 1970s, when The Sun moved decisively to the right, the total 
circulations of Labour and Conservative papers remained relatively close. 
It is notoriously difficult to measure the ‘impact’ of newspapers, but there 
is a strong argument for concluding that the Mirror made a significant 
contribution to the leftwards shift of opinion in the years leading up to the 
1945 general election. In its own way, the paper crystallized disillusionment 
with the National Government just as surely as the Left Book Club or 
local campaigns against fascism. The substance of the Mirror’s political 
analysis was not particularly original – indeed, it was often superficial 
and frustratingly vague – but the paper did develop a distinctive style 
 89 S. Rose, Which People’s War? National Identity and Citizenship in Britain, 1939–45 
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that was carefully tailored to its working-class audience. The other left-of-
centre popular papers were all closely linked to particular party machines 
and addressed relatively politicized readerships associated with parties or 
unions. The Mirror, by contrast, developed a different editorial appeal, an 
independent populist rhetoric which attempted to speak to – and for – a 
non-politically aligned audience of ordinary working-class people. It did 
not trouble readers with the detail of day-to-day political business, and was 
more likely to splash on a sensational court case than the latest parliamentary 
crisis; in that sense it was a harbinger of the aggressive tabloid culture of 
the future. The editorial team’s pragmatism was combined, however, with 
a social democratic reformism that frequently bubbled to the surface. 
The political coverage it did contain played skilfully on some of the most 
resonant discourses of working-class culture – such as cynicism towards 
politicians and bosses, and frustration with the rigidities and pomposities 
of British society. In its own idiosyncratic manner, the Mirror helped to 
integrate its readership into the developing ‘culture for democracy’. By the 
time of the 1945 election, over ten years after its reinvention had begun, the 
paper’s political journey was almost complete: for the first time, the paper 
threw its support behind Labour, and it would remain a critical friend of 
the party for decades to come.94 Its outspoken, irreverent and opportunistic 
left-of-centre journalism would provide an important counterweight to the 
conservatism and respectability that dominated much of British popular 
culture until the 1960s. 
 94 Although it refused to compromise its independence by explicitly instructing readers to 
back Labour (see Pugh, ‘The Daily Mirror’; Thomas, ‘“A cloak of apathy”’).
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5. ‘A timid disbelief in the equality to which lip-
service is constantly paid’: gender, politics 
and the press between the wars
Laura Beers
In 1936, Ray Strachey, the author and former suffragist and secretary to 
Nancy Astor, MP, published an edited collection titled Our Freedom and 
its Results. In it, five women, including two politicians, the independent 
Liberal MP Eleanor Rathbone and the Labour MP Mary Agnes ‘Molly’ 
Hamilton, reflected on how British women’s social and political position 
had changed – or failed to change – since the First World War. Despite 
the technical political equality with men that women had enjoyed since 
1928, both Rathbone and Hamilton were quick to emphasize the limits of 
reform. According to Rathbone, ‘Progress has been rapid when it depended 
on political action and slow when it depended on changes in hearts and 
habits’. Hamilton contended that ‘a timid disbelief in the equality to which 
lip-service is constantly paid’ persisted in Britain, and ‘the assumption that 
women are all the same, and that they are all really rather silly and helpless, 
still continually betrays itself ’.1
The two MPs’ cynicism about society’s willingness to accept women as 
men’s political equals is substantiated by an investigation of party propaganda 
directed towards women; and by press representations of women voters and 
female politicians in the inter-war period. For, while women were granted 
the franchise on limited terms in 1918 and on equal terms with men in 
1928, and while women were admitted to sit in the House of Commons 
in 1918, the removal of barriers against women’s entrance into the political 
sphere did not reflect a wholehearted acceptance of their equal capacity 
for political participation. Prejudices against women as silly and frivolous 
were not universally held within inter-war society, and certainly many 
felt that women were as capable of rational political behaviour as their 
male counterparts. Indeed, there were many who believed that class and 
 1 E. Rathbone, ‘Changes in political life’, in Our Freedom: and its Results, ed. R. Strachey 
(1936), pp. 15–76, at p. 16; M. A. Hamilton, ‘Changes in social life’, in Strachey, Our 
Freedom, pp. 231–85, at pp. 256, 258.
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education were more important determinants of political capacity than sex. 
Nonetheless, inter-war British political culture remained heavily influenced 
by gender stereotypes dating back at least to the early nineteenth century.2 
Alison Light has shown how popular literature reinforced a conservative 
gender order in inter-war Britain through its privileging of domesticity and 
dissociation of women from the political sphere.3 The values and assumptions 
that informed inter-war literature are equally evident in other spheres. Lucy 
Delap’s chapter in this volume illustrates the extent to which deeply held 
assumptions about sexual difference – both physical and psychological – 
buttressed men and women’s hostility towards the ordination of women 
by the Church of England. Such assumptions were equally evident in the 
political sphere. Party propaganda and political reporting in particular 
reinforced perceived differences between men and women through their 
representation of and appeal to women as emotional and irrational. Such 
representations and appeals reified existing prejudices against women and 
arguably retarded their further political and social emancipation. 
The chapters in this volume each explore how the British nation was 
redefined in the wake of the First World War, and many engage with the 
question of how the new media of communication that emerged in the 
early twentieth century helped to shape how the government, political 
parties, social reformers and intellectuals understood and appealed to this 
new nation, and how the nation in turn responded to those appeals. Other 
chapters consider the extent to which the media acted as both an inclusive 
force in British political life, and as a medium for reinforcing existing 
prejudices and narrowing the scope of political debate. This chapter argues 
that, even as political media evolved to communicate with a new mass 
democracy, the style and content of political communication continued 
to be informed by conventional gender stereotypes. While women were 
now technically included as members of the political nation, the media 
represented and appealed to them as unequal citizens. 
The chapter is divided into four parts. The first queries existing 
understandings of the franchise debates of the 1920s. It suggests that, 
while the majority had reconciled themselves to the inevitability of equal 
 2 On the creation of a gendered political language among the working-classes in the 19th 
century, see A. Clark, The Struggle for the Breeches: Gender and the Making of the English 
Working Class (Berkeley, Calif., 1997). The existence of such stereotypes in the 18th century 
is highlighted in Arianne Chernock’s recent study of men who dared to question women’s 
exclusion from the political sphere (Men and the Making of Modern British Feminism 
(Stanford, Calif., 2009)). 
 3 A. Light, Forever England: Femininity, Literature and Conservatism between the Wars 
(1991).
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suffrage by the 1920s, many remained less than convinced of women’s 
civic capacities. The next two sections look at party propaganda directed 
at women in the inter-war period, and at representations of women voters 
in the popular press. Finally, the last section examines representations 
of female politicians. The popular press, it argues, took for granted that 
women were less interested in political issues than men, and, consequently, 
focused on ‘human interest’ and fashion in reporting on female politicians 
in a bid to attract a female readership. While such coverage meant that 
female backbenchers were afforded more media attention than their male 
counterparts, they struggled to get their political message heard above the 
clamour for information on their domestic lives and fashion choices.
In 1929, the first election in which women held the franchise on equal 
terms with men, women formed a majority in over 80% of parliamentary 
constituencies. Statistics on the gender breakdown of voter turnout in 
inter-war Britain are not available; however anecdotal evidence suggests 
that women voters were exceptional in their commitment to exercising 
their newly earned rights as citizens. Whereas in continental European 
countries recorded gaps between male and female participation tended to 
range between 5 and 12%, in British elections in the 1920s women were 
reported to have turned out in larger numbers than men.4 Yet, despite their 
demonstrated commitment to exercising their rights as citizens, the view 
persisted in many quarters that women were less interested in politics than 
men, and that they lacked the political rationality of their male counterparts. 
For feminist historians writing in the 1980s and 1990s, the persistent 
hostility towards women’s political participation in inter-war Britain was 
more or less taken as read. Billie Melman argued that anxieties about 
the alleged army of ‘superfluous women’ created by the First World War 
combined with fears about the impact of feminine sexual and economic 
emancipation on the traditional balance of power between the sexes to 
produce a rhetoric within popular fiction and journalism that was peculiarly 
 4 On turnout differentials in continental Europe and the Antipodes, see H. Tingsten, 
Political Behavior: Studies in Election Statistics (1937). The highest differentials occurred 
in municipal elections in Scandinavian countries, and the lowest in New Zealand, where 
notably women had held the franchise since 1893. For anecdotal reports on British turnout, 
see, e.g., ‘Keen Women: 80 percent expected to vote’, Daily Mail, 2 Nov. 1922; Daily Express, 
30 Oct. 1924. H. Gosnell, Why Europe Votes (Chicago, Ill., 1930) cites an analysis of voter 
turnout in constituencies pre- and post-1928 to conclude that young women’s participation 
more or less equalled that of men. However, he also cites tickers’ sheets from three ‘typical’ 
polling districts in the 1924 election as evidence that ‘10 percent less of the women electors 
than of the men electors voted in 1924’.
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hostile to young women’s political and career ambitions. She identified 
the Daily Mail ’s prolonged campaign against ‘The Flapper Vote Folly’ in 
1927–8 as the acme of this sexualized hostility in the popular press.5 In her 
study of the suffrage movement after 1918, Cheryl Law argued that Stanley 
Baldwin’s government only equalized the franchise because the National 
Union of Societies for Equal Citizenship forced his hand: ‘while many 
politicians paid lip-service to the concept of women’s equality, they had no 
intention of giving it practical expression, especially where the balance of 
power [between the sexes] might be concerned’.6 
Recent scholarship, however, has sought to downplay, if not entirely to 
dismiss, opposition to full female enfranchisement in the 1920s. Adrian 
Bingham explicitly challenged Melman’s analysis of inter-war popular 
culture, emphasizing the mass circulation newspapers’ qualified support for 
women’s continued employment after the First World War, and the fact that 
much press commentary in the 1920s supported female enfranchisement at 
twenty-one, notwithstanding the Mail ’s anti-flapper vote campaign.7 He 
noted that the Daily Express took an optimistic view of women’s electoral 
impact in its leader columns. On 23 May 1929, the paper argued that ‘The 
new women voters, in every other respect more mature than their male 
contemporaries, are not in the least likely to register a snap judgment 
on the supreme question of politics they are now called upon to assist in 
deciding … The leaders of the parties need not fear the frivolity of the 
new voters’.8 Nicoletta Gullace has sought to revise Martin Pugh’s depiction 
of the Representation of the People Act (1918) as an incremental reform 
that ‘by no means reflected a coherent philosophy of political citizenship. 
But instead, in the long tradition of English parliamentary reform, derived 
its strength from a certain political coherence’.9 Pugh had warned against 
swallowing too easily ‘the assumption that there exists a direct relationship 
between the level of mass participation in the war effort and the extension 
of political and social privileges’, and argued that women were enfranchised 
 5 B. Melman, Women and the Popular Imagination in the Twenties: Flappers and Nymphs 
(1988). See also S. K. Kent, Making Peace: the Reconstruction of Gender in Interwar Britain 
(Princeton, NJ, 1993). While Alison Light emphasizes the encouragement of domestic 
tradition, as opposed to the hostility towards female emancipation, she similarly underscores 
the conservatism of inter-war popular culture in her Forever England.
 6 C. Law, Suffrage and Power: the Women’s Movement 1918–28 (1997; 2000), p. 208.
 7 A. Bingham, ‘“Stop the flapper vote folly”: Lord Rothermere, the Daily Mail, and the 
equalization of the franchise 1927–8’, Twentieth Century British History xiii (2002), 17–37; 
and A. Bingham, Gender, Modernity and the Popular Press in Interwar Britain (Oxford, 
2004), chs. 2, 4. 
 8 ‘Straight Facts About the Flapper Vote’, Daily Express, 23 May 1929.
 9 M. Pugh, Electoral Reform in War and Peace, 1906–18 (1978), p. 85.
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principally because it ceased to be expedient to resist their demands.10 
Gullace, in contrast, contended that the war witnessed a transformation 
of attitudes towards women as they proved their fitness for citizenship via 
their war work. Thus
Asquith attributed his ‘conversion’ to women’s suffrage to the heroic actions of 
women like Edith Cavell, who had ‘taught the bravest man amongst us a supreme 
lesson of courage,’ and Haldane battled a last ditch effort by Lord Loreburn to 
derail women’s suffrage in the House of Lords by pointing out that ‘Women are 
taking a tremendous part in this war. They are sacrificing their health, their lungs 
… A good many have died. There have been women, like Edith Cavell, whose 
names will not be forgotten, women who have died under shell fire, died under 
bombardment, died by bullet wounds just the same as men have died’.11
Further, ‘[a] feminized representation of the conscientious objector also 
facilitated the substitution of “conshies” for women in the discourse of 
unworthiness that undergirded discussion of the vote’.12 The fact that it 
was older women, and not the young women actively engaged in war work, 
who were granted the vote in 1918 does not, she argued, undermine her 
analysis. Rather, in the long tradition of virtual representation, these older 
women were seen as representing the voices of their heroic young sisters. 
The logical conclusion of Gullace’s work is that it was only a matter of time 
before parliament extended the franchise from these virtual representatives 
to young women themselves.
The majority of inter-war parliamentarians similarly accepted this logic. 
One of the principal arguments of the Edwardian anti-suffragists against 
enfranchising even a small portion of the female population had been 
that ‘the grant of votes to women cannot possibly stop short at a restricted 
franchise on the basis of property or other qualification … [Any extension] 
would pave the way to Adult Suffrage. There is no permanent or practicable 
halting point before’.13 Yet, although they conceded the inevitability of 
an equal adult franchise, many remained less than enthusiastic about the 
possibility. In fact, after the wartime patriotism had died down, several 
politicians expressed regret that the 1918 reform had gone as far as it had. 
Rather than the enduring redefinition of citizenship depicted by Gullace, 
they looked on the 1918 act as both ill-thought through and unfortunate. As 
Stanley Baldwin wrote to the king in March 1928: ‘At that time the whole 
 10 Pugh, Electoral Reform, p. 81.
 11 N. Gullace, The Blood of our Sons: Men, Women and the Renegotiation of British 
Citizenship during the Great War (New York, 2002), p. 158.
 12 Gullace, Blood of our Sons, p. 182.
 13 Manchester, Labour Party Archive, National League for Opposing Women’s Suffrage, 
Lord Curzon’s Fifteen Good Reasons against the Grant of Female Suffrage (n.d. [1912?]).
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nation was under the shadow of the war and various pieces of legislation were 
passed more from sentiment than from the point of view of practicability. 
The wider a democracy the more difficult it becomes to repeal laws which 
directly affect the community’.14
The belief that, while women could not be denied the vote, they were 
not likely to wield it with the maximum of intelligence and discernment is 
evident not only in openly hostile comments, but also in several backhanded 
endorsements of an equal franchise uttered by inter-war politicians. At a 
women’s meeting in Oxford in 1928, Lord Birkenhead expressed his support 
for franchise reform on the dubious grounds that, while ‘he was not well 
acquainted with the political equipment of the average young lady of 21 
… he believed it would be stating the case moderately if he supposed 
that the average young woman or man of 21 today was not less fitted to 
exercise the franchise than the class of agricultural labourer whom Disraeli 
enfranchised’.15 The previous year, Conservative politician Duff Cooper 
noted: ‘that argument which embodied the idea that younger women 
would often vote for the man they had pinned their faith on as the better 
man, without considering his views too closely, might after all, even were 
it proved, work for a healthy re-adjustment in some cases’.16 Ramsay 
MacDonald’s limited views of women’s intellectual capacity are repeatedly 
evident. His party was officially affiliated with the Women’s Labour League, 
yet he did not trust the political judgement of its members. As he wrote 
to Katherine Bruce Glasier in 1914: ‘If we had but one member of each 
branch who thought critically we should be perfectly safe. But our people 
feel and do not think’. The suggestion that women were ruled by emotion 
was luridly reiterated in 1918, when he blamed his election loss in Leicester, 
not on male voters, but on ‘the women – bloodthirsty, cursing their hate, 
issuing from the courts and alleys crowded with children, reeking with 
humanity – the sad flotsam and jetsam of wild emotion’.17 Even Arthur 
Henderson, the longtime suffragist sympathizer, gave his view that the 
franchise expansion would probably not affect the political balance of 
power very much, as young women would simply vote the same way as 
 14 Cambridge University Library, Baldwin papers 63, king’s letters, carbon copies of daily 
reports to the sovereign on proceedings in the Commons, vol. for 8 Feb. 1928–11 May 1929, 
Baldwin to George V, 30 March 1928.
 15 ‘Lord Birkenhead at Oxford: Women’s Fitness to Vote’, The Times, 22 Feb. 1928.
 16 ‘Miss Twenty-One and the Vote’, Kensington News, 3 Dec. 1927.
 17 S. Holton, Feminism and Democracy: Women’s Suffrage and Reform Politics in Britain 
1900–18 (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 55–6; L. Beers, ‘Education or manipulation: Labour, 
democracy and the popular press in interwar Britain’, Journal of British Studies, xlviii (2009), 
129–52, at p. 133.
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their parents.18 Henderson may well have been writing to placate a public 
nervous about the revolutionary implications of women’s franchise (and 
psephological studies have shown that both young women and young men 
do usually simply vote the same way as their parents).19 However, from 
the leader of a party whose sole hope for power lay in political education 
and conversion, his comments were not a ringing endorsement of young 
women as the vanguard of the new enlightened democracy. 
The belief on the part of politicians and political organizers that women 
were less rational and more impressionable than men is further visible in the 
changes to party propaganda after female enfranchisement. Other scholars 
have written about changes to political culture after 1918 – from the shift 
to a quieter, more mediated style of politics, to a greater emphasis on non-
party political organization.20 Another development that historians need 
to reconsider in light of gendered political assumptions is the increased 
prominence given to politicians’ physical appearance and personal attributes 
in campaign literature after 1918. During the debates leading up to the 1928 
Representation of the People Act, opponents of female enfranchisement had 
argued that women, if given the vote, would simply vote for the best-looking 
candidate. The Labour MP Ellen Wilkinson had jestingly sought to dispel 
her male colleagues’ anxieties on this count, disclaiming: ‘Looking round 
this House, I cannot see that there is any need for honourable members to 
be worried’.21 While most male politicians would not own up to holding the 
views mocked by Wilkinson, the shift in the style and content of campaign 
literature does suggest that they believed that women were more interested 
than men in seeing who they were going to vote for.
Before the First World War, constituency election leaflets did not 
normally include photographs of the candidate, who was principally 
 18 ‘Women and the General Election: A Socialist View’, Daily Express, 5 Apr. 1929.
 19 H. Hyman, Political Socialization: a Study in the Psychology of Political Behavior (Glencoe, 
Ill., 1959) was one of the first to document this. The importance of a generational break in 
voting preferences for the fortunes of the Labour party has been emphasized in M. Franklin 
and M. Lander, ‘The undoing of Winston Churchill: mobilization and conversion in the 1945 
realignment of British voters’, British Journal of Political Science, xxv (1995), 429–52.
 20 J. Lawrence, ‘The transformation of British public politics after the First World War’, 
Past & Present, cxc (2006), 185–216; H. McCarthy, ‘Parties, voluntary associations and 
democratic politics in interwar Britain’, Historical Journal, l (2007), 891–912. For a US 
comparison, see K. Anderson, After Suffrage: Women in Partisan and Electoral Politics before 
the New Deal (Chicago, Ill., 1996).
 21 ‘M.P.s’ Good Looks: Woman Member Reassures Them’, Liverpool Courier, 20 Feb. 1925; 
‘Women and the Franchise’, The Times, 21 Feb. 1925.
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identified by his membership in his national party.22 From 1918 onwards, 
in contrast, candidates consistently issued a photograph on the front page 
of their election addresses, with the consequence that, by 1929, of the 207 
candidates’ election addresses that I have reviewed, only seven did not 
include photographs.23 This transformation cannot be attributed solely to 
the enfranchisement of women. Of the nearly 450 election leaflets from the 
two 1910 elections that are held in the Liberal Party Archives at Bristol, half 
contain photographs of the candidate.24 Clearly the change owed much to 
the evolution of printing technologies in the last years of the nineteenth 
century that allowed publishers to reproduce photographs as halftones 
using rotary printing presses; as well as to parties’ efforts to appeal to less 
educated voters in the wake of the 1884 franchise reform. Yet, although such 
technology existed from the turn of the century, photographs only became 
ubiquitous in election leaflets after 1918. 
The link between this shift towards a more personal visual appeal and the 
women’s vote is underscored by several candidates’ inclusion, not only of 
their own head shots, but also of photographs of their wives and families. 
Of the 1910 leaflets in the Liberal party’s collection, only one included a 
photograph of a candidate’s family member: George Baxter, Unionist 
candidate for Dundee, printed a photograph of his (very attractive) 
wife on the back of his leaflet. In contrast, after 1918, several candidates 
included photographs of their wives and families in their election literature, 
occasionally accompanied by a special appeal to women voters written by 
the candidate’s wife.25 It is difficult to ignore the implied assumption that 
women were more inclined to judge a man’s political capacity on the basis 
of his physical appearance or his family life. 
The Labour party pretended to a more enlightened approach towards women 
voters, emphasizing its long-held support for Votes for Women – yet Labour 
 22 Of the 216 addresses from the Jan. 1910 general election held at the Liberal Party Archive 
at Bristol University, only 122 featured a photograph of the candidate: 54 of the 96 Liberal or 
Lib-Lab addresses featured photographs; 38 of the 85 Unionist addresses; 28 of the 32 Labour 
and SDF addresses; and two of the four independent addresses. Photographs are even less 
prevalent among the archive’s collection of election addresses from by-election campaigns 
held between 1913 and 1917 – only 25 out of 70.
 23 This sample, from the collection held at the Conservative Party Archives, Bodleian Library, 
Oxford, included 70 Conservative addresses, 72 Labour, 60 Liberal and five independent.
 24 Of the 231 leaflets from the December 1910 election, 123 included candidates’ 
photographs.
 25 M. Pugh, Women and the Women’s Movement in Britain 1914–59 (2nd edn., New York, 
1993), p. 120. In 1929, John Greenwood, the bachelor Liberal candidate for East Fulham, 
sought to assert his family credentials by including an endorsement from his mother in his 
election address!
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was no less cynical than its Conservative and Liberal counterparts in seeking to 
adjust its political practice to court the supposedly more impressionistic and 
superficial female electorate. During the 1929 election, the party produced a 
campaign poster that suggested that the young ladies would deem MacDonald 
the most attractive candidate – literally and figuratively.26 The Labour candidate 
and later MP for Coventry, Philip Noel-Baker, was notable for his exploitation 
of his ‘sex appeal’ in his election campaigns. Noel-Baker had been an Olympic 
runner before taking up a political career, and was rather better looking 
than the average politician. In his general propaganda, he played down his 
youthful athleticism, posing with a jacket and tie and a serious, closed-mouth 
smile. In his women’s literature, in contrast, he appeared tie-less and with the 
top button of his shirt undone, and sported a rakishly toothy grin. While 
Wilkinson fought hard to dispel her male colleagues’ fears ‘that if the younger 
women are given the vote, they will vote for the best-looking candidate’, 
Noel-Baker was clearly not taking any chances.27
Press coverage of women and politics similarly took for granted that women 
were more superficial than men, and that their political preferences would 
reflect this superficiality. One way in which this superficiality was allegedly 
manifested was in women’s supposed unwillingness, out of sexual jealously, 
to vote for their fellow women. Another was women’s apparent inability to 
appreciate the gravity of their civic responsibility. One particularly comic 
article on women voters suggested that young women’s reasons for voting for 
one party over the other were at best arbitrary. A Daily Express reporter wrote 
of a conversation she had had with three young women in South Tottenham:
I first tackled three girls who for the first time would be qualified to vote. They 
threw back their heads and laughed deliciously, ‘Oh! I expect I’ll vote,’ said one. 
‘You’ve only to sign your name on a paper haven’t you?
‘Who’ll I vote for? Well, the Conservatives, I think, because they employ 
people, don’t they? I’m a working girl, so I’d better keep in with them.’
She turned to one of her companions: ‘You’d better be Socialist, your young 
man is, isn’t he?’
‘All right, I’ll be the same as him,’ was the reply.
The third girl, not to leave the Liberals out in the cold, decided for them.28
 26 Cambridge University Library, uncatalogued poster collection, ‘The New Voter: “Poor 
Old Dears! – Isn’t It Pathetic?”’, Labour party poster, no. 23 (1929). 
 27 ‘M.P.s’ Good Looks’.
 28 M. Harrison, ‘How Will Women Vote in the Election’, Daily Express, 29 Apr. 1929.
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The article in which the above vignette featured was an otherwise serious 
piece of political journalism in a paper with a circulation of over 1.5 million, 
nearly half of whom were women. While the episode is intentionally comic, 
the female author was playing to serious prejudices about young women 
voters. Such prejudices were not specific to British society. The New York 
Times’s London correspondent, reporting on the ‘high-heeled army’ of 
‘stenographers and shopgirls’ marching to the polling stations in May 1929 
to cast their ballots, included a story of three young women in Chelsea who 
had asked a policeman not where to vote, but for whom to vote, and that of 
another young woman who, lacking a pencil, had sought to mark her ballot 
with lipstick. There was no suggestion that these women were anomalous 
in their foolishness.29 
The assumed frivolity and naivety of the flapper voter was visibly 
caricatured in the political cartoons of the period. Peter Mandler has 
highlighted the social significance of the replacement, in such cartoons, 
of the traditional character of John Bull by Sidney Strube’s ‘Little Man’, 
the domesticated suburban figure in bowler hat and whiskered moustache. 
Unlike John Bull or the stereotyped ‘English gentleman’, the Little Man was 
a new specimen of post-war democratic Britain. He ‘was not cold, aloof, 
imposing and arrogant at all, but kindly, a bit shy, very human’.30 As the 
author, diarist and National Labour politician Harold Nicolson wrote in 
1935, the modern Briton was ‘patient and good-humoured and very modest, 
and the least jealous race on earth … [he was] muddle-headed and decent, 
just like Strube’s little man’.31 But in one respect, the Little Man could not 
serve as the emblem of post-First World War British citizenry – for, unlike 
the majority of Britons, the Little Man was a man. Thus, in 1928 Strube 
introduced a new character into his cartoon repertoire – The Flapper. The 
Flapper became a frequent sidekick of the Little Man, as in one of her 
first appearances, when the two judged a political hat-making contest on 
3 August 1928. In a feature on women voters run during the 1929 election 
campaign, Strube confessed that while he ‘used to dislike drawing women 
… now he enjoys it’. And the paper proclaimed: ‘His “flapper” is almost—
but not quite—a rival to his Little Man’.32 
The ‘almost—but not quite’ is a telling comment on the Flapper’s status 
as second-class citizen – the Little Man’s lesser partner. Her appearance, 
furthermore, says volumes about popular stereotypes of young women 
 29 ‘New Women Voters Brighten Election’, New York Times, 31 May 1929.
 30 P. Mandler, The English National Character: the History of an Idea from Edmund Burke to 
Tony Blair (New Haven, Conn., 2006), p. 165.
 31 Quoted in Mandler, English National Character, p. 182.
 32 ‘Next Week: The Woman’s Daily Express’, Daily Express, 11 May 1929. 
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voters. The Flapper shared many of the traits of the Little Man, including 
a scepticism of political rhetoric and promises. But where the Little Man is 
earnest and attentive, if wary of politicians, the Flapper often seems bored 
by the political process – as in the hat-judging cartoon, where her eyes 
are closed and she is yawning. Further, Strube’s Flapper is vain, fashion-
conscious and self-absorbed. Unlike the Little Man, who is always clad in 
the same suit, bow tie and bowler hat, the Flapper is impeccably dressed 
for each occasion in an ever-changing stream of outfits. In ‘Song O’ the 
Sea’, for example, she appears clad in a bathing costume and spread out on 
a beach towel, and seems startled and confused when her sun-bathing is 
interrupted by three fiddling politicians attempting to court her favour.33
The theme of courtship in this and other cartoons played on the 
supposition that women approached politics like affairs of the heart. As 
a self-proclaimed ‘Truthful Man’ put it in a 1925 article in the Newcastle 
Chronicle: ‘“Affairs” do not intrigue her – unless they are affaires de coeur, 
which is another matter altogether’.34 David Low’s depictions of the new 
young woman voter in Beaverbrook’s other London paper, the Evening 
Standard, played on many of these same stereotypes. His doe-eyed Joan 
Bull was characterized by her naivety about politics. Like many of Strube’s 
cartoons, Low’s ‘Joan Bull’s Valentines, 1928’ presents Joan being wooed by 
the leaders of the three political parties.35
Political cartoons are a form of satire, and in poking fun at the idea of the 
flapper voter as naive and politically disengaged, Strube and Low exposed 
the foolishness of such characterizations of the new electors. At the same 
time, the resonance of such cartoons depended on the existence within 
the late 1920s population of a belief – however lightly held – that women 
were less informed about and less engaged with politics than men, and 
that their interest in male politicians was tinged by the romantic.36 These 
stereotypes about women’s attitude towards politics reinforced existing 
male assumptions about their political capacities, and likely also worked 
to persuade many women that they were not expected to pay the same 
attention to political issues as their male counterparts.
While such coverage strikes a modern feminist reader as insulting to 
women, there is only limited evidence that inter-war women took offence 
at such depictions. As with women who opposed female ordination and 
other liberalizing moves within the Church of England, gender conservatism 
 33 S. Strube, ‘Song O’ the Sea. Their wits-end-tide’, Daily Express, 18 May 1929. 
 34 ‘Woman has failed! Why she is an outsider in public life’, Newcastle Chronicle, 8 Dec. 1925.
 35 D. Low, ‘Joan Bull’s Valentines, 1928’, Evening Standard, 13 Feb. 1928. 
 36 For a contemporary, and still widely cited, assessment of the central role of stereotypes 
in journalism, see W. Lippmann, Public Opinion (1922; repr., Mineola, NY, 2004), p. 188.
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remained key to many women’s understandings of their relationship with the 
political sphere. Inter-war feminists took seriously the threat to social change 
posed by such press treatments, and denounced the reports and cartoons as 
retarding women’s political advancement. Rathbone believed that the press 
‘canard’ that women did not vote for other women was inhibiting women’s 
selection as parliamentary candidates: ‘Women having come only recently into 
the field, the party organizations are officered mainly by men, who share men’s 
prejudices and, wanting to win, are afraid of experimenting with the unknown. 
They probably believe the press nonsense about women being jealous of 
women’.37 Wilkinson was generally hostile towards the representation of 
women in political cartoons, although she claimed for Low an exceptional place 
among the pantheon of political cartoonists, asserting that he was ‘the only real 
feminist among men. His attitude of unromantic appreciation of the matter-
of-fact sex is a subtle flattery not to be resisted … For his cartoon on “the saner 
sex” bored with chivalry and indicating that the dustbin was the proper place 
for swords, Low has received the silent gratitude of all intelligent women’.38 
Wilkinson references Low’s cartoon of 9 May 1929, in which a ‘matter-of-
fact’ woman yawns in the face of a ‘romantic’ man’s attempts to woo her with 
chivalrous shows of force. But while this cartoon may have evoked the gratitude 
of Wilkinson and others like her for presenting women as practical-minded and 
peace-loving (in themselves stereotypes of female political behaviour), it, like 
most others from that era, nonetheless played on the theme of male politicians 
courting young women voters.39
While cartoons and news stories portrayed women voters as frivolous and 
emotional, press reporting on women MPs reflected a poor opinion of 
both female voters and female politicians. Historians have remarked on the 
interest of the inter-war press in women MPs’ personal lives and fashion 
choices, but the link between such press coverage, contemporary attitudes 
towards women voters and long-term trends in political culture has not 
been properly explored.40 
 37 Rathbone, ‘Changes in political life’, pp. 29, 31.
 38 E. Wilkinson, ‘Low’s Little Man’, Time and Tide, 6 Dec. 1930, p. 1538.
 39 The argument that women were inherently more practical-minded and pacific than 
men was actually used to disqualify them from political participation, on the grounds that 
society would be better served if women deployed their superior virtues outside the political 
sphere (B. Harrison, Separate Spheres: the Opposition to Women’s Suffrage in Britain (1978); J. 
Bush, Women against the Vote: Female Anti-Suffragism in Britain (Oxford, 2007)). 
 40 Pugh, Women and the Women’s Movement, p. 192; Bingham, Gender, Modernity, pp. 117, 
127; B. Harrison, ‘Women in a men’s House: the women MPs, 1918–45’, Historical Journal, 
xxix (1986), 623–54.
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The first decades of the twentieth century saw a revolution in the style 
and content of the popular press that was closely tied to the growth of the 
female readership. Between 1900 and 1945, women’s share of the national 
newspaper market rose rapidly, until by 1939 nearly as many women read 
a national paper as men. In an industry increasingly reliant on advertising 
revenue, these women readers were even more important than their growing 
proportion of total readership suggests, as 80% of household purchases were 
made by women.41 The competition for coveted female readers meant that 
editors devoted considerable attention to the question of what women 
wanted. In the 1930s, the large newspaper conglomerates began hiring 
research agencies such as the Institute of Practitioners of Advertising and 
Mass-Observation to study how men and women of different age groups 
and different social classes consumed the news – which papers they read, 
which sections of the paper they preferred and even in what order they read 
those sections.42 The conclusions of such studies would not have inspired 
optimism among those who believed that women held the key to revitalizing 
the British political process. Readers – both male and female – were found 
to prefer human interest stories and celebrity gossip over any other sections 
of the paper, but women were even less interested in domestic and foreign 
news than men, and more interested in fashion and celebrity. Even before 
such ‘scientific’ studies confirmed women’s preferences, editors had already 
developed an ingrained belief in the connection between fashion, celebrity 
and ‘human interest’ and a large female readership. 
In the 1920s, the ultimate example of a paper that sought to attract a 
female audience through ‘woman-friendly’ features was the Daily Express. 
The Express, according to one content analysis, carried more fashion 
coverage on its Women’s Page than any other broadsheet.43 It also gave 
heavy prominence to human interest stories and celebrity coverage in its 
general news columns and interspersed its columns on parliamentary and 
other events with pictures of fashionable ladies’ hats.44 The paper’s play for 
women readers was underscored by its promotional strategy. In the early 
1920s, it ran an occasional notice in its upper-right-hand corner proclaiming 
 41 J. Curran, A. Douglas and G. Whannel, ‘The political economy of the human-interest 
story’, in Newspapers and Democracy: International Essays on a Changing Medium, ed. A. 
Smith (Cambridge, Mass., 1980), pp. 288–316, at p. 291. 
 42 See, e.g., International Institute of Practitioners of Advertising (IIPA), Survey of Press 
Readership (1939); University of Sussex, Mass-Observation Archive, ‘File Report A11, 
Newspaper Reading Motives and Methods’ (Dec. 1938). 
 43 Bingham, Gender, Modernity, pp. 250–1.
 44 In 1936, the Express carried more human interest and women’s coverage than any other 
popular broadsheet (Curran and others, ‘Political economy’, Table 13.6). 
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itself as ‘The paper that women prefer’45 – despite the fact that, at this stage, 
it did not have access to market research to back up its claim. 
In 1932, the Express’s editor, Beverley Baxter, wrote to Beaverbrook: ‘the 
most important thing about the Daily Express is its political policy and 
particularly its empire policy … [But] it is essential that we maintain our 
hold upon the general public, and we would be foolish if we failed to realise 
that not one woman in a hundred reads political, financial or industrial 
news’. Writing fifteen years later, the journalist R. C. K. Ensor concluded 
that ‘women (in the mass that is) have no day-to-day interest in politics. 
They will not patronise a paper that obtrudes much serious politics upon 
them … Women’s concern is not with ideas or principles, but with persons 
and things’.46 Instead of questioning their own complicity in fostering a 
gendered reading culture in which women chose to consume more trivial 
news than their male counterparts, editors and publishers simply concluded 
that women’s demonstrable lack of interest made it economically risky to run 
too much ‘serious politics’. Their apparent taste for human interest, celebrity 
and fashion stories, on the other hand, meant that women politicians, if 
covered appropriately, might well prove to be of interest to women readers. 
Consequently, throughout the 1920s, newspapers set out to turn female 
MPs into political celebrities, whose personal lives were treated as just as 
newsworthy as their public achievements. The incursion of ‘human interest’ 
into political journalism has a long pedigree, dating back to W. T. Stead’s 
signed interview with General Gordon in the 9 January 1884 issue of the 
Pall Mall Gazette.47 However, the treatment of women MPs by the inter-war 
press represented both a quantitative and an undeniable qualitative shift in 
the boundaries between the public and private in political journalism.
Women MPs’ fashion decisions filled countless column inches in the 
daily and evening press. When Lady Astor was first elected to parliament 
in 1919, milliners sent her so many free samples in a bid to become the 
outfitter of the first woman MP that she decided to sidestep the whole 
issue by confining herself to a ‘uniform’ of black and white costumes.48 
Even then, her fashion sense did not escape press attention. When she did 
once, exceptionally, deviate from her political uniform in December 1928, 
appearing in the House in a red frock after coming straight from a private 
engagement, the Evening Standard ran two days of coverage on the story.49
 45 See, e.g., Daily Express, 8 Nov. 1922.
 46 Both quoted in Bingham, Gender, Modernity, p. 118.
 47 R. Schults, Crusader in Babylon: W. T. Stead and the Pall Mall Gazette (Lincoln, Neb., 
1972).
 48 Pugh, Women’s Movement, p. 192.
 49 ‘Lady Astor’s Red’, Evening Standard, 4, 5 Dec. 1928.
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The previous year, the Daily Express had been taken to court by Lady Vera 
Terrington, who sued the paper for libel after granting a reporter what she 
believed would be an interview about politics, only for the paper to publish 
a story headlined ‘The Best-Dressed Woman MP: Lady Terrington’s Aim if 
Elected: Furs and Pearls’. The article made no mention of her politics other 
than to identify her as the Liberal candidate for High Wycombe, but quoted 
her (alleged) statement that: ‘If I am returned to Westminster, I intend to wear 
my best clothes when I go there. I shall put on my ospreys and my fur coats 
and my pearls’.50 Terrington sued the paper on the grounds both that she was 
misquoted and that the article was intentionally defamatory. In deciding for the 
defendant, the presiding judge issued a summing up which concluded:
The jury must have thought, while Lady Terrington was giving her evidence, of 
the speech which Polonius made to his son when he was about to go to France:
‘Costly thy habit as they purse can buy,  
But not express’d in fancy; rich, not gaudy;
For the apparel oft proclaims the man.’
Therefore it was a matter of public interest what ladies who went to Parliament 
should put on.51
In the months and years that followed, the Daily Express (and other 
papers) proceeded to report on women MPs’ fashions with the same 
cheeky insouciance as previously. In the 1920s, a principal object of this 
press reporting was the Labour MP Ellen Wilkinson. Wilkinson is now 
one of the best known inter-war women MPs, remembered particularly for 
her leadership of the 1936 Jarrow Crusade. When she arrived at parliament 
in 1924, however, she was a comparative stranger, possessing neither an 
established career in public service, like her mentor Susan Lawrence, nor 
personal renown for her social standing, like her colleague Nancy Astor. 
Nonetheless, she soon became a regular feature in the columns of the daily 
and provincial press. When, in February 1925, Wilkinson decided to shingle 
her long red hair, the ‘story’ received coverage not only in the national press 
but in provincial papers such as the Liverpool Echo, the Sheffield Telegraph 
and the Manchester Dispatch – several of which ran photographs of ‘Wee 
Ellen’s’ new do. When, the following year, she cut her hair even shorter – 
sporting an ‘Eton crop’ – a similar bevy of press coverage followed. The 
interest in Wilkinson’s hair was equalled by the interest in her clothes, and 
 50 Daily Express, 3 Dec. 1923.
 51 Reported in ‘High Court of Justice: King’s Bench Division: Lady Terrington’s Libel 
Action’, The Times, 12 Nov. 1924.
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over the course of the 1920s her fashion choices filled numerous column 
inches in the London and provincial press.
In her 1931 novel, The Division Bell Mystery, Wilkinson had joked that 
‘most young politicians (male) … giv[e] as much thought to the rôle [they] 
should assume when [they] ente[r] Parliament as a newly elected woman 
M.P. gives to the costume to be worn on her first appearance’.52 The quip 
simultaneously poked fun at the pretences of young male parliamentarians 
and the press’s penchant for treating women MPs’ fashion choices as the 
most important aspect of their political career. But it also reflected the sad 
truth that a female MP could expect to warrant more press inches for her 
maiden outfit than for her maiden speech. 
To this interest in female MPs’ fashion choices was added a degree of 
coverage of their personal lives unprecedented among male politicians. 
Thus Wilkinson was repeatedly asked about her ‘decision’ to remain single. 
Her skills as a cook were well known among readers of the popular press. 
When she bought an Austin Seven motor car, her frequent accidents and less 
harrowing adventures behind the wheel became a new topic of press coverage. 
Her diary was scrutinized by gossip and society columnists who were quick 
to pick up on any such potentially scandalous items as the socialist firebrand 
and defender of the miners’ decision to attend a garden party held by her 
fellow feminist Lady Rhondda, despite the older woman’s being a prominent 
coal owner.53 Finally, reporters jumped on any minor anecdote that allegedly 
betrayed the young MP’s femininity. In March 1928, for example, in a debate 
on extending the franchise, Wilkinson took exception to William Joynson-
Hicks’s comment that ‘A woman over thirty is in no sense a young woman’. 
The next day, the Newcastle Chronicle declared that: 
Woman is rapidly becoming the rival of man in every sphere. He may 
congratulate himself, however, that one weak spot has been found in her armour. 
He at least does not care whether he is described as old or young. In thickness 
of skin at least he still retains a superiority. Moreover Miss Wilkinson’s many 
admirers may also be reassured. Dazzled by her perfections, they may have 
feared that she might lose the softer charms of her sex. The present controversy 
has shown that despite all glamour and appearances she is at heart sweetly and 
irrationally feminine.54
 52 E. Wilkinson, The Division Bell Mystery (1931), p. 9.
 53 The political fallout that Ellen took for this and other similar social engagements is 
mentioned in the catty contemporary study At the Feet of the Young Men, published under 
the pen name ‘The Janitor’ (1928), p. 72. In her 1929 novel, Clash, Ellen movingly depicts the 
emotional and ethical crises which her heroine Joan faces when confronted with similarly 
conflicting social loyalties.
 54 ‘As Old as She Looks’, Newcastle Chronicle, 30 March 1928.
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The exceptional degree of attention devoted to Wilkinson, compared 
to other women MPs, doubtless owed something to her status as the sole 
young unmarried woman in the House, at least until the arrival of Jennie 
Lee and Megan Lloyd George in 1929. Despite the fact that she was already 
thirty-three when she entered parliament, her diminutive physique made 
her appear younger, and in the context of the rather moribund House of 
Commons, she was, in fact, relatively young. She was quickly branded the 
House’s token ‘modern girl’ and, to the delight of the press, she looked and 
acted the part. Her working-class background likely further encouraged 
reporters’ tendency to view the MP as a ‘girl’, and perhaps invited a degree 
of intimacy that journalists would have been more hesitant to bestow on 
a woman from a different social background. This last point, however, 
should be raised cautiously, as gender, not class, appears to have been the 
key determinant of whether MPs would be subjected to such a high level of 
personal scrutiny. Notably, Ellen’s middle- and upper-class colleagues such 
as Lady Astor and Megan Lloyd George did not escape intensive media 
scrutiny simply by merit of their social position. 
Women MPs, including Wilkinson, professed to resent this uninvited 
press attention. In a 1932 article, Molly Hamilton derided the press’s 
tendency to treat female MPs like Hollywood starlets:
For the papers, women are ‘news’, as such. Women MPs get an immense 
publicity, not for their work, but for their clothes, their hobbies, their husbands, 
any and every extraneous thing they do. They are ‘featured’, incessantly, and the 
more incessantly the more irrelevant their activities. They could spend half their 
time in being photographed. If only one of them could have what the papers 
call a ‘romance’, it would be head-lined over two continents.55
In 1928, Wilkinson told a reporter for the Evening Standard: ‘Unfortunate 
politicians who have a message they want to get across find the public 
interested in their clothes and not their ideas. I am always being asked how 
I spend my £400 a year, how I do my cooking, and what I eat. It is much 
more difficult for a woman MP to retain any privacy than for a man’.56 
Other MPs actively shunned press publicity. Astor and Lee both adopted 
an inconspicuous uniform while in parliament.57 When asked about her 
fashion sense by an Evening Standard reporter, Susan Lawrence tersely 
 55 Hamilton, ‘Women in politics’.
 56 ‘“It Pays to Advertise” – what MPs say’, Evening Standard, 11 March 1927.
 57 Lee generally sought to diffuse press interest in her clothes by dressing in sober brown. 
However, she occasionally bucked her uniform and appeared in the House in a red cape, 
or clinging emerald evening dress, sending the lobby correspondents into journalistic 
paroxysms (see P. Hollis, Jennie Lee: a Life (Oxford, 1997), pp. 41–2).
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replied ‘that the clothes an MP wore were entirely his or her own affair’.58 
Wilkinson, in contrast, played along with reporters’ seemingly insatiable 
interest in her sartorial decision-making. She smiled for photographers 
who snapped photos of her sporting a new hairstyle or a new hat, and 
gave interviews on her inability to pull off wearing the colour red.59 She 
welcomed reporters into her home, answered questions about her domestic 
routines (she named her tea kettle Agatha after Agatha Christie) and coyly 
parried questions about her marriage prospects (‘Nothing in the future is 
definite. One never knows’).60 When she went to the US on a fundraising 
mission for the miners in August 1926, she consented to answer questions 
about her personal life from a reporter from the New York Tribune, although 
she protested that ‘she wanted any space in the newspaper she might claim 
to be devoted to the relief of the families of the miners’. The result was a 
profile that combined a good deal of human interest on the ‘little spirited 
woman’ with a rather thorough-going discussion of her views on industry 
and suffrage.61
Talking about her personal life and fashion choices was the price it was 
necessary to pay for the column space Wilkinson was determined to achieve 
for discussion of her politics. Further, by allowing herself to be presented 
as the House’s resident flapper, she made herself into the parliamentary 
authority on young women, despite the fact that she was in her thirties 
when she entered parliament. In this capacity, she repeatedly spoke out in 
defence of a young woman’s right to spend her new disposable income on 
more and more attractive consumer goods. Later, Wilkinson recognized 
that her high media profile could be used to secure coverage for the Jarrow 
Crusade in October 1936. Her status as the only female marcher gave the 
march a ‘human interest’ angle (beyond the obvious, if unsexy, human 
interest of impoverished shipworkers in a last ditch effort to save their 
livelihoods). Newspapers photographed Wilkinson, cigarette in mouth, 
being taught to play the drums by a group of her fellow crusaders, and 
newsreels played up the anomaly of a 4’ 11” woman surrounded by burly 
shipbuilders. Although the march was organized by local leaders of all 
 58 ‘Lady Astor’s Red’, Evening Standard, 5 Dec. 1928. 
 59 On her hair, see, e.g., ‘The Shingled M.P.’, Evening Standard, 11 Feb. 1925; ‘Ellen, M.P., 
has had an “Eton”’, Daily Herald, 22 May 1926. On her hat, see, e.g., ‘Miss Wilkinson’s New 
Hat’, Evening Standard, 6 May 1925; ‘Miss Wilkinson’s Borrowed Hat’, Morning Post, 3 July 
1925; on her colour preferences, see ‘Too Red for Ellen’, Sketch, 20 June 1925.
 60 ‘Diligent Girl’, Newcastle Evening Chronicle, 3 June 1929; ‘Why I Am Not Married’, 
interview with Miss Stein, Liverpool Echo, 13 Jan. 1927.
 61 ‘Ellen Wilkinson, Labour M.P. Finds American Women Indifferent to Suffrage’, New 
York Tribune, 29 Aug. 1926.
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political parties, and remained ostensibly non-party political, Wilkinson 
proved remarkably successful in identifying the march both with her 
own personality and with her party’s campaign for relief of the distressed 
areas; and both newsreel footage and press coverage identified her as the 
political face of the marchers.62
Wilkinson’s success in parlaying uninvited press attention into political 
power is only one illustration of the ways in which female politicians 
succeeded in turning patronizing media attention to their advantage. Their 
personal renown gave them a public platform that would not have been 
available to the average backbench MP. As with other marginalized groups 
within imperial society, women MPs were occasionally able to subvert 
practices intended to reinforce their subordinate status, and use them to 
further their own advantage.63 That said, it would be a mistake to discount 
the gendered stereotypes that propelled journalists and editors to showcase 
women MPs not only in news stories, but also in their fashion, gossip and 
feature columns, to a degree unprecedented among their male counterparts. 
Such practices helped to uphold gender divisions in modern political 
culture. Further, while the move towards a more personalized treatment 
of politics may have been most obvious in the case of women’s journalism 
and reports on female politicians in the inter-war period, such changes to 
political culture ultimately had a broader reach. One of the most obvious 
changes in modern political culture has been the revolution in the practice 
and performance of politics. Advertisement, packaging and personality – 
never absent from politics – have been increasingly brought to the fore in 
the past century.64 These changes to political culture cannot be entirely put 
down to the enfranchisement of women.65 Yet stereotypes and assumptions 
 62 ‘Photonews’ page, Daily Express, 29 Oct. 1936; ‘Jarrow Unemployed’, Pathé Gazette 
<http://www.britishpathe.com/record.php?id=68851> [accessed 26 Sept. 2011], in which 
Ellen is the only politician to appear. For Conservative frustration at the press’s fixation 
with Jarrow as Wilkinson’s crusade, see letter from the chairman of the Jarrow Conservative 
Association to The Times, 4 Nov. 1936.
 63 Two recent studies have emphasized the ability of colonial subjects to subvert power 
hierarchies and reinterpret intended meanings within inter-war imperial politics. See M. 
Sinha, Specters of Mother India: the Global Restructuring of an Empire (Durham, NC, 2006); 
M. Wiener, An Empire on Trial: Race, Murder, and Justice under British Rule, 1870–1935 
(Cambridge, 2008).
 64 M. Rosenbaum, From Soapbox to Soundbite: Party Political Campaigning in Britain since 
1945 (1997).
 65 James Thompson (‘“Pictorial lies?” – Posters and politics in Britain, c.1880–1914’, Past & 
Present, cxlvii (2007), 177–210) has highlighted the shift to visual political culture following 
the Third Reform Act.
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about women’s relationship to politics (however superficial, or downright 
false) encouraged a greater reliance on personality and appearance in 
political campaigns and reporting in the inter-war period that contributed 
to a broader restructuring of the relationship between politicians and the 
democratic nation.
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6. Conservative values, Anglicans and the gender 
order in inter-war Britain 
Lucy Delap
This chapter sets out to explore the contested ‘conservative’ nature of the 
inter-war period in Britain, in relation to gender norms and attitudes to 
feminism. The historiography of the inter-war period is deeply divided. 
One interpretation highlights the impact of the war and the slumps in 
creating a backlash against feminism and working women. Martin Pugh, 
Harold Smith and Susan Kingsley Kent, for example, stress the inter-war 
press vilification of feminists and flappers, and portray the period as one of 
conservative domesticity, with women increasingly isolated in the home and 
marginalized in the labour market.1 It seems a period in which conservative 
values effortlessly displaced other more progressive traditions, and traditional 
versions of gender relationships were used to stabilize a nation that was 
renegotiating its boundaries and forms of citizenship. Most of the evidence 
supporting the apparent inter-war gender ‘backlash’ is taken from the popular 
press, or from parliament. Historians ritually invoke extreme anti-feminist 
figures, such as Arabella Kenealy or Antoni Ludovici. It has been hard 
for researchers to assess how representative the extremist voices were. The 
characterization of the period as backward-looking in its conservatism has 
recently been challenged by historians such as Adrian Bingham, whose study 
of the inter-war popular press suggests that this period was far less dominated 
by misogyny and anti-feminism than previously thought. Pat Thane has also 
sought to re-evaluate the inter-war years, stressing the vitality of women’s 
activism, feminist in orientation if not in name, in organizations such as 
the Mothers’ Union and Women’s Institutes.2 Perhaps most influentially, 
Alison Light termed the period one of ‘conservative modernity’ as a means of 
capturing the paradoxical nature of inter-war British culture and society, with 
 1 M. Pugh, Women and the Women’s Movement in Britain 1914–59 (Basingstoke, 1992). 
Susan Kingsley Kent and Harold Smith, in H. L. Smith, British Feminism in the 20th 
Century (Aldershot, 1990), pp. 47, 81, 74.
 2 A. Bingham, Gender, Modernity, and the Popular Press in Inter-war Britain (Oxford, 
2004); P. Thane, ‘What difference did the vote make?’, in Women, Privilege and Power: 
British Politics 1750 to the Present, ed. A. Vickery (Stanford, Calif., 2001), pp. 253–88.
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its attempts to combine domesticity, modernism and new forms of hedonistic 
individualism. She describes inter-war conservatism as ‘in revolt against the 
past’, making cultural compromises with the new.3 
This chapter revisits the debates about the inter-war period and its gender order, 
and offers a new assessment of the extent and nature of gender conservatism, 
through looking at three controversies of the Anglican Church. First, drawing 
on well-established traditions of ‘denominational feminism’, and spurred by 
the signs of greater openness to women’s spiritual participation during the war, 
the church was subject to feminist activism during the 1920s and 1930s over the 
long-running issue of women preachers.4 Second, in a context of debates over 
the ‘flapper vote’, the nature of marriage and its assumptions of female obedience 
were also widely debated. Though the Anglican matrimonial order of service was 
revised in 1928, the issue of gender difference in marital vows has continued to 
be controversial to the present day. Finally, the ordination of women was also a 
major area of controversy. It was discussed from the Edwardian period onwards, 
and evoked as a threatening spectre by church conservatives when faced with 
any form of equality claim from women. The Church Times had stated in 1914 
that ‘the monstrous regiment of women in politics would be bad enough, but 
the monstrous regiment of priestesses would be a thousandfold worse’, and this 
extreme tone from the Anglo-Catholic wing of the church has been taken to 
set the terms of the ordination debate.5 These three areas of controversy seem to 
offer a clear ground on which a suffrage-like struggle continued beyond the 1918 
victory, and even beyond 1928. Indeed, the gaining of the vote and other civic 
rights for women, alongside the expansion of secondary and higher education 
for young women and their entry into the professions, encouraged feminists 
also to campaign for entry to religious realms. ‘Church feminism’ thrived in 
the ‘democratizing’ inter-war years, through having a clearly defined set of 
demands, and a charismatic leader in the suffragist and evangelical preacher 
Maude Royden.6 
This dimension of feminist history clearly supports claims that the 
women’s movement continued to be active after the First World War, 
 3 A. Light, Forever England: Femininity, Literature and Conservatism between the Wars 
(1991), p. 10.
 4 B. Heeney, The Women’s Movement in the Church of England, 1850–1930 (Oxford, 1988); 
S. Gill, Women and the Church of England: from the 18th Century to the Present (1994); J. De 
Vries, ‘Challenging traditions: denominational feminism in Britain, 1910–20’, in Globalizing 
Feminisms, 1789–1945, ed. K. Offen (Abingdon, 2010), pp. 122–31; P. J. Walker, ‘“With fear 
and trembling”: women, preaching and spiritual authority’, in Women, Gender and Religious 
Cultures in Britain, 1800–1940, ed. S. Morgan and J. De Vries (2010), pp. 94–116.
 5 Church Times, 24 July 1914.
 6 H. Hanson, Ministrations of Women in the Church, Extracts from Lambeth Conference 
(1920); S. Fletcher, Maude Royden: a Life (Oxford, 1989), p. 197.
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though not always named as ‘feminism’. Its significance goes beyond this, 
however, in also providing a window which allows for a gauging of the 
extent of gender conservatism in broad circles of public opinion. By drawing 
on the thriving Anglican Church press as well as the secular popular press, 
this chapter ventures beyond the voices of the (mostly London-based) 
highly partisan historical actors who have dominated accounts of inter-
war feminism and anti-feminism. The Anglican Church, I argue, was a 
major site at which gender was being interrogated in the inter-war years. 
As an institution invested in tradition, service and obedience, it was clearly 
associated with conservative public opinion, though it also hosted some very 
radical thinkers. The church press reflected the views of an articulate subset 
of Anglicans. It was the domain of educated churchgoers, and suggested 
little about working-class opinion; nor were Scottish, Welsh or Irish voices 
particularly well represented. With these caveats, it can nonetheless shed 
light on the sentiments of those outside metropolitan elites and the higher 
levels of the clergy; this allows for the incorporation of a diversity of opinion, 
including the lay voices of women. 
As the work of Cordelia Moyse has recently suggested, exploring 
the investments that Anglican women made in an institution which 
marginalized them highlights the significant presence of female gender 
conservatism. In what follows, I draw on the work of Deniz Kandiyoti 
in exploring the ‘patriarchal bargains’ Anglican churchwomen negotiated, 
though I also suggest the limitations of this approach. I also examine the 
operation of taboos and discourses of pollution in relation to gender, using 
insights from anthropologist Mary Douglas.7 
Tracing the Anglican gender debates allows for a rethinking of the 
adequacy of ‘conservative modernity’ as a label for the inter-war period, 
and an assessment of the continuities of gender conservatism in Britain. 
Modern historians of gender have recently been challenged by the medieval 
historian Judith Bennett to think more deeply about continuity, and to 
trace out the longer histories of gender norms.8 This chapter engages with 
Bennett’s call for longue durée gender history, by identifying both change and 
continuity in gender norms. Gender emerges as constitutionally complex, 
and uneven in its pace of change. While I do not find Bennett’s ‘patriarchal 
equilibrium’ a useful tool for thinking about Anglican engagements with 
 7 C. Moyse, A History of the Mothers’ Union: Women, Anglicanism and Globalisation, 1876–
2008 (Woodbridge, 2009); D. Kandiyoti, ‘Bargaining with patriarchy’, Gender and Society, ii 
(1988), 274–90; M. Douglas, Purity and Danger: an Analysis of the Concept of Pollution and 
Taboo (2002).
 8 J. M. Bennett, History Matters: Patriarchy and the Challenge of Feminism (Manchester, 
2006). Her chapter ‘Patriarchal equilibrium’ makes her case particularly cogently.
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gender, I nonetheless attempt to set the inter-war period within a broader 
history, and assess the endurance of gender conservatism within the church 
over a substantial time period. 
Edwardian anti-suffragists were convinced that women’s domestic realm 
included a powerful moral and religious role, which precluded other kinds 
of public influence. The positivist and anti-feminist writer Ethel Harrison, 
for example, claimed: ‘woman cannot ask for power when she cannot share 
responsibility. Her empire lies in ways other than man’s, of a more spiritual 
nature’.9 But such claims were received with irony by women involved in 
the Anglican Church, for in this spiritual realm, Edwardian women found 
themselves frustrated in their attempts to gain responsibility and influence. 
Before the First World War, the exclusion of women from most roles in 
Anglican parishes and the discrimination against them in the parochial 
franchise led to small rebellions among churchwomen, some of whom 
were also deeply involved in the suffrage agitation through the Church 
League for Women’s Suffrage (CLWS). Most suffragists were well aware of 
the contempt they inspired in the church. One suffrage newspaper seller 
reported in 1911: ‘Oh I’m wicked, but do take a fiendish delight in offering 
“Votes for Women” to the clergy. My! But the looks of some are blacker 
than their clothes. However they are not all alike and I nearly swooned 
today when one very pleasantly said he would like one of my papers’.10 
Suffragists had taken to interrupting church services with prayers for 
imprisoned suffragettes or protests against forcible feeding. A number of 
churches of various denominations were destroyed by the arson campaign of 
the Women’s Social and Political Union in 1913–14, leaving many clergymen 
highly antagonistic to feminist claims.
The First World War years highlighted the specific discriminations faced 
by women within the Anglican Church. Vacillation over whether women 
might be speakers within the National Mission of Repentance and Hope, 
which was intended to revive spiritualism during the war, infuriated 
both progressives and conservatives. Athelstan Riley, a high churchman 
who clashed publically with the archbishop of Canterbury on women’s 
role in the church, talked ominously of a feminist conspiracy to capture 
the priesthood.11 Few were willing to contemplate or campaign for female 
 9 E. Harrison, ‘Abdication’, Nineteenth Century (Dec. 1913), p. 1335.
 10 San Marino, California, Huntington Library, AF2, unpublished MS., Miss J. Anthony, 
‘Diary of a Newsy: on selling suffrage papers on a London street corner’, 7 July–15 Aug. 1911, 
21 July 1911.
 11 Church Times, 28 July 1916, p. 80.
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clergy, and even the CLWS (renamed the League of the Church Militant in 
1919) split on this issue. The progressive theologian Canon Streeter argued 
in 1917 that this question should be ‘indefinitely postponed’ because public 
opinion was so largely against it.12 Despite the expansion of the idea of female 
citizenship in the 1920s, many opponents still believed that a democratized 
version of citizenship was compatible with gender hierarchy. Bishop Hensley 
Henson noted that ‘the perverted notion of sexual equality ... implies the 
disintegration of the female, and the withdrawal from society of the principle 
of discipline under which citizenship is … ordained to develop’.13 
To many suffragists and feminists, the church seemed a backwater 
of resistance to changing ideas about women, whether a parish took an 
evangelical, Anglo-Catholic or liberal stance. Radicals in the church 
during the First World War had characterized it as cautious, conservative 
and respectable. The Church of England had itself become so concerned 
at the loss of young women from congregations that it commissioned a 
report, whose results were summarized by Miss E. K. Sanders in 1918. She 
confirmed that young women ‘of the leisured class’ were frustrated by the 
orthodoxy and inaction of the church, and those who were active faced 
‘indifference, and often … scarcely veiled hostility, from parish priests’.14 
Laywomen were forbidden to address congregations from the pulpit. Where 
they were allowed to speak from some other site in a church, ruses such as 
separating women’s addresses from the main service by an organ recital were 
used to dispel any suspicions that they might be giving sermons. There was 
a powerful sense that the traditions of the Church of England represented 
the stability of the nation as a whole. The bishop of Southwark claimed in 
1918 that ‘amid the break-up of the old Continental system, there was just 
one old country left – England – which preserved its institutions and had 
a sense of unbroken traditions for centuries. We stood before Europe as an 
old nation, like some wise old mother, who, by her guidance and influence 
might teach the lessons of stability and self-respect’.15 There was therefore 
a strong emotional investment in the gender status quo within the church.
Signs of change were, however, evident from shortly after the First World 
War; the radical clergyman Hudson Shaw sponsored Maude Royden’s 
preaching in his London church of St. Botolph’s Bishopsgate on several 
occasions in the late 1910s. Shaw had written to his bishop complaining 
 12 B. H. Streeter and E. Picton Turbervill, Woman and the Church (1917), p. 100.
 13 Henson, reported in Public Opinion, 30 March 1928, p. 312.
 14 Miss E. K. Sanders, ‘Younger women and the church’, in H. L. Goudge, The Place of 
Women in the Church (1917), p. 184.
 15 ‘England The Mother Of Nations. Women’s Work In The Church’, The Times, 6 Nov. 
1918, p. 4.
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of the ‘lack of bold, courageous leadership’ in the church on the question 
of women’s involvement. ‘[We are] rapidly losing our best thoughtful 
educated Women’, he claimed, through the ‘shameful divisions’ over 
women preachers.16 He claimed to have taken a poll of his congregation 
one weekday, and found that the great majority of his mostly male city 
audience were ready to approve of women speaking in church. But his was 
a church well known for its radicalism; Winnington-Ingram, the bishop 
of London, was unconvinced by Shaw’s arguments, and declared: ‘I still 
believe that the great mass of the women of England are opposed to other 
women haranguing mixed congregations in church’.17
The English Church Union (ECU), a conservative Anglo-Catholic 
pressure group, raised a petition in 1921 in response to Maude Royden’s 
attempts to take the Good Friday service (a non-statutory service) at St. 
Botolph’s. It gained 54,000 signatures, in contrast to the 1,000 or so that 
Royden’s supporters raised.18 Royden claimed gloomily in 1921 that the 
Church of England was ‘the last ditch of the anti-feminist’.19 Among both 
clergy and lay people, there seemed to be a deep reluctance to see women 
taking a greater role in the church, and intense support for tradition. An 
informal poll of prominent churchwomen in 1916 conducted by Ursula 
Roberts showed only thirty to forty out of some 150 women canvassed 
supported women’s ordination.20 However, the Anglican Church should 
not be read as a monolithic social body, and the church leadership in the 
early twentieth century sometimes emerged as more progressive than the 
laity and lower clergy. When asked to vote whether women should sit 
on church bodies higher than the parochial church council in 1914, the 
bishops were in favour, while the clergy narrowly rejected the idea. It was 
the lay representatives, however, who were profoundly against the move.21 
The League of the Church Militant (LCM) secretary noted in 1921 that 
‘from the opposition displayed in some of the Church papers we realize 
once more that as regards the position of women the Bishops have proved 
themselves far ahead of the clergy and the ecclesiastically minded layman’.22 
Nonetheless, in 1935, the Archbishops’ Conference again considered the 
idea of women’s ordination, and again rejected it. The Anglican leadership 
 16 Shaw to Winnington-Engram, 23 Sept. 1918, quoted in Heeney, Women’s Movement, p. 180.
 17 The Guardian, 27 May 1921, p. 386.
 18 See Church Times, 18 March 1921, p. 263, and 24 March 1921, p. 292. Hudson Shaw in 
Evening Standard, 24 March 1921. 
 19 Church Militant, Sept. 1921, also quoted in Fletcher, Maude Royden, p. 197.
 20 Church Militant, Sept. 1921, also quoted in Fletcher, Maude Royden, p. 143.
 21 ‘Women And The Priesthood’, The Times, 20 July 1914, p. 10.
 22 Hanson, Ministrations of Women.
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were relatively unsympathetic to the conservative, male-dominated Anglo-
Catholic movement, but remained cautious and conservative in relation to 
gender. 
The LCM advocated the ordination of women from 1919 until its demise 
in 1928. Its members felt themselves to be politically and socially isolated 
within the church. An editorial in its monthly paper, the Church Militant, 
commented in 1925: ‘our society is a small one, we have a scattered membership 
and the tenets we hold are not usual amongst orthodox churchpeople. If we 
testify ever so mildly to this part of the faith that is in us, we are liable to be 
looked at askance, to be considered rebellious, eccentric, odd ’.23 In part, this 
opposition to a widening of women’s role in the church was a legacy of the 
suffrage agitation. In 1918, when women’s suffrage was finally legislated in 
the House of Commons, suffragists attempted to organize a series of church 
services across Britain to celebrate. Dean Inge, described by one suffragist as 
a ‘great woman-hater’, had refused permission for St. Paul’s to host a service 
of thanksgiving, because of what he termed the ‘atrocious crimes and acts 
of sacrilege which disgraced the agitation for this reform, a time which we 
at St Paul’s have melancholy reasons to remember, and which we shall never 
be able to wholly erase from our memories’.24 The bitterness felt against 
suffrage militancy, which had included an attempt to bomb St. Paul’s in 
1913, had not diminished for Inge and his staff. The language of less senior 
clerics was much less guarded. A rural vicar wrote: 
Holding as I do a firm conviction that a nation which is so emasculated that 
it lets its destinies shift into the hands of its women is doomed, I should, if I 
observed the occasion at all, make it a day of Fasting and Humiliation, certainly 
not thanksgiving. The political jobbery by which the nation has been betrayed 
into this tomfoolery behind the backs of our fighting men is the culminating 
disgrace of a disgraceful period in our political history.25 
There were also theological objections that accompanied these memories 
of suffrage-feminism and misogynous sentiments. Bishop Winnington-
Ingram wrote to Hudson Shaw claiming that opposition to women’s 
ordination was widely held without any antagonism to women. He insisted 
that ‘it was not merely “spikes” and the ECU but moderate men’ who 
could not accept women as Anglican clergy because this would prevent 
any possible reunion with the Roman and Orthodox churches.26 Reunion 
 23 ‘Courage’, Church Militant, 15 July 1925, p. 116 (original emphasis).
 24 London, Women’s Library, Autograph Letter Collection: Women in the Church 
(hereafter ALC), Frances Balfour to Millicent Fawcett, 7 Feb. 1918; W. R. Inge to Balfour, 19 
Jan. 1918.
 25 ALC, V. Holt, 11 Feb. 1918.
 26 Winnington-Ingram to Shaw, 1 March 1921, quoted in Heeney, Women’s Movement, p. 194.
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seemed a realistic possibility at this point, and many believed that the 
Anglicans could not ordain women without forever cutting themselves off 
from the wider Catholic Church. However, this objection faded over time, 
as the possibility of reunion became remote in the face of a theological 
impasse between Anglicans and Rome. Winnington-Ingram’s claim for the 
moderate nature of anti-feminism does not really account for the intensely 
bitter gender debates within the church, nor even for his own revealing use 
of the word ‘harangue’ in describing female preachers. 
The conservative high church weekly the Church Times hosted much debate 
over women’s ordination, and its editorial comments reveal long-standing 
misogynistic stereotypes; a 1921 editorial talked of the ‘rector’s or curate’s 
clever wife’ with acute distaste.27 Women preachers would be hampered by 
glibness, superficiality and ignorance, it was argued. Clergymen wrote of their 
fears of the radicalism of ‘ecclesiastical Bolsheviks’ such as Maude Royden.28 
A few correspondents explicitly framed this as a concern with feminism: 
‘women priests would most certainly come to teaching feminism rather than 
the Gospel, since this sex can never avoid the personal for long’, declared one 
priest’s wife.29 Others talked of the clergy’s need for ‘virility’ and ‘masculine 
staying-power and balance which are plainly attributes of the other sex’.30 
There were few conceptual resources for imagining female authority among 
clergy and laity, and it was often regarded as comic or unpleasant. A 1932 
memorandum by the female staff of the London Diocesan Board of Women’s 
Work expressed their belief that ‘positions of almost unchecked authority do 
not, as a rule, bring out the best in women, but rather the reverse’. Nonetheless, 
though they had concluded against the ordination of women, they could not 
agree with the carefully worded statement that had been put to them – that 
‘there is a certain priority (not superiority) of man over woman which fits him 
to take that lead, to represent humanity as a whole, in a way not possible with 
a woman’. Male ‘priority’ and leadership were being questioned even by this 
group of relatively conservative women.31 
In 1923, several royal weddings prompted reflections on the nature of 
authority and obedience among men and women both within the church 
and beyond, through scrutiny of the royal brides’ promises of obedience. 
 27 ‘Women in the pulpit’, Church Times, 4 March 1921, p. 213.  
 28 F. J. Edmund, vicar of Netherfield, Notts., Church Times, 24 March 1921, p. 293.
 29 M. Baillie-Saunders, Church Times, 6 May 1921, p. 248. 
 30 Letters from Mrs. L. Robinson and G. M. Dawson, Church Times, 1 Apr. 1921, p. 316 
and 13 May 1921, p. 454.
 31 London, Women’s Library, Anglican Group for the Ordination of Women Papers, 
teaching staff of the London Diocesan Board of Women’s Work, unpublished memorandum 
requested by the Archbishops’ Committee on the Ministry of Women.
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Maude Royden proposed to the House of Laity that the vows of obedience 
be removed from the marriage service.32 Senior clergy, however, were 
unequivocal about female obedience. Canon Douglas Macleane of Salisbury 
feared ‘the weakening of obedience as the foundation of Christian ethics 
and Christian society’; Canon Goudge argued that ‘subordination of one 
kind or another exists in all forms of human society, and is necessary to their 
existence. It does not imply inferiority’. For Goudge, ‘within the family life, 
the husband is “the head of the wife”; … where there is ultimate difference 
of opinion on matters morally and religiously indifferent, his judgement 
must prevail’.33 He was forced, however, to fall back on the relatively weak 
argument of this being traditional not just in Anglican churches, but across 
human society. This prompted an acid reply from a feminist, noting that 
appeals to customary beliefs ‘might equally well be employed to prove that 
the earth is flat’.34 
Beyond the confines of the Anglican Church, the challenge to male 
leadership was clear. The liberal Daily News launched an enquiry into ‘The 
Bride’s Promise to Obey’ in 1923, and over the course of several weeks 
published large numbers of readers’ letters (a selection of the ‘many hundreds’ 
they received). Despite the editors’ valiant attempts to provoke controversy, 
the large majority of letter-writers felt that female marital obedience was 
anachronistic. Their numbers included many Christian ministers, one of 
whom wrote that ‘were it not for the numbing and deadening influence of 
the establishment of the Anglican Church, with its cast-iron formularies 
and traditions, the growing intelligence of both men and women would 
long ago have led to the indignant repudiation of this word [obey]’.35 Most 
ministers claimed that they left obedience vows out of the marriage services 
they conducted, though some bishops (where consulted) apparently 
insisted on its inclusion.36 Only very occasionally did readers make the 
gender-conservative argument that, as one male Essex-based reader put it, 
‘No wife who loves and honours her husband will desire the word “obey” to 
be omitted or qualified. There can be only one head; and, as the weaker and 
less-experienced of the partners, is a woman to lead?’37 
 32 See T. Jones, ‘Sex and gender in the Church of England, 1857–1957’ (unpublished 
University of Melbourne PhD thesis, 2007), pp. 54–5, cited in Morgan and De Vries, 
Women, Gender.
 33 Can. Douglas Macleane, Church Times, 5 Dec. 1924, p. 641; H. L. Goudge, Church 
Times, 24 Dec. 1924, p. 737.
 34 C. M. Duncan Jones, Church Times, 2 Jan. 1925, p. 4.
 35 ‘M.A.’, Daily News, 8 Nov. 1923, p. 2.
 36 On a bishop’s insistence on ‘obey’, and her own sentiments of repugnance, see letter 
from ‘An old widow and grandmother’, Daily News, 13 Nov. 1923, p. 2.
 37 ‘Essex’, Daily News, 10 Nov. 1923, p. 2.
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The appeal of biological statements of sexual difference was apparently 
diminishing, alongside concepts of female obedience and subordination. 
Sexual difference was frequently presented to inter-war readers using 
a tentative new language of ‘personality’ and ‘colour’, rather than the 
more polarizing and direct language of biological difference that earlier 
conservatives had adopted. Many gender conservatives seemed to lack 
intellectual resources to express or illustrate their beliefs. The successful 
medical doctor Mary Scharlieb had been active in progressive campaigns for 
sexual education, but still asserted her belief in sexual difference in religious 
settings. She argued in 1917 that women could intuitively sense
the unseemliness and undesirableness of women sharing in the public services 
in church. It is not lack of intellectual ability, nor deficiency of zeal … it is not 
a question of inferiority, but … it is a question of unlikeness of natures. To 
our minds it appears that women may be, and are, wise counsellors, efficient 
teachers, capable organizers and administrators in the Church, but we shrink 
from the idea that she should ‘seek the Priesthood also’.38
The grounds for this intuition, however, were hard to convey to her readers 
and there seemed no very coherent conservative language available to 
rationalize this emotional response of ‘shrinking’. 
A Church Times editorial in 1924 offered a similarly guarded statement of 
opposition to female clergy. The usual claims were made concerning the motives 
of sex rivalry and revolution among feminists, but the nub of the argument 
about femininity being imbued with sex was outlined in vague psychological 
rather than physical terms: ‘the quality and colour of the personality which 
is peculiar to sex, which constitutes much both of our glory and our shame 
as human beings, is more prominent in the female than the male. Masculine 
nature can be more sexless than the feminine’.39 In the 1930s, opponents of 
women’s ordination continued to make their case using ideas about sexual 
difference, even if they were no longer willing to state clear biological and 
scientific justifications for this. In a chatty and sometimes tentative address to 
women, the Anglo-Catholic religious scholar and journalist Evelyn Underhill 
floated the idea that ‘most of us [women], I think, are definitely at our best 
in a limited environment’ that would utilize women’s ‘home-making talents 
and our instinct for nurture’.40 In a similar friendly, personal tone, Dorothy 
Spens commented in the Church Times in 1936, ‘Most women are, I fancy, 
extremely personal in their thinking … even the most strong-minded women 
 38 Mary Scharlieb, in Goudge, Place of Women, pp. 163–4.
 39 Editorial, Church Times, 14 Nov. 1924, p. 549.
 40 E. Underhill, ‘The ideals of the ministry of women’, Theology (Jan. 1933), p. 40. This 
paper was read at a Central Council for Women’s Church Work conference in Oct. 1932.
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tend to personify the abstract and to translate the “case” into personal terms 
… Women’s best work is done as the outcome of their maternal instinct’. 
Like that of Canon Goudge, her argument rested on customary practices: ‘I 
think there is an argument to be drawn from the organisation of society as we 
know it. It has always been the case that the woman has tended to be supreme 
in all matters that concern the family and the ordering of the household, 
while in the world outside, and towards society at large, the man has been 
the dominant authority’.41 Inter-war conservative women often struggled to 
find an acceptable rationale for why female leadership and authority were 
so suspect. Nonetheless, church debates show a continuing conviction in 
divergent sexual qualities and suspicion of female authority figures, though 
this was now presented as a customary and commonsensical rather than 
scientifically backed belief. 
Ambiguity over the significance of sexual difference was perhaps partly 
a response to the very same issues being debated among feminists – there 
was no straightforward feminist orthodoxy against which to position 
anti-feminism. Prominent inter-war feminists such as Eleanor Rathbone, 
the president of the National Union of Societies for Equal Citizenship, 
foregrounded the idea of women’s special qualities of sympathy, kindness 
and sensitivity to human suffering.42 Apparently politically opposed figures 
often drew on similar intellectual traditions. Conservatives among both 
feminists and anti-feminists, for example, tended to argue in virtually 
indistinguishable terms that women and men brought something different 
to spiritual or public life, and that this sexual difference should be supported 
and noted by public institutions. This allowed some conservative women to 
appropriate a feminist identity despite their opposition to reform within the 
church. Dorothy Spens, an opponent of ordination, identified mid 1930s 
feminism as newly compatible with her cause: ‘The feminism which asks for 
identity of function is being replaced by the feminism which takes pride in 
the fact that the functions of women are in part different, and asks instead 
for adequate opportunity for the exercise of their distinctive capacities’. As 
in the Edwardian years, feminism could not function as a clear dividing 
line between the two sides. This does not indicate that feminism was 
incoherent or ideologically confused in the inter-war period, but simply 
reminds us that the divide between conservative and progressive positions 
was blurred, and did not map straightforwardly onto anti-feminist and 
feminist positions.43
 41 D. Spens, ‘The ministry of women’, Church Times, 20 March 1936, p. 346. 
 42 Rathbone, in R. Strachey, Our Freedom and its Results (1936), pp. 36, 75.
 43 Spens, ‘Ministry of women’, p. 346. L. Delap, ‘Feminist and anti-feminist encounters in 
Edwardian Britain’, Historical Research, lxxviii (2005), 377–99.
160
Brave New World
By 1939, one commentator noted that ‘nowadays [the argument from the 
inferiority of women] appears either not at all, or restated in a much more 
cautious form’.44 The changing tenor of debate and lack of consensus over 
gender conservatism across the inter-war years was clearly demonstrated in 
the church press. In 1924 the Church Times had argued that claims about 
women’s ordination were ‘warmly resented by all Christian professional 
women’. But the following issue retracted this, noting ‘we have been 
surprised and disconcerted by the receipt of a very large number of letters [of 
protest] ... Our statement, made on what we believed was good authority, 
was obviously unjustified’.45 Though this was accompanied by letters from 
churchwomen restating their sentiments of ‘horror’ and ‘utter repugnance’ 
at the thought of women priests, such opinions were beginning to sound 
old-fashioned.46 The ‘honest surprise’ of the conservative Church Times 
can be seen as a turning point of sorts, as women’s claims began to be 
taken more seriously and politely. There was also a new confidence among 
progressive women; in response to the Church Times’s comments about 
‘the colour’ of feminine personality, one Newnham College scholar wrote: 
‘attack here is so easy that I feel ungenerous’.47 There was an atmosphere of 
expectation that change in Anglican women’s position was to come in the 
near future. The English Churchman noted in 1928 that ‘talk on women’s 
service in the Church has advanced so rapidly that it is felt that ordination 
to the priesthood must inevitably follow in due time’.48 As women took on 
public and professional offices in the 1920s, it seemed that their authority 
must gradually become acceptable even in the spiritual realm.
Nonetheless, those advocating change were still adopting a language 
of prudence and caution. One group of Oxford female undergraduates 
commented in 1931 that despite their ambitions within the church, ‘to 
clamour loudly for the priesthood now … is the wrong course of action 
… It is essential to work from what is already here, quietly and prepared 
for sacrifice’. They advocated women’s work as missionaries, as a means 
of slowly gaining more responsibility in church functions.49 Those with 
less patience found themselves isolated. Maude Royden had resigned as 
president of the League of the Church Militant in 1924, claiming that she 
 44 P. Smythe, The Ordination of Women (1939), p. 209.
 45 Church Times, 31 Oct. 1924, p. 479, 7 Nov. 1924, p. 512.
 46 Editorial, and letters from I. Cauldwell and G. Livesey, Church Times, 14 Nov. 1924, pp. 
549, 545.
 47 E. Seymour Bennett, Church Times, 21 Nov. 1924, p. 577. 
 48 English Churchman, 9 Aug. 1928, p. 114.
 49 London, Women’s Library, Anglican Group for the Ordination of Women Papers, unpublished 
notes, by L. Barry in 1931, recording the views of her fellow female Oxford undergraduates. 
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was too unorthodox and out of touch with ‘the main body of opinion’ to 
be helpful to the cause of women’s ministry in the Anglican Church.50 If 
anti-feminism became less openly propounded in the church, Royden still 
feared that it was the private belief of many Anglicans. She noted in 1929, 
‘to-day, few Christians will openly say that women are spiritually inferior to 
men. Many, however, still act on that assumption’.51 
Royden and other feminist commentators accounted for the persistent power 
of the sometimes tongue-tied statements of conservative belief by pointing to 
a deeply felt, though often submerged fear of women’s bodies in the church’s 
opposition to women’s preaching and ministry. Royden argued that ‘the whole 
process of reproduction has been surrounded from primeval ages with various 
forms of tabu … [which implied] that women were both mysterious and 
dangerous and certainly at some times, if not always, ceremonially unclean’.52 
Despite the surface reverence towards women, she perceived a deep disgust at 
women’s reproductive powers, particularly menstruation. 
Menstruation and its ‘defilement’ had long been controversial and 
central to debates about gender, both in the early church and in modern 
Britain.53 The physician Henry Maudsley had argued in 1874 that the 
menstrual cycle made women unfit for any kind of intellectual activity.54 
Late Victorian feminists fiercely challenged this; some even believed that 
while ovulation was natural, menstruation itself was an acquired condition, 
linked to male sexual abuse, and that it would cease once society was more 
sexually egalitarian.55 Nonetheless, menstruation arguments continued 
to be used by anti-suffragists, and were relevant to the disqualification of 
women from professional and sacred functions within the Anglican Church 
well into the twentieth century. Pollution beliefs were highlighted in the 
majority of the pleas for women’s ordination, often citing examples of the 
survival of superstitious beliefs about gender in contemporary Britain, and 
 50 Fletcher, Maude Royden, p. 239 
 51 Royden preface to D. Northcroft, Women Free Church Ministers (1929), p. 1.
 52 A. M. Royden and C. M. Coltman, The Church and Woman ... With a Chapter on the 
Evangelical and Free Churches by Constance M. Coltman (1924), pp. 204–5.
 53 W. E. Phipps, ‘The menstrual taboo in the Judeo-Christian tradition’, Journal of Religion 
and Health, xix (1980), 298–303. R. Radford Ruether, in J. Becher, Women, Religion and 
Sexuality: Studies on the Impact of Religious Teachings on Women (1990).
 54 H. Maudsley, ‘Sex in mind and education’, Fortnightly Review, xv (1874), quoted in S. 
Kingsley Kent, Sex and Suffrage, 1860–1914 (Princeton, NJ, 1987), p. 136.
 55 See E. Wolstenholme-Elmy, Life to Women (1896), quoted in Kent, Sex and Suffrage, p. 
110.
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more specifically in the church.56 In his plea for women’s ordination, Canon 
Raven noted in 1928 that ‘the belief that menstruation involves ceremonial 
uncleanness is not uncommon in the Canons, and this barbaric survival has 
been openly urged on at least one occasion in the past ten years and, alas, 
by a rather prominent Anglican priest’.57 Ursula Roberts, a feminist poet 
and church activist, speculated that the taboo against women priests was 
comparable to that against incest, though she admitted that such a belief 
might seem ‘fantastic and obscure’ to most readers of her 1930 article in the 
Nineteenth Century.58
To some degree, this was a polemical strategy, aiming to tar opponents 
with accusations of ‘primitive savagery’ and ‘barbarism’. But there is evidence 
in the church press of high levels of anxiety over female sexuality and bodies, 
often allied to sins of luxury and excessive consumption. There were long 
running controversies, for example, over the celibacy or otherwise of the order 
of deaconesses in the inter-war church. One clergyman’s wife feared an end to 
the deaconesses’ celibacy vow: ‘we may live to meet deaconesses in velvet and 
diamonds, at dances and dinners, brought there by their duty to husbands and 
children’.59 Women’s experiences in the nonconformist churches also suggest 
a deep antagonism towards their reproductive functions. The first ordained 
female minister in Scotland, Vera Kenmure, found herself obliged to leave 
her congregation in Partick, Glasgow, and start a new church, after she had 
a child in 1934. She cited the hostility and opposition she had encountered 
when pregnant, despite her six years of service within this church.60 Her 
resignation was deeply controversial, and many of the younger members of 
this Congregationalist church followed her to a new ministry.61 
Beliefs about female pollution seemed extraordinarily persistent. In 
1938, Canon Robinson of Birstall discussed women’s ministry in the York 
Convocation and declared ‘the very thought that the chalice should be 
administered by a woman made him shudder’.62 In 1939, the author of a 
book-length survey of the debates about ‘church feminism’ commented 
that ‘arguments drawn from [menstruation] have an important share in the 
formation of opinion’. He personally believed that science had rendered such 
 56 Revd. J. R. Wilkinson, for example, wrote of the superstitious belief that only men 
should set the ‘first foot’ of the new year in houses in the north of England (Wilkinson, 
‘Women and the priesthood’, The Modern Churchman (Nov. 1923), pp. 390–2).
 57 C. Raven, Women and Holy Orders: a Plea to the Church of England (1928).
 58 U. Roberts, ‘Women and the priesthood’, Nineteenth Century (Aug. 1930), p. 241.
 59 Mrs. L. Robinson, Church Times, 1 Apr. 1921, p. 316.
 60 Royden and Coltman, The Church and Woman, p. 116.
 61 The Times, 6 March 1934, p. 16, and 26 March 1934, p. 9.
 62 Quoted in R. Howard, Should Women be Priests? Three Sermons Preached before the 
University of Oxford (Oxford, 1949), p. 33.
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concerns meaningless: ‘To the primitive mind, menstrual blood had all the 
horror of the unintelligible, but now that the mechanism of the monthly 
period is understood, all that need survive is a mild distaste’.63 But the fact 
that this argument still needed to be made suggests that menstruation was a 
persistent concern across the inter-war years, and there is no evidence that it 
diminished after the Second World War. The religious commentator F. D. 
Bacon stated in 1946 that ‘tabu’ held ‘unconscious sway’ among ‘the ordinary 
lay folk’ and also ‘lingers in the official mind of the Church, perhaps, for how 
else may we account for the tabu which is still attached to women?’64 
This ‘tabu’ explanation does help to explain the extreme bitterness and 
rancour of the debates on the ministry of women, noted at the time by the 
moderates and undecided. Female clergy apparently represented a threat to 
the deep psychic functions of pollution beliefs, beliefs which Mary Douglas 
has argued are used ‘as analogies for expressing a general view of the social 
order ... Patterns of sexual danger [and bodily pollution] can be used to 
express symmetry or hierarchy … as symbols of the relations between parts 
of society’.65 Pollution beliefs help to systematize and order the untidiness 
of lived experience, through exaggerated boundary setting and purity 
rituals, particularly at times of social change. At this deep level, there seems 
to be a persistent set of gendered taboos operating among Victorians and 
successive generations, that were no longer particularly visible in the inter-
war debates about women’s political and citizenship roles, but which were 
still very much at play in church controversies. To attribute this to misogyny 
does not seem to explain much; in particular, misogyny sheds little light on 
the gender conservatism of women. It is also too static and monolithic as a 
category, and largely fails to place antagonism towards women in historical 
context. As David Cressy’s work on churching rituals usefully reminds 
us, we need to think about the reception of beliefs or rituals that suggest 
pollution taboos, and bear in mind the possibility of their being interpreted 
in highly discrepant ways. The ‘churching’ of women after childbirth seems 
in keeping with the polluted nature of female reproductive functions, but 
was often interpreted as an empowering or entertaining social occasion by 
the women who undertook it.66 Simply to describe it as a form of taboo tells 
 63 Smythe, Ordination of Women, p. 216.
 64 F. D. Bacon, Women in the Church (Cambridge, 1946), p. 127. A 1948 report for the first 
World Council of Churches noted the widespread nature of the belief that women were 
ceremonially unclean (World Council of Churches, Life and Work of Women in the Church 
(1948)).
 65 Douglas, Purity and Danger, p. 4.
 66 D. Cressy, ‘Purification, thanksgiving and the churching of women in post-Reformation 
England’, Past & Present, cxli (1993), 106–46.
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us little about the investments made by women in institutions that seem to 
marginalize them. 
It might be expected that men and women would respond quite differently to 
pollution beliefs, and that they would hold less sway with women. Nonetheless, 
it had been an argument of the ‘antis’ that it was women themselves who most 
disliked the idea of female ministry. Was this because women might also find 
female bodies to be disgusting or unclean? Many clearly did not; a deputation 
of churchwomen protested angrily to the bishop of London after the ministry 
of women had been described as ‘revolting’ and ‘repulsive’ at a Convocation 
in 1921.67 Others commented on their surprise and shock at the overt hostility 
to women that they had never suspected would be found within the church. 
The religious writer Caroline Duncan-Jones claimed in 1924 that ‘The debate 
in the house of Clergy [on the marriage service] came as something of a shock 
since it revealed how large a proportion of our spiritual fathers are – to put it 
crudely – male first and Christian afterwards’.68 Nonetheless, women’s voices 
featured on both sides of the debate, and a remarkable number of wives of 
clergymen weighed in to the sometimes vitriolic exchanges in the Church Times. 
There seemed to be no significant divergence between the views of men and 
women on the ministry of women; conservatives of both sexes found the idea 
repulsive. ‘A Vicar’s Wife’ wrote of the ‘widespread and deep-seated ... aversion 
to such a dangerous innovation [as female clergy]’ among Anglican women.69 
Some women wrote of their horror and repugnance at the idea of female 
ordination. The physically tabooed nature of female bodies, menstruation and 
sexuality seems to have been shared by the sexes. Hera Cook comments on the 
unwillingness among women in the inter-war years to touch their own genitals, 
and notes that this persisted for some women well past the Second World War. 
Disposable sanitary towels had become available to the affluent by the 1930s, 
but for many women the experience of menstruation was one of discomfort, 
‘dirt’ and ‘contamination’. The conflicting or scaremongering advice offered by 
the medical profession concerning vaginas and menstruation suggests a broad 
social anxiety about female physiognomy. As Cook notes, ‘accepting the advice 
of the majority of the medical profession, even in the late 1950s, would often not 
have helped women to understand and interpret their own physical experience 
more positively’.70 Female gender conservatives were thus as likely as their male 
counterparts to find female bodies and reproductive capacities disgusting or 
challenging.
 67 Church Times, 8 July 1921, p. 29.
 68 C. M. Duncan Jones, Church Times, 12 Dec. 1924, p. 676.
 69 Church Times, 24 March 1921, p. 293.
 70 H. Cook, The Long Sexual Revolution: English Women, Sex and Contraception, 1800–1975 
(Oxford, 2004), pp. 151, 53.
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The investment that some Anglican women had in the exclusion of 
female bodies from sacred spaces can also be helpfully framed using Deniz 
Kandiyoti’s concept of patriarchal bargains. Kandiyoti argued that women 
make strategic choices when faced with patriarchal institutions at specific 
historical moments, and seek to optimize their ‘life options’ within a 
specific socio-cultural milieu. This may lead some to internalize forms of 
oppression and ‘collude in the reproduction of their own subordination’, 
though this rarely forms a stable bargain and is continually renegotiated.71 
Grace Davie and Tony Walter have suggested of a later twentieth-century 
context that women continued to feel ‘at home’ within religious institutions 
that relegated them to a secondary role because the Christian church 
assuaged some of their social, material and physical vulnerabilities, though 
ironically it also ‘fosters the very deprivation that it then compensates for’.72 
Churches provided women with community and fellowship, and resources 
for dealing with the closer relationship that many of them sustained with 
birth, death and sickness compared to men. Conservative Anglican women 
active within the inter-war church gained informal power despite the 
limitations on their parochial work, and many regarded their position as 
secure and respected. Their responses to church feminism suggest a deep 
and comparatively stable internalization of a particular set of beliefs about 
female bodies.73 There is evidence in Britain of the continuing influence of 
some older understandings of female bodies as ‘unclean’, often taken to be 
characteristic of the nineteenth century. These beliefs offered ‘dividends’ 
to both men and women in supporting, at a deep level, a relatively stable 
conservative gender order which was only very slowly affected by the 
‘permissive’ social changes witnessed after the Second World War.74 Though 
historian Callum Brown has argued that the more permissive context of the 
mid 1960s promoted a sharp turn towards secularization among women, 
the commitment of many Anglican churchwomen was not dramatically 
 71 Kandiyoti, ‘Bargaining with patriarchy’, p. 280.
 72 G. Davie and T. Walter, ‘The religiosity of women in the modern West’, British Journal 
of Sociology, xlix (1998), 647.
 73 The relatively stable British context contrasts with the more obviously strategic 
‘patriarchal bargains’ described by Helen Ebaugh among Catholic women in the United 
States (H. Ebaugh, ‘Patriarchal bargains and latent avenues of social mobility: nuns in the 
Roman Catholic Church’, Gender and Society, vii (1993)).
 74 I am deliberately avoiding tracing a longer history of menstrual taboos, which some 
have argued to be continuously in operation from the early church through to contemporary 
times. These kinds of longue durée arguments suggest a static, patriarchal oppression of 
women without offering sufficient historical context to do justice to the very diverse ways 
in which taboos might be understood and might influence practices, offering women very 
distinct means of interacting with or belonging to religious institutions.
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transformed, and continued to produce sentiments of disgust or discomfort 
at female bodies into the 1990s.75 
The insights offered by the concept of patriarchal bargains help to raise 
the concept of taboo beyond the idea of an unresolved psychosexual conflict 
or a universal feature of the human psyche. It locates the gendered rituals 
of status and respectability that are often played out in religious terms in 
specific historical and cultural contexts, rather than implying that taboos 
arise only from the psychic dramas of infancy and early childhood, or are 
somehow intrinsic to the (patriarchal) operations of the Christian church. 
Taboos are not peculiar to the religious realm, and their operation suggests 
the ways in which conservative men and women might establish a sense of 
belonging within Anglican institutions and rituals. However, I suspect that 
the idea of a patriarchal bargain has its limitations, and specifically, it fails 
to capture the role of faith in the investments made by Anglican women. It 
is clear that many lay women felt that their role in the church was shaped 
by a vocation or encounter with the divine, and Kandiyoti’s work does not 
give us many ways of acknowledging this.
The inter-war years have been seen as uniquely marked by a clash of different 
epochs, as ‘Victorian’ mentalities met more ‘modern’ world-views. In 1936, 
the writer and former MP Mary Agnes Hamilton held that:
the present denizens of the earth contain a very large number of persons born in 
the nineteenth century, with minds coloured by its very different outlook ... Hard 
as it is to recall and realize it now, there were, even a quarter of a century ago, 
very large numbers of otherwise intelligent persons who did sincerely endorse the 
view that members of the female sex were not human ... [These beliefs] still haunt 
many minds and live on there with the baseless potency of instincts.76
With a Whiggish optimism, she felt that as older generations passed away, the 
gender order would transform. In the years shortly after the First World War, 
 75 C. G. Brown, The Death of Christian Britain: Understanding Secularisation 1800–2000 
(2000). Ian Jones’s study of the first 10 years of women’s ordination within the Church 
of England suggests the continuing resonance of taboos around female bodies among 
churchwomen in the late 20th century: ‘one lay woman admitted she was unsettled by 
the sight of a female body in clerical robes’ (I. Jones, Women and Priesthood in the Church 
of England: Ten Years On (2004), p. 64). However, the evidence is not clear-cut; a recent 
study of a Welsh parish has suggested that female churchgoers ‘saw both their bodies and 
childbirth in a very positive light’ (J. Bjonness, ‘In the Name of the Father: religion and 
hierarchy in a parish in Swansea’, Swansea University, unpublished paper, cited in Davie and 
Walter, ‘Religiosity of women’).
 76 M. A. Hamilton, ‘Changes in social life’, in Strachey, Freedom and its Results, pp. 240–2.
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it was still possible to express anti-feminism in public, vitriolic terms, and 
proposals for women’s preaching and ordination elicited powerful responses 
of disgust and ridicule. However, apparently in keeping with Hamilton’s 
expectations, the inter-war years saw a transformation in the public 
acceptability of such beliefs. Public opinion seemed to swing against women’s 
vows of marital obedience. Many churchgoers became antagonized and 
offended by misogynous statements, though these continued to be aired. The 
reiteration of sexual difference that had been a mainstay of Edwardian anti-
feminism became a less effective strategy and commanded less consensus. The 
qualities on which men and women diverged were outlined with difficulty, 
deploying quite nebulous concepts of personality rather than biology. 
Nonetheless, the change in gender norms was slower than many had 
expected. The inability to imagine women as authority figures was a persistent 
theme throughout inter-war debates about gender. Many marriages still 
began with an unreciprocated promise to obey on the part of the bride. The 
taboos on women’s physical presence in sacred rituals were clearly still felt, 
and had to some extent been forced into more open expression between 
the wars by the existence within the church of radicals such as Maude 
Royden. Faced with direct challenges from confident and educated women, 
sexual pollution sentiments were deployed to bolster the continuing belief 
of inter-war and post-war conservatives in traditional gender hierarchies 
and the exclusion of women from some sacred roles. Such taboos represent 
a deep form of conservatism, apparently persistently felt across much of 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The persistence of pollution taboos 
helps to account for why so many opponents to women’s ordination openly 
acknowledged that their sentiments were emotional rather than rational or 
theological and were therefore very hard to shift.77 
The forms of progress and change in the Anglican Church discussed 
above are in keeping with the changes that Alison Light identified as a shift 
towards a ‘conservative modernity’ after the First World War. Light is right 
to identify a paradoxical, troubled, indecisive conservatism in this period. 
Gender controversies genuinely polarized Anglican opinion, and debate 
was persistent and widely aired. There was no easy acceptance of the central 
tenets of gender conservatism – that women could not exercise authority, 
were ‘subtly sexual’ and physically constrained in ways that men were not, 
and were unable to tolerate each other – though these beliefs continued 
to be restated. There appeared to be little agreed ground on which anti-
feminism could rest. A hostile but not very cohesive campaign against 
 77 See, e.g., Revd. E. C. Roberts, The Guardian, 8 Apr. 1910; and U. Roberts, ‘Women and 
the priesthood’, p. 240.
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women’s involvement in church offices resulted. No clear ideological or 
theological principle emerged, and arguments from custom, expediency 
and principle were all used without any seeming to clinch the issue.
It is crucial to set this sense of a transitional, fluid gender order against the 
wider context of the lack of movement towards women’s incorporation into 
the Anglican Church, and the evident continuities in gender conservatism. 
As noted above, Judith Bennett has recently challenged historians of gender 
to take a longer time frame that can account for continuities in what she 
terms the ‘patriarchal equilibrium’ that persistently marginalizes women.78 
The Anglican Church seems a case in point; despite women being ordained 
in Anglican churches outside Great Britain from 1944, they were excluded 
from holy orders in the Church of Scotland until 1969 and in the Church of 
England until 1992. Persistent emotional and psychological obstacles, as well 
as the dividends that some Anglican women gained from their secondary 
position in the church, meant that reformist and feminist arguments lacked 
traction within it. The debates of the inter-war years continued to be 
unresolved into the late twentieth century, and persist in the contemporary 
church. There was still a deep emotional association between women and 
the profanement of sacred spaces, though this met fierce opposition from 
an articulate minority. This chapter charts the double effect of change 
at some levels of public pronouncements and practice, yet continuity in 
the gender order at a deep psychological and embodied level across the 
twentieth century. 
Nonetheless, I conclude with a methodological word of caution: the longue 
durée of this gender order does not reach back, as Judith Bennett had envisaged 
and as some feminists have argued, across many centuries.79 Despite the 
historical recurrence of menstrual taboos in numerous societies and religions, 
the ways in which these taboos operate is determined by historically specific 
formations of medical knowledge, sexual cultures, theological and religious 
debates, and broader gender norms. This chapter points to continuities in 
gender conservatism that can help to contextualize the typically short periods 
that modern historians deploy, such as the inter-war ‘conservative modernity’ 
or post-war ‘permissiveness’. But this is no ‘patriarchal equilibrium’, and it is 
the nineteenth century rather than the ancient world to which we must look 
to understand the origins of such beliefs.
 78 Bennett, History Matters, p. 54.
 79 See, e.g., R. Radford Ruether, ‘Women’s body and blood: the sacred and the impure’, 
in Through the Devil’s Gateway: Women, Religion and Taboo, ed. A. Joseph (1990), pp. 7–21.
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7. Cultivating internationalism: Save the Children 
Fund, public opinion and the meaning of 
child relief, 1919–24
Ellen Boucher
Reading a daily newspaper has never been for the faint of heart, but in 
Britain in the immediate aftermath of the Great War, the act required a 
particular courage. The terrors of the war lingered on in the headlines. There 
were stories of shellshocked veterans assaulting their wives and neighbours, 
of violent ‘anti-alien’ riots in cities and towns throughout the nation, of 
imperial soldiers slaughtering civilians in India and Ireland, and steady 
coverage of the funerals and memorials that commemorated the million 
British souls lost in the fighting and influenza pandemic. Surveying these 
reports, many Britons concluded that their nation had been at once utterly 
changed and deeply disturbed by the preceding four years of total war.1 
Whether or not this press coverage was exaggerated – a question that 
remains a point of debate – it did have significant effects on inter-war 
political culture.2 As Jon Lawrence has argued, the fitful media discussion 
over the war’s impact on modern civilization helped to provoke a widespread 
‘fear of brutalization’ among the British public, which led many to disavow 
militarism in favour of an alternative view of the nation as a uniquely 
‘peaceable kingdom’.3 Where Britons had once styled themselves as rowdy 
and raucous political actors, now they came to redefine the public as ‘an 
essentially passive, reflective, and above all individualized entity’.4 Gone was 
the jingoistic swagger of the Victorian and Edwardian John Bull, whose 
confident stride had crossed the globe. In his stead there arose a kindlier, 
more retiring and more domesticated ‘Little Man’ figure to symbolize the 
 1 J. Lawrence, ‘Forging a peaceable kingdom: war, violence, and fear of brutalization in 
post-First World War Britain’, Journal of Modern History , lxxv (2003), 557–89. 
 2 Susan Kingsley Kent, contra Lawrence, has argued that these increased accounts of 
political violence indicate a widespread experience of collective trauma in the aftermath of the 
war (S. K. Kent, Aftershocks: Politics and Trauma in Britain, 1918–31 (Basingstoke, 2009)).
 3 Lawrence, ‘Forging a peaceable kingdom’.
 4 Lawrence, ‘Forging a peaceable kingdom’, p. 561; see also J. Lawrence, ‘The transformation 
of British public politics after the First World War’, Past & Present, cxc (2006), 185–216.
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national character. The new icon offered a more fitting emblem for an 
inter-war British people who appeared altogether less eager to intervene in 
world affairs and whose aversion to war would prove so consequential in the 
international political arena of the later 1930s.5 
There is no doubt that when viewed through the lens of conventional 
party politics or state action, inter-war Britons can appear isolationist 
almost to the point of navel gazing. And yet, when historians look past 
these realms to examine the vibrant array of clubs, voluntary societies and 
civic organizations that took root after the Great War, a different, and 
markedly more ‘internationalist’ picture begins to emerge. Although it 
is true that many of these groups focused on local and domestic issues, 
a significant proportion aimed to engage the public with the concerns 
of the wider world.6 For these reformers, forging the nation’s identity 
as a peaceable kingdom depended not on a drawing back from the 
international arena, but rather on active humanitarian interventions that 
crossed national lines.
In what follows, I analyse the development of one of these societies, the 
child welfare organization Save the Children Fund (SCF), to illustrate the 
important role it played in articulating a new and explicitly internationalist 
social consciousness during the inter-war period. My intent, though, is 
not simply to use the example of SCF to demonstrate that popular forms 
of internationalism survived the anxieties of the early 1920s, however 
important that point may be. We should not, after all, allow our desire to 
understand appeasement and the failures of collective security in the later 
1930s to obscure the wider spectrum of political action that flared to life at 
the start of the period. Rather, my objective is to explore how the cultural 
fears of brutalization that dominated the media in the years after the war 
shaped the content and character of internationalism as it simultaneously 
emerged. In this respect, the chapter contributes to recent scholarship that 
has explored how the transformation of the press in the inter-war period – a 
time in which the circulation of the top five national dailies grew to over 10 
million, and some two-thirds of the population became regular newspaper 
readers – defined all manner of public life in Britain, shaping everything 
from attitudes toward gender roles to the platforms of the major political 
 5 P. Mandler, The English National Character: the History of an Idea from Edmund Burke 
to Tony Blair (New Haven, Conn., 2006), pp. 143–95. See also A. Light, Forever England: 
Femininity, Literature and Conservatism between the Wars (1991).
 6 H. McCarthy, ‘Parties, voluntary associations, and democratic politics in interwar 
Britain’, Historical Journal, l (2007), 891–912; G. Finlayson, Citizen, State and Social Welfare 
in Britain, 1830–1990 (Oxford, 1994), pp. 201–86; M. Ceadel, Semi-Detached Idealists: the 
British Peace Movement and International Relations, 1854–1945 (Oxford, 2000).
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parties.7 Less attention has been paid to the media’s influence on British 
public opinion regarding international relations, although as the example 
of SCF suggests, its impact was significant and long lasting.
Explicitly populist and avowedly apolitical, SCF formulated one of the 
most potent arguments for international humanitarianism of its time. From 
inauspicious beginnings in the summer of 1919, when the organization 
occupied a single office in central London and had an operating budget 
of some £30,000, the fund quickly expanded to become the leading 
voice in inter-war activism concerning children.8 Only two years after 
its establishment, the London branch was receiving donations from over 
a dozen local committees throughout the United Kingdom, Ireland and 
Europe, and had distributed close to £1 million in food, medical supplies 
and clothing to refugees and struggling European families.9 SCF activists 
had also forged close ties to the international political scene in Geneva, 
centred on the League of Nations. In 1924, their skilful advocacy prompted 
the General Assembly to ratify its landmark Declaration on the Rights of the 
Child, a major public relations boon that cemented the fund’s international 
reputation and guaranteed it a spot on the league’s newly established Child 
Welfare Committee.10 
Much of this rapid rise to prominence was the result of SCF’s innovative 
use of the press. The society was one of the first British charities to harness 
the new power of the inter-war mass media. By 1921, it had commissioned 
a publicity officer, started filming documentaries of its work, and was 
spending upwards of 16% of donations on newspaper advertisements.11 
 7 D. LeMahieu, A Culture for Democracy: Mass Communication and the Cultivated Mind 
in Britain between the Wars (Oxford, 1988); A. Bingham, Gender, Modernity, and the Popular 
Press in Inter-War Britain (Oxford, 2004); L. Beers, Your Britain: Media and the Making 
of the Labour Party (Cambridge, 2010); S. Nicholas, ‘Stanley Baldwin, “Englishness” and 
the mass media’, in The Conservatives and British Society, ed. M. Francis and I. Zweiniger-
Bargielowska (Cardiff, 1996), pp. 127–46.
 8 A narrative of these early years can be found in the institutional history written by a 
prominent SCF activist (K. Freeman, If any Man Build: the History of Save the Children Fund 
(1965)). 
 9 ‘Save the Children Fund General Council’, The Record of Save the Children Fund 
(hereafter The Record), i (Aug. 1921), 301, 303.
 10 D. Marshall, ‘The construction of children as an object of international relations: the 
Declaration of Children’s Rights and the Child Welfare Committee of the League of Nations, 
1900–24’, International Journal of Children’s Rights, vii (1999), 103–47; P. Rooke and R. Schnell 
‘“Uncramping child life”: international children’s organizations, 1914–39’, in International Health 
Organisations and Movements, 1918–39, ed. P. Weindling (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 176–202.
 11 For an explanation of SCF’s publicity policy, see Jebb to Daily Express (14 Feb. 1922), in 
the microfilm collection, ‘Western aid and the global economy: the Save the Children Fund 
archive, London’ (Detroit, Mich., 2006) (hereafter SCF archive), EJ 197.
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Nevertheless, while previous scholars have demonstrated how the fund’s 
use of modern publicity techniques helped to awaken new sections of the 
population to the cause of internationalism, few have acknowledged the 
transformative effect of this relationship on the content and conduct of 
its work.12 As this chapter illustrates, the rise of the mass media did indeed 
broaden the opportunities for non-state actors like SCF to involve the 
public in the project of pan-European humanitarianism, yet it also imposed 
new constraints and limitations that ultimately narrowed the ideology and 
scope of inter-war international activism.
To understand the character and philosophy of SCF in its early years, it 
is helpful to start by examining the backgrounds of the two sisters who 
founded the organization: Eglantyne Jebb and Dorothy Buxton. Born into 
an elite Shropshire family, Jebb and Buxton were wealthy, religious and well 
educated (Jebb attended Oxford while Buxton attended Cambridge). Like 
many turn-of-the-century reformers of similar backgrounds, they ascribed 
to a Liberal philanthropic tradition that emphasized cross-class sympathy 
and self-help.13 Both women’s social activism started well before the war. 
In the early 1900s, Jebb joined the Charity Organisation Society (COS), 
and in keeping with that association’s commitment to efficient, ‘scientific’ 
reform, published a detailed survey of the economic and social problems 
confronting the city of Cambridge.14 In 1913, at the instigation of her 
brother-in-law, the Liberal and later Labour MP Charles Buxton, she began 
raising money for the Macedonian Relief Fund and took part in a two-week 
mission to the region following the Second Balkan War.15 Dorothy Buxton, 
meanwhile, focused on settlement work in London. When the First World 
War broke out, she began publishing translated excerpts of over 100 foreign 
papers in the Cambridge Magazine. The goal of the project, which she 
continued until 1920, and on which Jebb assisted, was to publicize the 
destructive consequences of the conflict on all sides.16 
 12 L. Mahood and V. Satzewich, ‘The Save the Children Fund and the Russian famine of 
1921–3: claims and counter-claims about feeding “Bolshevik” children’, Journal of Historical 
Sociology, xxii (2009), 55–83; L. Mahood, Feminism and Voluntary Action: Eglantyne Jebb and 
Save the Children Fund (Basingstoke, 2009), pp. 175–83; Freeman, If any Man Build, pp. 19–28. 
 13 Mahood, Feminism and Voluntary Action, pp. 34–55; F. Wilson, Rebel Daughter of a 
Country House: the Life of Eglantyne Jebb (1967). 
 14 E. Jebb, Cambridge: a Brief Study in Social Questions (Cambridge, 1906).
 15 Mahood, Feminism and Voluntary Action, pp. 148–9; Wilson, Rebel Daughter, pp. 142–3.
 16 Mahood, Feminism and Voluntary Action, pp. 157–9. There is no biography of Buxton, 
but a useful background can be found in the biography of her husband, written by SCF 
activist V. A. B. de Bunsen, Charles Roden Buxton: a Memoir (1948).
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It is important to note that Jebb’s and Buxton’s wartime endeavours already 
demonstrated a strong international focus and an awareness of the power of 
the media. Yet what is particularly striking about their early advocacy is how 
little of it focused on children. Neither woman espoused the Romantic, 
sentimentalized view of the young that was common among late Victorian 
and Edwardian child savers.17 In fact, Jebb privately made it clear to her 
family and friends that she held little personal affection for the young.18 
Rather, their concern was with the impact of unjust economic and political 
structures on poor and marginalized communities. Take, for instance, Jebb’s 
study of Cambridge. While she included chapters describing the need for 
better opportunities for girls and boys, the majority of the book charted 
the disruptive effects of urbanization and unemployment on the traditions 
of working-class life in the city.19 Similarly, the sisters’ wartime initiative 
to publish excerpts of the foreign press reflected an ardent pacifism. They 
opposed war not because it affected children per se, but because it destroyed 
all manner of society, separating men from their families, spreading famine 
and disease, and causing the breakdown of moral and economic patterns.
This broad-based humanitarianism, which promoted pacifism and 
prioritized economic analysis, continued to guide Jebb’s and Buxton’s 
activism after the armistice. Both women had adamantly opposed the British 
government’s wartime strategy of blockading the Central Powers, and were 
well aware from their daily translations of foreign newspapers that it was 
causing starvation levels of hunger in cities like Vienna and Berlin.20 They 
were horrified when the government announced that it would continue 
the blockade until the peace treaty had been finalized. In response, they 
helped to found a left-leaning pressure group, Fight the Famine Council 
(FFC), to raise public awareness about the extent of the suffering in central 
Europe. Much like the League of Nations Union (LNU), which got its start 
around the same time, the council’s objective was to democratize foreign 
policy by involving the newly expanded electorate in decision-making over 
 17 S. Swain, ‘Sweet childhood lost: idealized images of childhood in the British child 
rescue literature’, Journal of the History of Childhood and Youth, ii (2009), 198–214; H. 
Cunningham, The Children of the Poor: Representations of Childhood since the 17th Century 
(Oxford, 1991), pp. 133–63.
 18 Mahood, Feminism and Voluntary Action, pp. 101, 159. 
 19 See especially her discussion of the wider effects of demoralization among unemployed 
men (Jebb, Cambridge, pp. 64–81).
 20 Two excellent studies of the crisis in these capitals are M. Healy, Vienna and the Fall of 
the Habsburg Empire: Total War and Everyday Life in World War I (Cambridge, 2004); and 
B. Davis, Home Fires Burning: Food, Politics and Everyday Life in World War I Berlin (Chapel 
Hill, NC, 2000).
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international affairs.21 It thus took the form of a lobbying rather than relief 
association, and concentrated its efforts on mobilizing public pressure for a 
change in the government’s international policy.22
Problematic for the council, however, was the fact that many Britons 
at the time were less concerned with reconciliation and international co-
operation than with fixing blame for the war. Hostility towards Germany 
and Austria dominated the national press through the early months of 1919, 
and the public anger was quickly capitalized on by politicians looking for 
an easy way of gaining popularity.23 The ‘coupon’ election of 1918, which 
famously featured the slogan ‘hang the Kaiser’, witnessed all sides stoking 
the fires of anti-German sentiment. Soon after, parliament added its 
endorsement of these hatreds by renewing the blatantly xenophobic Aliens 
Restriction Act, which expanded provisions first enacted during the war 
and enabled the state to refuse admission to refugees and to deport foreign 
nationals without appeal.24 This wider context of anger and resentment 
dogged FFC’s public meetings throughout its short, two-year existence. 
Press accounts routinely noted that the council experienced ‘considerable 
interruption’ from the crowd; at one forum several women were ejected 
for repeatedly shouting, ‘We don’t want Germans here!’25 Such coverage 
greatly weakened FFC’s authority with the government, given how closely 
its argument depended on a demonstration of public support for an end to 
the blockade.
In tracing how Jebb and Buxton dealt with these problems, we can begin 
to see how proponents of internationalism adapted their appeals to the 
immediate cultural context of post-war Britain. Because any attempt to 
solicit assistance for the German and Austrian people as a whole was open 
to the critique that good British money should not be spent on those who 
had supported belligerent powers, Jebb and Buxton redirected attention to 
an undeniably more innocent subset of the population: children. In May of 
 21 H. McCarthy, ‘Democratizing British foreign policy: rethinking the peace ballot, 1934–
5’, Journal of British Studies, xlix (2010), 358–87.
 22 Lord Parmoor and others, The Famine in Europe: the Facts and Suggested Remedies, Being 
a Report of the International Economic Conference called by the Fight the Famine Council 
(1920), p. 7. See also Fight the Famine Council, Why Europe is Hungry (1919) and The Policy 
and Work of Fight the Famine Council (1920). 
 23 This hostility was, of course, a holdover from the war. On the press’s role in promoting 
anti-German sentiment, see L. Teinermann, ‘Fleet Street and the Kaiser: British public 
opinion and Wilhelm II’, German History, xxvi (2008), 469–85; N. Gullace, The Blood of our 
Sons: Men, Women, and the Renegotiation of British Citizenship During the Great War (New 
York, 2002), pp. 17–35.
 24 Kent, pp. 40–5.
 25 The Times, 6 Nov. 1919, p. 14, col. E. 
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1919, Jebb took the lead in forming Save the Children Fund, which split from 
the council in order to pursue a more active relief agenda. The mission of 
the new association was to solicit donations from Britain that could then be 
funnelled into the coffers of local children’s charities across central Europe. 
From the start, Jebb took pains to present SCF in ways that would appeal 
to the widest possible audience. While its directors tended to come from 
the ranks of the elite – the fund counted the Conservatives Lord Curzon 
and Lord Robert Cecil among its patrons and the Liberal Lord Weardale 
as chair – the organization itself was not elitist. One of its first major 
donations, for instance, came from trade unionist Robert Smillie, a founder 
of the Independent Labour Party, who contributed £10,000 on behalf of the 
British Miners’ Federation.26 As these examples further indicate, the early 
SCF was a centrist organization, open to men and women of all political 
persuasions and party alignments.27 It was also non-denominational. The 
Anglican archbishop of Canterbury, the Catholic archbishop of Westminster 
and the chief rabbi rounded out its circle of patrons. Moreover, the fund’s 
desire to attract supporters from across the social spectrum helps to explain 
why an organization that was predominantly made up of women volunteers 
and which concerned itself with the ‘maternal’ issue of child welfare always 
steered clear of the feminist label. As Caitriona Beaumont has argued, inter-
war feminism remained closely associated in the public mind with political 
radicalism, a stigma that led many service organizations to embrace a more 
gender-neutral conception of ‘active citizenship’.28 SCF was no exception to 
this trend. Indeed two of its leading patrons, Curzon and Weardale, were 
the former co-presidents of the National League for Opposing Women’s 
Suffrage.
While crafting this broadly inclusive, conservative public image, Jebb 
also pursued an aggressive publicity campaign that aimed to draw potential 
donors’ attention away from the divisions of the war and towards the 
realities of the post-war European crisis. She began by saturating SCF’s 
fundraising literature with the claim that the organization’s focus on 
children alleviated the question of war guilt that had so dogged the Fight 
the Famine Council. One of the fund’s first leading articles in its bi-weekly 
 26 Freeman, If any Man Build, p. 21.
 27 On the appeal of political centrism within inter-war associational life, see McCarthy, 
‘Parties’ and H. McCarthy, ‘Leading from the centre: the League of Nations Union, foreign 
policy and “political agreement” in the 1930s’, Contemporary British History, xxiii (2009), 
527–42.
 28 C. Beaumont, ‘Citizens not feminists: the boundary negotiated between citizenship 
and feminism by mainstream women’s organizations in England, 1928–39’, Women’s History 
Review, ix (2000), 411–29.
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magazine The Record featured Ethel Snowden, wife of former Labour MP 
Philip Snowden, reminding readers that most of the boys and girls they 
assisted ‘were not born when the war broke out’ and so ‘could not in any 
sense of the term be held responsible for the evil thing’.29 Similarly, other 
SCF members sought to differentiate between the potential culpability of 
German and Austrian adults and the blamelessness of their children. At a 
public meeting in Richmond, the Conservative politician Viscount Cave 
stated that while Britons were ‘right to be very angry with those who made 
the war’, it was only fair to ‘show pity for those who were innocent of that 
offence’. Illustrating that international appeals were not immune to the pull 
of popular nationalism, Cave went on to assure his audience that ‘whatever 
we might think of the parents’, a moral obligation remained to help their 
young. After all, children ‘could not choose their parents, or they might 
have chosen to be English’.30 Jebb’s and Buxton’s decision to use the neutral 
symbol of a suffering, dependent child to serve as the public face of their 
organization thus helped to mediate the still simmering tensions of wartime 
hostility.31 While many Britons found it difficult to imagine themselves in 
the shoes of German nationals, they could more easily sympathize with the 
plight of a young child who might grow up to look and act just like their 
own. 
Jebb’s second objective was to steer the public debate away from the 
question of whether Britons should aid their former enemies to the precise 
effect their donations would have on young lives. From the winter of 1919 
through to 1921, the organization flooded the mainstream and religious 
press with emotional full-page advertisements that quantified the cost of 
saving a child’s life in terms of everyday goods and luxuries. ‘The Price 
of a Bottle of Wine will Feed and Clothe a Naked, Starving Child’, SCF 
told readers of The Times in 1920. If a generous benefactor contributed 
the equivalent of a fur coat, 1,000 children would eat for a week.32 This 
novel approach accomplished two goals simultaneously: it led donors to 
think about the individual impact of their contribution, and it pointed out 
their own comparative wealth and prosperity. Even more powerfully, SCF 
began an ‘adoption’ scheme in 1920 by which members who contributed 
two shillings a week would receive the name and address of a child with 
 29 Mrs. P. Snowden, ‘The cry of the children’, The Record, i (Feb. 1921), 68.
 30 The Record, i (Feb. 1921), 80.
 31 On the broader use of child imagery to solicit humanitarian sentiment in periods 
of intense political and cultural conflict, see D. Marshall, ‘Humanitarian sympathy for 
children in times of war and the history of children’s rights, 1919–59’, in Children and War: 
a Historical Anthology, ed. J. Marten (New York, 2002), pp. 184–200.
 32 The Times, 12 March 1920, p. 12, col. E.
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whom they could exchange letters.33 By fostering this personal connection, 
the programme encouraged donors to feel a sense of responsibility for the 
children of central Europe, while making it emotionally difficult for them 
to stop their contributions if the first flush of pity waned. 
Through these and other publicity methods, SCF crafted a powerful 
rationale for Britons to look beyond the boundaries of the United Kingdom 
at a time when the retreat into domesticity appeared not just tempting but 
fully justified. The post-war challenges of xenophobia and public distrust 
of internationalism, it should be stressed, did indeed constrain the nascent 
organization. These forces pushed Jebb and Buxton to retreat from Fight 
the Famine’s broader mission to inspire democratic forms of political co-
operation to a less controversial focus on child relief. Yet their championing 
of the apolitical figure of a child-in-need helped the society to create an 
effective international appeal that largely managed to avoid the thorns of 
nationalism that so ensnared other aid organizations of the era.34 
SCF’s concern with children should not, therefore, be taken as a reflection 
of the most pressing humanitarian need after the First World War, but rather 
as a calculated choice that allowed Jebb and Buxton to continue advocating 
for British engagement with Europe into the 1920s. Yet the analysis should 
not end there, for SCF’s focus did still more. It allowed the organization 
to expand the notion of British humanitarian responsibility to encompass 
not just relief but reconstruction. The figure of the needy child formed the 
centrepiece of a larger conception of nationhood that placed Britain at the 
forefront of inter-war efforts to promote lasting peace through constructive 
nation-building. 
Although Jebb and Buxton first styled SCF as a temporary, crisis-oriented 
organization, the fund soon extended its mandate to include a number 
of social problems that required a deeper investment of time and money. 
The inaugural issue of The Record, for instance, drew attention to issues of 
overcrowding and inadequate sanitation in parts of Slovakia and Ruthenia, 
 33 See the description of the scheme in The Record, i (Nov. 1920), 45. SCF was not the 
first organization to use this type of personalized fundraising technique – Barnardo’s, for 
instance, had developed a similar ‘godparents’ scheme in the early 1900s, although it did 
not, to my knowledge, provide contact details for individual children.
 34 As John Hutchinson and Heather Jones have shown, hostile forms of wartime 
nationalism severely limited the effectiveness of pre-existing relief organizations like the 
Red Cross (J. Hutchinson, Champions of Charity: War and the Rise of the Red Cross (Boulder, 
Colo., 1996); H. Jones, ‘International or transnational? Humanitarian action during the 
First World War’, European Review of History, xvi (2009), 697–713). 
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where whole families ‘herded together in one-room shanties, in the utmost 
promiscuity, with pigs, rabbits and fowls’. These degraded conditions, ‘both 
symptomatic and productive of a low state of mentality and a fatal lack of 
initiative’, ran deeper than the war, and if not corrected would continue 
to hold the region in a suspended, backward state. The magazine prepared 
its readers for a long-term commitment in central and eastern Europe, 
arguing that Britons, as citizens of a more ‘enlightened’ and prosperous 
country, were well equipped to tackle these deficiencies. The ultimate goal 
of SCF was not only to save children but to revive communities as well, a 
task that it would accomplish by funding local education and employment 
initiatives.35 As Jebb noted, without this larger vision the organization’s 
relief efforts were bound to fail, for they would ‘only have kept children 
alive one year to die the next’.36 
In this focus on collective uplift through community-based projects 
and ‘professional interference’, SCF was tapping into a well-established 
philanthropic discourse that can be traced back to the late Victorian 
period.37 Following on the heels of Charles Booth’s and Seebohm 
Rowntree’s landmark structural analyses of urban poverty, early twentieth-
century British philanthropists increasingly viewed destitution as the 
product of breakdowns in the economic or political fabric of society rather 
than the fruit of individual moral failings.38 Armed with the new expertise 
being generated within the emerging fields of sociology and social work, 
reformers strove to classify and correct the structures that trapped successive 
generations of families in poverty. This novel science of charity supported 
both an expanded ethic of collective responsibility and a greater optimism 
about charitable intervention. It was up to those who had succeeded among 
the pressures of modern life to help the less fortunate to develop the qualities 
and skills they needed to attain prosperity.
SCF’s call for all Britons to dedicate themselves to easing the burdens 
of the poor was, therefore, in line with the philanthropic currents of the 
period. The organization went further, however, than others of its ilk by 
proposing that this ethic was not confined to the nation or empire. Charity 
might begin at home, it argued, but it should not end there. In this respect, 
SCF was combining the principles of domestic reform with the broader, 
 35 ‘The outlook’, The Record, i (Oct. 1920), 2–3.
 36 E. Jebb, ‘The Plight of Austria’, The Times, 8 Jan. 1921, p. 6, col. B.
 37 L. Lees, The Solidarity of Strangers: the English Poor Laws and the People, 1700–1948 
(Cambridge, 1998), p. 318.
 38 Lees, Solidarity of Strangers, pp. 231–93; J. Harris, Private Lives, Public Spirit: Britain, 
1870–1914 (Oxford, 1993); G. Stedman Jones, An End to Poverty? The Historical Debate (New 
York, 2004), pp. 199–224.
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Wilsonian ideal – popular throughout western Europe in the years after 
the war – of creating peace and security through nation-building.39 Yet 
while Woodrow Wilson’s vision took a top-down approach that relied on 
co-ordinated state action through institutions like the League of Nations, 
SCF’s was more populist, contending that Europe’s rebirth depended to an 
equal or even greater extent on the initiative of private citizens.40 Certainly, 
Jebb and other leading members of the fund acknowledged the importance 
of a strong government presence, but they were always careful to stress 
that the preferred method was to rely on the collective responsibility of 
individuals.41 It was for that reason that SCF channelled money not through 
state agencies but to existing philanthropic associations on the ground, like 
the Kinderfreund Workers’ Union in Germany and Austria, or the League 
of the Czech Red Heart.42 The intent was to connect the commitment of 
British donors to the actions of European reformers already engaged in 
their own national renewal.
Within this mission to inspire ordinary Britons to dedicate themselves 
to the project of pan-European reconstruction, the vestiges of Fight the 
Famine Council’s democratizing agenda lived on. Yet whereas the council 
had failed to strike a chord with the British public, SCF proved vastly more 
popular. By the summer of 1921, the London branch alone had grown 
to encompass over 170,000 direct subscribers – not including one-time 
donors – a figure that ranked it among the largest and most prominent 
British humanitarian organizations of the period.43 Once again, the society’s 
success in persuading the public to become involved in ‘constructive as 
well as palliative’ efforts across Europe can be attributed to its focus on 
the young.44 Children had been at the heart of nation-building projects 
since the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and there already existed a 
 39 On the global appeal of Wilson’s message, see E. Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-
Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism (Oxford, 2007).
 40 P. Cohrs, The Unfinished Peace after World War I: America, Britain, and the Stabilisation 
of Europe, 1919–32 (Cambridge, 2006), p. 31.
 41 Here again, the parallels to the objectives of the League of Nations Union are striking. 
On this emphasis within the LNU, see McCarthy, ‘Democratizing British foreign policy’. 
The two organizations shared a direct connection through the figure of Lord Cecil, a patron 
of SCF and the driving force behind the LNU, yet the societies do not appear to have 
pursued any direct collaboration. 
 42 For descriptions of these organizations, see The Record, i (Nov. 1920), 29.
 43 ‘Save the Children Fund General Council’, The Record, i (Aug. 1921), 301, 303. The 
largest international organization in Britain during the inter-war period was the League of 
Nations Union, which had 250,000 members by the mid 1920s, and which peaked in 1931 
with 400,000 subscribers.
 44 Lord Weardale, ‘The to-morrow of society’, The Record, i (Dec. 1920), 33.
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close association in the public mind between the strength of a people and 
the health of its children.45 In part, this link had been forged through the 
rapid rise of maternalist and child rescue movements throughout Europe 
at the turn of the century, when reformers had sought to quell anxiety 
about depopulation and national decline by reclaiming sick or neglected 
children.46 Trickier for the society, however, was the close connection 
between these pre-war maternalist initiatives and jingoistic forms of 
nationalism. Most Britons viewed child welfare as a domestic prerogative, 
and although there had been some attempts at holding pan-European 
child welfare congresses in the decades before the war, these meetings were 
designed mainly to exchange information that participants could then take 
back home to improve their national programmes.47 SCF, in contrast, was 
seeking to shift the responsibility for child welfare more deeply into the 
international arena. Its claim was that Britons were personally obliged to 
promote the healthy development of children from other nations as much 
as they were their own.
To cultivate this internationalist ethic, SCF began by tapping into popular 
fears about the uncertain future of Europe following the destabilization of 
the war. Key supporters emphasized that the fund’s focus on the young 
would give the British people greater control over the continent’s fate. As 
Lord Weardale put it in December of 1920, children were the ‘to-morrow 
of society’, the ‘raw material of the League of Nations’. SCF members 
should certainly care about the immediate needs of boys and girls, Weardale 
argued, but they should equally assist children in their journey towards 
becoming a ‘father of the race, a citizen of the future’.48 Similarly, for the 
popular commentator Jerome K. Jerome, the fund’s work was a clear matter 
of national security. As he reminded readers of The Record in early 1921: ‘If 
we leave the children to starve – if we leave them to grow up stunted and 
 45 H. Hendrick, Child Welfare: Historical Dimensions, Contemporary Debate (Bristol, 
2003), pp. 19–86.
 46 Mothers of a New World: Maternalist Politics and the Origins of Welfare States, ed. S. 
Koven and S. Michel (New York, 1993); J. Lewis, The Politics of Motherhood: Child and 
Maternal Welfare in England, 1900–39 (1980); D. Dwork, War is Good for Babies and other 
Young Children: a History of the Infant and Child Welfare Movement in England, 1898–1918 
(New York, 1987).
 47 The one major exception was the 1913 International Congress for the Promotion of 
Child Welfare, which resolved to create an independent, international child welfare office 
in Brussels. The outbreak of the war delayed the initiative, however, and issues of national 
sovereignty led the British Foreign and Home Offices to oppose the plan throughout the 
early 1920s. The Brussels project thus never got off the ground. For a full discussion, see 
Marshall, ‘The construction of children’, pp. 110–20.
 48 Weardale, ‘The to-morrow of society’.
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diseased in mind and body, Europe will perish. And let us not in these 
islands hug to ourselves the consolation that to us it will not matter … If 
Europe perishes we also perish’.49 Through comments like these, Weardale, 
Jerome and other SCF advocates invoked the notion – common among 
backers of the league – that the war had tied the fortunes of Europeans more 
closely together. Isolation was not only futile but dangerous. Britons should 
thus consider international activism directed at children as a ‘privilege’, one 
that would enable them to steer the creation of the new world order.50
In a similar vein, SCF’s early newspaper advertisements were careful 
to connect the needs of starving children to the plight of their families, 
communities and nations. Their adverts featured stark line drawings 
that focused on the icon of the ‘stricken mother’ – another figure closely 
associated with the nation – who appeared clutching a bundled infant or 
who was surrounded by her hungry young.51 While the faces of the children 
in these illustrations tended to be obscured, the mothers were often depicted 
looking straight at the reader with expressions that ranged from beseeching 
to quiet judgement. Wordlessly, they pleaded with Britons to invest in their 
family’s destiny.52 Accompanying these images were excerpts of reports from 
SCF workers in the field that served to place the needs of children within 
a wider context of national destruction. In the first advertisements, these 
dispatches highlighted the refugee crisis created by Turkish attacks against 
Armenians in Asia Minor, where correspondents described a hunger so acute 
that some were forced into cannibalism.53 By the end of 1920, the appeal 
shifted to the more familiar case of Austria, with a particular focus on its 
capital city of Vienna. There, the reports implied, inflation and continued 
scarcity had caused an even more poignant type of devastation in that it had 
reduced previously well-off families to utter ruin. ‘Austria is dying’, wrote 
the former war correspondent Philip Gibbs. Unless Britons joined SCF in 
stemming the ‘national decay’, the Austrian people were ‘doomed beyond 
any hope of life’ to become ‘a morbid poison in the heart of Europe’.54
These evocative descriptions of ruined homes and families were all the 
more powerful because they echoed familiar themes that were concurrently 
coming to dominate the national media at home. In his study of the gendered 
 49 J. K. Jerome, ‘Lest we perish’, The Record, i (Feb. 1921), 83.
 50 ‘The outlook’, p. 3.
 51 On the close connection between motherhood and nationalism across inter-war Europe, 
see M. Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe’s 20th Century (New York, 1998), pp. 81–4.
 52 See, for instance, the advertisements in The Times, 20 Apr. 1920, p. 19, col. E; 5 May 
1920, p. 6, col. C; as well as in The Quiver, Dec. 1921, advertising section.
 53 The Times, 1 Apr. 1920, p. 10, col. A. 
 54 P. Gibbs, ‘By Austria’s deathbed: an impression of Vienna’, The Record, i (May 1921), 200–1.
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dimensions of the inter-war press, Adrian Bingham has demonstrated how 
popular papers like the Daily Mail, Daily Express and Daily Herald responded 
to the admission of women into the electorate by feminizing their political 
discourse. Editors began to employ an array of gendered images, such as 
a ‘prudent housewife’ or ‘caring mother’, that were designed to appeal to 
women voters who were, it was assumed, primarily concerned with issues 
of hearth and home.55 The same iconography also influenced the publicity 
of the major political parties. As Laura Beers has argued, Labour’s adept 
use of press advertisements invoking the plight of working-class families 
helped to legitimate the 1919 railway strike and broaden cross-class support 
for trade unionism in the early 1920s.56 In its own press campaigns, SCF 
was thus invoking an established media language that presented national 
security and political progress as dependent upon the stability of home and 
family. The crucial difference was that the fund used these emotive appeals 
to steer readers’ attention not to issues of metropolitan politics but to the 
international realm. Such representations helped the organization to forge 
new connections between the domestic concerns of the average British 
newspaper reader and those of their less well-off European counterparts.
Through the symbol of the child Jebb and other SCF leaders were able 
to retain an emphasis on constructive philanthropy and reparative nation-
building even as they separated their work from the tense issue of war guilt. 
For advocates of internationalism, the figure of the child served a dual 
purpose. It transcended the political divisions of the war by highlighting 
the innocence and vulnerability of all young people, and it simultaneously 
evoked the struggles that confronted embattled European nations. SCF 
could thus pursue initiatives that aimed to sustain young lives regardless of 
social or ethnic background, alongside more broad-based programmes that 
used child welfare as a means to uplift national communities. Accordingly, 
in its early years, the fund supplied emergency rations and medical aid to 
children in nine European countries as well as in China in the wake of a 
devastating 1920 earthquake, but it also funded nation-building projects 
like domestic science centres, hospitals, teenage work apprenticeship 
programmes, and medical campaigns against tuberculosis and typhus.57 
Ultimately, Jebb’s and Buxton’s decision to restrict their focus to children 
– a strategy first used to combat the British public’s emotional retreat from 
Europe in the aftermath of the war – resulted in an expanded philanthropic 
 55 Bingham, Gender, Modernity, pp. 111–44.
 56 L. Beers, ‘“Is this man an anarchist?” Industrial action and the battle for public opinion 
in interwar Britain’, Journal of Modern History, lxxxii (2010), 30–60, esp. pp. 45–7.
 57 The various issues of The Record offer a comprehensive overview of these projects; see also 
Jebb’s description in Save the Child! A Posthumous Essay by Eglantyne Jebb (1929), pp. 1–16.
183
Cultivating internationalism
mandate that encompassed both relief and reconstruction across Europe 
and farther afield.
By the end of its second year, SCF seemed successfully to have adapted its 
message to the cultural climate of post-war Britain. Nevertheless, while the 
fund’s ideological focus on children helped to sway a significant portion of 
the public to adopt international engagement over isolation, the society was 
never able to escape completely the constraints of xenophobia and national 
antagonism. Indeed, as it embarked on its next major effort, the relief of the 
victims of the Russian famine, the organization encountered its strongest 
opposition yet. At the centre of the debate was SCF’s dedication to using 
child welfare as a means of fortifying the wider community, for while the 
society’s previous work had aimed to heal nations that lacked a strong state, 
the Bolshevik government appeared to be an active and coherent threat. 
These wider political concerns encroached on the public representation of 
SCF’s work, and ultimately impelled its leadership to reconceptualize their 
mission once again. The result was a progressive shift away from nation-
building as a core aim, and toward a more myopic vision that focused on 
the child to the exclusion of its larger community.
When the directors of the fund, working in conjunction with the American 
Relief Administration, the Red Cross and the Society of Friends, started 
sending food and medical supplies to Russia in the summer of 1921, the 
backlash began almost immediately.58 The first wave of opposition was 
internal, coming from donors who worried that the new cause would 
distract from the organization’s existing European programming. By 
October, the dissent was loud enough that the correspondent covering the 
annual meeting of the fund’s Geneva branch for The Record was forced to 
admit sheepishly that ‘on questions affecting Russia the atmosphere was – 
dare I say it? – a little electrical’.59 Far more damaging, however, was the 
crusade waged against the fund by the Daily Express. From the winter of 
1921 to the spring of 1922, the Beaverbrook paper argued that the society 
was going against Britain’s national interest by strengthening a belligerent 
power. ‘Every pound sent to Russia’, it contended, freed the Bolshevik 
government of its duties and increased its ‘ability to spread anarchy and 
ruin’.60 Calling the fund’s prioritization of Russian children over those of 
unemployed British families ‘monstrous’, it pleaded with readers to turn 
 58 On this wider relief effort, see C. Williams, ‘The 1921 Russian famine: centre and 
periphery responses’, Revolutionary Russia, vi (1993), 277–314.
 59 H. Watson, ‘The Stockholm conference’, The Record, ii (Oct. 1921), p. 36.
 60 SCF archive, EJ 197, Daily Express, 18 March 1922.
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their gaze back to the domestic realm.61 ‘Let the Russians work out their 
own salvation’, the paper concluded bluntly.62 
In a recent examination of SCF’s management of these critiques, Linda 
Mahood and Vic Satzewich have emphasized how the fund used inventive 
rhetorical strategies to maintain control of the public debate. From simple 
measures like limiting the use of the term ‘Bolshevik’ to more abstract 
techniques like presenting the famine as a natural disaster rather than 
the product of communist policies, the society’s publicity successfully 
persuaded Britons to keep giving. By the end of its first year in Russia, SCF 
had raised close to £500,000 for famine relief, which it was using to feed 
300,000 children a day in 1,450 kitchens throughout Saratov, one of the 
hardest hit provinces.63 Undoubtedly, this continued fundraising in the face 
of such concerted opposition was a considerable achievement. Yet SCF’s 
ability to meet the immediate relief crisis should not obscure the significant 
effects that this episode had on its ideology and practice in the longer run. 
The Russian campaign proved to be a turning point in the organization’s 
emerging ethic of internationalism, and in its aftermath, SCF took new 
steps to free its work from the contentious realm of politics. Throughout the 
1920s, the fund retreated from its earlier nation-building mission in both its 
publicity and programming, a shift that ultimately served to disassociate the 
figure of the disadvantaged child from its larger social and cultural context.
The redirection of SCF’s public image began soon after the organization 
entered Russia. Reviving strategies first used to tackle the issue of German 
and Austrian war guilt, the fund assured its donors that direct assistance 
would go only to the most vulnerable and politically innocent members of 
society. As The Record stated in the autumn of 1921, the fund’s ‘first, last and 
only task can and must be the saving of children’, a claim its Council backed 
with a solemn pledge to leave Russia the ‘moment one farthingsworth of food 
was diverted’ from the boys and girls for whom it was intended.64 SCF also 
revised its accounting methods so that every contributing committee could 
‘know exactly … the number of children it is supporting, who they are and 
where they are – their very names and addresses if it so pleases’.65 Although 
certain leaders of the fund, Jebb prominent among them, continued to insist 
that broader projects like agricultural development and disease prevention 
remained necessary, they now deflected the responsibility for these efforts 
 61 SCF archive, EJ 197, Daily Express, 26 Nov. 1921.
 62 SCF archive, EJ 197, Daily Express, 15 Dec. 1921.
 63 Mahood and Satzewich, ‘Save the Children Fund’, p. 56.
 64 ‘On giving way to others: a word to workers and friends’, The Record, ii (Nov. 1921), 52; 
‘Politics and charity’, The Record, ii (Oct. 1921), 20.
 65 ‘Cooperation true and false’, The Record, ii (Oct. 1921), 36.
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to the European states and the League of Nations.66 The result was to limit 
the moral obligation of the British public to the immediate relief of those 
who were politically neutral. As The Record repeatedly pointed out, children 
– like the fund – were not political actors. 
At the same time, the organization began to drop its prior focus on 
parents and families. Whereas earlier feature articles in The Record had 
frequently included vignettes recounting the shame felt by needy parents 
at their inability to help their young, from 1921 onward these appeals were 
more likely to portray the beneficiaries of SCF care as orphans. This change 
in representation, although subtle, helped to remove the children’s links 
to the messier and politically sensitive realm of the wider community.67 
It literally wrote parental claims out of the picture, leaving donors with a 
more comforting image of the child as a universal figure, one who lacked a 
clear national context and thus could belong to anyone.68 
Another tactic that had similar results was to concentrate more overtly 
on children’s physical pain. SCF had never been shy about using vivid 
descriptions of anguish to shock the public into sympathy. Yet from the period 
of the Russian campaign onward, its publicity grew increasingly graphic in 
its depiction of bodily suffering. A full-page advertisement in The Saturday 
Review, for instance, included a cable from Saratov that described children 
‘clothed in vile rags, full of vermin, and totally inadequate in this bitter 
weather, their bodies shrunken and distorted almost beyond recognition, 
their hands like the claws of some grotesque bird, their arms and legs like 
the limbs of skeletons and their faces wrinkled and wizened’. Another 
section called attention to the ‘terrible and gruesome’ consequences of the 
famine, citing that ‘one tiny girl, four years old, HAD ONLY HALF HER 
FACE LEFT, the other half having fallen away’.69 Misery this extensive, 
the accounts stressed, not only destroyed the spirit of childhood – making 
 66 See, for instance, ‘On giving way to others’.
 67 The origin of this tendency within late Victorian child rescue iconography is explored 
in L. Murdoch, Imagined Orphans: Poor Families, Child Welfare, and Contested Citizenship in 
London (New Brunswick, 2006).
 68 Compare, for instance, two articles on China that are representative of this shift. The first, 
written on the eve of the Russian campaign, emphasized the dire situation of ‘Mrs. L’, a destitute 
but loving mother who had lost five of her children to starvation. The second, published in the 
midst of the Daily Express controversy, focused on the figure of ‘Kim’, a ‘dirty, ragged unkempt 
little beggar boy’, whose parents’ death left him at the mercy of a neglectful and abusive Chinese 
woman. While ‘Mrs. L’ received assistance that allowed her to continue caring for her child, 
‘Kim’ was taken in by a Christian missionary who, the article reported, was ‘already calling him 
Papa’ (B. Y. Wong, ‘Waiting for death’, The Record, i (May 1921), 179–80; W. P. Pailing, ‘Kim: a 
picture of famine relief in China’, The Record, ii (Dec. 1921), 91–2).
 69 Saturday Review, 26 Nov. 1921, p. 623.
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these boys and girls ‘wrinkled and wizened’, old before their time – it also 
ravaged their developing bodies, producing a misshapen, inhuman form. 
Although this advertisement was one of the last also to include a picture of a 
mother holding her wasted child, the ideological focus of the publicity had 
changed, for the effect of such descriptions was to define the consequences 
of starvation in terms that applied only to children. While a parent might 
feel the pangs of hunger, these adverts implied, only their son or daughter 
would lose the core elements of their humanity. 
In one respect, there was nothing particularly original about SCF’s 
growing focus on what The Record called ‘the lure of the suffering child’.70 
As Thomas Lacqueur has argued, exacting, almost scientific descriptions of 
physical pain had been a fundamental part of the ‘humanitarian narrative’ 
since the eighteenth century, largely because they helped to expose the 
social causes of distress, making ameliorative action seem possible.71 For 
SCF, this focus on the devastation that starvation wrought on children’s 
bodies opened a space for discussing the practical steps that could be taken 
to make young Europeans whole again. It is no surprise, then, that the fund 
simultaneously began to stress its connection to the emerging ‘science of 
childhood’, which tended to define relief in terms of targeted nutritional 
and medical interventions, such as calorie supplements and immunizations, 
that would guide a malnourished child back to health.72 
On the other hand, SCF’s use of this graphic, child-centric publicity was 
unprecedented in that it was deployed through the channels of an expanding 
mass media, which ensured that this imagery had a larger audience and 
greater impact than ever before. Technological advances, such as the growing 
use of photography by the press during the early 1920s, also increased the 
fund’s ability to drive home its message. Following the Russian campaign, 
SCF began to replace the drawings of sorrowing mothers that had featured 
so prominently in its publicity with stark photographs of emaciated, solitary, 
and sometimes nude boys and girls.73 While the hand-drawn sketches had 
allowed donors to project themselves or their families onto the image, the 
photographs were more immediate. They instantly directed the viewer’s 
 70 A. Leggatt, ‘The lure of the suffering child’, The Record, iii (Third Quarter, 1922), 57–8.
 71 T. Lacqueur, ‘Bodies, details, and the humanitarian narrative’, in The New Cultural 
History, ed. L. Hunt (Berkeley, Calif., 1989), pp. 176–204.
 72 M. E. Sadler, ‘The science of childhood’, The Record, iii (Apr. 1923), 134–7. On this 
larger trend, see P. Weindling, ‘From sentiment to science: children’s relief organizations and 
the problem of malnutrition in inter-war Europe’, Disasters, xviii (1994), 203–12; Rooke and 
Schnell, ‘“Uncramping child life”’. 
 73 See especially the examples in The Record, ii (Nov. 1921), 52, 73; (Dec. 1921), 83, 94, 107, 
108; (June 1922), 280, 296, among many others.
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attention to the precise physical ailments of the victim, and prompted an 
exclusive identification with the child in the photo. The consequence of this 
turn to photography was to restrict the possible meanings that donors could 
glean from a fundraising campaign. Increasingly, the fund was calling on 
Britons to sympathize with a specific, archetypal child, rather than with a 
larger community or nation as a whole.74 
The greatest expression, however, of this new tendency to isolate the 
needs of the young from their cultural and national contexts was the 
development of the concept of children’s rights. Jebb first began envisioning 
the document that would become the Declaration on the Rights of the 
Child in the summer of 1922, when the attacks against SCF still raged in the 
press, and when some within the organization were pushing for an exclusive 
focus on domestic initiatives. She viewed it primarily as a propaganda move, 
hoping that the act of defining a number of universal principles for child 
welfare would reaffirm the public’s commitment to internationalism.75 
The resulting declaration, ratified by the League of Nations in 1924, was 
purposefully broad. It consisted of just five points that outlined the child’s 
right to food, shelter and medical attention, to education, and to freedom 
from exploitation. Crucially, as Murray Last has noted, it also defined the 
‘principle of first call’, which stated that the young should receive priority 
in relief over adults.76 As other historians have noted, the document that 
thus enshrined a ‘new status for childhood’ as an object of international 
responsibility77 simultaneously set children ‘apart as both a special and a 
separate moral category’.78 The young no longer appeared as social beings 
whose healthy development was intimately connected to that of their 
community. Rather, they were culturally isolated figures, whose salvation 
could come at the expense of their nation as a whole.
Charting these twists and turns in the emerging ideology of SCF in 
the aftermath of the war helps to illustrate a number of larger issues. 
First, this case study demonstrates the important but often overlooked 
point that popular internationalism remained a vibrant part of British 
cultural life during the early 1920s. Non-state actors like SCF provided 
 74 For a stimulating discussion of the role of photographs in crafting the meaning of child 
welfare, see S. Koven, Slumming: Sexual and Social Politics in Victorian London (Princeton, 
NJ, 2004), 88–139.
 75 Mahood, Feminism and Voluntary Action, p. 194.
 76 M. Last, ‘Putting children first’, Disasters, xviii (1994), 192–202.
 77 Marshall, ‘Construction of children’, p. 104. 
 78 Last, ‘Putting children first’, p. 193.
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an opportunity for ordinary Britons to engage personally in the broader 
cause of international humanitarianism, and offered a salient, alternative 
image of British nationhood that prioritized empathetic collaboration 
over xenophobia and isolationism.79 Yet the example also sheds light on 
the instrumental role of the mass media in determining the character and 
content of internationalism as it emerged in the aftermath of the First 
World War. In seeking to cultivate an outward-looking sentiment among 
the British public, the leaders of SCF were forced to grapple with both the 
promise and restrictions of the popular press. While the inter-war media 
provided a powerful tool to reach new audiences, it also served as a font 
for inflamed public passions, whether in the guise of lingering anger over 
war guilt or fears of Bolshevism. These feelings took their toll, delimiting 
the boundaries of the possible, and forcing the organization to narrow its 
mission from one of constructive nation-building to a more singular focus 
on child relief. 
Finally, understanding the impact of this inter-war dynamic on the 
early work of SCF is important because the society’s method of promoting 
international child-centred humanitarianism proved so long lasting. The 
fund’s status as the recognized leader in the field ensured the survival of 
its most prominent techniques. Charities today still routinely quantify 
the value of a child’s life in terms of ‘the price of a cup of coffee’, and all 
too frequently use graphic, dehumanizing pictures of suffering children to 
jolt viewers into sympathy.80 Moreover, the trend toward focusing donors’ 
attention on individual children rather than their communities has been 
taken to a new level by the internet. Online contributors to influential 
organizations like World Vision can now specify the exact child they want 
to assist by using a drop-down menu to specify their gender, age, birth date, 
nationality and HIV status. Such techniques may be effective at stimulating 
sentiment, yet their effect is both to isolate the needs of children from the 
complex realities underlying their situation and to value one segment of the 
population over humanity as a whole. They remain a trenchant reminder 
that although the antagonisms of the First World War have long since run 
their course, their legacy remains. 
 79 In this respect, SCF played a similar role in the inter-war period to that of NGOs in the 
post-1945 era, shaping ‘the way society perceives itself, conceptualizes its problems, and selects 
the solutions with which to address them’ (NGOs in Contemporary Britain: Non-State Actors in 
Society and Politics since 1945, ed. J. McKay and M. Hilton (Basingstoke, 2009), p. 3).
 80 This latter practice was abandoned by SCF in the 1980s, but remains prominent among 
other child welfare societies. For a comparison of the late 20th-century image policies of 
SCF and Barnardo’s, see Koven, Slumming, pp. 134–9.
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8. ‘Mending a broken world’: the universities 
and the nation, 1918–36
Tamson Pietsch
On 4 July 1921, the chancellors and rectors of the universities of the United 
Kingdom, together with delegates from their sister institutions across the 
British empire, sat down to lunch at the Savoy Hotel. They were gathered 
in London to attend the second Congress of the Universities of the British 
Empire, scheduled to begin the following day in Oxford. Proposing the 
toast on behalf of the government, the former Conservative prime minister 
and foreign secretary, Arthur Balfour, reflected on the dramatic events that 
had elapsed since the previous congress in 1912. In those nine years, he 
suggested, 
had been crowded and compressed changes the magnitude of which no man 
living – none even of the learned thinkers whom it is my privilege to address 
– can as yet estimate. Nobody can tell how great is the change which this 
deflection of civilized development has produced in the social elements of the 
world; nobody can tell whether it has hurried changes which were in any case 
inevitable, or whether it has modified in any profound sense the character 
of those changes. The work of estimating its magnitude falls, and must fall 
inevitably, to the historian, and to him alone. But we can see quite plainly each 
one of us, within our own experience, how the world has been shaken by the 
vast catastrophe of the Great War.1 
Though not yet sure of its meaning, Balfour and his contemporaries 
nonetheless sensed that the world that had emerged from the war of 1914–18 
was very different to that which had existed before it. 
And for those at the 1921 congress, it was the universities that seemed 
especially changed. In his opening address, Lord Curzon – then foreign 
secretary and chancellor at Oxford – had gone so far as to assert that no 
institutions had been ‘more profoundly affected [by the war] than the 
older universities’. During the conflict they had been emptied; Oxford had 
become a ‘quasi-military camp’ and a hospital for the wounded; the pens 
 1 Balfour, in Second Congress of the Universities of the Empire 1921: Report of Proceedings, 
ed. A. Hill (1921), p. xviii.
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of its writers were turned to ‘informing the public mind’; the brains of its 
‘men of science’ directed to research that had a material effect upon the 
conduct of the war. ‘Can it be imagined’, asked Curzon, ‘that four years 
of this experience did not leave an enduring impression both upon the life 
of the University and upon the mind of the State?’2 In the years after the 
peace, compulsory Greek was abolished and women were admitted into full 
membership of the university; the principle of state aid was accepted, and 
for a time student numbers nearly doubled.3 For dons unused to change, 
this indeed was a brave new world. 
It was a new world in which Curzon believed the universities had a vital 
role. For it was ‘not so much on paper conventions or signed documents, 
or even on political combinations’ that he thought the future peace would 
depend, but rather on the ‘growing commerce of knowledge and ideas … the 
drawing together of the minds and consciences of educated and thoughtful 
men’.4 Indeed, this notion of the universities’ central role in building the 
post-war world infused discussion at the 1921 congress. Delegates from 
universities across Britain and the empire struggled to come to terms with 
the impact of its immense social and cultural transformations wrought upon 
their own institutions, and at the same time they strove to find ways to heal 
the ruptures created by the conflict. As J. C. Irvine, professor of chemistry 
and principal of the University of St. Andrew’s, put it, ‘we came here not 
to carry back cut-and-dried curricula, but to measure and appreciate the 
forces which are operating around us, to find means to satisfy the highest 
aspirations of our fellow men, and to strive to mend a broken world’.5 
But the organization to which the universities turned to lead them in this 
task was one shaped by the methods and mindset of the old world. Founded 
at the first Congress of the Universities of the British Empire in 1912, the 
Universities’ Bureau of the British Empire had been designed to act as ‘an 
organ for the purpose of continuing [the] communication of knowledge 
and comparison of varied experience’ between the universities of the British 
empire begun at that meeting.6 Governed by a committee consisting of seven 
‘Home’ and seven ‘overseas’ (British Dominion) university representatives, 
for its first six years the bureau was funded entirely by the subscriptions 
of its member institutions. Its early life had been promising: it rented a 
 2 Curzon, in Second Congress, p. 4.
 3 Curzon, in Second Congress, p. 4.
 4 Curzon, in Second Congress, p. 6.
 5 Irvine, in Second Congress, p. 241.
 6 MacAlister (principal of the University of Glasgow) at the first congress in 1912, quoted 
in E. Ashby, Community of Universities: an Informal Portrait of the Association of Universities 
of the British Commonwealth, 1913–63 (1963), p. 10.
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room in the Imperial Institute in South Kensington, published the first 
edition of the Yearbook (which provided in one volume information about 
the courses, entrance requirements and staff of all the universities of the 
British empire) and began planning a second congress. The war seriously 
curtailed its growth, but it limped through, sustained largely by the efforts 
of its honorary secretary, Alex Hill – also principal of the University College 
of Southampton – and emerged in 1918 as the only formal association of 
universities in the country.7 Transfused by a one-off grant of £5,000 from the 
Board of Education, in the aftermath of the war the bureau sprang to new 
life. It incorporated under the Companies Act and gained a constitution, 
established and then administered the UK Committee of Vice-Chancellors 
and Principals, and looked to its members – both in Britain and overseas – 
to fund its operational costs. By 1919 Alex Hill could write, ‘In a very much 
larger sense than heretofore the Bureau is now recognized by the Board of 
Education, the Treasury, the Foreign Office, and the other Government 
Departments as their medium of communication with the Universities’.8 
But despite this new role at home, its aims and objects remained firmly 
imperial in scope.9 For, as far as the bureau was concerned, these domestic 
activities were part of its broader imperial mission. When, therefore, the 
British university representatives at the congress in 1921 turned to the bureau 
to help them meet the post-war challenge, they turned to an organization 
concerned with a very expansive definition of the British nation; one 
imbued with Edwardian notions of closer imperial union. 
For scholars of inter-war Britain the story of the bureau and the congresses 
is therefore an important one. In the midst of social and economic 
upheaval, the universities looked back to the certainties of an earlier period. 
They asserted their continuing role as institutions that trained the nation’s 
political leaders, and in taking up the mantra of efficiency and turning to 
the bureau as their collective voice, they invoked an older articulation of 
the nation that reached out to include the universities of the British empire 
as well as those of the United Kingdom. This was an expansive nation for 
which the Universities’ Bureau served both as expression and vehicle, and 
the ways that it found to deal with the new challenges of the period – mass 
democracy and the role of the state, science, centralization and the new 
internationalism – reflected its own expansive constitution. Fundamentally 
 7 Ashby, Community of Universities, pp. 10–16.
 8 University of Melbourne Archives (hereafter UMA), Registrar’s Correspondence, 
UM312/1920/444, Hill to the Melbourne registrar, 22 Nov. 1919.
 9 University of Sydney Archives (hereafter USA), Registrar’s General Subject Files, 
G3/13/723, ‘The Universities of the British Empire Memorandum and Articles of Association, 
1921’.
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it was in improving access horizontally, across space, rather than vertically, 
among the people, that the bureau and the universities believed their unique 
contribution to nation-building lay in the years after the Great War.
Yet the activities of the Universities’ Bureau and the deliberations of its 
congresses have received little historical attention, and the expansive vision 
of the nation that they articulated between the wars has been lost to view.10 
Despite a vigorous interest in the social and cultural history of British academia, 
historians since the Second World War have been slower to take up questions 
associated with its imperial and global dimensions.11 This has reflected a wider 
historiographical shift in which, from the 1960s on, historians in Britain and 
its former colonies turned away from older accounts of a connected imperial 
story and instead emphasized the national dimensions of the empire’s 
various cultures and communities.12 With its records destroyed during 
Second World War bombing, the bureau – itself rebranded in 1963 as the 
Association of Commonwealth Universities – dropped off the radar of British 
and imperial historians alike. But in the context of recent historiography, 
which sees transnational forces and trans-border connections as crucial to the 
construction of the nation, the time is surely ripe for historians to reconsider 
the bureau’s story.13 By turning to the correspondence held in the archives of 
universities across the Commonwealth and by examining the printed Records 
of Proceedings of the four inter-war congresses this chapter seeks to reconstruct 
its archive in order to bring to light the nature of the world that it tried to 
bring about in the period between the wars. 
Democracy and the state
For the delegates at the 1921 congress, chief among the most urgent issues 
facing the universities were the new claims of mass democracy. The ‘tide of 
democracy [is] … flowing in’, declared R. B. Haldane opening the session 
 10 The only real examination of the bureau is Eric Ashby’s 1963 ‘memoir’, Community of 
Universities.
 11 See A. H. Halsey and M. A. Trow, The British Academics (1971); A. H. Halsey, Decline of 
Donnish Dominion (Oxford, 1995); R. Anderson, Universities and Elites in Britain since 1800 
(Cambridge, 1992) and British Universities Past and Present (2006); L. Goldman, Dons and 
Workers: Oxford and Adult Education since 1850 (Oxford, 1995). 
 12 E.g., A. P. Newton, The Universities and Educational Systems of the Empire (1924) or R. 
A. Dallen, The University of Sydney: its History and Progress (Sydney, 1925), as compared to S. 
Rothblatt, The Revolution of the Dons: Cambridge and Society in Victorian England (1963) or 
R. J. W. Selleck, The Shop: the University of Melbourne 1850–1939 (Melbourne, 2003).
 13 See, e.g., I. R. Tyrrell, Transnational Nation: United States History in Global Perspective 
since 1789 (Basingstoke, 2007); C. A. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914: Global 
Connections and Comparisons (Oxford, 2004); After the Imperial Turn: Thinking with and 
through the Nation, ed. A. M. Burton (Durham, NC, 2003).
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on ‘adult education’; ‘it is lapping round the bases of our institutions, and 
to-day it is lapping round the foundations of our Universities’: 
All over the world those who work with their hands are calling for the higher 
education. Without that knowledge they feel that they cannot be free, that they are 
held back by fetters of ignorance from liberty to solve their own social problems … 
There is a class division in knowledge which goes deeper down than any other class 
division I know, and it is that sense of class division that is producing most of the 
unrest in the industrial world that we see to-day. It is knowledge that will solve your 
problems far better than the thrusting of ramrods into delicate works, and I think 
that that is the feeling which is beginning to take hold of the democracy itself just as 
strongly as it has taken hold of the intellectuals. Well, ladies and gentlemen, if that 
be so, we have to recognize this craving for spiritual freedom.14 
Haldane’s words betrayed an anxiety that lurked just beneath the surface of 
much congress discussion. The Representation of the People Act of 1918 had 
tripled the size of the electorate by dramatically widening the suffrage and 
Haldane’s talk of ramrods reflected a wider concern among the delegates 
about what this would mean for British society. ‘We have become aware’, 
said the University of Bristol’s professor of history, George H. Leonard, 
speaking after Haldane, ‘of a thirsty world of men and women … newly 
conscious of their powers’.15 
But despite these pronouncements, the universities saw their role in the 
new world as less about answering the demands of the newly enfranchised 
electorate and more about shaping the character of those who would lead 
them.16 Though moulding the nation’s leaders had long been the task of the 
universities in Britain, in the aftermath of the war it seemed to take on a 
new importance. In the face of the destructive capacities of technology and 
mechanization made evident by the conflict, Arthur Smithells, professor 
of chemistry at the University of Leeds, argued that university ‘teachers 
should stand shoulder to shoulder against all the forces that tend to the 
vitiation of the atmosphere of education and the desecration of our temples 
of learning’.17 Similarly, Lord Balfour of Burleigh, the chancellor of the 
University of St Andrew’s, asserted that ‘all young men standing on the 
threshold of their careers in life’, and especially those who would specialize 
– in science or in business – needed the ‘humanizing life of a University with 
its variety of individuals and interests and its broadening influence on the 
 14 Haldane, in Second Congress, p. 126.
 15 Leonard (professor of history at the University of Bristol), in Second Congress, p. 131.
 16 This approach echoes the response of some cultivated elites to the rise of the mass media 
as discussed by D. L. LeMahieu in A Culture for Democracy: Mass Communication and the 
Cultivated Mind in Britain between the Wars (Oxford, 1988).
 17 Smithells, in Second Congress, p. 198.
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formation of character’; for only at a university would these members of the 
rising elite ‘acquire the breadth of mind which [would] enable [them] better 
to understand the problems of life, and to acquire the power of applying the 
principles of liberal culture to the subjects of [their] every-day occupation’.18 
The universities thus saw education in character as a vital corrective to the 
newly formalized workplace, not just for industrial workers, as Ussishkin 
points out elsewhere in this volume, but also for those in the professions, 
business and science. It was thus not as educators of the newly enfranchised 
masses, but rather as institutions extending old world values to Britain’s new 
economic and social elites, that the universities initially saw themselves. 
For although the government made attempts to close the ‘class division 
in knowledge’ at a secondary school level with the 1918 Education Acts, 
the universities in Britain were largely unwilling to open their doors to ‘the 
democracy’. Their efforts in this direction were for the most part restricted 
to the field of adult education, and even then they did not see the work 
of adult and working-class education as best being done within their own 
walls. ‘We cannot bring the democracy into the Universities because the 
Universities would be swamped’ portended Haldane in 1921; ‘They cannot 
come to us’, argued Leonard, ‘they are too shy’.19 Instead what was advocated 
was the ‘sending forth’ of ‘more trained teachers into the highways and 
byways and into the central places … where the population has congregated 
and where the University atmosphere needs to be provided’.20 This was the 
‘missionary’ pattern of adult education established before the war, when 
University Extension Committees – mostly from Oxford, Cambridge 
and London – provided lecturers and teaching at Workers’ Educational 
Associations (WEAs) and other centres across the country. After the war this 
earlier pattern of adult education was extended rather than reformed, with 
universities across the country significantly expanding their ‘extra-mural’ 
activity and working in concert with the WEA and other centres. Therefore, 
despite the lofty pronouncements of congress delegates in 1921, it was not the 
universities or the bureau that took up advocacy on the question of educating 
‘the democracy’ in this period, but rather a variety of other extra-university 
organizations, including the WEA, the Department of Adult Education, the 
Young Men’s Christian Association and other voluntary and working men’s 
colleges.21
 18 Lord Balfour of Burleigh, in Second Congress, p. 239.
 19 Haldane, in Second Congress, p. 128; Leonard, in Second Congress, p. 131.
 20 Haldane, in Second Congress, p. 128.
 21 For more on the history of adult education, see T. Kelly, A History of Adult Education in 
Great Britain (Liverpool, 1970); Goldman, Dons and Workers; H. McCarthy, ‘Parties, voluntary 
associations, and democratic politics in interwar Britain’, Historical Journal, l (2007), 891–912. 
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However, though the universities sidestepped the issue of widening 
admission, the ‘advent of democracy’ did foreshadow a new relationship 
for them with the state. For, in the wake of the war, the universities 
found themselves under real financial strain. Large numbers of returned 
soldiers had flooded in, demanding accommodation, teaching and new 
approaches to both. With nowhere else to turn the exhausted universities 
looked to government to assist them, making new sorts of arguments about 
their contribution, not just to the war effort, but also to what professor 
of engineering and principal of the University of Edinburgh, J.A. Ewing, 
began to call Britain’s ‘system of national education’.22 As Ewing also 
pointed out, accepting the government’s money would entail new forms of 
accountability: ‘if they make a claim on the State’, the universities must also 
admit ‘that they have a duty to the State’.23 
What this duty might mean, however, was less clear, and universities 
feared the surrender of their independence. They were worried that money 
from the government might carry unacceptable conditions and compromise 
their autonomy, and some congress delegates suggested that the bureau 
might serve as a collective association to protect them from state intrusion.24 
Yet in reality the receipt of government grants was something that, like 
adult education, was stimulated though not created by the war.25 The newer 
universities had been receiving ad hoc government grants since the end of 
the nineteenth century and various committees had been instituted during 
this period to negotiate and agitate for their continuation. Indeed, the 
need to improve radically the pre-war system of state aid lay behind the 
meeting in 1918 in which, rallied by a letter from Alan Kidd (an officer 
at the Board of Education) to Sir William McCormick (the chair of the 
board’s pre-war Advisory Committee on University Grants), representatives 
from thirty-two British universities and colleges made a deputation that 
led to the establishment of the University Grants Committee (UGC).26 
 22 Ewing, in Second Congress, p. 305.
 23 Ewing, in Second Congress, p. 305.
 24 See J. G. Adami (vice-chancellor of the University of Liverpool), in Second Congress, pp. 
308–14; M. E. Sadler (vice-chancellor of the University of Leeds), in Second Congress, p. 330; 
University of Toronto Archives (hereafter UTA), Office of the President, A1967-0007/Box 58/68, 
‘Report of Committee submitted to the Universities Conference, London, March 26, 1920’.
 25 K. Vernon, Universities and the State in England, 1850–1939 (Abingdon, 2004), p. 139.
 26 Haldane, in Second Congress, p. 126. These grants had been made on a case by case basis, and 
the considerable tensions between the Treasury, the Board of Education and the Department 
of Agriculture – all of which took responsibility for distributing monies – had made this a 
complicated and messy process. Emergency arrangements during the war had only added to the 
confusion and further highlighted the need for some national system (see C. H. Shinn, Paying 
the Piper: the Development of the University Grants Committee 1919–46 (1986), pp. 27–54).
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Designed as a body that would advise the government on the provision of 
grants, and populated by individuals who, though not permitted to hold 
university appointments, nonetheless knew them well, the UGC emerged as 
a mechanism that allayed the universities’ fears about interference. Chaired 
by the genial McCormick, throughout the inter-war period it issued block 
grants to institutions to spend as they wished, just as the committee itself 
received annually a block grant from the government.27 The UGC thus 
allowed state support to be given to the universities while permitting them 
the autonomy they prized. In doing so it obviated the need for the bureau 
to take on any formal lobbying or representational role. 
Yet the question of universities and their ‘relations with the State’ was 
nevertheless one that seriously occupied the bureau, not least because it was – as 
Haldane himself acknowledged – an issue in which the British settler universities 
were considerably experienced. They had, after all, as the University of Toronto’s 
principal, Robert Falconer, was keen to point out in 1921, long drawn large 
financial support from their governments. The bureau dedicated sessions at 
congresses throughout the period to discussion of the topic, highlighting the 
experience of settler universities in order to allay the fears that some English 
delegates – especially in the early years – still felt about state intervention.28 
In 1921, the bureau chose Robert Stout – chancellor of the University of New 
Zealand – to chair the session on university finance, and for the 1926 congress 
it asked the Australian universities to present papers based on their experience 
of ‘the effect upon university work of State control, or co-operation’.29 
Indeed, at this last meeting, in response to Balfour’s expression of his fear of 
the ‘natural and pardonable instinct on the part of the State to control and 
supervise the working of an institution which it is doing so much to support’, 
representatives from universities across the Commonwealth rallied in defence 
of government funding.30 By the 1930s the nature of congress discussion had 
shifted significantly and debates over funding were characterized not so much 
by fear of state interference as by frustration at state frugality. For at the 1931 
and 1936 congresses, pressed by the Great Depression and perhaps soothed 
by the representations of the settler institutions, the universities in England 
found that they had good reason to support the bureau’s efforts to promote a 
language that legitimated state funding. 
 27 Shinn, Paying the Piper, p. 53.
 28 See T. Morison (vice-chancellor of the University of Durham and principal of Armstrong 
College), in Third Congress of the Universities of the Empire 1926: Report of Proceedings, ed. A. 
Hill (1926), p. 30.
 29 Stout, in Second Congress, p. 290; UMA, Registrar’s Correspondence, UM312/1926/147, 
Hill to the Melbourne registrar, 25 Jan. 1926.
 30 Balfour, in Second Congress, p. 5; Ashby, Community of Universities, p. 44.
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Science and specialization
As well as highlighting their role as training grounds of the nation’s new 
elites, the universities also justified their receipt of these government grants by 
pointing to the particular contributions they made to practical science. As the 
Liberal politician and chancellor of the University of Sheffield, Lord Crewe, 
argued in 1921, the ‘Universities, old and new, exist because they satisfy the 
needs of the country, moral, intellectual, and practical; and the nature of the 
teaching they supply is conditioned by those needs’.31 In the brave new world 
it was not just the leaders of the new democracy but also its economy that 
the universities must serve. For by the time of the second congress, the pre-
war debate about the place of science in the university had been sidelined and 
discussion turned instead on the extent to which it should be balanced by other 
‘humane’ subjects. 32 The Oxford classicist and rector of Exeter College, L. R. 
Farnell, wanted only to award first-class degrees to students who took Latin or 
Greek, while numerous others, as we have seen, argued for the importance of 
maintaining a balance between scientific and humanistic studies in order to 
counter the ‘materialistic bent of the present age’.33 But the Great War had been, 
as the president of the Board of Education, H. A. L. Fisher, observed in 1919, ‘in 
a sense [as] never before equalled, a war of science’, and it was widely recognized 
that the new world would be one built by science as well.
Indeed, a significant number of the delegates at the 1921 meeting had 
themselves been involved in scientific war work. Among them, R. W. Brock 
had served as a geologist in the Palestine campaign, the physicist Ernest 
Rutherford had led the British programme in submarine detection and, at 
St. Andrew’s, J. C. Irvine and his Department of Chemistry had produced 
bacteriological sugars for the army medical services and undertaken 
research for the chemical warfare department. Looking over the list of those 
delegates with war service, the colonial backgrounds of many of them is 
striking: Brock was from British Columbia, and Rutherford had trained 
in New Zealand; from McGill, H. S. Birkett raised, equipped and staffed 
the No. 3 Canadian General Military Hospital which served in France for 
the duration of the war; and A. J. Clark – who had been the professor of 
pharmacology in Cape Town – worked in the Royal Army Medical Corps. 
 31 Crewe-Milnes, in Second Congress, p. 186. The marquess of Crewe was the chancellor of 
the University of Sheffield and chairman of the governing body of the Imperial College of 
Science and Technology.
 32 For an example of the pre-war discussion, see R. B. Haldane in ‘Official Report of the 
Allied Colonial Universities Conference’, ed. C. Kinloch Cooke, Empire Review, vi (1903), 
119; Crewe-Milnes, in Second Congress, p. 186.
 33 Farnell, Cecil. H. Desch, Principal Herambachandra Maitra, Professor Pramathanath 
Banerjea and Professor F. W. Burstall, in Second Congress, pp. 230, 15, 26, 47, 95.
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Theirs were just some of the significant contributions that Roy Macleod has 
argued colonial scientists made to the war effort.34 Seen during the war as 
evidence of the close ties that bound the British empire together, in 1921 
Toronto’s Principal Falconer also seemed to imply that there might have 
been another reason for the strength of the colonial contribution to wartime 
science. For, reliant on government grants voted to them by local parliaments 
which were elected by a franchise much wider than that in Britain, from the 
1880s the colonial universities had been forced, as Falconer put it, to ‘[adjust] 
themselves to the emergent needs of their own localities’, developing the 
schools of engineering, applied science, medicine and commerce demanded 
by rapidly growing colonial communities. In the process these universities had 
‘learned new methods of instruction and added new departments which may 
seem strange to this country [England]’ where, despite some developments in 
the Edwardian period, applied science remained something viewed sceptically 
by the universities.35 Consequently, when the war came it was in the colonial 
and Scottish universities as well as British industry that a good deal of the 
relevant scientific and technological expertise was to be found.
With the inadequacies of university science in England highlighted by 
the war, the period following the conflict was one characterized by much 
discussion about how best to rectify the situation. The government led 
the way, establishing in 1915 the Department of Scientific and Industrial 
Research and encouraging the rapid development – as at Oxford – of 
provision in the universities for science and research.36 But at the bureau 
and at the congresses anxiety about what this might mean for institutions 
still attached to the notion of a liberal education translated into a concern 
over how it all was to be afforded. The answer proposed was articulated 
clearly by Robert Stout, vice-chancellor of the University of New Zealand: 
‘if you desire economy you must specialize in education. You cannot 
expect each University to undertake to teach all the subjects required for 
professional and industrial training’.37 Public money and post-war austerity, 
so the argument went, meant that the universities needed to maximize their 
‘efficiency’ – a word that rebounded in discussions throughout the period 
 34  R. MacLeod, Leverhulme Lectures, Oxford, 2007, in preparation as ‘The Scientist Goes 
to War’: the Mobilisation and Direction of Allied Scientific Operations in Europe, 1914–19. 
See also R. MacLeod, ‘“The arsenal in the Strand”: Australian chemists and the British 
munitions effort, 1916–19’, Annals of Science, xlvi (1989), 45–67 and Archibald Liversidge, 
FRS: Imperial Science under the Southern Cross (Sydney, 2010), pp. 398–411.
 35  Falconer, in Second Congress, p. xxiii.
 36  J. Prest, ‘The Asquith Commission’, in The History of the University of Oxford: viii, the 
20th Century, ed. B. Harrison (Oxford, 1994), pp. 27–44.
 37  Stout, in Second Congress, p. 292.
199
‘Mending a broken world’
– by each institution specializing in a particular set of subjects which built 
upon what Lord Crewe called ‘its local advantages’; the natural, industrial 
or professional character of the region in which it was located.38 As H. A. 
L. Fisher argued in 1922, ‘The expense of University education has become 
so great and the development of applied science … has now reached such a 
point that I feel it is quite impossible for the nation, as a whole, to advance 
unless there is a much higher degree of co-operation between Universities 
in respect to the distribution of studies’.39 These arguments were not just 
taken up by scientists. They also proved a boon to those like Farnell who 
wanted to protect the classical curriculum and privileges of Oxford and 
Cambridge. ‘Must there not be some distribution of functions’, he asked, 
‘not only as between the old Universities and the new, but between the one 
or two old Universities and many of the new?’40
But as far as the bureau was concerned, the ‘nation, as a whole’ included 
the British settler colonies, and therefore the ‘distribution of studies’ should 
encompass colonial universities as well. ‘[T]he overseas Universities’, 
wrote Alex Hill to bureau members in 1922, quoting the Liberal politician 
and historian James Bryce’s comments at the 1912 congress, ‘offer special 
opportunities of studying certain branches of applied science, such, for 
example, as mining and forestry’.41 Repeatedly placing the issue on the 
agendas of the newly instituted annual conferences of the universities of 
Great Britain and Ireland, as well as on the programmes of the congress 
meetings, the bureau also attempted to push the issue of specialization 
via an empire-wide information campaign. Beginning in 1922 it prepared 
annually a detailed report on the ‘Distribution of Subjects of Study to which 
exceptional attention is given in certain of the Universities and University 
Colleges of the United Kingdom’ and sent these to universities in Britain 
and the empire.42 From 1926 this summary was expanded to include the 
specialist studies of the ‘Universities in the Dominions Overseas’ as well.43 
Thus, central to the universities’ sense of their role in building the new 
world after the war, was an older, expansive understanding of the nation that 
included within its borders the settler colonies of Canada, Australia, New 
 38 Crewe, in Second Congress, p. 187.
 39 Fisher, quoted in USA, Registrar’s General Subject Files, G3/13/723, ‘Annual Conference 
of the Universities of Great Britain & Ireland 1922 Abridged Report of Proceedings’.
 40 Farnell, in Second Congress, p. 329.
 41 Hill, in USA, Registrar’s General Subject Files, G3/13/723, ‘Minutes of a Meeting of the 
Interchange Committee of the Bureau held May 12, 1922’. 
 42 USA, Registrar’s General Subject Files, G3/13/723, ‘Copy of Draft report listing the Distribution 
of Groups of Subjects in the Universities and University Colleges of the United Kingdom’.
 43 UMA, Registrar’s Correspondence, UM312/1927/556, Hill to the Melbourne registrar, 5 
March 1926.
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Zealand and South Africa as well as England, Scotland, Northern Ireland 
and Wales. For it was by utilizing the dispersed educational resources of the 
British universities abroad as well as those at home that the Universities’ 
Bureau thought the nation might most efficiently be served.
Yet for all its seeming virtues, this idea of institutional specialization 
raised two major stumbling blocks. The first had been identified long before 
the war when the issue had initially been brought up at the 1903 Allied 
Colonial Universities Conference – the progenitor of the later congresses. It 
concerned the problems of co-ordination between autonomous universities. 
Despite Bryce’s protestations at that meeting that ‘there is no idea present 
to the mind of any one of us of attempting in any way to circumscribe or 
to override the independence of each university’, the erosion of autonomy 
implied by a rationalized system of institutional specialization was exactly 
what the universities were not prepared to countenance.44 The second 
problem involved the mutual recognition of matriculation examinations 
– something needed to facilitate the movement of undergraduates from 
one institution to another. While a limited and complex system of bilateral 
agreements had developed before the war, the colonial universities in 
particular wanted an empire-wide standard. This, however, was something 
resisted by the ancient universities.45 In the face of variable standards across 
the empire, they were unwilling to sacrifice their individual autonomy and 
– as they saw it – diminish their prestige and preferred to maintain an older 
system of bilateral accreditation. 
However, and perhaps in part because of this, as the 1920s progressed and 
the newly instituted British PhD (established in 1918) began to take hold, 
the issue of student interchange increasingly came to be seen in terms of 
graduate rather than undergraduate study. Sir Thomas Holland, principal 
of the University of Edinburgh, gave expression to this at the 1931 congress:
I feel sure that undergraduates ought not come [to Britain] at all except from 
those areas in which there are no existing native Universities. The position of the 
post-graduate student creates a wholly different picture. His movement from one 
University to another, whether within or without Great Britain, is an advantage 
to him and an advantage to us, and that has nothing to do with the University 
but with the individual specialist of repute under whom he goes to study.46 
 44 Bryce, in ‘Official Report’, p. 77.
 45 J. W. Gregory, who in 1921 was the professor of geology at the University of Glasgow, 
had previously held the chair of geology and mineralogy at the University of Melbourne 
(UMA, Registrar’s Correspondence, UM312/1921/113, ‘Report of Professor J. W. Gregory of 
the 1921 Congress, 12 July, 1921’).
 46 Holland, in Fourth Congress of the Universities of the Empire 1931: Report of Proceedings 
(1931), p. 181.
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Therefore, while ‘specialization’ never dropped off the congresses’ programmes 
or the bureau’s radar and continued to be seen as crucial to the universities’ 
role in building the nation, the meaning of the term changed significantly. 
By the late 1920s it had come less to refer to the ‘distribution of studies’, and 
more to the newly valued specialized knowledge of individual researchers. 
Centralization 
Therefore, constrained by its inability to act officially on behalf of 
the universities who were highly sceptical of anything that seemed to 
threaten their independence, the bureau sought better to incorporate the 
resources of the ‘overseas universities’ through a more efficient distribution 
of information. This, indeed, had been a crucial aspect of its original 
constitution. With attempts to establish centralized control of curricula 
and teacher training meeting a very poor reception at the 1907 Imperial 
Education Conference, the leaders of the 1912 Universities’ Congress made 
it clear that the bureau would ‘not be an organ of government’.47 It would 
not, promised George Parkin, the organizing secretary of the Rhodes 
Trust, impinge on the ‘individuality and independence [which] rather than 
uniformity constitute the characteristic note of British Universities’. Rather, 
the bureau would be a ‘clearing house’: ‘a connecting link between all our 
world-wide experiences’ whose ‘first duty’ was the collection and distribution 
of information.48 Distributing information was something that the bureau 
did very well. From 1912 onwards, and in increasing quantities, it produced 
a steady flow of reports, booklets, surveys, programmes and circulars. In 
addition to the material on specialization, cited above, these included ‘lists 
of Students from abroad studying in the Home Universities’, statements of 
the bureau’s accounts and minutes of its meetings, titles of theses approved 
for research degrees, proposals for graduate tours, and various agitations 
about ways to foster student exchange.49 A large amount of information was 
procured for the Yearbooks, published annually, and a flurry of consultative 
correspondence took place in the lead up to any congress. 
But despite its best efforts, during the 1920s the bureau struggled to win 
the confidence of many of its members. It seemed to face two obstacles. 
 47 J. Greenlee, ‘The ABCs of imperial unity’, Canadian Journal of History, xiv (1979), 49–64. 
 48 Parkin, in Congress of the Universities of the Empire, 1912: Report of Proceedings, ed. A. 
Hill (1912), pp. 311, 323.
 49 UMA, Registrar’s Correspondence, UM312/1921/482, Hill to the Melbourne registrar, 
19 July 1921; UMA, Registrar’s Correspondence, UM312/1927/557, Hill to the Melbourne 
registrar, 11 Nov. 1926; UMA, Registrar’s Correspondence, UM312/1927/557, ‘Secretary’s 
report of a meeting of the Standing Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals held at 
Russell Square, Sat 24th 1927’.
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First, it found it difficult to find a role for itself in the changing post-war 
world. As we have seen, a number of the responsibilities that had seemed 
in 1921 to have been within its remit were instead assumed by other 
organizations, and the bureau found itself struggling to define its identity. 
But at the same time, it was administered by Alex Hill whose proprietorial 
ways meant that it struggled to manage the one task that was clearly its 
own: the dissemination of information. 
All this was made evident when, following the death of Hill in 1929, 
Frank Heath, formerly secretary of the (British) Department of Scientific 
and Industrial Research (DSIR), was appointed to review the bureau’s 
workings. He found a body labouring with too few employees, in a 
dilapidated building and without an adequate constitution.50 Increasing 
the staff and doubling the annual expenditure, Heath also proposed 
constitutional changes that gave it more purchase with member 
universities.51 By then too its role in higher educational organization had 
become clearer and it had found its place alongside institutions such as 
the UGC, the WEA and the DSIR. These reforms revived the bureau 
and from the early 1930s onwards universities and colleges from various 
parts of the Commonwealth began increasingly to use its employment 
services. By 1933 it could report that ‘Universities overseas are enlisting the 
services of the Bureau more and more in filling vacant appointments’.52 
This was no unfounded boast. The universities for whom it acted in 
that year included: Auckland College, Bombay, Hong Kong, Adelaide, 
Canterbury College, Andra and the Egyptian University in Cairo.53 This 
led the Australians – who had long been in the practice of convening 
London selection committees of their own – to try a change in policy.54 
Indeed, from the mid 1930s the bureau offered a more professional – and 
cheaper – service than could committees of selection constituted through 
individual university networks.55 Better run, better resourced and working 
with universities who were more interested in its success, under Heath the 
organization came to function much more effectively as the centralized 
‘clearing house’ it had always aspired to be. 
 50 Ashby, Community of Universities, p. 32.
 51 Ashby, Community of Universities, pp. 34–5.
 52 UMA, Registrar’s Correspondence, UM312/1933/403, ‘Report of the Executive Council 
and Accounts of the Bureau for the year 1 August 1932–31’, July 1933.
 53 UMA, Registrar’s Correspondence, UM312/1933/403, ‘Report of the Executive Council 
and Accounts of the Bureau for the year 1 August 1932–31’, July 1933.
 54 UMA, Registrar’s Correspondence, UM312/1933/403, Melbourne registrar to the 
bureau, 15 Nov. 1933. 
 55 See T. Pietsch, Universities and Empire: Academic Networks in the British World, 1850–
1940 (Manchester, forthcoming).
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This was reflected in its expanding activities, the most important of 
which was its management of the Carnegie Travelling Grants. At the end of 
1930 the Carnegie Corporation of New York had made a grant of $40,000 
to the bureau, ‘to be expended for the benefit of Empire Universities 
Overseas’.56 After spending some of this money on the transport costs of 
delegates attending the 1931 congress, it determined that the balance should 
be used to enable ‘selected members of the teaching and administrative 
staffs of oversea universities’ to visit the United Kingdom for the purpose of 
advanced study or research work. Bringing such individuals ‘into personal 
contact with each other’, the bureau felt, would help to ‘promote closer 
cooperation between the oversea and the home universities’.57 Leaving 
universities to choose their own candidates, and regional conferences to put 
forward their nominees, the Executive Committee of the bureau selected a 
final three from the total they received. The scheme was repeated annually 
between 1932 and 1936 and proved hugely attractive to academics working 
in the Dominions. Indeed, the Australian conference found having to make 
a selection from among their own number ‘a very awkward and invidious 
task’, and sought to divest themselves of this responsibility: ‘it is rather like 
throwing a bone amongst a lot of hungry dogs’ wrote the University of 
Western Australia’s Hubert Whitfeld to the Melbourne registrar in 1933.58 
They wished instead for a system of greater centralization – proposing that 
each university should forward its first choice to the bureau, which would 
then choose among them. Together with Heath’s reforms, the management 
of the Carnegie Grants helped to raise the bureau’s profile in the eyes of 
its member institutions. In offering the possibility of tangible benefits it 
provided an incentive for universities abroad to begin to utilize its other 
services too. But the flurry around the Carnegie Grants points also to 
the large extent to which it was not until the 1930s that the bureau began 
effectively to fill the centralizing and professionalizing functions that had 
been imputed to it in the aftermath of the war.
Internationalism and the expansive nation
The purpose to which the bureau put its Carnegie Grants in the 1930s 
reflected aspirations it had held since its inception. ‘The Exchange of 
Professors’ and the ‘Exchange of Students’ had been two of the functions 
projected for it by Parkin in 1912.59 Fostering the movement of staff and 
 56 ‘Empire Universities Carnegie Research Grants’, The Times, 6 June 1932.
 57 ‘Empire Universities Carnegie Research Grants’, The Times, 6 June 1932.
 58 UMA, Registrar’s Correspondence, UM312/1933/403, registrar, University of Western 
Australia, to Melbourne registrar, 1 Dec. 1933.
 59 Congress of the Universities of the Empire, 1912, pp. 313–14.
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students would, Parkin had thought, both enable the best use to be made 
of the various strengths of universities across the empire, and help to 
strengthen the bonds of a community he saw as stretching between them. 
It was a policy that, as Bryce had pointed out at the 1903 conference, was 
both educational and imperial.60 This logic of efficiency became even more 
important in the context of the universities’ assertion of their national role 
in the aftermath of the war. The subject of ‘interchange’ was discussed at 
all the congresses between 1921 and 1936. The Rhodes and 1851 Exhibition 
Scholarship programmes were cited as examples of the kind of system that 
needed to be implemented to foster the movement of students, while for 
staff the issue was seen as more complicated. In 1921 the institution of a 
system of sabbatical leave was proposed as something that would foster the 
movement of professors: in 1926 energy focused on establishing an empire-
wide Federated Superannuation Scheme; and in 1936 a special committee 
was established ‘to inquire into the possibility of effecting the exchange 
of members of University Teaching Staffs’.61 Nor was the bureau inactive 
between the congresses: in 1922 it appointed ‘interchange correspondents’ 
in each university; by 1927 it could report that it had ‘arranged for the 
temporary exchange of junior posts between teachers in Great Britain and 
teachers in the Dominions’; and in 1931 it made its decision about how to 
spend the Carnegie money.62
The importance the bureau placed upon interchange reflected the 
expansive definition of the British nation that underpinned all its activities. 
This was a vision of the nation that had been present from the beginnings 
of the congress movement. At the first meeting of colonial universities 
in 1903 Haldane had spoken of the ‘nation in its widest sense’, the ‘great 
British nation in its different parts, with its great common constitution, co-
operating for a common end’; and Bryce had referred to the ‘the national 
life of the whole British world’.63 As far as the pre-war delegates were 
concerned, this was a nation whose borders stretched out to include people 
and places beyond the British Isles; a nation that reflected the imperial 
careers of the delegates themselves.64 But it was a nation that – despite 
 60 ‘Official Report’, p. 77.
 61 Second Congress, pp. 388–92; W. M. Gibbons (University of Sheffield, secretary to the 
Federated Superannuation Scheme for Universities), in Third Congress, p. 244; Fifth Congress 
of the Universities of the Empire 1936: Report of Proceedings (1936), p. 230.
 62 UMA, Registrar’s Correspondence, UM312/1927/558, ‘Bureau Committee’s Report to 
the recent Congress’.
 63 Haldane, in ‘Official Report’, p. 118; Bryce, in ‘Official Report’, p. 77. 
 64 T. Pietsch, ‘Wandering scholars? Academic mobility and the British world: 1850–1940’, 
Journal of Historical Geography, xxxvi (2010), 377–87.
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frequent references to ‘empire’ and the presence of Indian delegates at all 
the congresses – was nonetheless racially constructed. Delegates worried 
about Indian educational standards and spoke at congresses throughout 
the period of the ‘British race’.65 And although, as Marc Matera’s chapter 
attests, numerous students from India, the Caribbean and Africa were 
by this time coming to study in Britain’s universities, their chances of 
gaining appointment as faculty members in Britain or the Dominions 
were virtually non-existent. When delegates at the congresses spoke of the 
imperial academic community it was overwhelmingly to the universities 
in the Dominions that they referred. It was this older and expansive vision 
of the British nation that was so central to the way the bureau framed the 
universities’ role in post-war reconstruction, for it was by better integrating 
its resources that the bureau hoped to rebuild the broken world.
However, in the wake of the conflict, educational fellowship 
and scholarly exchange also seemed to take on a new, international 
importance. As well as ‘drawing closer the bonds of the British Empire’, 
in 1921 Curzon thought that the bureau might also ‘aspire to a wider 
and more cosmopolitan range of influence, and that as it [drew] within 
its orbit the educated intelligence of other countries, and notably of 
America, it [might] exercise an appreciable influence on the peace of the 
world’.66 Or as Lord Robert Cecil, the chancellor of the University of 
Birmingham and one of the architects of the League of Nations, declared 
at the same meeting, ‘Learning has no territorial boundaries … Learning 
is one of the great unifying forces of the world, and we have now, more 
than at any other time in our lives, a further opportunity to demonstrate 
this’.67 Delegates discussed the need to extend interchange programmes to 
France and the United States as well as the Dominions (though notably 
not to Germany), and throughout the 1920s the bureau rented rooms in 
its premises in 50 Russell Square to the American University Union in 
Europe, the Harkness Foundation, the Office  National  des Universités 
et Ecoles Françaises, and the British Bureau of the Danish Student’s 
International Committee.68 
Yet, despite this new orientation – and the presence at all the inter-
war congresses of American as well as French representatives – the logic 
of internationalism remained underpinned by the notion of an imperial 
community. This was something about which the congress delegates were 
 65 L. S. Amery, in Third Congress, p. xii; W. Sherwood Fox (president of the University of 
Western Ontario), in Fourth Congress, p. 160. 
 66 Curzon, in Second Congress, p. 6.
 67 Cecil, in Second Congress, p. 336.
 68 Ashby, Community of Universities, p. 33.
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clear. ‘I have never known two nations to love one another’, said Ira McKay 
of McGill University in 1926, but
The only exception to that on a grand scale is the British Empire, because, after 
all, there is a great mass weight of friendship between the people of the overseas 
Dominions and the people of the Motherland, and between the people of the 
Motherland and those of the Dominions … Here, then, is a great mass weight 
of human material out of which we may carve a new contribution to human 
history if only we have the courage, the knowledge, and the skill to do it.69 
As far as the bureau and the congresses were concerned, it was as an 
embodiment of this unique kind of political and educational community 
– one that stretched between Britain and the Dominions – that the 
universities’ contribution to the new international world order would be 
made. For them, the new internationalism of the inter-war period grew out 
of the expansive British community that had preceded it. 
And this remained the case well into the 1930s. According to Sir Donald 
MacAlister, speaking in 1931 just a few months before the passing of the 
Statute of Westminster which established legislative equality for the self-
governing Dominions, maintaining ‘their essential unity of purpose’ and 
‘cherish[ing] the links that bind them together’ would only become more 
desirable ‘As the nations of the British Commonwealth become more 
and more politically autonomous’.70 Indeed, in the university sphere, by 
the end of the 1930s national autonomy was becoming a growing reality. 
Committees of the British vice-chancellors and principals were meeting 
with increasing frequency and in the Dominions national conferences 
were assuming more active roles. Yet according to Sir Edwin Deller, the 
principal of the University of London, in 1936 the universities of what 
was now called the British Commonwealth still shared ‘ties of kinship, of 
culture and of ideas’; they still constituted what the former Labour prime 
minister Ramsay MacDonald, at the same meeting, called a ‘body of unity 
in culture, unity in common traditions, unity in common inheritance’.71 
Although such language had for the most part dropped out of the inter-war 
congress discussions, in 1936 W. J. Adey, director of the Board of Education 
in South Australia, could still speak of a ‘British nation’ that included the 
Dominions.72 Indeed, for some of the delegates at the 1936 congress, the 
unity that this expansive nation represented seemed of renewed importance. 
 69 Mckay, in Third Congress, p. 36.
 70 MacAlister, in Fourth Congress, p. 154.
 71 Deller (principal of the University of London and treasurer of the Universities’ Bureau 
of the British Empire), in Fifth Congress, p. 252; MacDonald, in Fifth Congress, p. 251.
 72 Adey, in Fifth Congress, p. 74.
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‘In these days of peril, the co-operation of various parts of the Empire is 
more than ever essential’ contended the University of Sydney’s Percival 
Halse Rogers: ‘Dangers threaten on every hand, and unity is our only 
safeguard’.73 In the shadow of another war, it was still the expansive nature 
of the British academic community that its members thought was its most 
important contribution to what now seemed a breaking world. 
Conclusion
As Balfour and Curzon observed at the congress in 1921, the Great War 
brought immense changes to the universities in Britain. During the four 
years of its duration they turned their resources, both human and material, 
over to the nation: staff and students had lent their bodies and brains to 
the war effort, buildings had been requisitioned and teaching halted or 
curtailed. In the aftermath of the war the universities continued to draw 
upon this language of national service. In a mass democracy they saw 
their traditional role as organizations that shaped what Curzon called ‘the 
government, the character and the healthy manhood of the nation’ as all 
the more important. But, now funded by the state, they adapted themselves 
to act also ‘as instruments of intellectual progress [and] national efficiency’, 
fostering the scientific and technological knowledge seen as crucial to the 
new world.74 As they did so they developed closer connections with each 
other, initially in order better to negotiate their relationship with their new 
patron, but increasingly also as a form of professionalized efficiency; a way 
of pooling and making the most of their collective resources. 
But the organization the universities chose to give expression to their 
new collective voice was one whose foundations were rooted indelibly in 
the pre-war period. The Universities’ Bureau of the British Empire had 
been born of Edwardian attempts to foster closer imperial union and its 
mission and scope reflected these origins. As the only existing association 
of universities in Britain at the end of the war, both the government and 
the universities turned to it, almost by default, when they came together to 
plan for the peace. The bureau’s vision of the universities’ role in ‘mending 
a broken world’ was deliberate and clear, and central to it was an expansive 
understanding of the nation carried over from an older era. For according to 
the bureau the brave new post-war world would best be built by efficiently 
marshalling the intellectual resources of the whole nation, and this included 
the British universities ‘overseas’ as well as those at home. It would be about 
 73 Halse Rogers (judge of the Supreme Court of New South Wales and chancellor of the 
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the distribution of studies, and the circulation of information, students and 
staff in order to make the most of their various strengths and talents. 
This, indeed, was an approach that suited the older English universities 
for it enabled them to maintain their privileged positions not just as homes 
for the humanities, but also as institutions that had long cultivated their 
own relationships with Whitehall.75 It is, however, an approach that has 
hitherto been largely hidden from view and one that cannot be divorced 
from the more familiar story of the universities between the wars; a story 
which includes the development of research, the growth of new disciplines, 
and what might be described as the universities’ imperviousness to the 
claims of ‘the democracy’, with student numbers rising by only 0.2% 
between 1919 and 1939.76 The Second World War would bring many more 
radical changes to the universities in Britain. But the bombs that destroyed 
the bureau’s archives in 1940 must not also blind historians to the expansive 
articulation of the nation which shaped the thinking of university delegates 
at congresses throughout the inter-war period and framed the way they 
thought about their role in building the nation. The importance of the 
British ‘universities overseas’ has been erased from the history of Britain 
between the wars, but only by returning them to it can the historian begin 
to take up the task, so clearly outlined by Balfour in 1921, of estimating the 
magnitude of ‘the changes … in the social elements of the world’ brought 
about by the century’s first global conflict.77
 75 Cambridge’s proficiency in physics is mentioned by McKibbin among others, but it 
is perhaps relevant to note that it was led in the inter-war period by Ernest Rutherford, a 
graduate of the University of New Zealand (R. McKibbin, Classes and Cultures: England 
1918–51 (Oxford, 1998), pp. 249–50).  
 76 McKibbin, Classes and Cultures, p. 248; see also A. H. Halsey, ‘Oxford and the British 
universities’, in Harrison, History of the University of Oxford, pp. 577–606.
 77 Balfour, in Second Congress, p. xviii.
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9. Inter-war agnotology: empire, democracy and 
the production of ignorance
Priya Satia
Inter-war Britain was, for the first time, a mass democratic polity. This 
political reality, together with the new international institutions established 
to regulate foreign relations, suggests that the inter-war period was one in 
which decades of political idealism found some kind of fulfilment. Great 
men of such diverse political persuasions as Leonard Woolf and Robert 
Cecil had long expressed their faith that the right education might make 
the masses reliable participants in the making of foreign policy, and the 
convergence of the League of Nations with the arrival of mass democracy 
seemed to suggest that the time for democratically forged international 
relations had come. 
As we know, however, the Union for Democratic Control (UDC), 
founded in 1914, simultaneously expressed a fundamental lack of faith 
in government’s ability to formulate sensible foreign policies on its own, 
policies that would not land the nation in the kind of tragic disaster it 
experienced from 1914 to 1918. Its continued post-war calls to democratize 
Britain’s international relations were, in other words, grounded in cynicism 
about any paternalistic attempt to ‘educate’ public opinion; besides an 
idealistic faith in the value of democracy, it also expressed a feeling that the 
common sense of even the most primitively educated English person could 
yield better insight into foreign relations than the inevitably corrupt and 
interested ‘expert’. 
The cynics were right: despite the new institutions and the push for 
accountability to them, a new diplomacy never fully displaced the old. 
And this was in fact largely due to the rise, at the very moment of mass 
democracy, of the foreign policy expert – discussing grave questions at 
Chatham House or closeted with ministers in the proliferating government 
committees of the inter-war empire. What we find in the aftermath of the 
First World War is the hiving off of an exalted, elite realm of foreign policy-
making in precisely the era that modern democracy came into its own; 
the expert, engaged in discreet diplomatic exchanges and collaboration 
with other unaccountable elites, was part and parcel of the history of mass 
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democracy. And those anxious for democratic control saw this happening 
– they were as concerned with the quality of public opinion as they were 
with its actual purchase on the state. Certainly, foreign policy had always 
been an elite affair, but post-war ideals of greater democratic control of that 
sphere, together with the increasing unpopularity of expansionist imperial 
policy, forced the state to go to greater lengths to keep foreign policy aloof 
from public opinion. Official secrecy is an integral feature of the modern 
liberal democratic state, and the inter-war period was a crucial moment in 
the evolution of the ‘secret state’ of modern Britain.
The word ‘agnotology’ in my title is a neologism coined by Robert 
Proctor, a historian of science, who found it useful as a means of describing 
the tobacco industry’s systematic cultivation of ignorance about the harmful 
effects of cigarettes. He and Londa Schiebinger have edited a volume 
examining the production of ignorance about a range of politically and 
culturally sensitive scientific topics, from global climate change to female 
orgasm.1 I invoke this concept here as a useful means of describing the 
strategy behind official secrecy about empire in an age of mass democracy. 
Indeed, I would even posit agnotology as a central feature of the modern 
liberal democratic state: ironically, modern democracy, simply by virtue of 
its insistent demand for openness, tends to foster paranoid official secrecy. 
Agnotology also opens a new window onto the passionate debate among 
British historians about the importance of empire in British domestic 
culture, as we shall see. 
The expert was central to the work of agnotology; he was one of the 
mechanisms that the state evolved to adapt to institutions and movements 
for democratic control of government – alongside propaganda, censorship 
and reliance on more discreet technologies of policing, such as air control 
in the Middle East. These institutional mechanisms were designed to 
counter demands for openness and evade the audit of public opinion about 
colonial activity. Meanwhile, wartime scepticism about ‘official speak’ only 
intensified as some segments of the public grew wise to these tactics of 
evasion. Those anxious for democratic control of foreign policy were not 
only concerned with the quality of public opinion but also how public 
opinion could actually exert any influence over state activity. 
Of course, cynicism about state secrecy and dishonesty is an old political 
tradition in Britain. E. P. Thompson gave us the eighteenth-century 
chapter of this older, radical libertarian tradition. But he arrived at it while 
puzzling through the features of the post-Second World War ‘secret state’. 
 1 Agnotology: the Making and Unmaking of Ignorance, ed. R. Proctor and L. Schiebinger 
(Stanford, Calif., 2008).
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His critique of that state explicitly invoked the libertarian tradition but it 
also built upon the lessons of the inter-war period, when the imperial state 
devised new mechanisms for the exercise of secret state power in an age of 
mass democracy, and those who became aware of these new mechanisms 
became captive to a more malevolent view of the state than ever before.2 
In what follows, I will first briefly describe the making of inter-war 
agnotology, specifically with regard to the new empire in the Middle 
East, and then focus primarily on the effort of some inter-war Britons to 
identify and combat the state’s efforts to evade democratic accountability. 
As it happens, the new empire in the Middle East – the British mandates 
of Palestine, Transjordan and Mesopotamia – became one of the central 
controversies in the state’s and the public’s contest for control of foreign 
policy because it was there that many of those new mechanisms were most 
obviously discernible – partly because the region’s oriental qualities were 
alleged to have inspired them. It was not for nothing that E. D. Morel 
proclaimed Labour’s insistence on ‘full democratic control over foreign 
affairs’ in the midst of Labour questions about the secret diplomacy with 
Turkey at Lausanne in 1922–3. It was Middle East policy that inspired his 
conviction that foreign and domestic affairs were ‘inextricably intertwined’.3 
I use the term ‘covert empire’ to describe the mechanisms devised for British 
rule in the Middle East, and particularly Iraq – to distinguish it from indirect 
and informal empire. Iraq’s status as a League of Nations mandate was not its 
only novelty as a British colony: British imperial power in Iraq was located 
in a kind of parallel and informal state in the hands of unaccountable types 
of experts, an informal community of intelligence and security officials for 
whom bureaucratic procedures were merely something to be manipulated for 
the accomplishment of autocratically decided ends. Emerging technologies 
supported this covert rule. With aerial control, which was formally launched 
in 1922, the British developed a new form of policing in Iraq, whereby aircraft 
discreetly patrolled the country, using bombardment as necessary to crush any 
form of subversive activity. Military action by this regime was so covert that 
no decorations could be publicly awarded. No statistics on Iraqi casualties 
were gathered. Travel to the region was severely restricted.4 
 2 E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (1963); ‘The secret state’, Race 
and Class, xx (1979), 219–42.
 3 Morel in the Commons, reported in The Times, 25 Nov. 1922, p. 16. See also A. P. 
Thornton, The Imperial Idea and its Enemies: a Study in British Power (1959; Basingstoke, 
1985), p. 273; S. Howe, Anticolonialism in British Politics: the Left and the End of Empire, 
1918–64 (New York, 1993), pp. 47–8.
 4 P. Satia, Spies in Arabia: the Great War and the Cultural Foundations of Britain’s Covert 
Empire in the Middle East (New York, 2008), pp. 292–3, and ch. 8.
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At the same time, British administrators and politicians directed a 
feverish public relations campaign: spectacular air demonstrations and 
recruitment tours romanticizing aerial policing in Iraq; public lectures, 
officially inspired books and press articles, press statements, painting 
exhibitions, film and photography, all designed to cast the British 
presence in the region in the most favourable possible light.5 Much of this 
was the work of agent-bureaucrats like Gertrude Bell, oriental secretary 
in Iraq, and Colonial Office officials who wrote for Round Table and 
Blackwood’s despite regulations prohibiting officials from publishing even 
anonymously on such issues – after all, they protested, they were the only 
‘experts’ on the region.6 They also strove to persuade the public of what 
was at stake in the British presence. Official memos were disclosed to 
the press, with their origins tactfully suppressed, in order to persuade 
the public that ‘Mesopotamia was to receive the full brunt of bolshevik 
Turkish nationalist and Arab nationalist intrigue’ and would become ‘the 
nucleus and focus of all the evil forces in the world’.7 Popular conspiracy 
thinking was deliberately generated by the government to win over public 
opinion on the mandates. This was the political culture that inspired 
Leonard Woolf ’s unusually pessimistic 1925 essay ‘Fear and politics’, 
which described a human species so savagely consumed by fear that 
only individual confinement, rather than any scheme of international 
governance, could promise real global security.8
These two sides of the covert state – secrecy and propaganda – were 
designed to cope with anti-colonial sentiment in Iraq, in other parts of 
the empire, in the US and, most urgently, at home, but also to cope with 
the new political fact of mass democracy in Britain. I am not arguing here 
that newly enfranchised men and women challenged the state’s authority, 
but rather that the opinion-makers of the old, middle-class public, whose 
influence seemed threatened by new kinds of official experts, challenged it 
 5 Satia, Spies in Arabia, pp. 305–10.
 6 The National Archives of the UK: Public Record Office, CO 730/46: 54223, Hall 
and Shuckburgh, minutes, 9 Nov. 1923. At times, these were articles written on their own 
initiative; at other times, at official instigation.
 7 TNA: PRO, FO 371/5232, E16278, Norman Bray, appendix I of memo, 30 Dec. 
1920; TNA: PRO, WO 32/5728, Montagu to S/S WO, 24 June 1921; British Library, 
India Office Records, L/PS/10/866 pt. 2, Bray to Wakely, 22 Feb. 1921; TNA: PRO, 
FO 371/5232, E15068, IO to FO, 1 Dec. 1920, and minutes thereon; IO, statement for press 
release, in IO to FO, 1 Dec. 1920; Reuters, “‘England the Enemy’”, The Times, 22 Dec. 1920, 
p. 9.
 8 See also M. Grant, Propaganda and the Role of the State in Inter-War Britain (Oxford, 
1994), pp. 11–15; and, on a later period, S. L. Carruthers, Winning Hearts and Minds: British 
Governments, the Media and Colonial Counterinsurgency, 1944–60 (1995).
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in the name of mass democracy.9 The more that they, claiming to speak 
on behalf of the public, asserted their right to control foreign policy in 
Britain after the Great War, the more the state developed strategies to evade 
that public audit. Secrecy and propaganda together strove to undermine 
democratic control by cultivating public ignorance about affairs in the 
British Middle East. Those behind this activity felt justified by their own 
conviction that the public, with their critical stance, were merely playing 
into the hands of the global conspirators against Britain’s empire. Indeed, 
political paranoia was an important feature of this history; in the inter-
war period, the intuitive epistemology through which British officials 
had become resigned to understanding a region they deemed beyond 
empirical knowledge evolved into a conspiracy-theorist outlook in which 
all events in the Middle East were signs of a unified plot to overthrow 
the British empire. To those responsible for official advertisement about 
those, for the most part, imagined conspiracies, their work was merely 
counter-propaganda. 10
The state’s dismal view of mass democratic control of foreign policy was 
buttressed by contemporary scholarly studies of public opinion, which 
mostly delivered a pessimistic verdict on its capacity for wisdom.11 On 
the other hand, the press was exerting itself to redeem its wartime image 
as entirely submissive to government prerogatives – J. A. Hobson’s 1902 
critique of jingoism really got legs in this moment, finding an echo in UDC 
founder Norman Angell’s The Press and the Organisation of Society (1922). 
After the war, we see the emergence of a new vision of the press as defender 
of the public’s interests, intertwined with politics and feeding parliamentary 
debate in a new way, even if it could not fully shake off the government’s 
hand.12 
Thus, despite the government’s best efforts to suppress the subject, Iraq 
emerged as ‘the burning political issue of the time’, to quote Lord Peel, 
secretary of state for India; it was the point of which Churchill, as colonial 
 9 As the following makes clear, much, but not all, of the concern about official secrecy 
emanated from elite newspapers like The Times and the Manchester Guardian. It is certainly 
likely that in this they were not only expressing anxiety about state secrecy truncating their 
authority but also concern about the way in which mass democracy threatened to reduce 
their own voice in government (on which, see S. Koss, Rise and Fall of the Political Press in 
Britain, ii: the 20th Century (Chapel Hill, NC, 1984)). But there was certainly enough of an 
echo of their sentiments in parliament and elsewhere to suggest that more was at work in 
their criticism than simply two elite papers’ concern for self-preservation.
 10 Satia, Spies in Arabia, pp. 311, 317–25 and ch. 6.
 11 See, especially, Walter Lippman’s Public Opinion (1922).
 12 Thornton, Imperial Idea and its Enemies, pp. 303–4. On the press, see, for instance, M. 
Walsh, The News from Ireland: Foreign Correspondents and the Irish Revolution (2008).
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secretary, felt the press made most ‘effective use to injure the Government’.13 
People frequently remarked on the press’s ‘minute scrutiny’ of the issue, 
and indeed, everyone from the Morning Post to the Empire Review, The 
Times, the Liberal Daily Chronicle, the Labour Daily Herald and the Daily 
Mail attacked the government’s ‘insane policy in the Middle East’. The 
discrepancies between the government propaganda and the glimmerings 
of reality fuelled furious demands that they leave Iraq ‘bag and baggage’. 
The press wanted to know why Britons were paying through the nose for 
the upkeep of a country ‘advertised since our conquest ... as an Eldorado’.14 
It has usually been assumed that these critics were primarily concerned 
about rising costs in the Middle East and that air control, by substituting 
bombers for expensive troop garrisons, was designed to address this problem.15 
But criticism of Middle East policy did not cease after the establishment of 
air control in 1922; public opinion remained recalcitrant enough to force 
continual reformulation of the mandate arrangement,16 even if this was 
mostly semantic play, because it was never only about cost but secrecy. It 
was autocratic decision-making about the Middle East that troubled the 
eager democracy. In Whitehall, one of air control’s most saleable points 
was that its economy and speed would free Middle East policy from the 
check of British public opinion by making the ‘taxpayer question’ disappear 
altogether.17 But many British commentators knew that the scheme freed 
the government from fiscally imposed accountability to the public; they 
were on to the tools of covert empire.18 Concerns over cost were merely 
the starting point of a critique of government secrecy about Iraq. When 
the government requested military spending for the new colony, a Liberal 
member of parliament asked, ‘If £137,000 had been spent on a residency in 
Mesopotamia without any home department knowing anything about the 
 13 Lord Peel, comment on A. Haldane, ‘The Arab Rising in Mesopotamia, 1920’, 29 
Nov. 1922, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, lxviii (1923), 80; Churchill to Lloyd 
George, 31 Aug. 1920.
 14 J. de V. Loder, The Truth about Mesopotamia, Palestine and Syria (1923), p. 5; L. Fraser, 
‘The War-Mongers. “Sack the Lot!”’, Daily Mail, 12 July 1920; ‘Outlook in the Middle East’, 
Round Table, xxxvii (Dec. 1919), 82; Satia, Spies in Arabia, pp. 291–2.
 15 See, for instance, T. Dodge, Inventing Iraq: the Failure of Nation-Building and a History 
Denied (New York, 2003), p. 144; A. Clayton, The British Empire as a Superpower, 1919–39 
(1986), p. 80. 
 16 Mandate, then a constitutional monarchy under mandate, then a Treaty of Alliance, 
the 1923 protocol replacing mandate with advisory relationship, the 1927 treaty promising 
early support for league admission, the 1930 treaty promising admission by 1932, nominal 
independence in 1932, war and reoccupation in 1941, full British departure in 1958.
 17 TNA: PRO, AIR 23/542, J. M. Salmond, report, [c. Apr. 1924]. 
 18 Dodge, Inventing Iraq, pp. 23–4; TNA: PRO, AIR 23/542, J. M. Salmond, report, [c. 
Apr. 1924]. Satia, Spies in Arabia, ch. 7 and p. 288.
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project till the work was well advanced, how was the House to feel assured 
that this £800,000 would not be spent in the same manner?’19 
The Iraq issue was integral to the larger conversation about democratic 
control of foreign policy, as framed by an elite press cautioning the nation 
against the folly of continued paternalism in the wake of the recent global 
trauma. As The Times put it, ‘the time is past when any Government could 
commit the nation to the acquisition of a considerable new Empire ... 
without first making an exhaustive public statement of their intentions’.20 
Whether ordinary Britons knew or cared about their empire, a certain class 
of opinion-makers were intensely exercised about ignorance about the 
Middle East and went to great lengths to inform them that their ignorance 
had been deliberately contrived by the government. It is difficult to gauge 
what purchase this critique had at the level of either popular or elite opinion, 
but my point, for the purposes of this chapter, is that a new conversation 
unfolded between the wars about what people knew, should know or could 
know about foreign policy, particularly in Iraq. That the mass dailies appear 
to have been less exercised by this issue suggests that this conversation grew 
partly out of the old elite’s fears of its foreign policy influence being eclipsed 
by a new establishment of official experts.
Besides financial extravagance, the government’s commitment to military 
action at a time when the nation hungered for peace incensed those speaking 
in the name of democratic control of foreign policy. The Times revealed how 
‘straightaway, without the knowledge of the public at home, tiny punitive 
columns were mobilized’ whenever the authorities in Iraq desired. While the 
British government worried about secret Russian or Turkish incursions in 
its Middle Eastern empire, this paper spoke of public concern about its own 
government’s covert operations in the region. The Times suspected that operations 
there had been ‘far more considerable than the public have been allowed to 
know’, warning, along with the Manchester Guardian, that ‘the concealment 
of unfavourable news will no longer be tolerated. There has been far too much 
secrecy about the military operations in Mesopotamia’. ‘The nation’ had to have 
information to judge for itself the wisdom of the Mesopotamian venture.21 
 19 Colonel Hodge (Preston, L.), quoted in report on House of Commons, 1 March 1923, 
in The Times, 2 March 1923, p. 6.
 20 Editorial, ‘The Problem of Mesopotamia’, The Times, 8 Nov. 1919, p. 13. 
 21 ‘The Problem of Mesopotamia’, The Times, 8 Nov. 1919, p. 13; ‘Mesopotamia’, The Times, 
31 Dec. 1919, p. 11; ‘More Trouble in Mesopotamia’, The Times, 12 June 1920, p. 17; ‘The Risings 
in Mesopotamia’, The Times, 7 Aug. 1920, p. 11; ‘Mesopotamia’, The Guardian, 24 June 1920, 
p. 6, and report on the Lords, 26 June 1920, p. 13. On fears about the brutalization of the state, 
see also J. Lawrence, ‘Forging a peaceable kingdom: war, violence, and fear of brutalization in 
post-First World War Britain’, Journal of Modern History, lxxv (2003), 557–89.
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This segment of the press criticized the government’s constant ‘evasions, 
concealments, and half-truths’ about Middle East affairs, affirming a 
general ‘mistrust [of ] all official figures from Mesopotamia’. The Times, the 
Manchester Guardian and The Spectator agreed that the big mystery about 
the Iraqi insurrection of 1920 was not its origins, as the government would 
have it, but the government’s reluctance to submit to the public the actual 
extent of the problem and what it intended to do about it. They accused 
the War Office and the India Office of conspiring to conceal the gravity of 
the situation, even seeing in the official renaming of the mandate as ‘Iraq’ a 
mere ploy to divert taxpayers from ‘a name of evil omen’.22
The government was as imperial at home as abroad, they discovered. 
Like Iraqis, Britons were victims of an arrogant, unaccountable system 
of government that imposed oppressive taxation. The Times likened 
unchecked ministerial power at home to civil commissioner Arnold 
Wilson’s ‘uncontrolled power’ in Baghdad (which, the editors noted, had 
triggered insurgency there).23 Anti-imperial sentiment was grounded in a 
sense of shared misery under an autocratic state, a piquant measure of how 
low British democracy had been brought – low enough to create common 
experience with a people famous for their familiarity with despotism. It was 
less the state’s imperialism than its imperiousness that stung; many critics 
protested their enduring faith in the justice and decency of the empire as 
they complained of the government’s recent ‘subterfuges’.24
The concern with accountability homed in on the shadowy figure of 
the expert. What made the government unaccountable in this burgeoning 
critique was the concentration of power in the hands of ‘experts from 
outside’.25 Lloyd George’s rival for Liberal party leadership, Herbert 
Asquith, railed against experts who could ‘embark ... at their own whim, 
upon every kind of costly adventure’ in Mesopotamia.26 The Times and 
 22 Fraser, ‘The War-Mongers. “Sack the Lot!”’; ‘A Case for Frankness’, The Times, 15 June 
1920, p. 17; Editorial, ‘The war in Mesopotamia’, The Times, 21 Aug. 1920, p. 11; Editorial, 
‘Mesopotamia’, The Times, 18 July 1921, p. 11. See also ‘Mesopotamia and Anatolia’, The Times, 
23 June 1920, p. 17; ‘Policy in the Middle East’, The Guardian, 30 Sept. 1920, p. 6; ‘Risings in 
Mesopotamia’; ‘Mesopotamia and Economy’, The Guardian, 12 March 1921, p. 8; ‘Conspiracies 
and Common Sense’ and ‘Publicity the True Remedy’, The Spectator, 4 Dec. 1920, pp. 728–30; 
‘The Burden of Mesopotamia’, The Times, 31 Aug. 1922, p. 13; The Spectator, 21 Oct. 1922, p. 543.
 23 ‘A Case for Frankness’; see also Editorial, ‘An Imperial Secretary of State’, The Times, 20 
Jan. 1921, p. 11. 
 24 E. A. Powell, The Struggle for Power in Moslem Asia (New York, 1923), pp. xi, 5–6. A similar 
line can be traced in criticism of paramilitary activity in Ireland (see Walsh, News from Ireland).
 25 ‘Reckless Waste. Mr. Asquith’s Charge and Challenge’, The Times, 21 June 1920, p. 5.
 26 Asquith, speaking in support of a Liberal candidate, reported in ‘Reckless Waste. Mr. 
Asquith’s Charge and Challenge’.
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the Manchester Guardian inveighed against the ‘enthusiastic experts ... 
scattered’ among government departments.27 Just before he was co-opted 
into the government himself, T. E. Lawrence affirmed in the Sunday Times 
that the Mesopotamian insurrection was the result of the British civil 
authorities being ‘controlled from no Department of State, but from the 
empty space which divides the Foreign Office from the India Office’.28 
Ordinary Britons felt that as ‘the glamour’ of Iraq dissipated, they began 
to see their own government with ‘very different eyes’ too.29 Churchill’s 
new Middle East Department in the Colonial Office was looked upon 
with intense suspicion.30
Lawrence eventually emerged as the poster-boy for government treachery 
in the eyes of this old establishment, despite his heroic image. The war’s 
apparent demonstration of the heroic powers of a single British agent in the 
Middle East raised the possibility that the government might at any time 
resort to such an interloper to accomplish its goals in secrecy. Thus, in 1929, 
rumours of Lawrence’s presence in the RAF on the north-west frontier of 
India under a false name fed suspicions of illicit imperial activity in the 
region. Parliamentary questions were regularly posed about Lawrence’s 
complicity in various imperialistic plots, including a plan to overthrow the 
Soviet government.31 Concern about such figures clearly reached beyond the 
old elite, building on other strands of popular political paranoia. Lawrence 
was the ‘most mysterious man in the empire’, the ‘ultimate pro-consul of 
Britain in the East’, ‘arch spy of the world’. Socialists burned him in effigy 
 27 ‘The Air Ministry’, The Guardian, 18 Feb. 1921, p. 6; ‘The Change in Arabia’, The 
Guardian, 5 Nov. 1924, p. 8; ‘The Middle Eastern Department’, The Guardian, 16 Feb. 1921, 
p. 6; ‘The Risings in Mesopotamia. Most of Mesopotamia Insurgent’, The Times, 7 Aug. 
1920, p. 11; ‘What Is Our Mesopotamian Policy’, The Times, 16 Aug. 1920, p. 11. See also 
Frank Swettenham to the editor, The Times, 24 June 1920, p. 12; ‘Mesopotamian Trouble’, 
The Times, 19 Aug. 1920, p. 10; ‘Mesopotamia’, The Times, 19 Aug. 1920, p. 11; ‘War in 
Mesopotamia’; ‘British Policy in Mesopotamia’, The Times, 24 Aug. 1920, p. 11; ‘What Is 
Happening in Mesopotamia?’, The Times, 8 Sept. 1920, p. 11; ‘The Government and the 
Middle East’, The Times, 21 Sept. 1920, p. 11; ‘Our Military Expenditure Overseas’, The 
Times, 29 Oct. 1920, p. 13; ‘India and the Middle East’, The Times, 5 Nov. 1920, p. 13; ‘The 
Army Estimates and Mesopotamia’, The Times, 15 and 17 Dec. 1920, p. 13. 
 28 Lawrence to the Sunday Times, 22 Aug. 1920, in The Letters of T. E. Lawrence, ed. D. 
Garnett (1938), p. 315.
 29 Z. Buchanan, In the Hands of the Arabs (1921), pp. 4, 229, 233; ‘Captured Englishwoman’, 
letter to her sister, The Times, 23 Aug. 1920, p. 9; ‘In the Hands of the Arabs’, The Times, 25 
May 1921, p. 11.
 30 ‘The Middle Eastern Department’, The Guardian, 16 Feb. 1921, p. 6; ‘The Air Ministry’, 
The Guardian, 18 Feb. 1921, p. 6; Wilson to the editor, The Times, 17 Oct. 1924, p. 15; ‘The 
Change in Arabia’, The Guardian, 5 Nov. 1924, p. 8.
 31 Satia, Spies in Arabia, pp. 317, 324.
218
Brave New World
at Tower Hill.32 Even exiled to technical work on speedboats for the RAF, 
he remained dogged by suspicion as the man ‘to whose steely brain the 
most abstruse problems of speed, in air or water, are referred ... the ultimate 
government testing shop’.33 Gertrude Bell’s fame worked in a similar way. 
The press asked: ‘Why do we stay in Mesopotamia—Cherchez la femme 
... Miss Gertrude Bell’. She was ‘the Mystery Woman of the East, the 
uncrowned Queen, the Diana of the Desert’.34 Similarly, when another of 
their cohort of agent-bureaucrats, St. John Philby, went to Najd to mediate 
between Abdul Aziz ibn Saud and Sharif Hussein as a private individual 
after leaving government service in 1924, the press insisted that he was going 
as a government agent. Official denials of these accusations were taken with 
a large pinch of salt; after all, before the war, such unofficial envoys had 
been the mainstay of British diplomatic ties with the region. Moreover, the 
denials were presumed to be the agents’ handiwork – and they often were.35 
Such concerns were crucial to post-war demands to clean up the 
wartime explosion of the state, which had made covert empire possible 
by camouflaging dark corners of government in thickets of untamed 
bureaucracy. Anxiety about Middle East policy was bound up with concern 
about the mystery of who was framing it, about the distortions that the war 
had wrought on the state just when the notion of a democratic check on 
foreign policy had begun to gain traction.
The elite press made these demands for accountability not as a radical 
break with the past but as an effort to uphold constitutional tradition. The 
Times was indignant about the news of the government’s decision to assume 
a mandate for Mesopotamia ‘without … even … going through the pretence 
of seeking Parliamentary approval’.36 It was a ‘mockery’ of representative 
government. Transgressions of parliamentary procedure in the name of 
the new League of Nations invariably triggered allegations of ‘despotism 
by the Executive’. With its watchdog institutions like the International 
Labour Organization, the league may have facilitated greater international 
scrutiny of abuses in European colonies, but to some Britons at home, it 
 32 Daily Herald, 5 Jan. 1929, quoted in T. E. Lawrence: the Selected Letters, ed. M. Brown 
(New York, 1992), p. 311; ‘Great Britain and Afghan Rising’, The Times, 7 Jan. 1929, p. 14.
 33 Sunday Chronicle, quoted in J. Wilson, Lawrence of Arabia: the Authorised Biography of 
T. E. Lawrence (1989), pp. 894–5.
 34 Headlines from Beaverbrook and Rothermere newspapers, quoted in E. Monroe, 
Britain’s Moment in the Middle East, 1914–56 (1963), p. 142; Lady Bell, ‘Conclusion’, in her 
The Letters of Gertrude Bell (2 vols., 1927), ii. 776; Wilson, Lawrence of Arabia, pp. 706, 875.
 35 TNA: PRO, FO 371/10017, E9603, E8869/8869/91/1924, Shuckburgh to Osborne, 
4 Nov. 1924, and other correspondence in this file; Sunday Chronicle, quoted in Wilson, 
Lawrence of Arabia, pp. 894–5. On the pre-war era, see Satia, Spies in Arabia, ch. 1.
 36 Editorial, ‘Mesopotamia’, The Times, 1 June 1920, p. 17.
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also seemed likely to cloak them. International governance was a novelty; 
it seemed, to some at least, to reduce democratic oversight at the expense 
of yet more aloof expert administration (a fear certainly echoed today in 
sceptical views of the United Nations). In short, the league fuelled cynicism 
as much as it fulfilled idealism. Radicals in parliament protested that it was 
not that the nation did not want to hold on to the Mesopotamian ‘grave 
of empires’, but that the methods by which it was being administered were 
the greatest departure from parliamentary oversight ‘since the days of the 
Stuart Kings’. The old ‘Crown vs. Parliament’ conflict had revived in the 
guise of the ‘executive vs. the nation’, noted The Times – echoed by many 
supportive readers. Through the 1920s, the elite press criticized the drift 
‘towards government by individual Ministers’ who merely reported faits 
accomplis to the Commons – a reversion to ‘bad old ways’ that would again 
risk ‘catastrophe’.37 
Diplomacy was, to such critics, the ‘last redoubt’ of the aristocracy, and 
this made diminishing sense in an era of total war in which the masses 
suffered the consequences of diplomatic activity.38 Worse, the state seemed 
to have become captive to even narrower private interests, oligarchy 
adding insult to the injury of autocracy. In considering the government’s 
actions in Iraq, The Times discerned ‘in the background, and very audible 
though only dimly visible … gentlemen representing various conflicting 
oil interests, all hammering on the doors of Ministerial offices’.39 In a 
campaign speech, Asquith’s rhetorical questions about the meaning of 
British Middle Eastern policy elicited spontaneous heckles of ‘oil’.40 The 
informally organized world of covert empire had created shadowy spaces 
in which private interests could corrupt the government. The continual 
reappearance of a handful of experts in ever new guises, now as officials, 
now as oilmen, now as spies, seemed to confirm the sinister abuse of power. 
 37 ‘The Mandates’, The Spectator, 2 Apr. 1921, p. 419; ‘The Iraq Raids’, The Times, 27 Sept. 
1924, p. 12; ‘The Mandate for Mesopotamia’, The Times, 4 Feb. 1921, p. 11; ‘Mesopotamia and 
Mr. Churchill’, The Times, 23 Feb. 1921, p. 11; ‘Parliament and Mandates’, The Guardian, 24 
Feb. 1921, p. 6 and 15 March 1921, p. 6; ‘Iraq’, The Guardian, 4 May 1923, p. 8; J. R. Clynes in 
the Commons, 2 Feb. 1926, reported in The Times, 3 Feb. 1926, p. 8; ‘The Arab and Oil’, The 
Guardian, 5 Feb. 1921, p. 6; ‘Mesopotamia’, The Guardian, 26 June 1920, p. 10; ‘The League 
and Mosul’, The Guardian, 16 Dec. 1925, p. 10. On concerns about the league and secret 
diplomacy, see also J. Hinton, Protests and Visions: Peace Politics in 20th-Century Britain 
(1989), pp. 77–80; Thornton, Imperial Idea and its Enemies, p. 283.
 38 Thornton, Imperial Idea and its Enemies, pp. 279–81.
 39 ‘Mesopotamia’, The Times, 1 June 1920, p. 17; ‘The Risings in Mesopotamia. Most of 
Mesopotamia Insurgent’, The Times, 7 Aug. 1920, p. 11. See also ‘A Case for Frankness’, The 
Times, 15 June 1920, p. 17. 
 40 ‘Reckless Waste. Mr. Asquith’s Charge and Challenge’, The Times, 21 June 1920, p. 5.
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Thus, when Arnold Wilson, who as civil commissioner of Iraq had insisted 
on including the oil-rich, mostly Kurdish province of Mosul in the colony, 
turned up after retirement as ‘General Manager of the [Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company] for the Persia and Mesopotamia area’, a public outcry ensued.41 
The Times accused the government of distracting ‘innocent imperialists’ 
with talk about the civilizing mission, the defence of India and so on, while 
it fraternized with oilmen ‘behind the scenes’ on the assumption that British 
taxpayers thus ‘inoculated with imperial enthusiasm’ would be duped into 
paying for a permanent garrison to protect their interests.42 The promotion 
of popular imperialism, in other words, helped the government to generate 
ignorance about its own corruption. Certainly, oil was a commercial and 
geopolitical concern but it was just one among a range of British interests in 
Iraq, and Wilson’s reappearance on the scene probably had more to do with 
his perceived expertise as an old Middle East hand than a premeditated 
conspiracy of oilmen and the state. But the concerns about such plots reveal 
how covert empire, itself grounded in political paranoia, necessarily (and 
often rightly) produced limitless suspicion, as observers, at home and in 
Iraq, deduced that the tranquil facade of mandatory government concealed 
a hidden reality but did not know how far to let their imaginations run. The 
covert empire was found out but was, after all, covert enough that no one 
could build an accurate case against it. 
Like cost, brutality became a ‘question of the Press vs the Administration’.43 
Why, asked the Manchester Guardian, did they need to send ‘all this 
machinery, all these forces ... if we were establishing a political system on 
the basis of popular consent’?44 In the Sunday Times Lawrence revealed that 
‘The people of England have been led in Mesopotamia into a trap ... tricked 
into it by a steady withholding of information ... Our administration 
[has been] more bloody and inefficient than the public knows’,45 Many 
remained sceptical about official abjurations of cruel uses of airpower for 
purposes like tax collection, fearing that without public oversight operations 
 41 Editorial, ‘A Recent Retirement’, The Times, 5 March 1921, p. 11; Editorial, ‘The Case of 
Sir Arnold Wilson’, The Times, 26 March 1921, p. 9.
 42 ‘The Position in Mesopotamia’, The Times, 6 Sept. 1920, p. 11. See also Ramsay 
MacDonald and Andrew Bonar Law in the Commons, reported in The Times, 24 Nov. 1922, 
p. 7; ‘Mesopotamia’, The Guardian, 24 June 1920, p. 6; ‘Mesopotamia’, The Guardian, 26 
June 1920, p. 10; ‘Mesopotamia’, The Times, 18 July 1921, p. 11; ‘Mesopotamia’, The Guardian, 
21 Feb. 1923, p. 6; ‘Iraq’, The Guardian, 31 July 1924, p. 8; Commons debate, reported in The 
Times, 6 July 1926, p. 9.
 43 Commons debate, 20 Feb. 1923, reported in The Times, 21 Feb. 1923, p. 6. 
 44 ‘Mesopotamia’, The Guardian, 24 June 1920, p. 6.
 45 Lawrence, quoted in P. Knightley and C. Simpson, The Secret Lives of Lawrence of Arabia 
(1969), p. 138. See also Satia, Spies in Arabia, p. 302.
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were certain to be extraordinarily violent and frightfully un-British. The 
government’s sanitized language was not lost on the Manchester Guardian; 
it knew that ‘what the Colonial Office describes temperately as “air action”’ 
was ‘commonly known as bombing’, and surmised that had two British 
airmen not been killed in the incident at hand, the public would have heard 
nothing of it. This segment of the British press knew that it shared not only 
Iraqis’ fiscal enslavement but also their ignorance about the violence done 
there.46 
In parliament, too, the focus of the secrecy debate shifted from economy 
to humanity. Questions about Iraqi casualties invariably met with bald 
assertions that no numbers were available because of the elusiveness of all 
information in Arabia and that air operations had certainly caused fewer 
deaths than would have been produced by ground operations – usually 
eliciting outraged allegations of Hunnish behaviour (whether Labour or the 
Conservatives were in power).47 Eventually, endless obfuscations triggered 
demands for ‘a White Paper giving particulars of where and why these 
bombardments have taken place ... together with the fact that no one but 
the airmen concerned is ever present to know whether inhabitants have 
been killed’. The Air Ministry’s 1924 White Paper subsequently laid out 
the defence of air control’s humanity – mainly that it saved lives through 
its ‘moral effect’, a crudely airbrushed version of reality.48 Two decades 
later, George Orwell would famously unmask this sort of political speech 
as ‘the defence of the indefensible’: ‘Defenceless villages are bombarded 
from the air, the inhabitants driven out into the countryside, the cattle 
machine-gunned, the huts set on fire with incendiary bullets: this is called 
pacification’.49
The state did at times try to answer this critique of ‘official secrecy’ about 
Iraq. Special correspondents were deputed to write up favourable accounts of 
 46 ‘The Problem of Mesopotamia’, The Guardian, 24 July 1920, p. 8; ‘Iraq’s “Little War”’, 
The Times, 6 Apr. 1932, p. 16; ‘Bombing in Iraq’, The Guardian, 21 Apr. 1925, p. 8; ‘Outlook 
in the Middle East’, p. 85; The Spectator, 11 Nov. 1922, p. 682; ‘Aeroplanes as Tax Collectors’, 
The Guardian, 17 Jan. 1923, p. 6.
 47 See, for instance, the House of Commons debate on ‘Punitive bombing attacks’, 12 Apr. 
1923, reported in The Times, 13 Apr. 1924, p. 7; House of Commons debate on ‘Disturbances 
in Iraq’, 30 June 1924, reported in The Times, 1 July 1924, p. 9. 
 48 Commons debate, reported in The Times, 21 Feb. 1923, p. 6; debate, reported 21 March 1923, 
p. 7; debate, reported 23 Feb. 1923, p. 6; debate, reported 13 Apr. 1924, p. 7; debate, reported 1 
July 1924, p. 9; paraphrase of debate, reported 4 July 1924, p. 8; debate, reported 11 July 1924, p. 
8; White Paper, excerpted in ‘Iraq Bombing Operations’, The Times, 7 Aug. 1924, p. 11. 
 49 G. Orwell, ‘Politics and the English language’ (1946), available at <http://www.
mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/orwell46.htm> [accessed 21 June 2011]. On the reality of air 
control, see Satia, Spies in Arabia, ch. 7.
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the ‘open’ government there.50 The experts also made a case for government 
management of information in a region where news was merely ‘a fairy 
tale … passed rapidly from mouth to mouth’.51 In scholarly societies, they 
asserted their special role, railing against the ‘unfortunate pressure exerted 
on military policy by an ill-informed Press, backed by ignorant public 
opinion’ – ‘one of the penalties we have to pay for “democratic control”’, in 
the words of General Barrow, former military secretary for India, who then 
launched into a frightening description of the mayhem that would follow 
evacuation from Mesopotamia.52
But the more the state protested its openness, the more critics suspected 
that it protested too much. In 1928, responding to censure of the policy 
of detaining press telegrams in Baghdad, colonial secretary Leo Amery 
explained that telegrams appearing to give ‘exaggerated or misleading’ news 
were merely delayed so that the high commissioner’s office could provide 
the journalist with the ‘true facts’. But to critical members of parliament and 
the press, the system amounted to ‘government “dope”’. And, ‘Propaganda’, 
they knew, was ‘the executive arm of the invisible government’.53 
The state’s censorship and public relations efforts were sufficiently 
successful to stave off enough criticism both to keep the aerial regime in 
place and to keep the British in Iraq. But they could not silence criticism 
and, thus, as I mentioned above, the state was forced continually to 
reshape the British-Iraqi relationship and make the British presence ever 
more covert. The elite newspapers’ assertion of ‘knowingness’ about the 
 50 See, for instance, Arthur Moore, special correspondent, ‘State-making in Eden’, The 
Times, 16 Dec. 1919, p. 13.
 51 Commons debate, reported in The Times, 13 March 1928, pp. 8–9; ‘Wahabis and Iraq’, 
The Times, 13 March 1928, p. 15. See also ‘Order in Iraq’, 14 Apr. 1928, p. 10; Philby to the 
editor, The Times, 24 June 1932, p. 8; correspondent in Arabia, ‘Arab Border Raids’, The 
Times, 27 Apr. 1932, p. 13; British Library, Additional MSS., Sir A. T. Wilson papers, 52459A, 
Pennington to Wilson, 2 June 1920.
 52 Barrow and Peel, comments on Haldane, ‘Arab Rising’, pp. 79–80. See also R. M. 
Ruck, comment on H. R. Brooke-Popham, lecture on the uses of airpower in the war, 3 
Dec. 1919, in Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, lxv (1920), 69; TNA: PRO, FO 
371/13736, E3490, Lord Monteagle, minute, 8 July 1929; Capt. Eden, ‘The annual dinner of 
the Central Asian Society’, Journal of the Central Asian Society, xiii (1926), 320; A. T. Wilson, 
‘Mesopotamia, 1914–21’, Journal of the Central Asian Society, viii (1921), 155; Peel, comment 
on Eden, ‘Annual dinner’, pp. 320, 325; Capt. Acland, comment on Col. H. Burchall, ‘The 
air route to India’, 20 Oct. 1926, Journal of the Central Asian Society, xiv (1927), 17; St. 
Antony’s College, Oxford, Middle East Centre Archive, H. R. P. Dickson papers, box 2, file 
4, Thomas to Violet Dickson, 2 Feb. 1925.
 53 Commons debate, reported in The Times, 3 Apr. 1928, p. 8; ‘What Is Our Mesopotamian 
Policy’, The Times, 16 Aug. 1920, p. 11; E. Bernays, Propaganda (1928), quoted in Grant, 
Propaganda and the Role of the State, pp. 16–17.
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state’s secret activities and agenda were part of the new self-consciousness 
(and scepticism) about democratic politics after the war revealed, and 
considerably swelled, the leviathan power of that state. Mass democracy 
and covert empire went hand in hand. 
And so, in the inter-war period, we get a more malevolent vision of the 
state than ever before, rooted in suspicions of its unspeakable activities in 
the cradle of civilization. The new Middle East empire was crucial to the 
practice of mass democracy immediately after the war, not least because the 
place itself seemed corruptive. Commenting on the violence of air control, 
the Round Table warned that in Iraq British rule had ‘become Oriental and 
its end will be near’.54 Official production of ignorance and its criticism 
were anchored in cultural perceptions of a region in which secrecy and 
brutality were expected. 
From the early speculations about Iraq, exposing hidden imperial 
brutalities became the obsession of liberal critics who came shrewdly to 
equate empire with militarism – assuming, as A. P. Thornton puts it, ‘that 
virtue was only paraded in order to conceal vice’.55 Among them was 
Edward J. Thompson, father of E. P. Thompson. The son of Methodist 
missionaries in India, he taught literature there, and during the war served 
as an army chaplain with the 2nd Royal Leicestershires in Iraq. In 1918, he 
was posted to Jerusalem where he met and married his wife, the daughter 
of an American missionary in Syria. He earned a military cross for his war 
service and published several books on his experiences, from 1919 to 1933, 
including a volume of verse, two memoirs and a novel, which were part of 
the wider public discussion about the ethics of British activity in Iraq. 
It was not only the Amritsar massacre but the unending outcry over 
Mesopotamia that inspired Thompson to interrupt his decade-long effort 
to recount his Middle Eastern experiences with a revisionist account of the 
Indian ‘mutiny’, The Other Side of the Medal (1925). The New Statesman 
praised him for uncovering ‘the policy of terrorisation’ behind that event.56 
Raised by a father so profoundly shaped by his experiences in Iraq, E. P. 
Thompson grew up, as he said in an interview, ‘expecting governments 
to be mendacious and imperialist and expecting that one’s stance ought 
to be hostile to government’.57 His father’s search for redemption from 
disillusionment with the state went hand in hand with his passionate faith 
 54 ‘The Outlook in the Middle East’, Round Table, xxxvii (Dec. 1919), 85. See also 
‘Aeroplanes as Tax Collectors’.
 55 Thornton, Imperial Idea and its Enemies, pp. 303–4.
 56 Quoted in M. Lago, ‘India’s Prisoner’: a Biography of Edward John Thompson (Columbia, 
Mo., 2001), pp. 205–27.
 57 Quoted in D. Dworkin, Cultural Marxism in Postwar Britain (Durham, NC, 1997), p. 17.
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in the historian’s craft as the most effective means of truth-telling against the 
government, and that, too, his son absorbed. During the revived campaign 
for nuclear disarmament of 1979–81, E. P. Thompson invoked the historic 
libertarian tradition of working-class people as the only force capable of 
checking the excesses of the ‘secret state’ that had emerged in twentieth-
century Britain; and he also recognized that that tradition was the ironic 
inspiration of the state’s peculiar invisibility – the very unpopularity of 
the security and police agencies had pushed them into the ‘lowest possible 
visibility’ and encouraged them to develop ‘techniques of invisible influence 
and control’. These techniques had largely been learned, he explained, 
through the intense ‘inter-recruitment, cross-postings and exchange’ 
between the realms of imperial and domestic policing.58
Inter-war British debates about Iraq thus suggest a new way of thinking 
about the controversial question of whether Britain was an ‘imperial society’. 
The proper measure of an ‘imperial society’ is perhaps not, as Bernard 
Porter would have it, the extent of British employment in the empire or 
the precision of cultural knowledge about empire.59 Ignorance, as public 
debate in the US today confirms, can coexist quite peacefully with active 
and expansionist imperialism, and even with daily inundations of imperial 
imagery that bear little connection to the most urgent aspects of policy. 
This is what The Times picked up on when it accused the government of 
‘inoculating’ Britons with ‘imperial enthusiasm’, as noted above. It could 
even be that the essence of the truly ‘imperial society’ lies in the comfortable 
combination of ignorance with popular imperial culture – and not only in 
times of covert empire when the cultivation of ignorance is an important 
government activity. Ignorance is not only bliss; it is the luxury of those 
above the fray. 
Most critically, the question of Britain’s cultural absorption in empire 
must be historicized. The substantive question is not whether Britain was 
an ‘imperial society’, but how and when it was – culturally, economically, 
politically or socially. Porter is essentially arguing against a straw man; few 
historians on the other side of the debate would claim that press coverage 
alone indicates total cultural enthralment to empire, that all Britons 
were consumed equally by the Mutiny and the Boer War, and with equal 
political and cultural impact. We know that the press and popular opinion 
functioned very differently in 1857 and 1900; and ignorance functioned 
 58 Thompson, ‘Secret state’; ‘An alternative to doomsday’, New Statesman, 21 Dec. 1979, 
repr. in Britain and the Bomb: the ‘New Statesman’ Papers on Destruction and Disarmament 
(Manchester, 1981).
 59 B. Porter, The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain 
(Oxford, 2004). 
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differently too. The questions we need to ask are: how and when do culture 
and popular opinion matter in imperial history? How much did it matter, 
at different times, what anyone thought? And how was their opinion shaped 
in the first place? 
In this story of the struggle against imperial agnotology, we learn 
something about how inter-war imperial democracy worked. Domestic 
politics weighed heavily in the design of the Iraqi state; and the design 
of the Iraqi state, and the secrecy around it, weighed heavily in domestic 
debates about the meaning of democracy. It is a useful lesson for the US 
today as we think about the role of experts, secrecy, propaganda and aerial 
control in our ongoing wars in the Middle East.
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10. Black intellectuals in the imperial metropolis and the 
debate over race and empire in Sanders of the River
Marc Matera
Released in Britain in 1935, the film Sanders of the River is a hymn to the figure 
of the colonial district commissioner and the necessity for and beneficence 
of British governance in Africa. Set in Nigeria, the film is based on Edgar 
Wallace’s book with the same title. The protagonist, Commissioner Sanders, 
played by Leslie Banks, is the archetype of the colonial administrator 
who rules by force of his personality over his childlike charges. The film’s 
prologue neatly encapsulates its central message: ‘Sailors, soldiers and 
merchant adventurers were the pioneers who laid the foundations for the 
British Empire. Today their work is carried on by the civil servants – the 
Keepers of the King’s Peace’. Then, superimposed on a map of Africa, it 
continues: ‘Africa – tens of millions of natives, each tribe under its own 
chieftain, guarded and protected by a handful of white men, whose work 
is an unsung saga of courage and efficiency’. Throughout, the subdued 
but decidedly authoritarian Sanders maintains order through personal 
charisma and an intuitive capacity to know – to distinguish, see through 
and manipulate – the teeming thousands of Africans within his territory. 
The incident that leads to the film’s central drama occurs when, after five 
years of uninterrupted peace, Sanders travels to England to get married. 
Upon his departure from the scene, the European gunrunners, Farini and 
Smith, spread a rumour that ‘Lord Sandi’ is dead, inciting the malevolent 
King Mofalaba to revolt. Commissioner Ferguson, Sanders’s junior officer, 
confronts the old king alone and is murdered as a consequence. Following 
Ferguson’s disappearance, the missionary Father O’Leary cables the 
Colonial Office: ‘Send four battalions or Sanders’. Cutting his honeymoon 
short, Sanders hastily returns and once again imposes his authority, which, 
for the first time, appears to be fundamentally dependent on European 
technology; he is recalled over the telephone, returns by aeroplane, travels 
by paddle steamer to the Old King’s country, and subdues the latter’s army 
with machine guns. 
Though undoubtedly racist, the plot of Sanders of the River is rather 
unremarkable within the annals of British imperialist fiction. Indeed, the 
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film is less outrageous than its source, and its protagonist more benevolent 
than in Wallace’s fiction. Rather than the content of Sanders of the River, 
this chapter focuses on the circumstances surrounding the film’s production 
and its reception by black intellectuals in the imperial metropolis. Like 
the empire itself, the production of the film depended upon the active 
participation of those colonial subjects it claimed to represent, including 
the involvement of many West Indians and Africans resident in London. 
The release of Sanders of the River, in turn, fuelled far-reaching discussions 
about race and racism among commentators on both sides of the Atlantic. 
The storm of criticism that greeted the film revealed the heightened stakes 
of representing the colonial relationship on the screen. As Prem Chowdhry 
observes in her study of representations of colonial India in film, ‘empire 
cinema had emerged in the 1930s as an arena for debate and discussion on 
matters of imperialist concern and thus as a new site for the formation of 
public opinion’. If the cinema became a powerful new propaganda tool, 
it was also capable of generating alternative – unforeseen and unintended 
– consequences in public opinion. Imperial films were susceptible to anti-
colonial critiques, ‘a subversion of symbols and meanings’, which potentially 
undermined their pro-British effects and ‘made them counter-productive’.1 
Yet, interactions on the set and discussion of the film also exposed differences 
of context, interests, identity and authority among black intellectuals and 
activists.2 Sanders of the River and, particularly, the presence of recognizable 
black faces in the film incited debate over the meaning of race and competing 
performances of blackness in the imperial metropolis.3 
Before the late twentieth century, Britain was, as Frederick Cooper puts 
it, ‘not a nation-state, but an empire-state’, and ‘both the way the leaders of 
empire-states thought about their polity and the forms in which political 
contestation took place reflect “thinking like an empire”’.4 During the last 
three decades, a concerted effort to integrate the domestic and imperial 
 1 P. Chowdhry, Colonial India and the Making of Empire Cinema: Image, Ideology, and 
Identity (Manchester, 2000), p. 45.
 2 On the inescapable role of difference in articulations of diaspora and black internationalist 
discourse, see B. Hayes Edwards, The Practice of Diaspora: Literature, Translation, and the 
Rise of Black Internationalism (Cambridge, 2003).
 3 On people of African descent in the imperial metropolis, see J. Schneer, London 1900: 
the Imperial Metropolis (New Haven, Conn., 2001), pp. 3–14, 203–26; B. Schwarz, ‘Black 
metropolis/white England’, in Modern Times: Reflections on a Century of English Modernity, 
ed. M. Nava and A. O’Shea (1996), pp. 176–207. 
 4 F. Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley, Calif., 2005), 
pp. 153–4. See also G. Wilder, The French Imperial Nation-State: Negritude and Colonial 
Humanism between the Two World Wars (Chicago, Ill., 2005); and J. D. Kelly and M. Kaplan, 
Represented Communities: Fiji and World Decolonization (Chicago, Ill., 2001).
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components of British history has drawn attention to the ways in which the 
empire came ‘home’ to and shaped the development of the British Isles.5 
Yet, despite greater recognition of the imperial aspects of British society and 
culture, much of the scholarship associated with the so-called new imperial 
history has continued to focus predominately on metropolitan Britain and/
or white Britons. Moreover, while it has become common for historians 
to note the interconnection or ‘mutual constitution’ of the histories of 
domestic Britain and its empire, of metropolitan and colonial cultures, it 
is often unclear how this took place in practice. To upset the traditional 
focus on the metropole and its relations with the colonies, the vertical ties 
linking centre and periphery, Tony Ballantyne, Alison Games, Alan Lester, 
Thomas Metcalf and others have stressed the importance of connections 
between colonies and urged a re-conceptualization of empire in terms of 
overlapping ‘networks’ and ‘webs of trade, knowledge, migration, military 
power and political intervention’.6 At the same time, there has been a related 
effort to resituate the history of the British empire within a global context. 
Durba Ghosh and Dane Kennedy, for example, maintain that ‘the processes 
unleashed by the spread of British imperialism had an impact beyond the 
territories and peoples of the British Empire, generating a global exchange 
that both buttressed imperial authority and contested it’. To map the 
extent and complexity of the overlapping networks set in motion by the 
‘imperial social formation’, Mrinalini Sinha calls for ‘a mode of analysis 
that is simultaneously global in its reach and conjunctural in its focus’.7 
The everyday lives and political struggles of sojourners and migrants from 
 5 For useful overviews of the recent literature, see especially C. Hall and S. O. Rose, 
‘Introduction: being at home with the empire’, At Home with the Empire: Metropolitan 
Culture and the Imperial World, ed. C. Hall and S. O. Rose (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 1–31; and 
R. Price, ‘One big thing: Britain, its empire, and their imperial culture’, Journal of British 
Studies, xlv (2006), 602–27.
 6 T. Ballantyne and A. Burton, ‘Introduction: bodies, empires, and world histories’, in 
Bodies in Contact: Rethinking Colonial Encounters in World History, ed. T. Ballantyne and A. 
Burton (Durham, NC, 2005), p. 3. See also T. Ballantyne, Orientalism and Race: Aryanism 
in the British Empire (Basingstoke, 2002); A. Lester, Imperial Networks: Creating Identities in 
19th-Century South Africa and Britain (2001); T. R. Metcalf, Imperial Connections: India in 
the Indian Ocean Arena, 1860–1920 (Berkeley, Calif., 2007); A. Games, The Web of Empire: 
English Cosmopolitans in an Age of Expansion, 1560–1660 (Oxford, 2008). 
 7  D. Ghosh and D. Kennedy, ‘Introduction’, in Decentering Empire: Britain, India and 
the Transcolonial World, ed. D. Ghosh and D. Kennedy (New Delhi, 2006), p. 2; M. Sinha, 
‘Mapping the imperial social formation: a modest proposal for feminist history’, Signs, xxv 
(2000), 1077–82. See also M. Sinha, Specters of Mother India: the Global Restructuring of an 
Empire (Durham, NC, 2006); and S. Ward, ‘Transcending the nation: a global imperial 
history?’, After the Imperial Turn: Thinking with and through the Nation, ed. A. Burton 
(Durham, NC, 2003), pp. 44–56.
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Africa and the Caribbean who are the focus here provide a concrete example 
of a web of networks which were, at once, imperial and trans-imperial and 
transcended not only the divide between metropole and colony but the 
boundaries of the British empire as well.
The circuitry of empire and the technologies undergirding colonial 
rule, which came to include cinema in the early twentieth century, helped 
to produce alternative forms of identity and association, new political 
imaginaries, and transnational pathways of thought and action. Empire-
building required the consolidation and reproduction of both incorporative 
and differentiating institutions, practices and discourses, which produced 
highly unequal power relations but also struggles over the degree of inclusion 
within the imperial polity. These insights have significant implications for 
how we think about agency and resistance within the context of empire as well 
as the structures and terms in which contests over the nature of citizenship 
and sovereignty emerged. As Cooper suggests, we should ‘recognize the 
instability and contested nature of colonizing ideologies’, as well as how 
colonial subjects ‘sought to reinterpret, appropriate, deflect, and resist the 
political ideas they gleaned from colonial rulers, their own experiences, and 
their connections across colonial boundaries’. As Ghosh and Kennedy point 
out, ‘in spite of the transformative and damaging effects of colonialism, some 
colonised subjects showed that they grasped strategies of wielding power 
very well and capitalised on the liberal promises of colonialism as a way of 
contesting British rule’. Like Cooper, they maintain that ‘it should be possible 
to retain analytic space for the strategic agency of colonial subjects while 
recognising the context of coloniality and without resorting to crude notions 
of collaboration’. African and West Indian intellectuals in London between 
the wars exposed the discrepancy between the rhetoric and practice of empire-
building and appropriated the terms of their colonizers to make material 
demands on the state and assert their right to substantive citizenship. At the 
same time, they formed alliances and articulated visions of community based 
on consanguinity with people of African descent elsewhere from their outpost 
at the heart of the British empire. As Kevin Grant, Philippa Levine and Frank 
Trentmann note, empires not only produced struggles for racial equality and, 
ultimately, independence from colonial rule; they were also ‘sites of social 
and political movements that developed critiques of national sovereignty and 
explored transnational identities of citizenship and belonging’.8
 8 Cooper, Colonialism in Question, pp. 26, 32; Ghosh and Kennedy, Decentering Empire, 
pp. 6–7; K. Grant, P. Levine and F. Trentmann, ‘Introduction’, in Beyond Sovereignty: 
Britain, Empire and Transnationalism, c.1880–1950, ed. K. Grant, P. Levine and F. Trentmann 
(Basingstoke, 2007), pp. 2–3. See also S. Banerjee, Becoming Imperial Citizens: Indians in the 
Late-Victorian Empire (Durham, NC, 2010).
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The production of Sanders of the River brought different groups and 
individuals into dialogue with one another, demonstrating how the various 
webs of empire contributed to the construction of a larger intellectual 
milieu and community of address  – an alternative black public sphere. The 
reasoned, public discussions among Africans and West Indians in London 
on the representation of Africa in various experiments in empire-building 
during the inter-war period led to broader critiques of racism and colonial 
rule.9 At the same time, black intellectuals in London demonstrated their 
fluency in the practice of democratic citizenship and, thus, their suitability 
for a more supple and colourblind form of political association within the 
empire.
The projection of empire
More than mere popular entertainment, Sanders of the River was the 
product of a particular set of concerns that surfaced in the early 1930s and 
an unabashed defence of an increasingly beleaguered system of colonial 
governance. In the face of mounting criticism, the film makers and colonial 
officials in Britain, together with multiple African colonies who assisted 
them, sought to present a positive image of colonial rule as currently 
practised. The film offered a view of the indirect rule system in Africa 
similar to those of apologists like Margery Perham, who appeared with 
growing frequency in British newspapers and other forums justifying it as, 
if not perfect, a necessity.10 
At the same time, the position of officials in the Foreign Office and 
Department of Overseas Trade, that government propaganda as a form of 
‘national self-advertisement … was a necessary instrument of the modern 
state’, gradually became the dominant view amid the global economic 
depression.11 As the secretary of the Empire Marketing Board, Stephen 
 9 The British Empire Exhibition, which opened at Wembley in 1924, became the occasion 
for a renewed attempt at organizing west Africans in London on a broader basis, which 
culminated in the creation of the West African Students Union (D. M. Stephen, ‘“The white 
man’s grave”: British West Africa and the British Empire Exhibition of 1924–5’, Journal of 
British Studies, xlviii (2009), 102–28). On the Wembley Exhibition, see also D. Judd, Empire: 
the British Imperial Experience, from 1765 to the Present (1996), pp. 273–86; K. McClelland and 
S. O. Rose, ‘Citizenship and empire, 1867–1928’, in Hall and Rose, At Home with the Empire, 
pp. 294–6; D. L. Hughes, ‘Kenya, India and the British Empire Exhibition of 1924’, Race and 
Class, xlvii (2006), 66–85. On ‘empire strengthening’ and Africa after the First World War, see 
B. Bush, Imperialism, Race and Resistance: Africa and Britain, 1919–45 (1999).
 10 On Perham and other defenders of ‘trusteeship’ and indirect rule in the inter-war 
period, see Bush, Imperialism.
 11 P. M. Taylor, The Projection of Britain: British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda, 1919–39 
(Cambridge, 1981), p. 103.
232
Brave New World
Tallents emerged as the most well-known advocate of expanded public 
relations efforts to advance British diplomatic interests and promote 
commerce, including imperial produce. Although reluctant to use the term 
‘propaganda’, in his influential pamphlet, The Projection of England (1932), 
Tallents argued that ‘we must master the art of national projection and 
must set ourselves to throw a fitting projection of England upon the world’s 
screen’.12 It was within this context that the Colonial Office and the pro-
imperial lobby in Britain began to take greater interest in the power of 
film to shape public opinion.13 On the one hand, many believed it could 
be applied more fruitfully as a propaganda tool among metropolitan and 
colonial populations as well as in foreign markets, and there were repeated 
calls for films promoting the empire at imperial conferences in the 1920s 
and 1930s. On the other hand, the popularity of American films vis-à-vis 
homegrown productions both in Britain and the colonies represented a 
growing source of concern, particularly with regards to the maintenance 
of British prestige in the latter. Interest in the cinema as a technology of 
civic education mixed with concerns over the fate of British films in both 
imperial and foreign markets.14 As Sir James Parr explained in an address to 
the Empire Film Institute, ‘It is horrible to think that the British Empire is 
receiving its education from a place called Hollywood … Trade follows the 
film, not the flag’.15 To make matters worse, at a time when the diplomatic 
and economic support of the United States became increasingly vital, 
British inroads into the American market remained comparatively limited. 
Among British releases, colonial epics were consistently the biggest box 
office draws in the United States throughout the inter-war years and well 
into the post-war period. For film makers in both Britain and the United 
States, as Barbara Bush states, quoting a journalist from the Daily Express, 
‘the empire was “good business” and … films like Sanders of the River were 
“far more successful at the box office than any equal amount of sophisticated 
sex nonsense”’.16 For all of these reasons, writing in Sight and Sound in 1936, 
Winifred Holmes argued, ‘It is essential for the continued unity and good 
will of the Empire that more and better British films should be distributed 
everywhere and that these films should add to England’s prestige and show 
 12 S. G. Tallents, The Projection of England (1932), pp. 39–40.
 13 Bush, Imperialism, pp. 24–5.
 14 M. Kale, ‘Screening empire from itself: imperial preference, represented communities, 
and the decent burial of the Indian Cinematograph Committee Report (1927–8)’, in Grant, 
Levine and Trentmann, Beyond Sovereignty, pp. 191–213.
 15 Quoted in P. Swann, The British Documentary Film Movement, 1926–46 (Cambridge, 
1989), p. 125.
 16 Bush, Imperialism, p. 25.
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more of her ideals and epic qualities than before’.17 In a memorandum on 
propaganda to Neville Chamberlain from April 1934, the deputy director of 
the government’s National Publicity Bureau, Joseph Ball, suggested that ‘It 
should be possible to ensure the adoption by some of the more enlightened 
producers of scenarios dealing with … historical or imperial subjects in 
such a way as to enlist the sympathies of audiences on the side of the present 
government’. By 1938, Ball could assure Chamberlain that ‘I have cultivated 
close links with the “leaders” of the British film industry, and I am satisfied 
that I can count upon most of them for their full support’.18 
In this regard, the Hungarian film maker Alexander Korda fitted the 
bill perfectly, and he was probably one of the ‘leaders’ of the British film 
industry of whom Ball wrote. In 1933, Korda’s The Private Life of Henry VIII 
became one of the first films produced in Britain to enjoy box office success 
on an international level. Korda was eager to make a film that displayed the 
virtues of British rule in the colonies for his next project and dispatched two 
film crews under the direction of his brother, Zoltan, to shoot ethnographic 
footage in the Congo, Uganda and Sudan. Upon his return from the six-
month trip, during which he enjoyed the full support of the local colonial 
administration, Zoltan Korda showed the African-American actor and 
singer Paul Robeson excerpts from the nearly 60,000 feet of film, in the 
hope of persuading him to accept the lead role in the project. Impressed 
by the footage of African landscapes and native African dances and rituals, 
Robeson enthusiastically agreed to participate, ‘certain’, as his biographers 
put it, ‘that the film would offer blacks, in particular American blacks, a 
picture of the “Dark Continent” in which they could take pride’.19 
A black star and pan-Africa in London
By the inter-war period, the capital of the British empire had also become, 
as C. L. Innes observes, ‘the heart of resistance to empire’.20 As a global 
city and hub of the overlapping networks of empire, the city facilitated 
the circulation of individuals and ideas, and, as Elleke Boehmer explains, 
‘thus formed an important meeting ground for Indian, Irish, African, and 
Caribbean freedom movements’. In the imperial metropolis, ‘elites from 
 17 Quoted in A. Aldgate and J. Richards, Best of British Cinema and Society from 1930 to the 
Present (1999), p. 30; Sight and Sound, v (1936), 74.
 18 Quoted in Aldgate and Richards, Best of British Cinema, pp. 30–1; The National 
Archives of the UK: Public Record Office, NC 8/21/9 (14 Apr. 1934 and June 1938).
 19 S. Tully Boyle and A. Bunie, Paul Robeson: the Years of Promise and Achievement 
(Amherst, Mass., 2001), pp. 292–3.
 20 C. L. Innes, A History of Black and Asian Writing in Britain, 1700–2000 (Cambridge, 
2002), p. 167.
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different colonial contexts were able to mingle and exchange opinions in 
clubs, salons, and debating halls – in effect to experience different forms 
of cultural and political self-representation’.21 As British power in Africa 
reached its apex after the First World War, many Caribbean and African 
students, intellectuals and activists embraced the goal of emancipation 
through transnational co-operation between communities of African descent 
around the world, or black internationalism, for the first time in the city. 
My use of black internationalism as an organizing concept, instead of ‘pan-
Africanism’, situates the political imagination and activities of those under 
consideration here within their particular historical context, a period which 
many commentators recognized as one of increasing global integration. It 
more accurately reflects their language and ideas, which drew heavily upon 
the various tributaries of internationalist thought during the period.22 If black 
intellectuals’ growing impatience with British rule and the lack of colonial 
reform contributed to new alliances around race, the context of empire and 
the changing rationales for it in the wake of the First World War informed 
their political goals and conceptions of what black sovereignty might entail 
in an increasingly interdependent world. African and West Indian men and 
women in London engaged in dialogue with movements and individuals 
from elsewhere in the empire and African-American intellectuals across the 
Atlantic, established black pressure groups and publications, and exercised 
political dissent and imagination in envisioning the formation of regional 
federations in west Africa and the West Indies within a radically reconfigured 
British empire. Unlike the previous generation of west African intellectuals 
who were influenced by Edward W. Blyden’s emphasis on racial purity, as 
Zachernuk notes, the ‘new ideas for … development’ espoused by those in 
Britain during the 1930s ‘eschewed the idea of racial peculiarity, proposing 
instead modern global standards’. Increasingly, ‘Indirect rule was rejected 
in favor of development along British Commonwealth lines’. At the same 
time, their demands went beyond those of their predecessors in ‘denying 
the need for gradual trusteeship on the road to self-government’. A Nigerian 
 21 E. Boehmer, Empire, the National, and the Postcolonial, 1890–1920 (Oxford, 2002), pp. 
20, 153. 
 22 On changing conceptions of citizenship and the ‘new internationalism’ of the inter-war 
period, see F. Trentmann, ‘After the nation-state: citizenship, empire and global coordination 
in the new internationalism, 1914–30’, in Grant, Levine and Trentmann, Beyond Sovereignty, 
pp. 34–53; Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations, ed. D. 
Long and B. C. Schmidt (Albany, NY, 2005); C. Sylvest, ‘Continuity and change in British 
liberal internationalism, c.1900–1930’, Review of International Studies, xxxi (2005), 263–83; 
J. Stapleton, ‘Citizenship versus patriotism in 20th-century England’, Historical Journal, 
xlviii (2005), 151–78; and H. McCarthy, ‘The League of Nations, public ritual and national 
identity in Britain, c.1919–56’, History Workshop Journal, lxx (2010), 108–32.
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student and member of the West African Students Union, H. O. Davies, 
articulated the sentiments of many of his contemporaries when he insisted 
that the ‘British Empire deserves nothing but extinction as complete as that 
of the Dodo’, while arguing that Nigeria could ‘live and flourish’ within 
the Commonwealth.23 From the West African Students Union’s hostel in 
Camden Town to cramped apartments in Euston and Hampstead, from 
the university seminar to Soho’s nightclubs, London played a central role in 
the development of black internationalist thought and activity through the 
conversations, alliances and boundary crossings which only the city made 
possible. In the mid 1930s, the set of the imperialist epic Sanders of the River 
became for a brief time another such pan-African space.
Shooting for the film in Britain began in the early summer of 1934 
at Shepperton Studios in Middlesex. Not only did the film feature two 
prominent African-American actors – Robeson in the part of Bosambo and 
the twenty-year-old Nina Mae McKinney as his wife, Lilongo – but the film 
makers recruited nearly 250 extras from the ranks of black dockworkers and 
labourers in the port cities of Bristol, Liverpool, Cardiff and London, as 
well as a number of African and Caribbean students, actors and musicians, 
whom the film maker and critic Paul Rotha somewhat dismissively 
described as ‘Negroes dug from agents’ files and cafe bars’.24 At least twenty 
different African languages could be heard on the set. The Kenyan Jomo 
Kenyatta, then known as Johnstone, played one of the African chiefs in 
Sanders’s district; the Nigerian actor Orlando Martins appeared in the 
minor role of K’Lova; and a number of African students like H. O. Davies, 
who was beginning his studies at the London School of Economics, were 
cast as extras. The Sierra Leonean Ernest Marke, who formed the Colonial 
Workers’ Association and operated a nightclub in Soho during the 1940s, 
recalled first meeting Kenyatta on the set. Both Marke and Kenyatta 
later participated in the 1945 Pan-African Congress in Manchester.25 The 
composition of the motley cast crossed not only ethnic and linguistic 
divides but also class differences. Most students and other members of 
the literati from the British Caribbean and Africa rarely interacted with 
black and mixed-race workers in the metropole, but, for several weeks, they 
mingled with one another on a soundstage on the outskirts of London for 
the same daily pittance. 
 23 P. Zachernuk, Colonial Subjects: an African Intelligentsia and Atlantic Ideas 
(Charlottesville, Va., 2000), p. 112; H. O. Davies, ‘Our Secretary’s Bag’, Daily Service (13 
Oct. 1938).
 24 P. Rotha, ‘Sanders of the River’, in Rotha on the Film: a Selection of Writings about the 
Cinema (Fair Lawn, NJ, 1958), p. 139.
 25 E. Marke, In Troubled Waters: Memoirs of 70 Years in England (1986), p. 136.
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The interaction with Africans encouraged a growing interest in the 
history of African cultures within Paul Robeson and his wife, Eslanda 
Goode Robeson, who was studying anthropology at the London School 
of Economics. As Bill Schwarz explains, Robeson ‘brought Harlem to 
London and … it was in London that, in his own words, he “discovered 
Africa”’.26 His son, Paul Jr., recalled, ‘He found his own African roots … 
and became radicalized by the African anti-colonial fighters of that time 
like Jomo Kenyatta’.27 While life on the set helped to initiate a dramatic 
alteration in Robeson’s self-conception and politics, it also increased his zeal 
for the project and his hopes for the final product. As Marie Seton notes in 
her biography, Robeson believed ‘that if he could portray an African chief 
on the screen with cultural accuracy, then he was making a contribution to 
the understanding of the tribal culture which he considered was a part of 
his own heritage’.28 Despite clear signs within the script that the end result 
would reproduce a plethora of stereotypes of Africans, not least of which 
being his character’s name (Bosambo), Robeson remained confident that 
the film would portray Africa ‘in a really magnificent way’.29
Yet, if the experience helped to foster a personal attachment to Africa 
within Robeson, it also revealed the limits of his own knowledge and 
experience, and exposed him to the differences and tensions among people 
of African descent in London. Robeson’s costume, which consisted of a 
Tarzan-esque leopard skin and little else, drew criticism from some Africans 
who visited the set. Dame Flora Robson, Robeson’s co-star in the 1933 stage 
production of Eugene O’Neill’s All God’s Chillin, Got Wings, recalled: ‘He 
… was ticked off by a Prince of the Ashanti who was up at Oxford and said 
“What do you wear a leopard skin for?” So Paul said, “Well, what do you 
wear in Africa? Tweeds?” And the Prince said “Yes. We do.” They didn’t like 
him. They thought as an educated man he shouldn’t play these primitive 
parts’.30 Such encounters were humbling for the Robesons. Eslanda later 
reflected on how, in their naivety, they inadvertently perpetuated a bigoted 
image of Africans. 
These Africans, these ‘primitives’, make me feel humble and respectful. I blush 
with shame for the mental picture my fellow Negroes in America have of our 
African brothers: wild black savages in leopard skins, waving spears and eating 
 26 Schwarz, ‘Black metropolis/white England’, p. 180; Paul Robeson Speaks: Writings, 
Speeches, Interviews, 1918–74, ed. P. S. Foner (1978), p. 351.
 27 Paul Robeson Jr., interviewed in Songs of Freedom: Paul Robeson and the Black American 
Struggle, Channel Four Television (30 June 1986).
 28 M. Seton, Paul Robeson (1958), p. 78. 
 29 Quoted in Seton, Paul Robeson, p. 300. 
 30 Flora Robson, interviewed in Paul Robeson, BBC Television (26 Nov. 1978).
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raw meat. And we, with films like Sanders of the River, are unwittingly helping 
to perpetuate this misconception.31 
Robeson’s long-time assistant, Joe Andrews, remembered an incident that 
demonstrated how little the couple understood the regional differences and 
prejudices among Africans. Eslanda drove Paul to the set each morning 
and often picked up African cast members on the way. ‘More than once’, 
Andrews recalled, ‘she had the East African Kenyatta and the West African 
Orlando Martins jammed with others into the car. Neither Kenyatta nor 
Martins was happy about the situation. When Paul realized there was a 
problem, he asked Essie simply to not pick up anyone’. Andrews added: ‘It 
never occurred to her whether they were East or West Africans before she 
let them in the car, which shows really how little she understood them and 
their prejudices’.32 These experiences led the Robesons to take a more direct 
interest in the diversity of, and complex relations between, African cultures, 
and Eslanda embarked on her own journey to Africa in 1936, where she and 
her son travelled to South Africa, Basutoland, Kenya, Uganda and Egypt, 
and visited several of the friends that the couple met in London.
By the end of 1934, Paul had also become more sensitive to the prevalence 
of racism in British society. In addition to the Africans, West Indians and 
black Britons whom he encountered during the production of Sanders of 
the River, his interactions with black organizations like the West African 
Students Union (WASU) and the League of Coloured Peoples (LCP) 
contributed greatly to this process. Despite his own brush with the colour 
bar when he was denied service at London’s fashionable Savoy Grill in 
1929, Reginald Bridgeman of the League Against Imperialism reported 
that Robeson ‘startled many of those who heard him [at a LCP meeting in 
1933] by denying that there was any discrimination against coloured persons 
in Britain. Any prejudice, he said, that may exist is due to the presence 
of Americans in this country’.33 By December 1934, when he delivered a 
speech entitled ‘The Negro in the Modern World’ during a league meeting 
at Memorial Hall, his thinking had altered considerably. Here, he focused 
on themes that had begun to preoccupy him – the cultural wealth of Africa 
and the importance of identifying with this cultural heritage for people of 
African descent around the world. He surprised the audience by declaring 
that he was ‘unquestionably leaving’ Britain. Part of the reason for this 
decision, he explained, was his inability to ignore the extent to which his 
own position as a celebrity diverged from that of others of African descent 
 31 E. Goode Robeson, African Journey (1946), p. 49.
 32 Quoted in Boyle and Bunie, Paul Robeson, p. 298.
 33 TNA: PRO, KV 2/1829, Reginald Bridgeman to Arnold Ward, 15 Sept. 1933.
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in the country: ‘I want to be where I can be African and not have to be Mr. 
Paul Robeson every hour of the day’. While he admitted that he enjoyed 
‘perfect freedom and peace’ in Britain, he added, ‘it has not been so with 
my friends – companions of my own race. Where I am welcome they are 
not … I am tired of the burden of my race, which will be with me so long 
as I remain here’.34 Just months before Sanders of the River hit big screens 
across Britain and, soon thereafter, the United States and elsewhere, its star 
had made a dramatic volte-face in his public stance and personal politics as 
a result of his experiences in Britain.
Sanders of the River and the black public sphere
Even before its cinematic release, the film proved to be a huge commercial 
success. For weeks before it opened on 29 March 1935, a publicity campaign 
promised viewers both high adventure and a rare glimpse into an exotic 
Africa. Sanders shattered existing records for advanced ticket sales, and 
Harper’s Bazaar proclaimed that ‘all the world is going’ in the run up to the 
premiere.35 James Agate of Tatler noted ‘the breathless interest it aroused’ in a 
theatre ‘packed from floor to ceiling by an audience of every height of brow’. 
The aerial and panoramic footage of African landscapes and cultural practices 
in the film were novel in the history of British cinema and lent a certain truth-
value to it. As one reviewer explained, it combined ‘a dramatic film with a 
“documentary” authority’ in ‘an illuminating study of a primitive civilization 
with full-blooded adventure to provide the maximum emotional thrill’. 
Similarly, the Daily Sketch observed, ‘Sanders and his story are occasionally in 
danger of being ousted by something closely akin to a travelogue’, but it is ‘a 
grand travelogue … full of movement and primitive passion’.36
However, not everyone in Britain held the film in such high regard, nor 
was the criticism of it limited to London’s black residents. In a scathing 
review for Cinema Quarterly, Paul Rotha observed sardonically, ‘So this is 
Africa, ladies and gentlemen, wild, untamed Africa before your very eyes, 
where the White Man rules by kindness and the Union Jack means peace!’ 
While excoriating the director, Alexander Korda, Rotha expressed sympathy 
for the film’s star:
You may, like me, feel embarrassed for Robeson. To portray on the public 
screen one of your own people as a smiling but cunning rogue, as clay in a 
woman’s hands (especially when she is of the sophisticated American brand), 
 34 Quoted in Manchester Guardian (14 Dec. 1934); see also ‘The 21st general meeting’, The 
Keys, ii (1935), 52.
 35 Harper’s Bazaar, March 1935; The Observer and Daily Mail, 25 May 1935.
 36 Film World, 13 Apr. 1935; Daily Sketch, 10 Apr. 1935; J. Agate, ‘The cinema: lighted 
Africa’, Tatler, mdccxliv (17 Apr. 1935).
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as toady to the White Man, is no small feat. With Wimperis’s lyrics of stabbing 
and killing, with a little son to hoist around, with a hearth-rug round his loins, 
a medallion on his navel, and a plaster forest through which to stalk, what more 
could Robeson do, save not appear at all? 
Rotha anticipated a hostile reception from those ostensibly represented in 
the film, who, he rightly surmised, would interpret it as an insult to Africa 
and Africans in general:
It is important to remember that the multitudes of this country who see Africa 
in this film are being encouraged to believe this fudge is real … To exploit the 
past is the historian’s loss. To exploit the present means, in this case, the disgrace 
of a Continent. What reception will it get in Africa? … Who cares? It is only 
entertainment, after all! Sursum Korda!37 
After the film’s release, black commentators on both sides of the Atlantic 
debated the significance and impact of Robeson’s involvement in the film, 
repeatedly questioning his judgement for participating in such a project. 
Many, though not all, concluded that, whatever the personal cost, he should 
have passed on Sanders. However, though often critical, the diverse reactions 
of black intellectuals demonstrated the role of multiple, overlapping and, at 
times, conflicting identifications and interests in shaping their attitudes to the 
film and its star. Against the portrayal of colonial Africa presented in Sanders 
of the River, Africans and West Indians in London deployed a countervailing 
performance of blackness in the form of the activist-intellectual engaged in 
public discourse and worthy of the full fruits of imperial citizenship. Their 
responses were neither the same nor unequivocal, but were linked by a sense 
of common cause and universally entailed a call for greater unity among 
people of African descent across regional and cultural differences. While 
directed in part towards a wider British audience, the often heated debates 
between black intellectuals contributed to and assumed the existence of an 
alternative black public sphere.38
As a result of his international fame, Paul Robeson’s presence alone ensured 
that the debate over the film would be a transatlantic affair. If the alluring 
images of Africa, including, as Rotha put it, the usual ‘snatched chances for 
black nudity’, accounted for much of the film’s popularity, the appearance 
of Robeson in his first British film was equally important.39 Asked near the 
 37 Rotha, ‘Sanders of the River’, pp. 139–40.
 38 On the difference between the public in general, dominant publics, alternative public 
spheres and counterpublics, see M. Warner, ‘Public and counterpublics’, Public Culture, xiv 
(2002), 49–90. For a similar usage of the notion of an alternative black public sphere, see 
Wilder, French Imperial Nation-State, pp. 192–8.
 39 Rotha, ‘Sanders of the River’, p. 139.
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end of his life to contribute a short piece on ‘black intellectuals in Britain’, the 
Trinidadian writer and activist C. L. R. James remarked, ‘I doubt if there are 
many black men who have made the impact on England that Paul Robeson 
has made. He … was one of the best-known and best-loved black men who 
ever was looked upon by British people as one of the blacks who had made 
it’.40 An African-American celebrity who had become the most famous black 
man in Britain after his triumphant debut on the London stage in the musical 
Show Boat in 1928, his participation in Sanders of the River became the source 
of considerable controversy among black intellectuals around the Atlantic. 
Released amid the Italian invasion of Abyssinia and the major European 
powers’ acquiescence to the move, James recalled that the film ‘caused one 
hell of a row’ among West Indians and Africans in London.41 During a brief 
stop in London on his way back to west Africa from the United States, the 
nationalist and future president of Nigeria, Nnamdi Azikiwe, published an 
explicit condemnation of it. ‘Whoever sees this picture’, he declared, ‘will be 
shocked at the exaggeration of African mentality, so far as superstitious beliefs 
are concerned, not to speak of the knavery and chicanery of some African 
chiefs. I feel what is being paraded in the world today as art or literature is 
nothing short of propaganda’.42 After a screening of the film in Cape Town, 
South Africa, the local correspondent for the Chicago Defender wondered: 
‘Has Paul Robeson been tricked in his role of “Bosambo” … ?’ ‘This’, he 
noted, ‘is the all-engrossing subject of debate here’.43 Robeson also faced an 
onslaught of criticism when he returned to New York, where, he recalled in 
1938, ‘I was met by a deputation who wanted to know how the hell I had 
come to play in a film which stood for everything they rightly thought I 
opposed’.44 During an interview in 1936 for the Sunday Worker, an African-
American journalist lambasted Robeson: 
This picture … was a slanderous attack on African natives who were pictured 
as being satisfied with the ‘benevolent’ oppression of English imperialism. 
You yourself played the role of selling the natives out to the imperialists … 
You became the tool of British imperialism and must be attacked and exposed 
whenever you act in such pictures or plays. 
In response, Robeson claimed that ‘the twist in the picture which was 
favourable to English imperialism was accomplished during the cutting of 
 40 C. L. R. James, ‘Black intellectuals in Britain’, in Colour, Culture and Consciousness, ed. 
B. Parekh (1974), p. 154.
 41 Quoted in Boyle and Bunie, Paul Robeson, p. 324.
 42 N. Azikiwe, Renascent Africa (Lagos, 1968), pp. 153–5.
 43 ‘Africans Believe Paul Robeson Was Tricked in British Film’, Chicago Defender (5 Oct. 
1935), p. 24.
 44 P. Robeson, The Cine-Technician (Sept.–Oct. 1938), pp. 74–5.
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the picture after it was shot. I had no idea that it would have such a turn 
after I had acted in it’. Ultimately, he conceded, ‘You’re right, and I think all 
the attacks against me and the film were correct’.45 These reactions indicate 
both the sense of betrayal provoked by Robeson’s participation in the 
project and the extent to which the public debate on race and imperialism 
had become a transatlantic one. 
Yet, more immediate concerns and differences in material and cultural 
power between the African-American celebrity and them mitigated the 
responses of black organizations and individual West Indians and Africans 
in London. Some, like Kenyatta, remained silent on their involvement in 
the film, offering neither explanation nor justification. For individuals 
like H. O. Davies, working as an extra on the film was a source of much-
needed income for a cash-strapped student and a fun experience, but of 
little more significance. As a member of the WASU in the late 1930s and 
1940s, Davies, who became a major influence on the black internationalism 
espoused by the group, largely dismissed the criticism of his old friend, 
Azikiwe. ‘None of us’, he recalled, ‘worried about the article [by Azikiwe] 
because the fellows we met from day to day were decent and affectionate, 
and the crowd wage of two pounds a day was a little fortune in the pocket 
of overseas students in London. We all took the whole film, and acting in 
it, as great fun’.46 
For black organizations like the WASU and LCP, the publicity and 
financial resources that someone of Robeson’s stature might provide 
attenuated their willingness publicly to condemn the actor, leading, at 
times, to awkward apologetics. In a review of the film in its journal, The 
Keys, the LCP’s ‘Special Film Correspondent’ offered a critical appraisal of 
the film’s plot, while praising Robeson’s gifts as an artist: 
Sanders of the River … is just the kind of film which will appeal to the average 
English audience in a Jubilee year. It portrays the good old myth of the strong, 
silent, white man quelling hordes of angry savages with his scowl, and peacefully 
and altruistically ruling his thousands of ignorant black children by the sheer 
strength of his personality.
Although ‘Mr. Robeson’s glorious voice is well recorded’, the author 
asserted, ‘As Bosambo he is completely wasted. In fact the whole cast – 
many of whom you will recognize – has been sacrificed to make room for 
some news-reel pictures of Africa, and some fine opportunities for real 
Negro acting have been withheld’. The league’s unnamed correspondent 
 45 Ben Davis Jr., ‘U.S.S.R. – The Land for Me’, Sunday Worker, 10 May 1936, in Foner, 
Paul Robeson Speaks, pp. 107–8.
 46 H. O. Davies, Memoirs (Ibadan, 1989), pp. 61–2.
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dismissed the film as a work of propaganda and a missed opportunity 
for furthering black achievement as well as mutual recognition and 
understanding between black and white. ‘Still’, the review concluded, ‘if 
only to hear Paul Robeson sing, and to see some good Negro dancing, you 
should see this film’.47 
In 1935, the WASU honoured Robeson as ‘Babãsale’ or patron in 
recognition of his financial contribution to the organization, and the 
union’s journal featured a group photograph of members seated around 
the Robesons taken during the reception at its hostel.48 In the subsequent 
issue, the editors defended Robeson against the mounting criticism directed 
towards him for Sanders of the River. They responded, in particular, to 
the recent accusations of the Jamaican writer Una Marson, an outspoken 
feminist and an active member of the LCP, who had joined the growing 
ranks of his critics. Marson first met Robeson when she visited the set of 
Sanders of the River in 1934. ‘He told me’, she recalled, ‘that he found it 
difficult to get suitable coloured plays’ and introduced her to the work of 
the black Russian author, Alexander Pushkin.49 In the months after this 
initial meeting, however, Marson became increasingly embittered towards 
the famous African-American artist as she read the numerous articles in 
British papers in which he celebrated ‘the real but unknown glories of 
African culture’. One of the most important of these pieces, ‘I Want Negro 
Culture’, appeared in the New Statesman and Nation and was reprinted in 
the WASU’s journal with glowing commentary. Soon thereafter, Marson 
published a response in the former. ‘The cry for negro culture is putting 
the cart before the horse’, she argued, ‘and the first task of the negro who 
has achieved is to teach his people the value of unity. The negro worries 
too much about what the white man thinks of him and too little about 
what he is himself in the eyes of people of his own race’. Marson implied 
that Robeson had placed his personal success and popularity before the 
collective interests of people of African descent, adding: ‘There is nothing 
the negro needs more than sound, wise leadership by men and women able 
and willing to sacrifice for the good of their own people’.50 His recent calls 
for the development of a distinct black culture, she suggested, represented 
little more than veiled attempts at further self-aggrandizement. Worse 
still, these efforts had seduced many in London, like the members of the 
 47 G. M., The Keys, ii (1935), 83.
 48 ‘Installation of Mr. Paul Robeson as Babãsale (patron) of W.A.S.U.’, Wãsù, iv (1935), 
6–8.
 49 U. Marson, ‘Coloured contributions’, Public Opinion (3 July 1937), p. 20.
 50 News Chronicle (8 June 1935).
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WASU.51 The leaders of the union expressed agreement with Marson’s 
call for greater unity among people of African descent but dismissed her 
accusations: ‘If Miss Marson is insinuating that Mr. Robeson belongs to 
that class of successful Negroes who are “boosting” the race in order to 
focus attention on themselves, we may tell her gently but firmly that she is 
mistaken’.52 While Robeson’s substantial celebrity and resources led groups 
like the WASU to defend the star in the public realm, these same qualities 
also fuelled suspicion among others.
Marcus Garvey emerged as the most vociferous critic of Robeson in 
London. Once again, the WASU rushed to respond to the charges that 
Garvey levelled against him, a move that reflected both the political 
differences between them and the group’s tenuous financial position in the 
mid 1930s. Garvey had been an important source of inspiration and ally to 
the WASU in its early years. He helped to finance its journal and transferred 
the lease on his residence in West Kensington to the union when he left 
London in 1928.53 Yet, by the time Garvey returned to Britain in the early 
1930s, his credibility greatly diminished, he had little influence on and few 
ties to the centres of black activism in the city, while the WASU had become 
one of the most significant of the latter. Against the backdrop of the rising 
threat of fascism and a renewed bout of imperialist expansion by the fascist 
powers, the organization had begun to articulate a black internationalist 
perspective, which they explicitly distinguished from Garveyite black 
nationalism. In 1937, an editorial in Wãsù declared: ‘our nationalism is with 
a difference. It is not of the Mussolini-Hitler-Franco or the “Ethiopian” 
type which may be termed rabid nationalism. Ours is based on justice … 
We do not believe in the parrot-cry, “Africa for the Africans”, but rather 
Africans for Africa – a great difference’.54 
 51 Marson’s biographer, Delia Jarrett-Macauley, attributes her attack to envy. Although 
she had enjoyed considerable success, staging her play At What Price? in the West End, 
publishing two volumes of poetry, and managing the LCP’s social activities and journal, 
Marson undoubtedly felt upstaged by Robeson, who appeared to be usurping some of her 
central concerns, such as the creation of a theatre for plays by black authors in London, and 
receiving all the credit for advancing them. Indeed, she tried (unsuccessfully) to establish 
a London-based black theatre group that, as she told the Daily Gleaner in 1936, could 
‘produce Empire plays by native people’ without success. Yet, if the motivation for Marson’s 
intervention was in part personal, she also articulated concerns shared by other West Indians 
and Africans in London (‘Racial Prejudice in London Not Improving Says Miss Marson’, 
Daily Gleaner, 28 Sept. 1936, p. 5; D. Jarrett-Macauley, The Life of Una Marson, 1905–65 
(Manchester, 1998)).
 52 ‘Race enemy no. 1’, Wãsù, iv (1935), 18.
 53 The Marcus Garvey and Universal Negro Improvement Association Papers, ed. R. A. Hill 
(12 vols., Los Angeles, Calif., 1990), vii. 734.
 54 ‘Nationalism in Africa’, Wãsù, vi (1937), 22.
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The union had also moved into a more permanent home, which served as 
a social centre and hostel offering short-term lodgings to Africans and others 
of African descent. The WASU House became an important site of black 
sociability in London, but its future remained in doubt for much of the 
decade. The group first engaged in a public campaign against the Colonial 
Office and the opening of a government-sponsored hostel named Aggrey 
House, decrying the move as an attempt to undercut their independent 
initiative and extend the practice of indirect rule to management of 
colonial students in the metropole. Ladipo Solanke eventually secured 
limited financial support from the colonial governments of west Africa for 
the maintenance of the WASU hostel, but these funds were renewable on 
an annual basis and never fully covered the cost of maintaining the house. 
Thus, the group remained dependent upon outside sources of funding as 
well as positive publicity. Within this context, Robeson’s ability to provide 
the necessary financial and cultural capital for the WASU to continue its 
activities in London was of no small importance. Indeed, the same issue of 
Wãsù that featured the response to Robeson’s critics like Garvey also contained 
a photograph of the Robesons amid members and their friends during the 
WASU Day festivities held at the African Hostel on 31 October 1936.55
Writing in the Black Man, Garvey harangued readers: ‘Anyone who has 
seen “Sanders of the River” can readily grasp the significance of the surrender 
of the Negro to all that is cultural, civilized, lofty and high, which mark 
him as being unworthy for a competent place at the present time in the 
civilisation of the world’. In identifying ‘the danger of Paul Robeson as an 
actor’, he linked such representations of Africans to the growing prevalence 
of racial prejudice in Britain. ‘A picture like this’, he added, ‘shown to the 
majority of people of ordinary intelligence, can only tend to inflame them 
against the black man. There is no wonder … that cultured blacks and 
respectable people of colour find it difficult to secure courteous reception 
and accommodation in England’.56 The WASU countered by questioning 
the motives of critics like Garvey and took the rather disingenuous position 
that Sanders of the River was a work of historical fiction. ‘Such critics’, the 
editors of Wãsù asserted, ‘show a lack of a sense of proportion or historical 
perspective … Was there not a time when the African went about in skins 
and sometimes in nothing at all? Why should the African to-day be ashamed 
of such incident?’ At the same time, they dismissed the notion that the film 
reflected anything approaching reality in contemporary Africa, stating: ‘If 
 55 ‘Ogboni and Iyafin Paul Robeson and W.A.S.U. members and their friends at the 
W.A.S.U. Day Celebrations at the African Hostel in London, on the 31st of October, 1936’, 
Wãsù, vi (1937), 60.
 56 Marcus Garvey, ‘Paul Robeson as actor’, Black Man, i (1935), 8–9.
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the white man is so foolish as to think that the African to-day is like his 
ancestor of, say, fifty years ago, he will have a rude awakening when he 
meet[s] him’. The union’s co-founder and general secretary, Ladipo Solanke, 
had gained renown for his repeated public denunciations of the portrayal 
of west Africans at the 1924 Empire Exhibition at Wembley, but, in this 
dispute, the WASU allied with Robeson against Garvey, stressing the need 
for racial unity and accusing the latter of ‘pointless criticism’ motivated by 
petty jealousy. ‘It is not what our ancestors wore nor the “propaganda films” 
of the white man that is retarding our progress’, they argued, ‘but such 
pointless criticism with which we have had to deal. It is not love of the race 
that has prompted its authors, but, we venture to think, it is a case of the 
Fox and the Sour Grapes’.57 Infighting among people of African descent was 
the most pressing problem, not the representation of Africans in imperialist 
films.
Garvey dismissed the union’s defence of Robeson as youthful ignorance 
and restated his position, citing the more critical views of other Africans in 
London: 
In the wave of opinion he [Robeson] has visited a small African students’ 
Organization in London called Wasu … The picture of this social gathering has 
been published widely. Probably it leaves the impression that a certain number 
of African students support Robeson in the continuation of his performances 
in such pictures … We know of Africans who feel just to the opposite … 
He continued: 
The few Africans who sat with him were young men who have not yet started 
to think in the highest sense of the racial integrity and pride. Probably Paul 
Robeson is a patron of the student body. If so, it would be expected that the 
students who are appreciative of his assistance would rally around him, but that 
surely will not leave the inference that he is endorsed to continue appearing 
in such pictures that do not do us as a race any good. Paul Robeson ought to 
realize that the growing prejudice against Negroes in England, or Great Britain 
for that matter, is due largely to the peculiar impression moving picture fans 
obtain from seeing such pictures …58 
Garvey’s insistence on the role of popular culture in warping Britons’ 
perception of Africans generally accorded with views expressed by the 
WASU in other circumstances. But those in the WASU who came 
to Robeson’s defence were not simply star-struck or naive, as Garvey 
suggested. Indeed, as even he recognized, other factors were at work. As the 
group developed a more ambitious agenda, its position became both more 
 57 ‘Mr. Paul Robeson and his critics’, Wãsù, v, Christmas Number (1936), 49–51.
 58 M. Garvey, ‘Paul Robeson and his mission’, Black Man, ii (1937), 2–3.
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established and more tenuous. Like the individuals whose participation in 
the film was guided mainly by personal considerations, the union’s response 
to the criticism levelled at Robeson for Sanders of the River represented a 
tactical move reflecting pragmatic concerns as well as its commitment to 
black unity.
Robeson himself ultimately disavowed Sanders of the River, acknowledging 
the validity of the criticisms of the film and later citing the experience 
as an important turning point in his career, but exactly when (and the 
related question of why) remains unclear. He subsequently claimed that, 
‘when it was shown at its premiere in London and I saw what it was, I 
was called to the stage and in protest refused to perform. Since that time 
I have refused to play in three films offered me by that same producer’.59 
However, in their recent biography, Boyle and Bunie observe: ‘By virtually 
all accounts (excepting Seton’s) Robeson expressed no dissatisfaction with 
the film until faced with a storm of protest from … West Indians, Africans, 
native members of the India League, and white anti-imperialists’.60 
Robeson became more politically active in the late 1930s and 1940s, but 
his turn to communism rather than a more direct engagement with black 
internationalism disappointed many, a failure which some linked to 
differences in background and experience.61 C. L. R. James later attributed 
this to his being an American rather than a colonial subject in the British 
empire. As he recalled: 
Paul showed such intense interest in Africa during the early 1930s, I was sure he 
would eventually join us in the fight against British colonialism. He was such 
a giant, and we expected and hoped for so much from him. But, in truth, he 
was not a colonial and never really understood British imperialism. In fact, it 
 59 Davis Jr., ‘U.S.S.R.’, pp. 107–8.
 60 In 1938, he explained, ‘“Sanders of the River” … attracted me because the material that 
London Films brought back from Africa seemed to me good honest pictures of African folk 
ways … But in the complete version, “Sanders of the River” resolved itself into a piece of 
flag-waving, in which I wasn’t interested. As far as I was concerned it was a total loss’. When 
asked the same year why he ‘cut himself off’ from the British and American commercial film 
industry soon thereafter, he said, ‘because I am no longer willing to identify myself with an 
organization that has no regard for reality – an organization that attempts to nullify public 
intelligence, falsify life and entirely ignores the many dynamic forces at work in the world 
today’. Boyle and Bunie, Paul Robeson, p. 324; Robeson, The Cine-Technician (Sept.–Oct. 
1938), pp. 74–5; P. Robeson, ‘Why Robeson rebelled’, Film Weekly, 8 Oct. 1938.
 61 E.g., Robeson was criticized at an LCP meeting for joining the communist-supported 
Unity Theatre, and ‘it was agreed that steps should be taken to persuade him not to identify 
himself so closely with the Communist Party’ (TNA: PRO, KV 2/1829 (26 Oct. 1937)). On 
Robeson and the Unity Theatre, see C. Chambers, The Story of the Unity Theatre (New York, 
1989).
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took him a long time to grasp the damage done by a movie like Sanders of the 
River … As an American I don’t think he understood what the British had done 
in the colonies and how wrong it all was, even though it was so like his own 
situation in America.62
James pointed to the different perspectives of African Americans and 
Africans (and presumably West Indians) under British colonial rule only 
to deny that there were in fact substantive differences between racialized 
structures operating in their respective contexts. Whatever disagreements 
emerged between them, Robeson’s interactions with members of the LCP 
and WASU, as well as individuals like C. L. R. James and Jomo Kenyatta, 
played no small role in awakening his interest in Africa and spurring his turn 
to communist internationalism. These encounters laid the foundation for 
the Robesons’ later involvement in the anti-imperialist Council on African 
Affairs in the United States.63 The encounter with the African-American 
star also led many black intellectuals in London, as with James above, to 
think in more complex and global terms about the consistency of racial 
subordination across the varying circumstances of people of African descent 
in a world shaped by empire. The networks of empire that brought the 
Robesons, James and the African and West Indian members of the WASU 
and LCP together in London helped to foster a sense of belonging to a 
larger black world, a source of identification and a community of address, 
that underpinned the debate over and various reactions to Sanders of the 
River.
Conclusion
Both the intent behind Sanders of the River and the responses that it 
solicited from West Indian and African commentators in London reflected 
a growing struggle over the form of the British empire and the nature of 
citizenship within it. The film emerged at a moment when indirect rule 
seemed increasingly untenable as a means of securing Britain’s ties to its 
African colonies into the future. Its appearance was part of a larger attempt 
to market the empire at home, in the colonies and abroad in the inter-
war period. Yet, the production process itself, dependent as it was on the 
participation of an internationally recognized African-American star and 
scores of other black actors and extras, created a space for interaction, 
alliance-building and even conflict among individuals of African descent 
 62 Quoted in Boyle and Bunie, Paul Robeson, pp. 365–6.
 63 On what Schwarz terms Robeson’s ‘folk internationalism’, see Schwarz, ‘Black 
metropolis/white England’. On Eslanda Robeson’s important role in the Council on African 
Affairs and other anti-imperialist activities, see J. Castledine, ‘… Without battle ships, atom 
bombs, and lynch ropes’ (unpublished Rutgers University PhD thesis, 2007).
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in Britain. Moreover, the intrusion of black intellectuals into the debates 
surrounding Sanders of the River revealed the contours of a self-conscious 
and, in terms of perspective and perceived interests, relatively distinct black 
public sphere in the imperial metropolis as well as a trans-Atlantic dialogue 
on race and empire. Pressed into service as a new technology of ‘empire-
strengthening’, the cinema also provided an opportunity for Africans and 
West Indians to critique empire and articulate their own visions of racial 
community.
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11. Co-operatives and the technocrats, or 
‘the Fabian agony’ revisited
Aaron Windel
Introduction
In 1963, New Left Review published a scathing assessment of the Labour 
party’s record on colonial issues.1 Ioan Davies’s claim in ‘The Labour 
Commonwealth’ was that Labour had been inept at contemplating, much 
less acting upon, the problem of empire. Labour leaders since the 1920s 
had been too concerned with supporting national living standards and 
had failed to find a plan of political development toward independence 
for the colonies. The Fabians, especially Sidney and Beatrice Webb, were 
‘social imperialists’.2 Labour stalled or hid behind procedural excuses when 
confronted by nationalists in India in the 1920s.3 All the talk of a multi-
racial Commonwealth went nowhere since ultimately Labour, like the 
Conservatives, was motivated first by concerns for economic growth at 
home. In Davies’s view, British politics from the inter-war years onwards 
had suffered ‘the Fabian agony’, which prevented the British left from 
meeting the emergent Third World left on common ground.4 ‘Throughout 
the interwar years’, Davies wrote, ‘Labour had little to offer most of these 
[its colonies and dependencies] … But for most of Africa, Arabia and the 
Caribbean there was no policy that was not derivative from Britain’s own 
 1 I. Davies, ‘The Labour Commonwealth’, New Left Review, xxii (Dec. 1963), 75–94. 
Davies’s attack was resented by Fabian leaders in Labour. Anthony Wedgwood Benn’s 
letter to the NLR editorial board, in which he listed the many contacts among important 
socialists in independent Africa, was published the following year (T. Benn, ‘Fabianism and 
colonialism’, New Left Review, xxv (May–June 1964), 84–6). 
 2 Davies, ‘Labour Commonwealth’, p. 76. Since this chapter focuses on 1929–31, it is worth 
noting that Ramsay MacDonald, for his part, had long been suspicious of Chamberlain’s 
vision of a closely knit empire with inter-imperial trade strengthening its civic bonds. He 
wrote in Labour and the Empire in 1907 that ‘placing such advantage in the forefront of the 
raison d’être of Empire makes the imperial fabric a gross erection of the commercial spirit – 
a kind of United States sky-scraper valued because of its utility in raking rents – and such 
erections do not stand the test of time’ (R. MacDonald, Labour and Empire (1907), p. 92).
 3 Davies, ‘Labour Commonwealth’, p. 78.
 4 Davies, ‘Labour Commonwealth’, p. 89.
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economic interests. Trusteeship was a concept now accepted by all parties, 
yet it involved no theory of political development and rested substantially 
on the ability of local governors and the static nature of tribal rule’.5
Subsequently, historians have also painted a picture of Labour pulled 
towards inaction by its conflicting internal energies. Partha Gupta claimed 
that the Labour party on the whole was anti-imperialist, but that it suffered 
from a strain of racism in its rank and file and among its theorists, Fabians 
especially, that prevented the party from pursuing a policy of national 
independence.6 Few have researched the question of the place of empire 
in British politics more thoroughly than Ronald Hyam, and his account 
of Labour’s attempt at policy for Africa from 1945 to 1951 is similarly one 
of feet dragging while the party tried to balance its moral commitment 
to independence throughout the empire with its Cold War geopolitical 
concern for fighting the spread of communism.7 
This chapter takes a somewhat different angle on the question of 
Labour’s programme of economic and political development in the 
empire and how the second Labour government administered inter-war 
trusteeship for Africa. Instead of looking for a critical mass of party MPs 
calling for decolonization and national elections, I take the economic 
and political model that the Fabians regarded as their domestic ideal – a 
‘Socialist Commonwealth’ with neighbourhood co-operatives as political 
and economic centres of community life – and explore how it fared in 
the empire during the brief Labour government, 1929–31. The spread of a 
state-endorsed and closely supervised co-operative movement from India 
and Ceylon to Palestine and Africa received an important boost from 
 5 Davies, ‘Labour Commonwealth’, p. 78.
 6 Gupta acknowledged that Labour’s greatest difficulty was in fact staying in office long 
enough to make headway in any direction, having spent only 9 years of 40 (1924–64) at 
the head of government and only a handful of those enjoying a majority of Labour MPs 
(P. S. Gupta, Imperialism and the British Labour Movement, 1914–64 (New York, 1975), p. 
391). Richard Toye in the Historical Journal several years ago argued that Labour’s inability 
to move forward on its goal of international economic co-operation was similarly the result 
of a ‘planning paradox’ that placed the needs of Labour’s domestic agenda, which party 
leaders insisted required market controls, at odds with American hopes for liberal trade 
arrangements in the Atlantic sphere (R. Toye, ‘The Labour party’s external economic policy 
in the 1940s’, Historical Journal, xliii (2000), 189–215).
 7 There also was serious concern that quitting Africa would lead to race war as white 
settlers seized control of some new states and black nationalists took control of others. The 
apartheidist Union of South Africa was at once a continual threat to multi-racialism while 
at the same time it was perceived as an indispensable ally against Soviet incursions on the 
continent (R. Hyam, Understanding the British Empire (Cambridge, 2010); see esp. Hyam’s 
chapter, ‘Africa and the Labour government, 1945–51’, which originally appeared in the 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, xvi (1988), 148–72). 
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Sidney Webb (Lord Passfield) when he took office as secretary of state 
for the colonies in 1929. The Webbs’ own pronouncements on political 
community and Commonwealth were objections to liberal parliaments, 
which they viewed as imperfect institutions for a true democracy and as 
heirs of capitalistic subversions of the community ideal in English history.8 
I propose that it is better to think about how Sidney Webb pursued the 
implementation of the political institutions in which he believed. Taken 
alongside his and Beatrice Webb’s writings for the Fabian Society on the 
coming of a co-operative socialist Commonwealth, Sidney Webb’s efforts 
to create a viable co-operative movement throughout the empire suggest 
that he in fact rather quickly steered Colonial Office policy on land use and 
labour toward Fabian goals. 
The initiative in the Colonial Office to promote ‘native co-operatives’ as a 
programme for rural development in Africa seems to have been Webb’s. His 
main collaborator, and ambassador for the project to the various colonial 
governments of the African territories targeted, was the career India civil 
servant Charles Francis Strickland. This chapter seeks to reconstruct the 
political philosophies of co-operation that Webb and Strickland espoused 
and to suggest some of the consequences of their collaboration for the 
history of rural development in Africa. 
Webb believed that co-operatives – from marketing co-operatives 
to Rochdale grocery co-ops and co-operative credit societies – could do 
great good for the condition of the peasant and labourer in the colonial 
world.  While it is certainly true that Webb accepted a racial hierarchy as a 
determinant of colonial subjects’ capacity for self-rule, he was also a man of 
humanitarian principles. He was among the early critics of debt as a scourge 
on populations brought too quickly into the machinery of global capital. 
He was bothered especially by the conditions of the fellahin (agricultural 
labourers and peasants) in Palestine, and his collaboration with Strickland 
began when he asked the latter to go to Palestine ‘to study the economic 
position of the fellahin’ and to instruct district officers and the fellahin 
on the principle and practice of co-operative credit societies. In September 
1930, the two men met at Whitehall and discussed Strickland’s report on 
Palestine. Webb had meanwhile read Strickland’s essay ‘Co-operation 
in tropical dependencies’, which had been printed and circulated in the 
 8 Of the extant institutions that might provide a basis for effective community 
democracy, the Webbs held up municipal government, trade unions and co-operatives 
as organic institutions that might truly represent the people. Parliament, on the other 
hand, was ‘hypertrophied in its function’ and its popularly elected Commons constantly 
hampered by ‘its hereditary and arbitrarily selected House of Lords’ (S. Webb and B. Webb, 
A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain (1920), pp. 104–5).
252
Brave New World
Colonial Office in advance of the upcoming Colonial Office Conference.9 
During their meeting, Webb urged a follow-up mission for Strickland to 
tour Zanzibar and Tanganyika Territory and other east African territories. 
Webb then wrote to the various colonial governors and asked for their 
co-operation with Strickland’s study trips. His mission was to study the 
feasibility of a co-operative movement but also to advise on the drafting of 
laws that could determine its course.10
Strickland was expert on several important imperial subjects: rural debt, 
rural unrest and co-operative economics. These were interrelated themes 
for him, as they were for many colonial civil servants, missionaries and 
anthropologists in inter-war Africa who believed that development and 
improved welfare for colonial subjects was the only insurance against 
revolution. Strickland spoke and wrote on co-operation with authority and 
an almost evangelical zeal. He argued that a vibrant, global co-operative 
system would alleviate economic burdens on peasant producers and prevent 
the migration of populations into wage labour. He was relentless in his 
insistence that co-operation could only work if societies were overseen by 
European experts and safeguarded by laws that enabled a high degree of 
state control over African co-operative ventures.
As a result of his tours of Africa, Strickland went on to assist in drafting 
the Tanganyika Territory’s Co-operatives Ordinance, which became law in 
1932, and he was consulted by the Colonial Office on similar legislation 
throughout British Africa from 1931 to 1938.11 His handiwork can be seen 
in co-operatives legislation from the Gold Coast to Zanzibar, and its legacy 
carried over into the post-independence period as state-managed co-
operatives became central to the development of socialism in states like 
Tanzania and Zambia. The requirement for a high degree of state scrutiny 
of co-operative bookkeeping was often present in co-operative planning 
after independence, and this was partly the result of Strickland’s influence 
as he wrote the original laws.12  
Strickland argued that colonial governments had much to gain by making 
co-operative economics the cornerstone of rural development in Africa. 
First, African economic practice would over time become tied to Western 
 9 The National Archives of the UK: Public Record Office, CO 323/1071/14, ‘Report on 
co-operative methods by C. F. Strickland’.
 10 TNA: PRO, CO 323/1071/14, ‘Report on co-operative methods by C. F. Strickland’. 
 11 TNA: PRO, CO 691/118/10, ‘Co-operative marketing’. See also J. C. DeGraft-Johnson, 
African Experiment: Cooperative Agriculture and Banking in British West Africa (1958), pp. 
61–3.
 12 S. A. Quick, Humanism or Technocracy? Zambia’s Farming Co-operatives, 1965–72 
(Manchester, 1978). 
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consumers, providing a steady source of consumer goods for export and 
consequently an infusion of cash, and escape from usurious debt, among 
a struggling global peasantry. Second, the problem of social change and 
its potential for conjuring new and unpredictable political alliances – for 
example African nationalism – would be met with a new institution that 
could forge non-ethnic community ties in locations throughout the empire. 
Strickland would insist throughout the inter-war period that co-operatives 
could provide a valuable political education for Africans. Webb and the 
Fabians had long been convinced of this for Britons.
The Fabian co-operative Commonwealth
Co-operatives were central to Labour’s inter-war vision of democratic 
renewal and constitutional reform at home, and the co-operative movement 
of the nineteenth century, along with the trade union movement, held a 
sacred place in the Fabian mythology of working-class struggle. In 1920, 
the Fabian Society published Sidney and Beatrice Webb’s A Constitution 
for a Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain. The work surveyed the 
situation of socialist recruitment on the ground and elaborated the Fabian 
socialist vision for a ‘Co-operative Commonwealth of Tomorrow’, which, 
the Webbs claimed, was no Utopia but merely the likely endpoint of 
current ‘development towards a fully democratized community’.13 With the 
coming ‘Socialist Commonwealth’, Britons would witness the restoration 
of community-centred politics that the liberal parliamentary system had 
sacrificed and failed to improve upon with its national institutions. For 
the Webbs, the ‘neighbourhood’ presented the smallest unit of community. 
They argued that, in the early twentieth century, capitalism sought further 
to atomize the urban neighbourhoods that had grown up around industry 
and services during capital’s advance. In Durkheimian fashion they 
proposed that solidarity at the neighbourhood level had broken down. The 
lamentable result was the ‘Decay of Civic Patriotism’.14 For the Webbs, trade 
union and co-operative socialism promised to restore that lost community. 
Despite the nostalgia for an older form of community politics, the Webbs’ 
vision of the future embraced the industrial machinery of modernity. 
Modern systems of conveyance and communication were linchpins in 
the movement towards co-operation if it were ever to be global in scale. 
The Webbs were optimistic, since marketing and consumer co-operatives 
had developed to the point that they had their own ships for importing 
goods. Co-operation, which in its ideal was supposed to encourage 
 13 Webb and Webb, A Constitution, p. 102.
 14 Webb and Webb, A Constitution, p. 203.
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consumer-producer exchanges that restored the proximity between the two 
and the personal knowledge of seller and buyer, could instead be global. 
In the future, the Webbs believed, much industry and trade would be 
conducted by combinations of co-operatives that had all the trappings of 
modern industry – minus the intense profit motive. They wrote: ‘Recent 
developments have, however, discovered that Democracies of Consumers, 
far from being limited to the supply of their own members, may be found to 
be the one and only solution of international trade on Socialist principles, 
independent either of the capitalist importer or exporter, or both of them’.15
The co-operative movement already in force in Britain was seen by the 
Webbs as a beachhead in the campaign for a new socialist community.16 
Throughout her life, Beatrice explored institutions of custom or even recent 
social practice that provided material support networks between members. 
Voluntary, community-based assurances for material necessities dominated 
her political philosophy. In her 1910 study of the co-operative movement, 
she had placed the nucleus of ‘the Co-operative idea’ squarely in the context 
of English working-class history. She explained that the co-operative 
movement had its historic roots in Owenite socialism and the Rochdale 
weavers (many of whom were Chartists).17
By 1920, the Webbs claimed in their Constitution, the movement had 
brought 5–6% of the aggregate of British industry and services into co-
operative administration. Beatrice Webb had earlier pointed out the ‘state 
within a state’ that was emerging as a consequence of the federation of 
co-operatives. The Co-operative Union, which included 1,300 hundred 
societies and more than a million members, better represented the will of the 
people than any of the extant machinery of national politics.18  The coming 
socialist community would be one in which its constituent members were 
patriotic and active in local, municipal and national politics. Co-operatives 
and neighbourhood organizations were not a rejection of mass politics but a 
vehicle for what Fabians saw as a more authentic and egalitarian expression 
of the political will of the nation.19 The co-operative initiative was grassroots 
and democratic.
In the empire, though, a different vision of co-operation prevailed. 
The co-operative ideal that the Webbs promoted in England did not 
 15 Webb and Webb, A Constitution, pp. 252–4.
 16 B. Webb, The Co-operative Movement in Great Britain (4th edn., 1910). The original 
publication date was 1891.
 17 R. G. Gregory, Sidney Webb and East Africa: Labour’s Experiment with the Doctrine of 
Native Paramountcy (Berkeley, Calif., 1962), p. 88.
 18 B. Webb, Co-operative Movement, pp. 173–4.
 19 Webb and Webb, A Constitution, pp. 247–55.
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unproblematically apply to the African question of self-rule – an ideal 
Sidney espoused but believed should be deferred until the crash course in 
modern life had been completed by the empire’s ‘child’ subjects. Webb was 
far too paternalistic to view African co-operatives on the same scale and with 
the same optimism as a path toward the development of organic socialism 
among the ‘non-adult races’. If anything worthwhile were to develop from 
the co-operative movement in Africa, it would have to come through strict 
supervision by Europeans trained in co-operative methods and versed in the 
particular dilemmas of peasant production and consumption in Africa.20 
The role of the empire in the thought of Fabian socialists, and in their 
views as to the future of socialism on a national and global scale, was 
fraught with contradictions. On the one hand, empire was recognized as 
the result of a rapacious capitalism that sought the incorporation of the 
globe at all costs. On this count empire stood to be criticized. But travel 
throughout the empire had revealed to the Webbs the deficiencies of non-
Western practices of government and administration. When they perceived 
a lack of technocratic skill outside the West, they saw the colonial state and 
the potential for development in a way that fused high modernism with 
older paternalist assumptions about other races that underlay late Victorian 
and Edwardian ideas about empire as well as the theory of trusteeship.21 
With the exception of the Japanese, whom the Webbs admired for their 
administrative acumen as the singular exception in the Eastern world, non-
Western and non-white races struggled to attain civilization and required 
the tutelage of the West.22
Strickland’s political philosophy of co-operation
One thing that Strickland and Webb held in common in their ideal of co-
operation was that the co-operative would be a site of instruction, a place 
to shape the character. For the Webbs, always pushing for adult working 
men’s education, the co-operative would be a place for the daily instruction 
 20 S. Webb and B. Webb, ‘What is socialism part XVIII: the guardianship of the non-
adult races’, New Statesman, i (2 Aug. 1913), 525–6.
 21 The example of Kenya shows how Webb saw the mandate to govern as trustee, as well 
as his approach to political radicalism in the empire. In his correspondence with Edward 
Grigg, governor of Kenya, he acknowledged the conflict between settlers and Africans, the 
dilemmas of welfare provision and the troubling lack of African representation in Kenyan 
politics, but he also agreed that the influence of the Kikuyu Central Association under 
popular leaders like Harry Thuku created problems by stirring up anti-government opinion 
(though Webb stopped short of calling the KCA seditious) (London School of Economics, 
Passfield papers, 4/22 fo. 53, ‘Lord Passfield’s correspondence with colonial governors’).
 22 J. M. Winter, ‘The Webbs and the non-white world: a case of socialist racialism’, Journal 
of Contemporary History, ix (1974), 181–92.
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of practical socialism. For Strickland, the co-operative would teach 
politics, geography and economics to a global peasantry that, as a result 
of this tutelage, would safely navigate between the Scylla and Charybdis 
of benighted traditionalism and exploitative capitalism. For both the 
Webbs and Strickland, the political philosophy of co-operation was suited 
for populations in a condition of mobility and migration. The Webbs 
narrated the history of co-operation as an innovation of displaced people. 
Early modern enclosures had forced people into conditions where daily life 
required co-operative association. Strickland saw population growth and 
the reduction of non-enclosed land as the twin engines driving the social 
transformation common in India and east and central Africa. The causal 
relationship between displacement from land and radical social effects was 
an important concern for Strickland and the subject of several of his essays 
on the rural problem in India.23 He was very aware of the potential for 
rural unrest to disrupt government. He had witnessed the rise of Gandhi’s 
popularity in India and the movements to resist land and salt taxes. These, 
he feared, could ‘paralyze the government’, and he believed government to 
be the only thing preventing the Indian peasant’s complete exploitation by 
the moneylender and landlord.24 
Strickland viewed co-operation as a mode of economic participation 
that was relevant in nearly all conditions, including ‘Tropical Africa’. He 
wrote in 1933 that ‘Co-operation is capable of assuming a great variety 
of forms, there is no rigidity in its mechanism, and it is prima facie 
improbable that a method and a set of principles, which have been found 
to correspond to human needs, not only among white races, but also 
among the yellow, should be entirely irrelevant to the nature and needs 
of the black’.25 While co-operation was potentially applicable everywhere, 
the system could not simply emerge organically in every location. The 
guiding hand of European supervisors would be needed to ensure that 
co-operative principles were followed, since all too often in Africa, he 
suggested, the ‘native’ producers and consumer co-operatives strayed 
from the ethos of co-operation.
Co-operation, for Strickland, necessarily included an element of 
coercion. He rejected societies that had compulsory membership, but 
mutual coercion between members was the basis of a healthy co-operative. 
 23 C. F. Strickland, ‘Cooperation and the rural problem of India’, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, xliii (1929), 500–31; see also C. F. Strickland, ‘The Indian village and Indian 
unrest’, Foreign Affairs, x (1931), 70–80.
 24 Strickland, ‘Indian village’, p. 75.
 25 C. F. Strickland, ‘Co-operation for Africa’, Africa: Journal of the International African 
Institute, vi (1933), 17.
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Interlocking obligations and privileges constituted the co-operative ideal. 
In terms of reforming the character, there was no better mechanism than 
the weight of a neighbour’s opinion. What was more, every co-operative 
would operate only with the explicit permission of government in the form 
of registration. Once the registrar approved a co-operative by reviewing its 
constitution and by-laws, he reserved the right to revoke any licence that 
stepped out of line with its own by-law.26
While the Webbs saw the political potential to cure national institutional 
ills impeding democracy for Britain, for Strickland, co-operation held 
the promise of slowly introducing a new form of community rule that 
could potentially transcend the institutions, techniques and personnel 
of indirect rule in Africa. The hereditary systems of tribal rule through 
chiefs, he believed, suffered not only a problem of legitimacy but a severe 
limitation in their ability to meet the modern welfare needs of growing 
populations. In his most comprehensive work, Co-operation for Africa, 
Strickland summarized the British mode of rule, as opposed to that of 
other powers. As a consequence of social change in Africa, indirect rule 
faced its own crisis. Native institutions, he argued, had never been static 
and had always adapted to changing circumstances. However, before 
the introduction of European modes and scales of production, market 
economies and, especially, white settlement, change had always been 
gradual. The danger of the present situation was the pace of change – 
a conclusion that social anthropologists like Bronislaw Malinowski and 
Lucy Mair had reached through fieldwork and had been pressing on 
colonial officials since the mid 1920s.27 Co-operatives, as a hybrid between 
ancient community values and modern economics, could provide a 
smoother transition. As for the looming demands of colonial populations 
for welfare support from the trustee state, Strickland envisioned an 
expanding colonial bureaucracy that would enable even a small core of 
European administrators effectively to oversee the field. In his book, 
Strickland enumerated the likely demands on government, including 
sanitation, hospitals, roads and the administration of justice. He wrote: 
‘There will be propaganda in support of the health department, in favour 
of vaccination or inoculation, sanitary measures, curative measure … 
and in favour of the education department, for more schools or better 
schools, or different schools, for adult classes, technical classes, travelling 
 26 Strickland, ‘Co-operation for Africa’, p. 18.
 27 See B. Malinowski, ‘Practical anthropology’, Africa: Journal of the International 
African Institute, ii (1929), 22–38. See also, Lucy Mair’s review, and ringing endorsement, 
of Strickland’s Co-Operation for Africa in the same journal (L. P. Mair, Africa: Journal of the 
International African Institute, vi (1933), 342–4).
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shows, radio communication and rural vernacular libraries’.28 Strickland 
concluded that native councils and chiefs were simply not up to the 
task. The solution to the sheer burden of new needs and government 
responsibility could only be addressed by ‘the presentation of the co-
operative movement as the “core” of a welfare policy’. 
Strickland’s advocacy helped to put the co-operative movement at the 
front of debates on the administration of native affairs. Lord Lugard, the 
authority on indirect rule, was a supporter of Strickland’s arguments. In 
a preface to Strickland’s Co-operation for Africa, he praised the author’s 
revisions of indirect rule and encouraged all colonial governors to embrace 
them. Lugard maintained that there was no way, and indeed no reason, 
to restore pre-colonial systems. The object for the administration became, 
instead, ‘Adaptation’, whereby the administrator ‘bring[s] the New into 
harmony with the Old’. Lugard’s administrative model held that there 
was more to native administration than devolving all responsibility onto 
chiefs and elders. Rather, the skilful administrator now had to be expert 
in making things seem as though they originated in the community, even 
when they were novel experiments from the outside. Strickland’s co-
operative system fitted this standard, and Lugard wrote in support that 
‘The fundamental principle of the system is identical with that of Indirect 
Rule – which could be better named “Co-operative Rule”’.29 
Strickland’s arguments on co-operatives went beyond the question of 
economic uplift and welfare provision. Like the Webbs, he placed the co-
operative movement in the vanguard of future political development in 
Africa. In 1934, Strickland delivered a lecture on co-operation in Africa to 
a joint meeting of the Royal African Society and the Royal Society of the 
Arts. There he sought to convince the audience, which included former 
colonial governors, veteran administrators and African students in London, 
that co-operation would be a welcome aid in ‘native administration’. 
Under indirect rule, he reminded the audience, the locus of native 
authority should have been in the chiefs and native councils. However, it 
remained to be seen whether one day the councils would be true sovereign 
powers in Africa. It was certainly not the case at the moment everywhere. 
Sometimes, too, the native council was an invention of colonial rule and 
had secured little popular support. He told the academic audience that 
‘Wherever a Council, in the shape of a judicial court or an executive 
organ, is effectively functioning and really does meet a popular demand, 
 28 Mair, review of Co-operation for Africa, p. 37.
 29 Lord Lugard, ‘Introduction’, in C. F. Strickland, Co-operation for Africa (Oxford, 1933), 
pp. vii–viii.
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I should not for a moment wish to weaken it or trespass on its proper 
province’.30 The voluntary nature of the co-operative, however, would 
mean popular acceptance of the forms of arbitration that it provided. 
Soon, the co-operative society could shoulder some of the burden of 
administration and jurisprudence. Members would pledge in all cases ‘of 
a civil nature’ to seek arbitration in the co-operative before recourse to the 
native council or European court.31 Where native councils failed because 
people did not respect them in ‘sensitive questions of personal conduct, 
economic advantage, or social propriety’, the co-operative could work 
by being ‘a less mandatory and more voluntary system … for regulating 
and amending human conduct in such a sphere’.32 On working through 
the tribal structures, Strickland argued that the difference between tribal 
rule and co-operative rule was simple: people were members of a tribe 
by compulsion and members of a co-operative by choice. But such 
associations could not stand on their own without the help of expert 
guidance and legal protections that favoured African co-operators. The 
registrar could not be a local man, since his function was not local. He 
should be a European with a whole staff of African supervisors rooted in 
their local communities and serving as the interface between government 
and the societies themselves.33  
Co-operation in practice
The imperial field was not a blank page on which Strickland and the Webbs 
could write a new history of the co-operative movement. Co-operatives 
could co-exist with plantation land tenure systems throughout the empire, 
and under settler control they could be used as a collective bloc to prevent 
peasant cash crops from reaching markets. ‘Native co-operatives’ had been 
embraced by the state in India as an important pathway towards rural 
development and the alleviation of rural welfare needs. Social unrest was 
cited among the pressing problems in India in the late nineteenth century 
for which a programme of rural development was needed. This provided the 
background for Strickland’s position on co-operation as a political solution 
to rural unrest. One of the recommendations that came out of an 1895 
commission of enquiry established by the British government at Madras to 
explore continental European solutions to rural poverty and unrest was to 
‘find an Indian Raiffeisen’, the earliest German version of an agricultural 
 30 C. F. Strickland, ‘Supplement: the co-operative movement in Africa’, Journal of the 
Royal African Society, xxxiv (1935), 1–18, at p. 7.
 31 Strickland, ‘Supplement’, p. 13.
 32 Strickland, ‘Supplement’, p. 7.  
 33 Strickland, ‘Supplement’, pp. 17–18.
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producers’ co-operative.34 By the 1920s, the state structure of co-operative 
registration – whereby co-operatives would at once be widely promoted 
and heavily controlled – was in legal force in India. By the time of Labour’s 
victory in 1929, Strickland was already helping to guide the transplantation 
of the Punjab’s law to the Federated Malay States.
Much of the cash crop agriculture of British Africa between the wars 
was processed through white settler marketing co-operatives. These would 
maintain godowns where members could bring their cash crops for grading, 
storage and sale. In settler areas of the African empire, co-operatives were 
sometimes used as an economic weapon against Africans. Africans could not 
be members of the marketing co-operatives, and yet laws sometimes forced 
Africans to sell to them. Before Strickland’s tours, there was no mechanism 
for registering ‘native co-operatives’. Settlers also enjoyed the advantages 
of co-operative credit. Moreover, laws preserved white monopolies on the 
farming of tea and some grades of coffee. 
In Kenya, African farmers were not permitted by law to market their 
surplus through their own co-operative societies until 1945. The settlers’ 
legislative council would not pass Strickland’s law unless the Colonial Office 
redrafted it and exempted whites from some of the supervisory regulations. 
Sir Alan Pim’s 1935 report on the financial position of and taxation in Kenya 
Colony had recommended co-operation for its ability to inspire ‘the Natives 
with the idea of progress and the advantages to be obtained from more 
scientific methods of working’. As a follow up to Strickland’s tours, the 
Colonial Office had sponsored a trip by W. K. H. Campbell again to study 
the feasibility of co-operation, and he recommended ‘the establishment of 
a separate Co-operative Department for Kenya’, with a European registrar 
and African ‘field inspectors’.  
 34 H. H. Münkner, ‘One hundred years: Co-operative Credit Societies Act in India – a 
unique experience of legal social engineering’, paper presented at the 34th International 
Symposium of the European Faculty of Land Use and Development, Strasbourg, 28–29 
Oct. 2004, p. 3. Immediately after the Great War, the India government sent Strickland 
and two other civilian administrators on a tour of Europe to study co-operation. 
They produced three volumes (see C. F. Strickland, Studies in European Co-Operation 
(Lahore, 1922); O. Rothfield, Impressions of the Co-operative Movement in France and Italy 
(Bombay, 1920); and M. L. Darling, Some Aspects of Co-operation in Germany, Italy, and 
Ireland (Lahore, 1922)). The Punjabi administration was extraordinary in the empire 
and an exemplar of the trustee state. According to Clive Dewey, ‘The government of 
the Punjab presided over the most interventionist regime in India. In Bengal, Civilians 
[in Indian administration] were restricted to collecting revenue and trying lawsuits; the 
“nightwatchman state”. In the Punjab, they reached out into villages – encouraging 
cultivators, rescuing debtors, enlisting soldiers, and settling millions of migrants on the 
largest irrigation schemes in the world’ (C. Dewey, Anglo-Indian Attitudes: the Mind of the 
Indian Civil Service (1993), p. 201). 
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In northern Rhodesia, white settlers took early advantage of co-operative 
marketing in an effort to corner the internal and external maize markets. 
Africans were not permitted to join the settler co-op. As early as 1930, 
the settlers’ co-operative had secured exclusive contracts with two of the 
major mining companies to be grain suppliers to the Copper Belt, where 
mine managers rationed the grain to workers.35 The Plateau Tonga were 
sometimes able to circumvent the white co-op’s monopoly by selling their 
grain to traders who, in the midst of a global downturn in prices, would 
undercut the white farmers. The whites retaliated first by passing market 
control laws that brought the traders into their fold, and then they passed a 
law that formalized a subordinate position for Africans in the grain market. 
All African maize after 1935 would have to be surrendered to the Marketing 
Control Board, an innovation in state-managed production that would soon 
be the British standard for the Second World War. In turn, the Marketing 
Control Board would sell the grain and then return a maximum of a quarter 
of total profits (from the sale of settler and African maize combined) to 
the Tonga producers. Members of the legislative council – one European 
represented the African population’s interests during committee meetings 
– argued that the unrestrained Tonga production of maize threatened 
permanently to degrade the soil.36 The settlers’ scheme raised little protest 
in the Colonial Office, and there is no telling for certain how many settler 
farms were saved by the elimination of African competition from the 
market. After colonialism, independent Zambia, led by president Kenneth 
Kaunda, embraced state-managed co-operative production and marketing 
as the path towards rapid rural development, and co-operatives were key 
political institutions for the independent Zambian state. 
Likewise, in Uganda during the late colonial period, co-operatives 
became closely connected to anti-colonial struggles, and during the fight 
for independence they became popular political institutions, functioning 
as local government in the countryside. Throughout Uganda, co-operative 
cotton marketing societies, and the unions that brought them together 
at the district level, had large memberships, and their political role was 
especially strong in Bugisu. A survey of Ugandan farmers in 1966 showed 
the continued importance of co-operative societies to the Gisu. Nearly 
95% of farmers in Bugisu could identify the name of their district co-
operative union, and an equal number could name at least one officer at the 
district level. A total of 64% saw co-operatives as something separate from 
 35 K. P. Vickery, ‘Saving settlers: maize control in northern Rhodesia’, Journal of Southern 
African Studies, xi (1985), 212–34. 
 36 Vickery, ‘Saving settlers’, pp. 224–8.
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government, and 75% believed that they influenced it. The perception that 
real political power flowed through the co-operatives clearly had an effect 
on popular involvement in the societies. In Bugisu, 87% of farmers claimed 
regularly to attend local co-operative meetings, and of those more than half 
claimed that they always did so.37
Strickland’s African tours coincided with an explosion of ‘native co-
operatives’ in Britain’s League of Nations mandated territory, Tanganyika 
Territory, where a large number of mostly Chagga farmers co-operatively 
farmed and marketed coffee. In 1926 the Kilimanjaro Native Coffee Planters’ 
Association (KNPA) claimed 7,000 members, who co-operatively farmed 
around 2,800 acres of coffee trees, yielding eighty tons of coffee beans for 
market. The number of Kilimanjaro coffee farmers grew every year to the 
end of the Second World War, and the trend generally continued to the end 
of British rule and independence. In 1967, 65,000 farmers cultivated 35,000 
acres and produced almost 13,000 tons of coffee beans for market.38
Co-operatives were succeeding in Tanganyika Territory, but for whom? 
John Iliffe has argued that the Tanganyika government used state-controlled 
co-operatives as part of a strategy to destroy ‘the emerging African farmer-
traders in the coffee growing areas’.39 The KNPA was already marketing 
coffee a full five years before Strickland’s tours of Zanzibar and Tanganyika 
Territory and his drafting of co-operatives law for both, which shows 
that co-operation was already growing in popularity before the state’s 
involvement and that the state responded to this form of African self-help 
in an effort to control it. But the association was controversial in the politics 
of Kilimanjaro. One chief reportedly told the provincial officer, ‘These 
people’s influence is over the whole tribe whereas our influence is only in 
our own sections of the mountain’.40 The Tanganyikan governor Donald 
Cameron, a defender of the principle of indirect rule, asked his agricultural 
officers to discourage African cultivation of coffee, and the leader of the 
association, Joseph Merinyo, was jailed on (probably false) charges of fraud 
 37 The 1958 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Affairs of the Bugisu Co-operative 
Union Limited is quoted, alongside their 1966 survey findings, in Young, Sherman and Rose, 
Cooperatives and Development, pp. 76–8.
 38 The source for the figures is a table produced by the Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative 
Union and printed in S. F. Moore, Social Facts and Fabrications: ‘Customary Law’ on 
Kilimanjaro, 1880–1980 (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 120–1. The year 1967 was a significant one 
for the co-operative model as a programme of rural development. It was then that President 
Julius Nyere declared ujamaa, with its focus on co-operative farms, as the Tanzanian path to 
socialism. 
 39 J. Iliffe, The Emergence of African Capitalism (Minneapolis, Minn., 1983), p. 36.
 40 D. M. P. McCarthy, Colonial Bureaucracy and Creating Underdevelopment, 1919–40 
(Ames, Iowa, 1982), p. 97.
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in 1931.41 The government moved quickly with formal legislation, though, 
and in 1932 passed its first co-operatives law. The law, which Strickland 
helped to draft, mandated that all co-operatives had to be registered, and 
it reorganized coffee co-operation on Kilimanjaro into a central union 
connecting the numerous smaller societies. 
The drafting of this law had been an important part of Strickland’s African 
mission. His orders from Sidney Webb were to advise colonial governments 
on legislation to provide for ‘the constitution and control’ of co-operatives.42 
The control part was essential. The co-operatives legislation was intended to 
license extant co-operatives, and the law also set up a structure of registration 
and audit which required co-operators to pay fees in order to stay on a firm 
legal footing. A society could no longer exist purely as an association, since 
the co-operatives law required a fixed address and building for every co-
operative venture, and it was also mandated that the Co-operatives Bill be 
posted on the premises.43 Every year membership lists, subscription rates, 
dividends and society investments would be opened up to the registrar 
or his agents for inspection. The law created the position of co-operatives 
registrar, whose incumbent had to be part promoter and part overseer of all 
forms of co-operative enterprise. The registrar could, by decree, constitute 
or terminate any society. Native courts were also explicitly written out of 
the law as arbiters in any conflict among members, between societies or 
between societies and people with financial claims against them. Depending 
on one’s circumstances, this could turn out badly, since Strickland argued to 
the Colonial Office that debt imprisonment was a necessary enforcement 
tool for the state in dealing with co-operative societies or individuals. He 
sketched a scenario in which a co-operative lending society might lend to 
a co-operative member who, because of a village quarrel, might quit the 
society and default on his debt. Strickland’s co-operatives would have legal 
grounds to sue for the villager’s imprisonment ‘to deter other members from 
likewise breaking their promises’.44 Coercion, after all, was an important 
part of the civic bond forged in co-operatives. 
 41 A. Coulson, Tanzania: a Political Economy (Oxford, 1982), pp. 61–2.
 42 TNA: PRO, CO 691/118/10, ‘Co-operative marketing’. The subject of the Colonial Office 
discussion here was Strickland’s report on co-operation in Tanganyika Territory and draft 
legislation sent to the Colonial Office by the Tanganyika Territory governor. The legislation 
was mostly copied from the laws governing co-operatives in Ceylon and the Punjab.
 43 TNA: PRO, CO 691/118/10, ‘Co-operative marketing’.
 44 TNA: PRO, CO 323/1151/6, ‘Reports etc. by Mr. C.F. Strickland in regard to co-
operation and economic conditions in Palestine, Malaya, Zanzibar, and T.T.’ In ch. 3, ‘Co-
operation’ (para. 9), in his report on Zanzibar and the clove industry, Strickland cautions 
the Colonial Office to ignore recent protests against the use of imprisonment for debt. The 
scenario of village debt collection appears in his report on Palestine (para. 60).
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While membership increased every year, many Chagga small farmers thought 
they could do better selling locally outside the union, which additionally 
required a 2% cut of the sale of coffee. In 1934, an additional law, which became 
known as the ‘Chagga Rule’, was passed that effectively gave the Kilimanjaro 
Native Co-operative Union (KNCU) a monopoly on coffee marketing on the 
mountain, forcing all farmers to work under its auspices. Protests increased as 
people began to rally behind several lawsuits filed by Africans in the British 
courts to have the Chagga Rule dismissed. Chagga chiefs lent their political 
support to the rule and tried to reduce the impact of the protests by arresting 
the ringleaders. Finally, in 1937 the Tanganyikan high court dismissed the 
lawsuits, taking the path of least resistance with the chiefs and claiming that 
the individual plaintiffs did not have the right to file the lawsuits because of 
the principle of indirect rule. While the drafters of co-operatives law had been 
at pains to attach legal jurisdiction over African economic life in emerging 
co-operatives – as in the rules on arbitration and debt settlement that would 
be handled outside the native authority by a registrar – now the old call for 
the power of native courts over native affairs resurfaced. Indirect rule required 
that they work through the court of the Chagga council, which was obviously 
hostile as the council had just tried and jailed several protesters against the 
Chagga Rule.45 The protests, which the Fabian Colonial Bureau would later 
downplay in its assessments of the co-operative movement, were taken very 
seriously by the British authorities who flew Royal Air Force planes over the 
Moshi district and increased the police presence.46  In the end, at least thirteen 
Chagga protesters were exiled – which was the preferred method of the British 
colonial authority in dealing with political agitators – for ‘inciting members 
of the Chagga tribe to hold secret meetings in defiance of the Chiefs’ orders’.47
The story of the ‘coffee riots’ shows that the political aims of reformers to see 
co-operation emerge in African economic life could sometimes be subverted 
when people embraced them in large numbers. The Tanganyikan state was able 
to use co-operatives legislation to reaffirm the authority of the chiefs against 
what many feared had quickly become a dangerous political movement. 
Conclusion
Strickland only said of his meeting with Sidney Webb in 1930 that the 
latter had promised that ‘There will be more co-operation for Africa’.48 But 
 45 McCarthy, Colonial Bureaucracy, pp. 100–1.
 46 McCarthy, Colonial Bureaucracy, p. 102.
 47 McCarthy, Colonial Bureaucracy, p. 105.
 48 Fabian Colonial Bureau, Cooperation in the Colonies: a Report from a Special Committee 
to the Fabian Colonial Bureau (1945). The quotation appears in Strickland’s preface to the 
1945 Fabian report. 
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Webb left office abruptly in 1931 with the collapse of the short-lived Labour 
government, following on the heels of a Joint Commission of Parliament 
review of his White Paper on East African Native Policy that prevented 
it from ever becoming policy.49 For the future of the co-operative idea of 
empire, though, one of the most immediate necessities of the colonial state 
had been taken care of by 1931, as yet another stream of revenue for the 
state in fees and taxes had been created by the co-operatives laws. While in 
1932 east African governors had stalled the implementation of the Indian 
co-operative model, they agreed on the principles and throughout the 1930s 
co-operative laws came into force and African co-operatives continued 
to grow. But with the coming of the Second World War, the marketing 
infrastructures established by co-operatives law were replaced by war-time 
marketing boards. Indeed, the small incursions into rationalizing co-
operative production and marketing could be seen as a trial run in the 
implementation of this much vaster and more sophisticated scheme of 
market control for the war and its immediate aftermath.50
In 1945, with the coming of Labour to power again – this time with a 
broad agenda for welfare at home but also operating under the 1940 Colonial 
Welfare and Development Act – the issue of co-operation was once again 
taken up by the Fabians through their newly constituted policy group, the 
Fabian Colonial Bureau. The bureau, more than any other policy study 
group in the Fabian Society, had direct influence on the colonial policy 
of the Labour party after the Second World War.51 A special committee 
was assembled to allow the bureau to tackle the issue of co-operation 
for colonial development, proclaiming that the ‘planned development of 
cooperative association and enterprise … [should be] a fundamental part 
of colonial economic and social policy’.52 The committee brought together 
experts on co-operation, including Strickland, who also provided a preface 
when the society published its report. Most notable on the committee were 
Arthur Creech Jones, who within a year would be secretary of state for the 
colonies, and Leonard Woolf, the renowned socialist author and publisher 
who had by that point already published on Socialism and Co-operation and 
 49 In 1930 Webb submitted a White Paper on Native Policy in East Africa in which he 
re-affirmed the earl of Devonshire’s 1923 statement on trusteeship and defined it as native 
paramountcy, rejecting the dual policy of the colonial secretary who preceded Webb in 
office – Leopold Amery.
 50 For a west African example, see R. Alence, ‘Colonial government, social conflict and 
state involvement in Africa’s open economies: the origins of the Ghana Cocoa Marketing 
Board, 1939–46’, Journal of African History, xlii (2001), 397–416. 
 51 J. F. Milburn, ‘The Fabian Society and the British Labour party’, Western Political 
Quarterly, xi (1958), 336.
 52 Fabian Colonial Bureau, Co-Operation in the Colonies, p. 14.
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Co-operation and the Future of Industry. The Fabian bureau’s starting principles 
for development after the war demonstrated similar views of co-operation 
to those long preached by Strickland since his days as a civil servant in the 
Punjab. Once again, co-operation promised to yield economic results in the 
self-support of communities and to teach better living and better citizenship; 
and the economics of co-operation were connected to the political and social 
work that the permeation of the movement would allow to be performed. 
‘Co-operation is adult education in the business of life’, Strickland averred in 
his preface to the Fabian report. The committee embraced Strickland’s vision 
of co-operatives as providing a venue for a politics of the village community 
increasingly detached from tribal authority. The co-operative movement, if 
given real support by government, could even be the source of the political 
transition to self-rule that had been announced (and indefinitely deferred) 
in the theory of trusteeship. If a colony could sufficiently develop its ‘co-
operative economy’, the Fabian bureau argued, it would have taken ‘a long step 
forward … in its capacity for democratic self government’.53 Self-rule, though, 
meant deeply connected political and economic relationships that required 
the development of most African-held land into cash crops. Meanwhile the 
settler state in Kenya made it illegal for Africans to grow coffee.
The Fabian Colonial Bureau assessed the African co-operative movement 
and administration as a development strategy and measured it by the tons of 
bulk foodstuffs that co-operatives brought to market and by the intangible 
political effects that Strickland, and the Webbs, had predicted. The post-war 
Fabian Colonial Bureau affirmed Strickland’s arguments about co-operation 
and the need for paternalist intervention by the state. If co-operation was 
going to be a success in the post-war period, it must be undertaken with 
laws for registration designed to provide European oversight because the 
African co-operator, unlike the European, lacked the organizational skill 
and the capacity for efficient management because he did not have the same 
‘education, standing, and wealth’.54 
By 1945, when the Fabian Colonial Bureau took up the question of using 
co-operatives as a central aspect of development and welfare in the colonies, 
the lines separating national citizen from imperial subject were already being 
smoothed over by the emergent universal subject embodied in the consumer. 
Co-operatives were necessary for the colonies, the Fabians argued, because 
in the post-war system of international control of production, marketing 
and commodity pricing, the small producer and the consumer were left to 
fend for themselves, little fish in a pool of sharks. ‘In the general objective of 
 53 Fabian Colonial Bureau, Co-Operation in the Colonies, p. 15.
 54 Fabian Colonial Bureau, Co-Operation in the Colonies, p. 76.
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raising consumption levels and nutritional standards the need for adequate 
representation of consumers cannot be overstressed’, they wrote, adding 
that the development of co-operative consumer societies would be ‘of the 
utmost value’ to meet those ends.55
The Chagga embrace of co-operation seemed to reap the political rewards 
that the Fabians found encouraging. The Tanganyikan experiment reflected 
at least some of the aspirations of Strickland. The bureau noted that the 
introduction of co-operatives disturbed some chiefs, ‘who were afraid of 
the growth of a rival power calling for loyalty among their followers’, and 
that Lord Hailey’s African Survey found that the KNCU tried to undermine 
the power of at least one ‘unpopular chief ’. Beyond these incidents, co-
operatives were proving to be a vital force for introducing modern political 
sensibilities. The report praised the political contributions: 
It provides an excellent means of political education for the progressive young 
Chagga, teaching him how to conduct himself and to express his thoughts 
in a constitutional manner. To attend the meetings of its primary societies is 
illuminating. They are conducted on the basis of free speech, delivered with 
proper decorum, and enable the peasant to express himself on a variety of 
subjects concerned with his welfare, as, for example, crops and prices and the 
proper use of land. There can be little doubt that these meetings are largely 
responsible for the growth of a healthy public opinion on such matters. The 
Union is run by comparatively young and well-educated men and affords 
plenty of scope for the younger generation in the tribe to display their energies 
and abilities in an orderly and progressive manner.56 
The Fabians were too narrowly focused on the political effects of increased 
involvement in what was, for them, the privileged institution in the 
coming socialist Commonwealth. They failed to understand the tensions 
of imperial rule, and the African and settler interests that intersected with 
the co-operative movement in east Africa. They missed that in Tanganyika 
Territory the co-operative had at times been a decidedly unpopular venture 
for many small farmers, especially as the government increased registration 
and audit measures and imposed mandatory co-operative marketing. While 
the Fabians noted the ‘riots’ on Kilimanjaro, they failed to understand the 
political motivations or economic considerations of the more than 2,000 
Chagga farmers who were involved in the protests. Instead, they attributed 
the unrest, in part, to German government machinations in propaganda 
intended artificially to raise the market price for coffee coming from 
German settler plantations.
 55 Fabian Colonial Bureau, Co-Operation in the Colonies, p. 16.
 56 Fabian Colonial Bureau, Co-Operation in the Colonies, pp. 79–80.
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The Indian co-operative model transplanted to Africa was encouraged 
by the Colonial Office under Sidney Webb not only as a mechanism to 
assist African cultivators in the cash market and to ease rural debt but as 
a form of political supervision. This was fully in line with the tenets of 
trusteeship, which as a theory of statecraft seemed to turn every structural 
problem into a question of education. The instruction that co-operatives 
could provide was of the order, for instance, of translating the meaning of 
food disconnected from its place of origin. Co-operatives could speak the 
language of empire, in this case that of produce grading for retail. They 
required a training of attention on the aggregate desires of distant consumers 
as these were shaped by consumer tastes and calculations of price and 
quality. In this way they took part in the particular early twentieth-century 
forms of commodity movement that had developed global infrastructures 
for moving produce on wartime scales and schedules. Modern co-operation 
relied on the fantasy, promoted by the Fabians but also by many others then 
and since, that the neighbourhood could be reproduced on a global scale. 
It was usually the structural barriers to land and resources for Africans that 
got lost in translation, causing co-operative enthusiasts in government to 
read impediments to co-operation in the ‘African mind’ or in the resilience 
of superstition rather than in an imperial order based on the enclosure of 
available resources.57
 57 Webb’s White Paper on Native Policy, while never ratified, had at least attempted to 
bring land rights into a clear policy of trusteeship. He wrote in his White Paper that ‘the 
first essential is to remove finally from the native mind any feeling of insecurity in regard to 
his tribal lands; and to keep available for all the tribes land of such extent and character as 
will fully suffice for their actual and future needs’ (see Gregory, Sidney Webb and East Africa, 
pp. 108–13, for discussion of the White Paper on Native Policy). The joint commission 
blocked Webb’s statement from becoming law, and in east Africa settler land grabs increased 
throughout the 1940s and early 1950s to disastrous effect (see T. Kanogo, Squatters and the 
Roots of Mau Mau, 1905–63 (Athens, Ohio, 1987)). 
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After the First World War, Britain faced a number of challenges as it sought to 
adapt to domestic conditions of mass democracy while maintaining its position 
in the empire in the face of national independence movements. As politicians 
at home and abroad sought to legitimize their position, new efforts were 
made to conceptualize nationality and citizenship, with attempts to engage 
the public using mass media and greater emphasis on governing in the public 
interest.
Brave New World reappraises the domestic and imperial history of Britain in 
the inter-war period, investigating how ‘nation building’ was given renewed 
impetus by the upheavals of the First World War. The essays in this collection 
address how new technologies and approaches to governance were used to 
forge new national identities both at home and in the empire, covering a wide 
range of issues from the representation of empire on film to the convergence 
of politics and ‘star culture’.
The book is an invaluable resource for scholars of British social, political and 
imperial history, as well as being of interest to the general reader.
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